

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
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**THE
1ST
KING GEORGE'S OWN
GURKHA RIFLES
THE MALAUN REGIMENT.**



HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY KING GEORGE V.
COLONEL-IN-CHIEF OF THE REGIMENT.
1st January, 1906.

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


THE IST KING GEORGE'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES.

THE MALAUN REGIMENT.

"BHURTPORE."
"ALI WAL."
"SOBRAON."

"GIVENCHY, 1914."
"NEUVE CHAPELLE."
"YPRES, 1915."
"ST. JULIEN."
"FESTUBERT, 1915."
"LOOS."
"FRANCE AND
FLANDERS, 1914-15."



"AFGHANISTAN, 1878-80."
"PUNJAB FRONTIER."
"TIRAH."

"MEGIDDO."
"SHARON."
"PALESTINE, 1918."
"TIGRIS, 1916."
"KUT AL AMARA, 1917."
"BAGHDAD."
"MESOPOTAMIA, 1916-18."
"N.W. FRONTIER, INDIA, 1915, 17."

1815 — 1921.

BY
FRANCIS
F. LORRAINE PETRE, O.B.E.

1925
LONDON
ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION
WHITEHALL, S.W.

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DEDICATION

To the undying memory of those beloved members of our brotherhood who in the Great War and in the Third Afghan War "*fell asleep on the bed of Honour.*"

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL	EDMUND EMERSON BOUSEFIELD , attached from the 123rd Outram's Rifles.
MAJOR	CHARLES BLISS , C.I.E.
MAJOR	ARTHUR YOUNG .
CAPTAIN	THOMAS CAMPBELL BURKE .
CAPTAIN	REGINALD WALLACE GOPLAND , Indian Army Reserve of Officers.
CAPTAIN	WILFRED PLASSY CROOKSHANK .
CAPTAIN	BEAUCHAMP OSWALD DUFF .
CAPTAIN	COLIN HAY GIFFARD .
CAPTAIN	WALTER GREATWOOD , attached from the 123rd Outram's Rifles.
CAPTAIN	GILBERT STUART KENNEDY .
CAPTAIN	HENRY IRONSIDE MONEY .
CAPTAIN	HERBERT GRENDON POWERS , M.O.
LIEUTENANT	ARTHUR ALEXANDER HEYLAND , attached from the 5th Gurkha Rifles.
LIEUTENANT	REGINALD FREDERICK DESMOND PLUNKETT .
LIEUTENANT	LIONEL BICKERSTITH RUNDALL .
LIEUTENANT	GUY STANFORTH WEMYSS ST. GEORGE .
2ND LIEUTENANT	GORDON ALLISON .
2ND LIEUTENANT	BERNARD MOORE BLAKESTON , Indian Army Reserve of Officers.
2ND LIEUTENANT	GEORGE KING HICKS COCHRANE , Indian Army Reserve of Officers.
2ND LIEUTENANT	FERGUS LE FANU DOBBIN .
2ND LIEUTENANT	ERNEST DUDLEY FFRENCH .
2ND LIEUTENANT	STEPHEN GABRIEL FRY , Indian Army Reserve of Officers.
2ND LIEUTENANT	RICHARD SUMNER GAMBLE , Indian Army Reserve of Officers.
2ND LIEUTENANT	HARRY BENTLEY HERBERT , Indian Army Reserve of Officers.
2ND LIEUTENANT	CHRISTIAN BINGLEY PATTERSON , Indian Army Reserve of Officers and Indian (Imperial) Forest Service.
2ND LIEUTENANT	LOUIS VICTOR WEBB , Indian Army Reserve of Officers.
SUBADAR MAJOR	MAN SING THAPA .
SUBADAR	BIRIA GURUNG .
SUBADAR (A/S.M.)	HARKBIR LIMBU , I.D.S.M., attached from Burma Military Police.
SUBADAR	LALBIR THAPA .
SUBADAR	RANSARAN RANA .
SUBADAR	SUBLAL GHARTI .
SUBADAR	TULA GURUNG , attached from the 2/3rd Q.A.O. Gurkha Rifles.
JEMADAR	DALBAHADUR THAPA .
JEMADAR	HIRA GURUNG .
JEMADAR	JAGJIT GHARTI .
JEMADAR	MANDHOJ GURUNG .
JEMADAR	RANBIR THAPA .
JEMADAR	TIKARAM KUMAL .

"Then said he, 'I am going to my Father's. . . . My sword I give to him that shall succeed me in my Pilgrimage, and my courage and skill to him that can get it.' . . . And as he went down deeper, he said, 'Grave, where is thy Victory?' So he passed over, and all the trumpets sounded for him on the other side."

PREFACE

WHEN compared with the life of any of the older regiments of the British Army, that of the First, King George's Own, Gurkha Rifles is a short one, yet few of the existing regiments of the Indian Army are older, and still fewer recruit to-day men of the same races as those borne on their rolls a century ago.

Then, whereas in the case of British Regiments, documents are sure to exist that will furnish adequate records of their doings and achievements during the last two hundred years, it is unlikely that any general attempt was made to record the doings of Indian Regiments before the middle of last century.

Colonel George Young, who died while this History was in the Press, and who, at his death, was the oldest member of the Regiment, stated that it was during the time when he was adjutant—1868 to 1870—that Army Headquarters directed that a "Digest of Services" should be maintained by every unit of the army. Colonel Young stated that he had himself prepared the notes from which was compiled the "Digest of Services" of the First Goorkha Regiment (Light Infantry) from 1815 to 1870. When compiled, this record was forwarded to District Headquarters, and there formally approved of.

It is practically certain that the earlier pages of the Digest of Services of the First Battalion, now in the Record Box at Dharmasala, contain a duplicate copy of that record, and it is a significant fact that the account of the first thirty-five years of the life of the Regiment covers five and a quarter pages of foolscap in a large round hand.

What was contained in those few lines was probably all that was generally known of the regimental history till 1902, when there joined the Second Battalion 2nd Lieutenant Alan Latham, who set himself to collect materials for a fuller and more worthy record. For twelve years Latham worked, devoting all his spare time to the history; then the War intervened, and after it was over Major Latham, as he by that time was, was transferred to another unit.

In the meantime, in the years just preceding the War, the Regiment had begun to collect funds with which to celebrate its approaching centenary. Here again the War intervened, and when it was over the survivors unanimously decided that it was not a time for such a celebration as had been contemplated. It was decided that the funds that had been collected should be devoted to producing the History of the Regiment, and that it should be dedicated to the memory of those who had given their lives in the Great War. It was hoped that the numbers of the Non-Commissioned-Officers and men who died in the War might also have been included in the dedication, but unfortunately the records are not complete enough to admit of anything like an accurate total being arrived at; all that we know is that the death roll is well above seven hundred.

In order that a more detached and impartial atmosphere might be obtained, it was decided that the History should be written by some one who was in no way connected with the Regiment nor with anyone who had served in it. Application was made to the Royal United Service Institution, and through the kindness of Sir Arthur Leatham, the History Committee were put into touch with the late Mr. F. Loraine Petre who wrote the History, though he has not lived to see it published. The Committee deplore his death, and his help and advice have been greatly

missed during the final stages. The work he has put into the History cannot be measured by ordinary standards. The author of many Regimental Histories and other Military Works, he brought to this work a wide experience and seasoned judgment.

From 1814 to 1898 the narrative is chiefly based on Major Latham's *Brief History of The First Prince of Wales' Own Gurkha Rifles*.

During the early years of its life as a Regular Line Battalion of the Indian Army the Regiment suffered some very heavy losses in the transfer of some of its most efficient officers to other units. Campbell Claye Grant Ross, John Adam Tytler, V.C., and George Nicholas Channer, V.C., were all tried and valued officers who had made their reputations with the Regiment, and who were then specially selected for employment elsewhere.

The Regiment desire to thank :—

The India Office for permission to consult and use maps in the Record Office, and particularly Mr. Wright of the Record Office for his assistance.

The Royal United Service Institution for help and advice.

Mr. R. H. Hood, Superintendent of the T. & B. Estate for the map of the ground round Charpura.

Mrs. R. Dudley Rowe, daughter of the author, for her great kindness in completing the set of period uniform plates left unfinished owing to the death of Captain J. L. Barry.

The late Mr. C. W. Kennedy for his gift of the miniature of Colonel Charles Pratt Kennedy. Lieutenant-Colonel C. de W. Crookshank, M.P., author of *Prints of British Military Operations 1066-1868*, for permission to use the blocks of the *Assault of the Fortress of Bhurtpore*.

Mrs. C. S. McCausland for permission to reproduce the portrait of Lieutenant-General J. K. McCausland.

Lady Sale-Hill for permission to reproduce the miniature of Sir Rowley Sale Sale-Hill.

Mrs. W. L. Dundas for permission to reproduce the sketch of Goorkas of the Sabathoo Battalion.

Miss A. M. Gepp and Mr. H. H. Gepp for the use of the private letters of Lieutenant T. S. Gepp.

Messrs. W. & D. Downey, Ltd., for the use of an ivory miniature of His Majesty the King.

Mr. K. R. Wilson for his valuable advice and help throughout the stages of production and publication.

Finally the History Committee would like all readers to know that any information, relating to the Regiment or to those who have served in it, is valuable, especially papers relating to its earlier years. The Regiment has no portraits, and very little information of

Robert Ross—Charles O'Brien.

Hugh Troup—Horatio Thomas Tapp.

It appears to be widely believed that private letters can have no regimental interest, but they are always of use and are sometimes of enormous value, while outside the actual information they contain private letters have a human touch that is lacking in all official documents. The President of the History Committee in Dharmasala will welcome any letters or other papers and will always treat them with the greatest care.

September, 1925.

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N.W. FRONTIER OF INDIA

(In pocket at end of Volume)

SHEET I.	PESHAWAR
SHEET II.	KOHAT
SHEET III.	BANNU
SHEET IV.	FORT SANDEMAN

1ST KING GEORGE'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES

CHAPTER I

THE BIRTH OF THE REGIMENT AND ITS EARLY YEARS

1814-1825

IT is a curious anomaly that the British Indian Army draws a large and highly trusted force from Nepal, a state whose most determined resolve is to exclude the European and his ways from its territory. There is but one road to Katmandu which is, to a very limited extent, opened to Europeans, and, with the exception of this road and a very few miles round the capital, no living Englishman has visited any part of the country. We do not include the few shooting parties which, from Bareilly and the North of Oudh, have been permitted, with passes, to extend their operations for a few days or weeks into the jungles of the Terai beyond the British boundary. A century ago these people were our bitter enemies: to-day they are our faithful allies and friends who have shown their good-will, not only by their acquiescence in the recruiting of their subjects for the British Gurkha Regiments, but also on special occasions, notably in the Mutiny and the recent Great War, by giving assistance by their own forces.

In the distant past the inhabitants of Nepal were of Mongolian origin, but the population has been mixed with the Hindu invaders from the plains of India. From these are descended the Thakurs and Khas who stand at the top of the social ladder. Next below them come the Magars and Gurungs, Mongolians by descent, but admitted by the invaders to the Kshatriya caste. They are the pick of the fighting men.

Next to them come the aboriginal Limbus, Rais, and Sunwars—all these come within the appellation of Gurkhas. Below them again are the Newars of the Nepal Valley, the Lepchas, Bhutias, and Dhotials. At the very bottom of the ladder are the Tharus, a low caste who used to be reputed tree-dwellers of the Terai, in the atrocious climate of which they alone were immune from fever.

The Gurkha Regiments are recruited chiefly from the Thakurs, Khas, Magars, Gurungs, Limbus and Rais, with a few Newars.*

In the middle of the eighteenth century Prithwi Narain, whose name connotes his Hindu origin, was King of the Gurkhas established about Gorkha, on the Gandak River, some fifty


* The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th Gurkhas are Magars and Gurungs. The 7th and 10th are Limbus and Rais. The 9th are Khas.

or sixty miles west of Katmandu. These Gurkhas began pushing out in all directions, conquering the Newars of Katmandu, gradually extending their dominion far north-westwards to the Sutlej, and finally attempting to establish themselves in the plains south of their Himalayan abode. Here they came into contact with the British.

It is not necessary to describe the various provocations which finally induced the Marquis of Hastings to declare war on the Gurkhas in April 1814, a date which rendered it impossible to undertake serious military operations till the ensuing cold weather.

The total force, European and Indian, prepared for the invasion of Nepal was thirty thousand men with sixty guns, to which were added about twelve thousand more troops of Native Contingents and irregular forces.

Against these Nepal had only twelve thousand regulars and some local militia ; the latter, being mostly subjects of conquered states, were by no means too well disposed towards their conquerors.



The invading force was divided into four widely separated columns, a division of forces which was perhaps justified by the difficulties of the country, and by the certainty that the Nepalese had no General capable of repeating Bonaparte's campaign of 1796.

We need only concern ourselves with the operations of the western column, under General Ochterlony, which was to operate near the Sutlej in the hills west of Simla. The other columns were generally fearfully mismanaged, and incurred disasters which reflect anything but credit on their leaders.

Ochterlony's force of six thousand men, composed entirely of Native troops, set out from Ludhiana in the middle of October 1814 against Amar Sing Thapa, the Gurkha commander in those parts. By the end of the month it was at Plasi, at the foot of the hills within which was Amar Sing with his little force. The invaders' line of advance led over a succession of parallel ranges each well defended by stockaded and otherwise fortified posts. The first ridge, with the forts of Nalagarh and Taragarh, was taken by the 5th November.

The next range, with the Fort of Ramgarh, was turned, and Amar Sing, still holding Ramgarh with his right, fell back on the third ridge where his main stronghold was the Fort of Malaun, a name ever memorable in the annals of the 1st Gurkhas, the Malaun Regiment.

As Ochterlony advanced he had met with the most stubborn resistance from the Gurkhas. On one occasion a part of a reconnoitring force was cut off with a loss of one officer and ninety-five sepoys. Still he worked patiently on, though he had at one time serious doubts of success.

He next, on the 16th January 1815, sent a force to turn the Malaun Ridge from the south, and, marching along its farther side, to cut Amar Sing's communication with Bilaspur on the Sutlej, from which alone he now drew supplies. The operation was successful, and Amar Sing withdrew entirely to the Malaun position. The fort of Ratangarh, on the eastern slope of that ridge, was captured by the British. The small garrisons which Amar Sing had left in the forts of the Ramgarh Ridge were now gradually mopped up.

At this time, thanks to reinforcements, Ochterlony had seven thousand men, whilst Amar Sing had at no time more than a short three thousand.

Amar Sing now held the Malaun Ridge, stretching south by east from that fort to Surajgarh on a line of peaks, of which all but two were crowned by stockades. The two unfortified peaks were Byla and Deothal, the former being the nearest to Surajgarh, whilst Deothal was within a thousand yards of Malaun itself. The capture of one or both of these peaks would cut the Gurkha chain of defences in two.

In the night of the 14th-15th April, five columns were sent by Ochterlony to converge on these peaks. The three first seized Byla unopposed, the other two encountered a fierce resistance on Deothal, and only after severe fighting during the whole of the 15th established themselves on the top, where they fortified themselves as best they might. The position was vital to the Gurkhas, and the expected counter-attack duly came on the 16th.

The British had two battalions and two field guns on the captured peak when Bhagtia Thapa, Amar Sing's chosen lieutenant, advanced against it from all sides with two thousand Gurkhas, the greater part of the force Amar Sing still had. The attack was carried out with wonderful intrepidity, and repeated several times; but against the steady fire of Ochterlony's troops, who were no longer handicapped by having to fight whilst climbing unaccustomed heights, it failed. The Gurkhas were repulsed with a loss of about five hundred, including the gallant Bhagtia Thapa, killed as he led the final desperate charge. How severe was the fighting is shown by the British loss of two officers and fifty-nine men killed, five officers and two hundred and eighty-eight men wounded. The remains of the Gurkha forces were now collected in Malaun, after abandoning the other forts, and Ochterlony drew close his lines of investment and made arrangements for carrying heavy artillery on to Deothal.

Amar Sing's chiefs, discouraged by their losses and by the news of the British capture of Almora, the capital of Kumaon, began to press him to surrender on the best terms obtainable for himself and his son Ranjur Sing, now besieged in *Jaihak* * by the British column from Dehra Dun. They began to leave him, and many of their men came over to the British before the end of the siege.

Amar Sing still placed his confidence in the approaching rains which might be expected to put a stop to Ochterlony's activities for the time. The chiefs gradually deserted, leaving Amar Sing to retire into the Malaun Fort, which was all he could hold with the two hundred men left to him. There he held on till the British bombardment had lasted three days. Then he surrendered on honourable terms for himself and Ranjur Sing, both being allowed to retire to Central Nepal. An agreement was signed under which the Gurkha boundary on the west was to be the Kali or Sarda River, as it still is.

All this account of the Gurkha War may seem at first sight hardly relevant to the history of a regiment which did not exist till just before the surrender of Amar Sing and his son; in reality it is not so, for it was from the remnants of the forces which had opposed so gallant a resistance to the British that the first Gurkha Regiments in the British service were constituted.

As early as the 18th December 1814 we find a letter from Mr. Adam, Secretary to Government, authorizing General Ochterlony to raise irregular forces in the country which he was invading. Of these irregular forces, which were also authorized for the other columns, we find the following account in James Baillie Fraser's *Journal of a Tour through the Himalaya*

* *Jaihak* was a Gurkha stronghold near Nahan, a few miles north by west of it. It was *not* Jutogh, as one is at first inclined to suppose.

Mountains. Fraser was with the Dehra Dun column. He says that, about the time of the evacuation of Kalunga (November 1814), important landholders began to come over to us and bring supplies, etc. The British began to feel the want of means of harassing the enemy by cutting off small bodies, and also for guarding convoys, protecting friendly districts, and other similar services. These duties were too much for the regular troops. "This gave rise to the measure of forming a light irregular corps, to be raised chiefly among the highlanders of these friendly districts, the old soldiers and dependants of the ex-Rajas, to whom arms were distributed and native officers attached, chiefly their countrymen. They were found useful, and the levies grew and formed a temporary addition to the army, easily raised, soon reducible; and the species of straggling warfare that was necessarily pursued gave considerable scope for their services, which, though not to be much relied on in cases of importance and danger, were in many cases very desirable."

All sorts of people—Mewatis, Sikhs, Pathans and local men—were taken into these irregular forces which, with the Dehra Dun column, presently had a strength of about seven thousand men.

As Gurkha fortresses were taken, their garrisons also were permitted to join. Fraser gives as an instance the Fort of Choupal, the garrison of which supplied a contingent of about one hundred men, which was doubled by deserters from Jaithak and other places.

The same process was followed in Ochterlony's column. In this direction the officer most concerned in the raising of the irregular forces was Lieutenant Robert Ross, of the 6th Native Infantry. He found himself at the head of some two thousand troops of the friendly Hindur Raja and a number of so-called "*Nussuree*" * Gurkhas, the latter representing portions of the Gurkha garrisons of forts captured, and deserters, or followers of the chiefs who left Amar Sing.

On the 21st November 1814, Lieut.-Colonel Fagan, the Adjutant-General, wrote to Ochterlony :—

"The Commander-in-Chief approves of your having assured the Subadar and Gurkha prisoners of service at the rate of pay received from their own Government under the prudent precautions by which that assurance was accompanied. His Excellency was likewise happy to observe the desire evinced by the Subadar to accompany you, which you very properly declined acquiescing in." †

That the Nasiri Gurkhas were already serving the British before the capitulation of Amar Sing Thapa is shown by a letter from Ochterlony, dated 17th April 1815, in which he says : "three hundred of the Hindoor Raja's troops, three hundred of the Nassuree Gurkhas . . . marched from the Village of Pungal."

Writing again to Fagan on the 8th May 1815, he says :—

"On the 3rd, Lieutenant Ross, with the Nusseerees unemployed in the business of stockading, took up a post under our advanced positions and a little in front of our irregular redoubt."

* The term "*Nusseree*" is used in contemporary correspondence without explanation. Apparently it is based on the Hindustani word "*Nasir*," an assistant, defender, or friend. Looking to the account above given of the origin of the irregular forces, it seems quite natural to describe them as "*Nasiris*" or "*Friendlies*."

† This letter is printed at p. 230 of the Nepal papers. The letters of the 7th and 10th November, to which it is a reply, are not printed, and their tenor must be inferred from the reply.

He encloses a copy of his instructions to Ross which prescribe that officer's objectives as :—

- (1) to establish a post as near as possible to the enemy ;
- (2) by this to open a short and safe route to those wishing to come over from the enemy ;
- (3) to watch closely for negligence on the part of the enemy, affording an opportunity to attack the "battered redoubt."

The establishment of the Nasiris was noted as very important, and Ross was told that, if he saw fit to attack, he would be supported by Colonel Thompson with three hundred regulars.

Ochterlony also encloses Ross's report on his action in accordance with these instructions. It says that he had been negotiating with the Gurkha commander of the "battered fort," who had agreed to abstain from firing when Ross should advance. The advance was made at 9 p.m. on the 3rd May, the enemy retired as arranged, and Ross occupied the fort. Then, on being beckoned to, the Gurkhas came over and passed to the British rear. Ross then went on and occupied a second redoubt which commanded the Malaun water supply.

A Governor-General's Order of the 21st May (after the surrender) says :—

"Most laudable exertions, no less than distinguished courage, marked the important services of Lieutenant Ross of the 6th and Lieutenant Murray of the 1st in the difficult situations for which they were selected by Major-General Ochterlony."

Meanwhile it had been decided at Head-quarters to constitute three Regiments from the elements thus available.

The Governor-General's Order of the 24th April 1815, directing the constitution of these three regiments is not now traceable at Simla, but the following extracts from a letter from the Governor-General in Council to the Directors of the East India Company, dated 7th October 1815, and the Commander-in-Chief's orders of the 27th July 1815, show clearly its purport, and were no doubt mere copies of parts of it.

Extract from letter from Bengal, dated 7th October 1815, received by Court of Directors of the East India Company.

"203. The Right Hon. the Governor-General having determined to embody and form into Battalions, for the service of the conquered territories in the hills, the Goorkah troops who came over to the British service during the course of the Western campaign, and having issued the necessary instructions to that effect to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, we published in General Orders the following establishment of those corps as prescribed by the Governor-General, together with the Regulations for their formation and organization.

His Excellency the Governor-General having also determined and ordered that a local corps should be raised and formed for the service of the province of Kemaon, we published in General Orders the establishment of that corps as prescribed by His Excellency, viz. :—

204. That the Nusseree Goorkahs and those serving under Lieutenant Young at Nahan be formed into three battalions of eight companies, and each company of the strength hereafter detailed :—

The Battalions to be numbered and named as follows :—

205. The Nusseree Goorkah to be formed into two Battalions, and to be denominated the 1st and 2nd Nusseree Battalions. The Goorkahs under Lieutenant Young to form a Third Battalion and to be denominated the Sirmoor Battalion.

206. The establishment of the Kemaon Battalion to consist also of eight companies each of the same strength and establishment in every respect to that hereafter fixed for the Nusseree and Sirmoor battalions, and to be composed of the Goorkah corps late under the command of Soubah Jyekishen, of natives of Kemaon, and other corps of hillmen.

ESTABLISHMENTS.

One European officer (Captain or Lieutenant) to command, with the full Batta of the next superior rank, in addition to all other regimental allowances.

One European Adjutant with allowances and office establishment the same as in the local corps, viz. : Rs. 132.

One Assistant Surgeon										Regimental Allowances		
										Rs.	a.	p.
1	Sergeant-Major *	55	5	2
1	Quartermaster-Sergeant *	49	5	2
1	Drill Havildar	5	5	0
1	Drill Naick	2	8	0
1	Bugle Major	8	0	0
2	Native Doctors at Rs. 15	30	0	0

ONE COMPANY.

										Rs.		Rs.
1	Subadar	60	.	60
4	Jemadars	20	.	80
8	Havildars	8	.	64
8	Naicks	7	.	56
120	Sepoys.	5.8	.	610
1	Pay Havildar (non-effective)	5	.	5
<hr/>												
141												Rs. 875

										Rs.		Rs.
16	Pippa wallah †	4	.	64
3	Musicians or Buglers	4	.	12
2	Water-carriers	4	.	8
2	Smiths	5	.	10
1	Bellows man	4	.	4
<hr/>												
												Rs. 98

										Rs.		
Allowance to Commanding Officer for iron, steel, charcoal, and for repairs of arms and accoutrements										.	.	150
Do. do. Guides and Hircarrahs										.	.	150
Do. do. Adjutant for targets										.	.	45

* Europeans.

† Pippa Wallahs or peepas were camp followers who performed fatigue duties, such as pitching or striking camp, etc., and other menial duties uncongenial to the fighting soldier.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF A BATTALION.

	Rs.	a.	Rs.	a.
1 Mistri smith			7	0
1 Mate carpenter			7	8
1 Workman carpenter			5	0
2 Chuckdars	4	8	9	0
2 Secligars	5	8	11	0
1 Persian moonshi			30	0
1 Mutsuddie (hill-man)			20	0

207. The following rates of off-reckoning were fixed by his Lordship for the different ranks of the Nusseree, Sirmoor, and Kemaon Battalions, being the same as were established for the corps of Hill Rangers under this presidency.

	Rs.	a.
Subadars.	8	0
Jemadars	3	0
Havildars	1	0
Naick	1	0
Sepoys	0	8

208. The surplus of these off-reckonings are to be thrown into the General Fund conformably with the existing Regulations. His Lordship considered it proper that the Assistant Surgeons attached to the Nusseree, Sirmoor and Kemaon Battalions should be permitted to draw medical allowance at the rate of sonat rupees 22.8.0 per mensem for every hundred men 'present and fit for duty,' and that no stoppages should be made for men of these corps on account of medical aid provided for them.

209. Any number of Goorkahs, Nusserees or those under Lieutenant Young that may remain in excess to the beforementioned establishment to be formed into supplementary "putties" of the following strength:—

- 1 Jemadar.
- 2 Havildars.
- 2 Naicks.
- 25 Sepoys.

From which casualties and vacancies are to be filled up to complete the regular companies.

210. The General Orders by the Governor-General in Council of 15th July 1811 attaching bazars to corps have been extended by His Lordship to the Nusseree, Sirmoor, and Kemaon Battalions under the provisions established by those regulations.

211. The Governor-General was pleased to authorize and sanction the continuance of the denomination of Soubah and the allowance annexed to it in favour of four Native Officers serving with the Nusseree Battalion who had held this advanced rank in the Goorkah service, conformably to the tenor of the engagement entered into with those Native Officers.

212. The rank of Subadar is still to be considered as the highest to which a Native can attain in the Nusseree or other Goorkah Battalions, and on the death or resignation of any or all of the officers who have been confirmed as Soubahs that rank is to be discontinued.

213. The Right Honourable the Governor-General was pleased to make the following appointments to the command of the Nusseree and Sirmoor Battalions:—

Lieutenant Ross, of the 2nd Battalion 6th Native Infantry, to command 1st Nusseree Battalion.

Lieutenant J. Macharg, of the 2nd Battalion 6th Native Infantry, to command 2nd Nusseree Battalion.

Lieutenant F. Young, of the 2nd Battalion 13th Native Infantry, to command the Sirmoor Battalion.

Lieutenant Sir Robert Colquhoun, of the 1st Battalion 22nd Native Infantry, to command the Kemaon Battalion."

The orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief to General Ochterlony were as follows :—

"GENERAL ORDERS BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Head-quarters, Futti Ghur, 27th July 1815.

Major-General Ochterlony will be pleased to form the whole of the Goorkas who came over during the late Campaign to the Westward, both Nusserees and those under Lieutenant F. Young, into three Battalions of the strength and composition detailed in the instructions which have been transmitted to the Major-General.

The uniform of the Nusseree and Sirmoor Battalions to be a close green jacket without facings, red cuffs and collar and trimmings, blue loose trousers, and a bonnet, the whole according to a description which has been furnished to Major-General Ochterlony.

The clothing to be furnished by regular indents on the Agent of the 1st Division Army clothing at Futti Ghur. These indents to be forwarded without delay by Commandants of Battalions in the manner directed by the Regulations.

The men are to supply themselves with the trousers and bonnets, under the superintendence and direction of Commanding Officers, and according to the prescribed patterns.

The Nusseree and Sirmoor Battalions are to be armed with Musquets until a sufficient number of Fuzils can be obtained. Each man to retain and wear his kookrey in a leather waist-belt of the pattern which has been approved.

Indents for arms and accoutrements required to complete the Corps to be sent to the nearest Magazines, whence they are to be supplied without delay.

The following will be the distribution of the Nusseree and Sirmoor Battalions :—

The 1st Nusseree Battalion to have its Head-quarters at Subatoo.

The 2nd at Malaun, and the Sirmoor Battalion at Nahan or Jyetuck.

Major-General Ochterlony will regulate the outposts to be occupied from, and dependent on the above stations, as well as the strength of the detachments, according to local circumstances and his own discretion.

The undermentioned Officers are appointed Adjutants to the Nusseree, Sirmoor and Kumaon Battalions :—

Lieutenant J. Nicolson, 2nd Battalion 1st Native Infantry, to the 1st Nusseree Battalion.

When the Battalions are formed, formation Returns to be transmitted to the Adjutant-General's office."

We are really only concerned with the 1st Nasiri Battalion which, after several changes of name and status, now exists as the subject of this History of the "1st King George's Own Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment)." The 2nd Nusseree Battalion ceased to exist in 1829.

The Sirmoor Battalion is now the 2nd King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles).

Though the 1st Nasiri Battalion may be taken to date from the 24th April 1815, the date of the G.G.O. sanctioning it, it could hardly have been actually organized till some months later, so that it was not in active existence as a battalion before the capitulation of Malaun on the 15th May. Nevertheless, as we have already shown, Nasiri Gurkhas, under Lieutenant Ross, the future commander of the Battalion, were already engaged against their compatriots and future comrades at the beginning of May.

The numbers of the new 1st Nasiri Battalion were constituted by men who joined the British service after or before Amar Sing's surrender. One batch, no doubt, was the body which came over to Lieutenant Ross on the night of 3rd May. The capitulation was signed on the 21st May 1815 by Ochterlony for the British, and by Amar Sing for the Nepalese.

The British General, "in consideration of the bravery, skill and fidelity with which he had defended the country entrusted to his charge," agreed that Amar Sing should march out with his arms, accoutrements, colours, two guns, and all his personal property. He was allowed to take with him the troops he had in Rajgarh. Similar terms were granted to Ranjur Sing in respect of Jaithak, but he was only allowed one gun and two hundred men, besides about three hundred unarmed followers. Father and son were to join where they might wish on the road, and were to march via Thanesar, Hardwar, and Najibabad to beyond the agreed new Western boundary of Nepal, the Kali or Sarda River.

Article 5 of the capitulation is as follows :—

"All the troops in the service of Nepal, with the exception of those granted to the personal honour of the Kajeas Ummer Sing and Ranjur Sing, will be at liberty to enter into the service of the British Government, if agreeable to themselves and the British Government chooses to accept their services, and those who are not employed will be maintained on a specific allowance by the British Government till peace is concluded between the two States."

On the same day Ochterlony writes to the Adjutant-General :—

"I have directed two hundred and fifty sepoy of the 2nd Battalion of the 6th, under the orders of Lieutenant Ross, with the Intelligence Department, to accompany the Kajea to Thanesar, from whence he will proceed to Hardwar via Saharanpore, where the detachment can be relieved if His Excellency should deem it proper." *

This seems to show that the 1st Nasiri Battalion was not organized at this time ; had it been, its commandant would not have been sent off in command of the detachment of his regular regiment. Looking to the date (27th July 1815) of the Commander-in-Chief's orders issued in pursuance of the decision of the 24th April, it seems clear that the organization of the new regiment could only have begun from the end of July or beginning of August. It is only formally that the Regiment can date its birth from the 24th April, the date of the Governor-General's missing order or letter.

The British Officers and N.C.O.'s of these irregular Battalions, it will be seen, were at first only the following : (1) Commandant ; (2) Adjutant ; (3) Assistant-Surgeon ; (4) Sergeant-Major ; (5) Quartermaster-Sergeant. It is not till 1826 that a Second-in-Command appears on the establishment.

It is clear, from what has been said above, and from the constant mention of him in

* The extracts and abstracts above quoted are mostly from Vol. I of the published papers regarding the administration of the Marquis of Hastings (*Nepal Papers*).

despatches, that Lieutenant Ross had gained the full confidence of Ochterlony, and it is not surprising to find him selected for the command of the 1st Nasiri Battalion, the new battalion formed from part of the irregular corps which he had himself raised.

Lieutenant James Nicholson, of the 1st Bengal Native Infantry, was appointed the first Adjutant.

The Head-quarters of the new battalion were to be Sabathu, a Gurkha fort surrendered along with Malaun, Jaithak, and other places. Nevertheless, it was cantoned in Ajmere till 1816, when it removed to Sabathu, where it remained till 1843. It was not engaged in the renewed Gurkha War of 1816, the scene of which was farther East on the Gorakhpur and Purneah frontier, and on the direct road from Segowli to Katmandu. The Gurkha Kingdom had put up a splendid fight against the British, but once the treaty of Segowli was executed the peace was more than honourably observed by the Nepalese. The Marquis of Hastings had displayed excellent diplomacy by exacting harsher terms than were necessary, and then modifying them, after they had been accepted, by returning to Nepal a part of the coveted Terai.

The next notable point in the history of the Gurkha Regiments appears in the following :—

“GENERAL ORDERS ISSUED BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Head-quarters, Calcutta, 6th May 1823.

GENERAL ORDERS BY THE HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

Fort William, 2nd May 1823.

No. 8 of 1823. It being deemed essential to the Order and regularity of the several departments, as well as just and equitable in itself, to place the several Corps of Local or Provincial troops, each on one uniform scale or proportion with regard to rank, emoluments and establishments with reference to the importance of their respective duties, the Governor-General in Council directs that the following Rules be established, in place of those now in force, respecting all the Irregular Troops serving under this Presidency :—

LOCAL INFANTRY.

1. That the 14 battalions named in the margin be declared “ Local Battalions ” raised for the service and defence of the Provinces or districts in which they were formed, or elsewhere on emergency, and liable to active service in the field ; that they have rank and precedence next after the troops of the Line, and be considered to be entitled to the benefits of the Invalid Pension Establishment under regulations to be issued separately ; in consequence of which they are to pay Stoppages when sick in hospital according to the rules and rates laid down in Section XXIII Appendix Medical Regulations, excepting the Bencoolen Local Battalion, which from its situation beyond sea, is exempted from Stoppages.

2. The pay of all Local Infantry will prospectively be as follows, excepting the Bencoolen Battalion, which will continue to enjoy all the pecuniary advantages of a Corps of the Line, viz. :—

- 2 Ramghur Local Battalion.
- 3 Bhaugulpore Hill Rangers.
- 4 Dinagepore Local Bn.
- 5 Chumparun Lt. Infantry.
- 6 1st Nusseri (Gorka) Bn.
- 7 2nd ditto.
- 8 Sirmoor ditto.
- 10 Rungpore Lt. Infantry.
- 11 Gorukpore Lt. Infantry.
- 12 Rampoorah Local Bn.
- (1) Calcutta Native Militia.
- In the Civil Dept. (9) Kemaon Bn.
- 13 Bencoolen Local Bn.
- 14 Mhairwara ditto.

PAY.

										Rs.	a.
Subadar	30	0
Jemadar	15	0
Havildar	10	0
Naick	8	0
Native Drummer	6	0
Sepoy	5	8

All Orphan School or Christian Drummers will be transferred to Corps of the Line, excepting those with the Bencoolen Battalion, under orders from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

3. Full Batta is only allowed to Local Infantry and their Establishments when on Actual Service with Troops of the Line, and for the numbers only so employed; viz. :—

F.B.

										Rs.	a.
Subadar	15	0
Jemadar	7	8
Havildar	4	0
Naick	4	0
Native Drummer	2	0
Sepoy	1	8

In all cases the Certificates prescribed in G.O.V.P. of the 12th May 1815 (Sect. 141, Chap. IX, last Code) shall be annexed to the Abstracts to authorize the payment of half or full Batta to Local troops and their Establishments.

5. The several ranks of Native Commandant, Soobah, Native Adjutant, Subadar-Major, and Colour-Havildar are prospectively abolished in the Corps of Local Infantry, on the demise, promotion or retirement of those now holding those ranks, the two latter being distinctive privileges applicable only to Corps of the Line, except in cases of extraordinary bravery or good conduct in the field, which can be specially brought to the notice of Government, through the Commander-in-Chief.

6. The Establishment of each Company of Local Infantry to be in the proportion of 1 Subadar, 1 Jemadar,* 2 Native Drummers, and generally 1 Havildar and 1 Naick to every 16 Privates which may be ordered for each Company—from 80 the Regular Establishment, as far as 100 on Emergency. The annexed Abstract No. 1 shows the number of Companies, Effective Strength, Staff and Establishment of each Local Battalion, with the rates of Pay prospectively assigned to each.

7. The Staff of all Local Battalions to be generally as follows, with reference however to their aggregate strength; for instance, Corps of four or six Companies are not entitled to a Drill Naick or Fife-Major, but only to a Drill-Havildar and Drum-Major, and one Native Doctor instead of two; viz. :—

* Except the mixed Corps, as the Bhagulpoor and Mhairwara Battalion, which will continue at 2 Jemadars a Company.

[illegible]

N.B.—A Second-in-Command is continued to the Rungpoor and Mhairwara Battalions as a temporary measure.*

8. The Commandant of each Local Battalion shall be entitled to the following Allowances : viz. :—

His Annual proportion of Compensation in lieu of Off-Reckonings.	
The Batta of the next Superior Rank.	Rs.
For Guides and Hurkarus when so entitled	150
Horse Allowance in all situations	30
Stationery ditto ditto ditto	30
For Repairs of Arms and Accoutrements, including Petty Stores, Butts and Targets, etc., per Company	25
For Repairs of Camp Equipage, etc., as directed in G.O.G.G. 27th December last.	
For 2 Carts or Hackeries for Spare Arms and Accoutrements when marching only each	30
The separate Allowances heretofore drawn for Petty Stores, Butts and Targets, etc., are abolished in Local Corps, being consolidated in the above.	

9. The Adjutants of Local Battalions shall, from the 1st prox., draw the following Allowances : viz. :—

	Rs.
Staff Pay per diem, Rs. 2	62
Writer	30
Stationery, Candles, Books, etc.	20
Office Tent or Quarters	30
Horse Allowance	30
	<hr/> Rs. 172

And in all Local Corps in which a Mess is regularly certified to exist, the reduced Mess Allowance of 60 Rupees per mensem to be drawn by the Adjutant.

* This shows that there was then no Second-in-Command of the Nasiris Battalions.

10. The Medical Officer in charge of each Local Battalion will draw a Medicine Allowance of 4 Sonat Annas per man, or 25 Rupees per one hundred men monthly, for the whole of the fighting men, officers and Staff. He will conform in every respect to the Rules laid down for the Establishment, management and attendance of Hospitals in Native Corps of the Line—Doolies and Bearers, in Cantonments or Marching, will be provided as usual by the Commissariat.

11. The following Scale of Quartermaster's and other Establishments, with their several rates of pay and Batta, is laid down for all Local Battalions (with exception to the Bencoolen Corps, whose Allowances are equal to the Line) from the 1st prox., when all in excess thereto will be finally struck off; ample compensation being provided for the expense of the Forge and other Duties of a Contingent nature in the increased scale of Allowances which will henceforward be applicable to the Rajpootana and Hill Corps, equally with the other Local Battalions; viz. :—

		Pay	H.B.	F.B.
	Staff 1 Sircar at	15/-	2/8	5/-
	2 Native Doctors at	15/-	2/8	5/-
	1 Tindal at	7/8	1/-	2/-
Subject to the foregoing rules regarding half or full Batta.	1 Lascar per 2 Companies in Cantonments	4/12	-/8	1/-
	1 Lascar per Company marching			
	1 Hand Bhistie per Company at	4/8	-/8	1/-
	1 Mate Carpenter at	6/-	1/-	2/-
	2 Bildars at	3/8	-/8	1/-
	1 Bazar Chowdry at 11	25/-	—	—
	1 Bazar Mootsuddy at 5			
	3 Flag or Weighmen, at 3 9			

12. The Peepawallas now with the Kemaon Battalion will, like those of the other Hill Corps, be made over to the Commissariat from the 1st prox.—Thirty (30) for each Hill Corps will be retained and paid by that Department.

13. No more than one English Writer is allowed to the Commandant of each Local Battalion, as the Pay-Havildars, being extended to all, must supercede the necessity of having Native or Persian Writers.

14. These Corps are clothed, armed, equipt and supplied with Ammunition at the expense of the State, under the same Rules as prevail with Troops of the Line, excepting their Belts and Accoutrements which are black instead of buff. They are supplied also under the like orders with Camp Equipage and Stores when necessary. The dress and discipline are the same, except that the men supply themselves with Half Mounting, on which account Commandants are strictly prohibited from making any deduction, except in cases of confirmed slovenliness or inattention of the men to cleanliness and the Standing Orders, which being special cases will be noted in Orders and the Adjutant directed to supply the parties deficient of Half Mounting, deducting the actual cost thereof from the men's pay.

15. Such Local Corps as have Details of Artillery or Irregular Horse attached, will retain them till further orders, as a separate and temporary Establishment.

16. The Rates of Pay and Allowances to all Local Corps being thus equalized, with their several Establishments, will have effect from the 1st June, with all other alterations directed, except those specially postponed. But all the reductions of Pay, etc., to Native Commissioned or Non-Commissioned Officers, shall only have prospective effect as they are promoted, or

(No. 1.)

GENERAL ABSTRACT OF THE FORMATION, NUMBERS AND RATES OF PAY, AND ALLOWANCES OF THE LOCAL INFANTRY
CORPS, SERVING UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF FORT WILLIAM, FROM THE 1ST JUNE, 1823.

Local Battalions.	Native Officers and Men.							Effective Staff, European and Native.							Non-effective.				Contingent Allowances.						Quartermaster's Establishments.							
Names of Corps, with the Dates of their formation.	No. of Companies	Subadars	Jemadars	Havildars	Naicks	Drummers	Sepoys	Commandant, etc.	Adjutant	Assistant Surgeon and Medical Allowance	Sergeant-Major	Quartermaster-Serjt.	Sircars	Native Doctors	Drill-Havildars	Drill-Naicks	Drum- and Fifes-Major	Pay-Havildars	Guide Allowance	Horse Allowance	Stationery Allowance	Repairs of Arms, etc.	Do. Camp Equipage	Mess Allowance	For 2 Carts Marching	Tindals	Lascars	Hand Bhisties	Mate Carpenters	Bildars	Bazar Establishments	
	—	30	15	10	8	6	5.8	S.B. 1½	25 Rs. per 100 men	51.5.2	45.5.2	15	15	15	5	2½	5	5	150	30	30	25 Rs. per Com.	As per Regulation 27th December 1822 with Corps having it	60	Marching or in the Field only	7½	4½	4½	6	3½	25	
24th April 1815.6. 1st Nusseri Bn.	8	8	8	40	40	16	640	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	8	5	150	30	30	25 Rs. per Com.	As per Regulation 27th December 1822 with Corps having it	60	Marching or in the Field only	1	4	8	1	2	5

removed by retirement, decease, etc., while all augmentations of pay to any rank shall date from the 1st proximo. The alterations of Allowances to the European Officers and Staff and Drummers with the Contingencies and Quartermaster's Establishments shall take place from the 1st June next, when all Military Allowances not here enumerated shall cease.

As a result of these orders the 1st Nasiri Battalion now became the "6th Local Infantry—1st Nasiri (Gorka) Battalion."

The 2nd Nasiri, Sirmur, and Kumaon Battalions became respectively the 7th, 8th and 9th Local Infantry.

In this year also were constituted garrison companies under the following conditions:—

Where any of the men who came over from the enemy in 1814–1815, or were then taken into service, became unfitted by age or infirmity for more active duties, they were drafted into a garrison company, employed solely in garrison duties in the forts and outposts in the Nepal conquests hitherto occupied by the corps to which they belonged, and considered as stationary. If, owing to the large numbers of such men, it became necessary, the Commander-in-Chief had power to create temporarily a second or even a third garrison company. The position of the Battalion as regards pensions was also fixed by G.G.O. No. 9 of the 2nd May 1823.

Put quite briefly, its principal provisions, for Native Officers, Commissioned and Non-Commissioned, and lower Native ranks were:—

(1) No invalid pension under twenty years service, except in case of wounds or incurable disorders contracted on service, and not brought on by the sufferer's own fault.

(2) Even after twenty years, no pension to be recommended for an applicant "unless he shall in every respect be unfit for Local Service from wounds, age, or infirmities."

(3) Those above the lowest rank, in order to qualify for a pension of their rank, must have served for three years in that rank. The rates of pension were:—

Rank.	Lower or Common Rate in Case of Ordinary Wounds; Long Service or Decrepitude.	Loss of Limb or Both Eyes on Service.
	Rupees per mensem.	Rupees per mensem.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Subah * or Commandant.	28 0 0	45 0 0
Subadar	18 0 0	30 0 0
Jemadar	10 0 0	15 0 0
Havildar, Drum- or Fife-Major.	6 0 0	10 0 0
Naick or Native Doctor	5 0 0	8 0 0
Drummer	3 8 0	5 0 0
Sepoy	3 8 0	5 0 0
Gun or tent Tindal	4 0 0	6 0 0
Gun or tent Lascar	3 0 0	4 8 0
Bhisti	3 0 0	4 8 0

The regimental records of this period appear to be too meagre to afford any insight into the regimental life at Sabathu, or such questions as quarters, hutting, etc.

* This rank, as well as Subadar-Major, prospectively abolished in Local Corps.

Lieutenant Mundy, A.D.C. to Lord Combermere, who passed through Sabathu in 1827, mentions that it consisted of fifteen or twenty bungalows built like an English village round a village green of some four acres. There were cantonments for a regiment of seven hundred, and a bazar. As for the old Gurkha fort, he describes it as a very poor affair, built on a mound no higher than that at Salt Hill where, in his day, the Eton College function called "Montem" used to be celebrated.*

He also mentions that the Commandant of the 1st Nasiri Battalion was at the same time Political Officer for the neighbouring Hill States.

Captain Ross is mentioned in Aitchison's *Treaties Engagements and Sanads* as the Governor-General's Agent, in which capacity he signed the "Hukmnama" providing for the position of at least one of the Hill States which were returned by the Government, on special conditions, to their original chiefs, who had been conquered and turned out by the Nepalese.

Captain Kennedy, the next Commandant of the 1st Nasiri Battalion, after Ross left it in 1822, was also in Political charge of the Hill States. He was the first permanent European inhabitant of Simla; for it was he who built the first house there. It is still a well-known house in Simla—Kennedy House—almost in the centre on the road from the Church to Vice-regal Lodge.

We find him mentioned as the host and guide of Sir W. Lloyd in his *Journey from Cawnpore to the Borrendo Pass in 1821*. Unfortunately this book says very little of Sabathu, but the writer proceeded from Simla to Kotgarh, beyond Narkanda, and looking down, from a distance of five miles and a height of four thousand feet, on the upper Sutlej. His party consisted of Captain Alexander Gerard and his brother Surgeon James Gilbert Gerard. At Kotgarh they found Captain Patrick Gerard, the third brother, who was in command of part of the 1st Nasiri Battalion stationed there, and amused himself, in what must have been a very dull as well as a very remote station, by surveying, meteorology, botany, exploring, and gardening.

James Gilbert Gerard was the first Medical Officer of the 1st Nasiris.

The next traveller who has left a printed record of his experiences in these parts was Lieutenant Henry Fane, A.D.C. to the Commander-in-Chief in India, with whom he was on tour. From his book, *Five Years in India*, we find that up to 1830 Kotgarh had had a garrison of two companies of sepoy, evidently of the 1st Nasiris. After that it was abandoned as a station, but a small guard of Gurkhas was still maintained there, and relieved every two months. Fane was there, and at Sabathu, in April 1835, and mentions that the Commandant of the 1st Nasiris was still Political Agent for the Hill States. Fane also observes that recruiting for the Gurkhas was at that time difficult, owing to obstruction by the Nepalese Government, and that in consequence some recruits "of a different caste" had to be accepted. Fane describes what he saw at Sabathu. In the morning there was a review of the Gurkhas for the Commander-in-Chief.

His A.D.C. describing it, likens the uniform to that of the Ceylon Rifles, but remarks that the Gurkhas were armed only with smooth-bore muskets. Of them he says, "they were in exceedingly good order and marched-past as well as any regiment could do."

In the afternoon there was a sham fight in the shape of an attack on a stockade, "perched on the brow of a hill, with precipices on either side . . . by no means a place which one would pick out for one's morning's amusement to attack in earnest." The stockade was defended by four companies and attacked by the same number, the remainder being in reserve.

* The mound is about 20 feet high, on the western border of Slough.



SUBADAR AND GOORKHA SIPAHIS
OF THE
SABATHU BATTALION.

CHEPAL


11th October, 1834.

In the attack he speaks of "the little fellows cutting down the stockade with the 'talwars' (*sic*) (a small kind of sword), which is their national weapon." Of course by "talwars" "kukris" were meant, as they are described as the national weapon of the Gurkhas.

On the evening before there had been a dinner at which were "all the beauty and fashion of Sabattoo, consisting of two ladies and four of the opposite sex."

M. Jacquemont, a French scientist and traveller, writes a good deal about Simla in its early days, and is very loud in his praise of Captain Kennedy, the successor of Captain Ross, in command of the 1st Nasiris. He was greatly impressed by what seemed to him Kennedy's high pay and his great powers as a Political Agent. He also says much of the Commandant's hospitality and amiability. He mentions the dwelling built by Ross at Simla, which was absolutely the first European house there, as "a mere cottage of wood and thatch." *

* Many extracts translated from Jacquemont's published letters appear in Sir E. Buck's *Simla Past and Present* ; but they are more interesting to the student of Simla history than to the 1st Gurkhas.



CHAPTER II

THE SIEGE OF BHURTPORE AND EVENTS DOWN TO THE 1st SIKH WAR

1825-1844

THE first Battle Honour borne by the regiment is "Bhurtpore," an honour which was only conferred in 1874, forty-eight years after the siege in which it was gained by the two Gurkha Battalions (1st and 2nd) which have it.

The regimental Head-quarters were not with Lord Combermere's army besieging Bhurtpore, but the 1st Nasiri Battalion and the Sirmoor Battalion each contributed a detachment which is roughly described as two hundred men. The records of the 1st Gurkhas show them as having sent two companies, whilst, according to Colonel Shakespear's *History of the 2nd Gurkhas*, the Sirmoor Battalion sent three companies under Captain Fisher and Lieutenants Kirke and Spottiswoode.*

The records of the 1st Gurkhas do not apparently mention any European Officers' names as going with the detachment, but it seems clear that Lieutenant Henry Kirke was with it. His name appears in the casualty list attached to Lord Combermere's despatch on the 24th January 1826 thus:—

"Wounded—1st Nussuree Detachment—Lieutenant Henry Kirke (12th Regiment N.I.) slightly."†

* On the 22nd November 1825, General Reynell, commanding at Agra, wrote to the Secretary to Government at Fort William that, at Lord Combermere's request, he had ordered the commandants of the Nasiri and Sirmur Battalions to send two hundred men each to Karnal and Saharanpur respectively. The detachments were to have a proportion of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. He makes no special mention of British Officers. He had ordered the detachments to remain at Karnal and Saharanpur till he received the sanction of the Governor-General to their being moved on to Agra, as desired by the Commander-in-Chief. He remarked that the Gurkhas, being "so hardy and such good marksmen," would be most useful in the coming operations, which were still a secret. Sanction to the move was duly accorded, and it seems clear that the Nasiri and Sirmur Battalions furnished two hundred men each besides officers.

† In the *East India Register*, the establishments of Local Infantry and Irregular corps are not shown separately till 1845. Against the names of regular officers attached to them there is, up to that year, a note showing to which corps they were attached. In the *Register* for 1826 Lieutenant Kirke is shown under the 12th Native Infantry with no remark. In 1827 he is noted as attached to the Sirmoor Battalion; in 1828 as adjutant Sirmoor Battalion. It appears probable that the two Nasiri companies were sent to the Bhurtpore force without a British Officer, and that Lieutenant Kirke was put in command of them. Considering that there were six companies left behind, and that the only European commissioned combatant officers then sanctioned for the battalion were the commander and adjutant, it seems probable they could not have sent one with the two companies. It also seems probable that the Nasiri detachment was attached to the 14th Foot, which was in the 1st Division. Colonel Shakespear says the Sirmoor detachment was attached to the "39th Foot," but this is clearly a mistake for the 59th Foot, which was in the 2nd Division. On the analogy of this, the Nasiris would naturally be attached to the 14th Foot. From information collected by the Regiment it appears Lieutenant Kirke was attached to the 1st Nasiris in January 1826, and transferred to the Sirmoor Battalion on the 17th February 1826. Kirke's name does not appear under the Nasiri Battalion in the Bengal Army List of 1826, which was issued in April, nor in that of March 1825.

In General Reynell's Divisional order of the 18th January, issued immediately after the storm, it is said: "The spirited conduct of the little detachment of the Nussuree Battalion, under Lieutenant Kirke, has not escaped the Major-General's observation." General Nicolls' orders of the 19th acknowledge the services of the Sirmoor Battalion. This settles definitely the spheres of action of the two Gurkha detachments, and shows that Kirke was with the Nasiris in the storm.

It is not necessary in this History to go in any detail into the circumstances which led to the siege of Bhurtpore. The fortress had been besieged in 1805 by Lord Lake, who had failed disastrously. For the next twenty years that failure had been a thorn in the side of the East India Company's Government. It had been used as a taunt by every Native State or disaffected body, and the saying of all such had in effect been: "Go and take Bhurtpore if you can!"

In 1825 the supreme control in the Jat State had been seized by the usurper Durjan Sal, who was distinctly hostile to the British Government. Sir David Ochterlony, the hero of the Gurkha War of 1815, was for marching against him at once, before he had the time to gather reinforcements and complete the fortifications of his capital. But the Government of India were then in difficulties with Burma, and were moreover hampered by financial trouble, and by urgent instructions from home to avoid, as far as possible, interference in Native States. Ochterlony's scheme was therefore disallowed and that gallant commander died shortly afterwards, his death being probably accelerated by chagrin.

By the latter part of 1825 Durjan Sal's preparations were so far advanced, and his insolence was so great, that the Government was forced to decide on his suppression.

A second check before Bhurtpore would have been disastrous for British prestige, and would have probably resulted in a general revolt of the Native States, whose eyes were riveted on the siege of a place which they had come to look upon as impregnable. The Government was determined to make a good job of this second siege, and collected an army of some twenty-seven thousand men, which was placed under the personal command of Lord Combermere, the Commander-in-Chief in India. A powerful siege train was collected by whipping up every heavy gun and mortar above Allahabad.

To the siege artillery of those days Bhurtpore, with its baked mud towers and curtains, opposed a very serious obstacle, which had eventually to be overcome largely by mining. Round shot and shells produced but small effect in the way of breaches.

The outer enceinte of the great fortress was some eight miles in circumference, surrounded by a broad and deep ditch, generally dry, but capable of being filled with water from a "jhil" on the West side. Inside this enceinte was the native city, and inside this again the Palace, surrounded by fortifications and a moat as strong as those of the outer enceinte and with a citadel on the South-west.

Lord Lake's attack in 1805 had been from the South-west. Lord Combermere decided to feint from this direction, but to make his real attack against the North-east angle of the defences. There was no glacis to the outer defences, but its place was taken by a broad open "esplanade," outside which was a broader circle of jungle.

Combermere's 1st Infantry Division (in which was the Nasiri detachment) moved from Muttra under the command of Major-General Thomas Reynell, C.B., whilst the 2nd, under Major-General Jasper Nicolls, moved from Agra. These were preceded by the Cavalry, who were fortunate enough to be able to seize and block the channel from the "jhil" by which the outer ditch was filled.


The sluices had been already opened, but the flow of water was stopped before it had time to do more than create a few pools in the ditch. Practically the ditch remained dry.

Bhurtpore was invested, after a fashion, on the 11th December 1825; but, owing to the jungle, the circumference of the line of investment was some fifteen miles, and, with

the force available, it was only possible to occupy a great part of it by Cavalry posts. The Infantry divisions were in the North-east sector, the 1st Division on the right facing the North side of the Fortress and the North-east angle, whilst the 2nd Division extended down the Eastern side.

After nine or ten days spent in careful reconnaissances, it was decided to open trenches and erect batteries opposite the North-east angle and the adjoining parts of the Eastern and Northern sides. The right of the first parallel was to be supported from Baldeo Sing's garden at the inner edge of the jungle East of the angle, whilst a corresponding support for the left flank was to be the Kuddum Kunder temple farther South. These two posts were seized by an advance through the jungle on the 23rd December before daybreak.

The temple, on the left, was seized by the 2nd Division, with which was the Sirmur



FORTRESS OF BHURTPORE—N.E. CORNER.

detachment which was employed as skirmishers in the advance. Baldeo Sing's garden fell to the lot of the 1st Division, with which the Nasiris were employed in the same rôle as the Sirmur men at the temple. It appears from the Field General Orders (quoted by Creighton) that on the 24th December Baldeo Sing's garden was occupied by the Sirmur Battalion then and on the 27th; but there seems to have been rather confused notions at Head-quarters, as in one place there is a reference to the "1st Nusserra Sirmoor Battalion."

No resistance was encountered at Baldeo Sing's garden, and the troops were able to take shelter under the "bund" beyond it, where they were under a constant but ineffectual fire from the enemy. General Reynell, according to Creighton, had a narrow escape from it, a round shot passing between his legs. This shows that troops of his (1st) Division took Baldeo Sing's garden. To the right of the garden there was a rather warm skirmish between some of the enemy and a detachment of Light Infantry and Gurkhas (Nasiris) under Captain J. Hunter. This detachment was feeling its way towards

the Goberdhan Gate of the city. Some loss was incurred by the enemy, but apparently none by the Light Infantry and Nasiris.*

At 3 p.m. the troops which had occupied the garden were relieved by others of the 1st Division. That night the 1st parallel was opened, six hundred yards from the ditch. The 2nd parallel, connecting two advanced batteries, was opened on the 27th, about two hundred and fifty yards from the ditch.

From this date it is not very clear what precise part the Nasiris played: they appear to have been employed in the trenches and advanced posts to keep down the enemy's matchlock fire. On the illustration † of the storming of the North-east angle, the position is marked of a Gurkha post occupied during the siege operations; but it is not stated whether these Gurkhas were of the Nasiri or the Sirmur Battalion. Looking, however, to its situation, close under the North-east bastion, it seems highly probable that it would be held by the 1st Division, and therefore by the Nasiris. The explanation attached to the plate describes it as a "small embankment from behind which the Goorkha troops used to snipe at the enemy during the siege," and it is well within the area of the 1st Division; in fact, it is on the right of the North-east bastion.‡

Hopes had been entertained of the breaches being ready for storming so early as the 5th or 6th January, but, under the advice of the Engineers, the storm had eventually to be postponed for nearly a fortnight. The breaches were not satisfactory, and Durjan Sal's garrison was very numerous, including many others, such as Pathans and Sikhs, besides the Jats.

On the 11th January there was some skirmishing in front of one of the advanced batteries which, from its position, was clearly within the area of operations of the 1st Division. The enemy had occupied a position in front of this battery, from which the Gurkhas (evidently Nasiris) were ordered to eject them. The attack failed, and Captain Bell, commanding the battery, was ordered to "lob" shells into the enemy position. Even this does not seem to have had much effect.

Next day a party of Gurkhas was sent into the ditch to work along the Northern face, from the North-east bastion as far as the Jagina Gate, and ascertain what the enemy was doing. This area was clearly in that of the 1st Division, and we may confidently assert that the party was of Nasiris.

As they approached the outwork covering the gate, they discovered a traverse of cotton bags in the ditch, covering it against two British guns which were enfilading the ditch. Just beyond this traverse was a gallery which the enemy had made in the wall, apparently for the purpose of sorties into the ditch. Its exit was covered from the East by the traverse. A few of the enemy were encountered and bayoneted, without loss on the Gurkha side.

The gallery which had thus fortunately been discovered was afterwards destroyed by artillery fire. On the 17th January the breaches were at last ready, and the ditches in front of them were kept clear of the enemy by small detachments of Europeans and Gurkhas posted in them. The precise positions of the Nasiris are not ascertainable, but no doubt they were about the North-east bastion and the breach on the extreme right, west of the Jagina Gate.

* *Creighton*, p. 14. He says: "The Goorkhas are admirable Light Troops, and were conspicuous in this encounter, which caused the enemy some loss."

† To face page 22.

‡ In the list of casualties attached to Lord Combermere's despatch of the 5th January 1826, there is an entry "1st Nussuree Battalion—killed, 1 sepoy."

The two main attacks on the 18th January were to be on the left by General Nicolls' Division, against what was known as the long-necked bastion and its neighbourhood, and on the right by General Reynell's against the North-east bastion. There were to be subsidiary attacks on the left and right of Nicolls' column with which we need not concern ourselves, as the Gurkhas employed with that division were of the Sirmur Battalion.

Of the Nasiris, one hundred men, under Lieutenant Kirke, were to attack a breach which had been made West of the Jagina Gate, and then to work eastwards to meet Reynell's main column assaulting the great bastion of the North-east angle. This subsidiary attack was to be led by Lieut.-Colonel Delamain, of the 58th Native Infantry, with his own regiment, commanded for the storm by Captain Hunter. At the head of his column were two companies of the East India Company's European Regiment, and the detachment of one hundred Nasiris. Where the rest of the detachment were is not quite certain; but probably some of them, from the posts in the ditch, followed Reynell's main attack. This seems to be confirmed by the regimental records, which say the regiment was attached to the leading brigade, under Brigadier McCombe, attacking the centre of the main breach.

The breach in front of Delamain was, like those in the great bastion, far from easy. Both required to be improved by the explosion, just before the assault, of mines prepared and charged under them. The mines under the long-necked bastion had been fired on the 16th with good results.

The stormers were assembled in the trenches at dawn on the 18th, and were subjected to a heavy fire from the walls till eight o'clock. At that hour the signal for the assault was given by the explosion of the mine under the breach in Delamain's front beyond the Jagina Gate. That was immediately followed by the firing of the mines to blow in the counterscarp opposite the North-east bastion. Then the great mine, charged with ten thousand pounds of powder, under the North-east or Pathan bastion, was fired, blowing up a great part of it and killing three hundred of the Pathan garrison. With the details of the assault on this bastion, led by the 14th Foot, we are not much concerned. The explosion of the mine had caused considerable loss to the two columns of stormers there, killing one of the Brigadiers and wounding the other.


Meanwhile, Nicolls' column at the long-necked bastion had also gone forward, and at the same time Delamain's column, headed by the two companies of Europeans and Kirke's one hundred men of the 1st Nasiri Battalion, had burst through their breach and at once turned to their left to meet the right half of Reynell's attack as it moved to its right along the ramparts.

The Nasiris soon got along to the rear of the Jagina Gate. From this point there ran eastwards a sunken road behind the ramparts, some sixty feet below them. Into this the only entrance was by a narrow flight of stairs. Into this death-trap the Jats were forced back. Surrender they would not, and almost all were killed, either before the sunken road was reached, or in it as the troops of Delamain pressed on from the West and General Everard, with Reynell's right main column, met the fugitives from the East. Whether there were any of the Nasiris with the last-named force is not certain, but, as above stated, is not improbable.

The losses of the Nasiri detachment were:—

Killed—one havildar, three rank and file.

18TH JANUARY 1826.



A. Question on the Plaintiff's Rights.
B. General Remedy requested by the Plaintiff.
C.C. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
D.D. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
E.E. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
F.F. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
G.G. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
H.H. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
I.I. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
J.J. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
K.K. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
L.L. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
M.M. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
N.N. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
O.O. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
P.P. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
Q.Q. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
R.R. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
S.S. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
T.T. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
U.U. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
V.V. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
W.W. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
X.X. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
Y.Y. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.
Z.Z. Mr. James Brown, on the Plaintiff's right, made the Plaintiff's right.





Engraved by G. B. Shaw

*View of the Assault on the Fortress of DHURTIPORE by the British Troops under the personal Command of
His Excellency General Sir David Baird on the 10th January 1806.*

Printed and Published at the Asiatic Lithographic Press, York Street, Chancery Lane, Calcutta.

1807

Wounded—Lieutenant Kirke (slightly), one subadar, one jemadar, nineteen rank and file.*

Whilst all this had been going on on the North front, Reynell's column had stormed the Pathan bastion, killing or capturing the whole of its garrison. The right brigade had pushed to the right to meet Delamain as above described. The left brigade had gone in the opposite direction to meet Colonel Wilson's successful attack on the breach between the long-necked and Pathan bastions. Nicolls' main column had captured the long-necked bastion, and part of his Division had forced an entrance into the city by the Muttra Gate.

Nicolls, besides sending troops into the city to clear the streets, moved along the ramparts to his left, whilst Reynell's men, including the Nasiris, moved along them to his right. The two forces presently met at the Fateh Burj, in the South-west, the scene of Lake's final repulse in 1805. The Citadel surrendered without resistance. Durjan Sal and his family, whilst attempting to escape, were captured by the cavalry, and Bhurtpore was at last in the hands of the British. Of its garrison, estimated at twenty-five thousand men, it is impossible to say what the total casualties were, though they were estimated at some thirteen thousand, of whom at least four thousand were killed.

In May 1826 the strength of the eight companies of the 1st Nasiris was reduced to eighty privates each.†

After the return of the two companies from Bhurtpore we have no record of the doings of the battalion till the 1st December 1826, when, in consequence of the dissolution of the 4th and 5th Local Battalions, the 1st Nasiri Battalion stepped up and became the 4th, instead of the 6th, Local Battalion.

In 1828, owing to the distance of Sabathu from the homes of most of the men in Nepal, the grant of furlough between the 1st April and the 1st December was sanctioned for the battalion.

During the hot season of this year the battalion furnished an escort for the Commander-in-Chief during his residence in the Hills.

On the 19th June 1828, the Governor-General, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, was pleased to promote Subadar Kamlapati, of the 1st Nasiris, to the special rank of Subadar-Major, and to direct the presentation to him of a sword-of-honour, as a mark of the favour of Government consequent on his distinguished gallantry during the siege and storm of Bhurtpore. The Digest of Service states that he also received Rs. 1,000 and a "khillat" or robe of honour.

It will be remembered that the original cuffs, collars and trimmings of the 1st Nasiri uniform were red. In September 1828,‡ they were changed to black. A circular of the Adjutant-General, dated 9th January 1829, lays down the new uniform for officers of the Local Hill Corps§ in the following terms:—

* The Sirmur Battalion lost one man killed and five wounded in Nicolls' attack.

† This was the strength shown in the orders of 1823, but apparently the strength had risen meanwhile. Para. 6 of the orders of 1823 seems to contemplate variations in the rank-and-file strength of companies from eighty to one hundred men.

‡ The Regimental digest of service appears to give the date of the change of facings as 15th September 1844 (G.O.C.C., 15th September 1844). This is clearly an error. The order of 1828 is of the Commander-in-Chief, dated 15th September 1828. On this subject see Appendix.

§ In this term were included the 1st and 2nd Nasiri, the Sirmur, and Kumaon Battalions, and the Assam and Sylhet Light Infantry Corps.

Jacket, dark green cloth, hussar style; Prussian collar, full three inches deep, ornamented with black mohair braid; collar and cuffs of regimental facings, single-breasted, with three rows of ball buttons, and Russia braid loops very close all the way down the front; pointed cuff, three inches deep at the point, ornamented with braid; figures on the sleeves, side seams, welts, and hips: no wings or epaulettes are worn.

Cap, black beaver, bell shape, seven inches and a half deep, black sunk glazed top, eleven inches in diameter; a black silk band round the top, two inches and three-quarters wide; a patent leather band round the bottom, one inch wide; a black lace double circle in the centre, communicating by a black bullion loop and button to a bullion rosette at the top; black lines and acorn tassels; bronzed scales and lions' heads; black stamped peak.

Tuft, a round black ball (or tuft) to be worn, in place of a feather.

Trousers, dark green, with a double stripe of black Russia braid down the outward seam.

Sabre, infantry regulation scabbard, black leather, with gilt mountings.

Sword-knot, plain black leather.

Waist-belt, black patent leather, one inch wide, with snake ornament in front; plain rings, through which hang two slings of similar width, for rings of scabbard.

Pouch-belt, black patent leather, two inches and a half wide, with a plate engraved, and lion's head; whistle and chain.

Sash, black silk patent net, with cords and tassels, to go twice round and tie.

Pouch, black patent leather; rounded flap, four inches and a half deep, five inches wide at top, six at bottom; a bugle in the centre; holes bored.

Gloves, white. *Stock*, black silk. *Boots*, ankle.

UNDRESS.

Jacket, similar to dress, only with a less proportion of trimmings.

Trousers, dark-green, made quite loose; straight cut, and without ornament of any kind.

Cap, a plain light shako, with an oilskin cover. Tuft, sword, scabbard, sword-knot, waist-belt, pouch, pouch-belt, sash, gloves, stock, boots, the same as in dress.

Forage-cap, of plain green cloth, welted with the colour of the facings; a black leather peak, and a band of black silk lace or mohair, two inches broad, and a black silk knob at the top.

Great-coat, plain blue; single-breasted; Prussian collar, and ball buttons.

Cloak, blue, lined with black shalloon, of walking length; clasp ornaments at the collar, and ball buttons.

The Commanding Officer, Second-in-command, and Adjutant, to wear, in addition to the foregoing uniforms:—

Tache-slings, three, of black patent leather, half an inch wide, attached to rings of waist-belt, and fastening with loops and buckles to rings of tache.

Tache, plain black patent leather; pocket nine inches deep, seven and a half wide at top, nine at bottom; face twelve inches deep, eight inches wide at top, eleven at bottom; perfectly plain, with three rings at top, for tache-slings.

Spurs, steel, screw, the neck two inches long, including rowels.

Scabbard, steel, instead of leather.





LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHARLES PRATT KENNEDY

(In the uniform of the Bengal Horse Artillery)

Circa 1825

Saddle-cloth, to be edged with black silk lace.

Collar, brown leather.

The horse furniture of the mounted officers to be in other respects the same as that of officers of the line.

SURGEON.

Coat, single-breasted; collar, cuffs and buttons the same as the uniform of the regiment; long skirts, with white Kerseymere turnbacks, and bugle skirt ornaments; without epaulettes or wings.

Hat, cocked, plain, with a black silk loop and button. Appointments and other articles of dress the same as other officers, except the sash, which is not worn.

The sword-belt to be worn under the coat.

There appear to have been revised dress regulations issued in 1820, but it has not been found possible to trace them at Simla.

The question of the distribution as prize money of the great treasure taken at the siege of Bhurtpore in 1826 was only settled in February 1829. It amounted, at the then rate of exchange, to about half a million sterling. The shares received by the Commander-in-Chief and Senior officers were very considerable. Even a regimental Major received about Rs. 9,500, and a Captain about Rs. 4,800.

The shares for lower ranks, of which were all of the Nasiris present at the siege, were:—

	Rs.	a.	p.
Lieutenant	2,381	14	0
Subadar-Major	322	8	0
Subadar	282	3	0
Jemadar	120	15	0
Havildar	53	12	0
Naick, drummer, sepoy, and bhisti	26	14	0

On the 1st February 1829 the 2nd Nasiri Battalion was disbanded and distributed as follows:—

(1) All men under six years' service received a gratuity of six months' pay.

(2) Native Officers, N.C.O.'s, buglers, and privates of over six years' service and being "Natives of the Nepal territory" were transferred in equal numbers to the 1st Nasiri and the Sirmur Battalions. There was allowed "a preference of corps to officers and men as far as their inclinations can be consulted, unless they should prefer taking service in any regiment of the line."

The 1st Nasiri Battalion now became "The Nasiri Battalion" simply.

In 1838 the regiment supplied an escort of one company for the Commander-in-Chief during his tour in the Plains.

It took no active part in the campaign in Afghanistan in 1839; but a detachment of two companies was sent down to garrison the fort at Ludhiana while the campaign lasted.

It was in 1839 that good conduct pay was instituted for the Native Army, and the rates fixed for sepoy of the Gurkha Battalions were:—

After 20 years' good conduct service, Rs. 1 extra pay per mensem.

After 27 years' good conduct service, 8 annas more extra pay.

In 1840 the battalion was employed in quelling disturbances in the Bilaspur State west of Simla. Raja Kharak Chand of that State died in 1839 without a son. One of

his widows, in 1840, pretending that she had given birth to a son eight months after his decease, stirred up a rebellion against Raja Jagat Chand, the cousin and successor of Kharak Chand. It was this rebellion which had to be suppressed by the Gurkhas. There does not appear to have been any fighting.

In 1841 the battalion was moved from Sabathu to Kotgarh.* It returned to Sabathu after fifteen days, leaving two companies at Kotgarh.

There it was their duty to watch the Sikh troops beyond the Sutlej and guard the passages of the river. The relations between the British Government and the Sikh kingdom were becoming strained since the death of Ranjit Sing in 1839 had left his kingdom torn by dissensions, and soon to be practically ruled by the Khalsa Army.

In 1842 two companies of Gurkhas had again to be sent to put down disturbances in the territory of the Rana of Kumharsen, a small State south of the Sutlej near Kotgarh. The State had lapsed to Government in default of direct heirs of Rana Kehar Sing, who died in 1839. Government, however, in consideration of the loyalty of Kehar Sing, re-granted it to a distant relative, Pritam Sing, and the disturbance to be quelled no doubt arose out of the action of other claimants alleging rights superior to Pritam Sing's. Again there is no record of fighting.

In May 1842 one company of the regiment was ordered to be armed with muzzle-loading rifles of the Brunswick two-grooved pattern.† The Commanding Officer was directed "to make a selection throughout the battalion of the best marksmen, to whom these rifles are to be entrusted." In addition to the prescribed proportion for service, one hundred and twenty rounds of ball ammunition per rifle were allowed for practice.

In 1843 the Head-quarters of the regiment were moved from Sabathu to Jutogh, the well-known cantonment just outside Simla. Here they remained till 1850. Sabathu had to be evacuated, as it was required for a British Infantry Battalion. In this same year (1843) the regiment for a short time garrisoned the fort at Umballa during the absence of the regular garrison on the campaign against Sindhia, which ended with the Battle of Maharajpur.

In January 1844 the whole battalion was armed with two-grooved rifles, and one hundred and twenty rounds of ball ammunition per man were allowed.

In November "half batta" was sanctioned for the regiment under the same rules as those for "extra batta" for regiments of the line.

* See Sir W. Lloyd's account of Kotgarh, *ante*, p. 16.

† It seems certain that these were the first rifled weapons issued to the Bengal Army. The Nasiri and Sirmur Battalions were thus the first Rifle Regiments of the Indian Army. The Bengal Army List of 1845 gives the title of the regiment as "Nussuree (Rifle) Battalion."

CHAPTER III

THE SIKH WARS—ALIWAL AND SOBRAON

1845-1849

IN the latter part of 1845 came the final rupture between the British Government and the Sikh Kingdom, now almost entirely in the hands of its powerful European-trained army.

On the 27th December 1845 the regiment marched for Ludhiana. It was commanded by Colonel N. Penny, and had a strength of five hundred and eighty-six rank and file. On arrival at Ludhiana it was attached to the 4th Brigade, commanded by Brig.-General Godby, and forming part of the division under Major-General Sir Harry Smith.

The battalion reached Ludhiana on the 10th January 1846, the Battles of Moodkee and Ferozeshah having already been fought, some three weeks earlier. The Sirmur Battalion was already in Ludhiana when the Nasiri Battalion arrived. The garrison was weak, consisting of the two Gurkha Battalions, the 30th Native Infantry, and a native cavalry regiment, and was seriously menaced by a large Sikh force under Ranjor Sing, who crossed the Sutlej on the very day of the arrival of the Nasiris, and encamped within two miles of the place.

In this position he was a serious threat to the communications of the British Army, on the Sutlej above Ferozepur, with its base at Umballa. At the same time, his object was to gather in supplies from the Jaghir Sikh States on the left bank of the Sutlej. There was a Sikh garrison in the small fort at Dharmkot, midway between Ferozeshah and Ludhiana, the garrison of which was thus cut off from direct communication with the main army.

On the 17th January Sir Harry Smith took Dharmkot without difficulty, and thence proceeded to move round, South of Ranjor Sing's force, so as to relieve Ludhiana. Moving by Jagraon, some twenty-five miles South of the Sutlej, on the 20th January, he arrived before the fort of Budhowal, South-west of Ludhiana, on the 22nd, to find Ranjor Sing drawn up there.

Smith, who did not wish to fight a battle before being joined by the Ludhiana garrison, proceeded to march across the enemy's front, protecting his march with a flank guard. There was some fighting and considerable loss of stragglers and baggage, but Ludhiana was safely reached that evening.


Wheeler's Brigade of Sir H. Smith's Division, having been sent to reinforce the latter, moved by the same route, where he found the direct road to Ludhiana blocked by Sikhs. His advance had, however, alarmed Ranjor Sing, lest he should be nipped between the two forces, and induced him to abandon his position at Budhowal and fall back on the village of Aliwal, just South of the Sutlej and some thirty miles West of Ludhiana. On the 24th January Wheeler was at Jagraon, and Smith, advancing next day from Ludhiana, met him at Budhowal.

The Sirmur Battalion was now transferred to Wheeler's (2nd) Brigade, the Nasiris remaining in Godby's (4th) Brigade.

Sir Harry Smith's force consisted of some ten thousand men, of whom a little over seven thousand were infantry, with twenty-two field, six horse artillery guns, and two eight-inch howitzers.

On the 26th Ranjor Sing's hitherto mainly irregular army was reinforced by four thousand regulars and twelve guns, besides a large force of cavalry.

At daybreak on the 28th, after giving his force a much-needed day of rest, Sir H. Smith advanced to attack Ranjor Sing, who was entrenched in a semicircle with his flanks resting on the Sutlej, but had also moved out of his camp to meet the British. Godby's Brigade had been brought up the previous evening from Ludhiana, and was placed on the right of the infantry, which was preceded in the advance by the cavalry and horse artillery.



BATTLE OF ALIWAL.

When the enemy's line was first sighted by Sir H. Smith, after a march of about six miles, it had its centre about the village of Aliwal, on a ridge stretching North-east and South-west. Its left appeared to be still in the entrenched camp. Sir H. Smith presently moved his cavalry to the flanks, and deployed his infantry in front of the position.

Godby's Brigade, with the 1st Nasiri Battalion, was at first, says Sir H. Smith's despatch, "in direct echelon to the rear of the right, the Shekawatti infantry in like manner to the rear of my left." Observing that his right was outflanked by the enemy, the General took ground to the right and advanced in line under artillery fire about 10 a.m. For what happened next, when Sir Harry Smith had decided that his best plan was

to crush the Sikh left and centre and capture Aliwal as the key of the position, we will quote his own words: "I therefore," he writes to the Commander-in-Chief, "quickly brought up Brigadier Godby's Brigade; and with it, and the 1st Brigade under Brigadier Hicks, made a rapid and noble charge, carried the village and two guns of large calibre. The line I ordered to advance, Her Majesty's 31st Foot and the Native Regiments contending for the front; and the battle became general."

The cavalry on the right drove Ranjor Sing's horsemen of his left wing back and on to their infantry. "I observed the enemy's encampment, and saw it was full of infantry; I immediately brought upon it Brigadier Godby's Brigade, by changing front, and taking the enemy's infantry 'en revers.' They drove them before them, and took some guns without a check."

Meanwhile, Ranjor Sing, with his left and centre in distress, endeavoured to cover his retreat by holding on about the village of Bhundri with his right. With the details of

the battle in this direction we are not concerned. The British advance was equally successful here, and presently the whole Sikh force was in wild flight through its entrenched camp and across the river by boats and the ford. Every gun they had, to the number of sixty-seven, either fell into the hands of the victors or was lost in the quicksands of the river.

The brief account above given shows how important a part the Nasiri Battalion, as part of Godby's Brigade, played in the first and decisive stroke of a battle which ended in complete victory. The victories of Moodkee and Ferozeshah had been Pyrrhic in their losses, and left the Sikh main army still able to maintain itself on the left bank of the Sutlej. At Aliwal the main force of Ranjor Sing was driven in disorder across the river. The loss on the British side was—killed 151, wounded 413, missing 25; total 589 of all ranks. In Godby's Brigade (36th Native Infantry and Nasiri Battalion) only one officer of the 36th Native Infantry was wounded; of other ranks nine were killed, twenty-six wounded, and one missing, of whom six killed and sixteen wounded belonged to the Nasiris. Their commander, Brigadier Penny, is thanked in the despatch, and Sir H. Smith writes: "The intrepid little Goorkhas of the Nuseree and Sirmoor Battalions in bravery and obedience can be exceeded by none. I much regretted that I had no brigade to give Brigadier Penny (of the Nuseree Battalion), who was in orders for one, as His Excellency is aware; I can only say therefore that, when he gets his brigade, if he leads it as he did his gallant band of Goorkhas, it will be inferior to none."

In his despatch, covering those of Sir H. Gough and Sir H. Smith, the Governor-General writes:—

"Great praise is also due to Brigadiers Godby and Hicks who, with the 36th Native Infantry and Nasiri Battalion, H.M. 31st, and the 24th and 47th Native Infantry, stormed the village of Aliwal, drove the enemy from it, and seized the guns by which it was defended. The Governor-General has much satisfaction in observing the warm terms of admiration in which the Major-General speaks of the Nuseree and Sirmoor Battalions . . . under Brigadier Penny and Captain Fisher. . . . These corps nobly emulated the example of the regular regiments of infantry."

After his victory of Aliwal, one consequence of which had been the complete submission of all the Sikh detachments on the left bank of the Sutlej, Sir H. Smith rejoined the main army on the 7th February in front of Sobraon, where it was facing the great Sikh entrenched bridge-head on the left bank of the Sutlej. Sir Hugh Gough had been waiting to make his attack on this position till he was joined by his siege train, the movement of which from Delhi had been covered by Sir H. Smith's operations before and at the battle of Aliwal.

On the 10th February all was ready for the attack. Brigadier Penny now had his Brigade, and the Nasiri Battalion was commanded by Captain O'Brien. The battalion was in the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, the Brigade commanded by Penny himself. The Division was still commanded by Sir H. Smith.


When positions were taken up for the attack, Sir H. Smith's Division was on the extreme right, with its right flank resting on the Sutlej above Sobraon, General Gilbert's 2nd Division being the next infantry on its left.

The original plan for the battle was for an attack by the British left, under Sir R. Dick, on the right flank of the Sikh entrenchments resting on the lower course of the

Sutlej. The Sikh right was its least strongly fortified portion, and it was hoped, by the capture of the entrenchments in this direction, to be able to take the rest of the fortifications in reverse.

The attack was to be precluded by an artillery preparation by the heavy guns. During the attack of the British left the rôle of the centre (Gilbert) and right (Smith) was to be confined to a feint, designed to keep a large portion of the Sikh army away from the real point of attack on their right.

Two hours of cannonading had not done much harm to the enemy's entrenchments



when, as it was reported that the heavy gun ammunition was running short, it was deemed necessary to launch the attack of the left at once. The Sikhs had, however, realized Gough's design, and hurried reinforcements to their right. Splendid though the attack of Dick's Division was, it was repulsed. It was clearly necessary now to convert the feint attack of the centre and right into a real one, and thus cause the Sikhs to bring back to those areas the troops which they had sent to help their hard-pressed right.

So far, the centre and right divisions had been amusing the enemy with lines of skirmishers and light troops thrown forward. Gilbert's and Smith's Divisions now at once advanced, but found in front of them the strongest part of the Sikh entrenchments, great

continuous ramparts with broad and deep ditches in front of them. On the right of Smith's Division the 31st Foot headed the advance with the 50th Foot in support. The next column was of the 47th Native Infantry, supported by the 42nd Native Infantry. The left of the division was formed by the Nasiri Battalion moving just to the right of the village of Sobraon, which was outside the Sikh entrenchments.

Both divisions reeled for a moment under the storm of shot and shell, grape and musketry, which fell upon them at short range. It is said that Gilbert lost six hundred and eighty-five men and Smith four hundred and eighty-nine in about half an hour.

Re-forming after these heavy losses, both divisions advanced again, now to find their task eased by the renewal of the attack of the British left as Dick's men found the defence slackening owing to the recall of the Sikhs to meet the new danger to their left.

Dick's Division was now able to penetrate far enough into the Sikh camp to get into touch with Gilbert's left. The Sikhs still fought with desperate gallantry, but the battle was lost for them, and all three divisions of the British pressed steadily forward through the entrenchments, sweeping the defenders back to the river, which had risen in the night and was no longer fordable where it had been on the previous day.

The victory was complete, and the Sikhs suffered terribly from the British artillery as they sought to get across the river. The bridge had been broken by their own general, Tej Sing, as he passed it in his flight.

There had been no great disparity of numbers between the two armies at Sobraon, perhaps twenty thousand Sikhs against fifteen thousand on the British side. The English loss had been 320 killed and 2,083 wounded; what that of the Sikhs was cannot be ascertained: it has been estimated at from 5,000 to 8,000, besides 67 guns and 200 camel swivels.

In the Nasiri Battalion the adjutant, Lieutenant Hay, was killed whilst acting as Brigade-Major to Brig.-General Penny, who also was wounded; Captain O'Brien, its commanding officer, was severely wounded; six Native officers were wounded, of whom two (Subadars Drig Sing Rana and Thirta Gurung) died of their wounds. Of rank and file six were killed and seventy-four wounded.

Again, as at Aliwal, the conduct of the Gurkhas had excited the admiration of the superior commanders.

Sir Hugh Gough's despatch contains the following passage:—

"I must pause in this narrative especially to notice the determined hardihood and bravery with which our two battalions of Goorkahs, the Sirmoor * and Nusseree, met the Sikhs wherever they were opposed to them. Soldiers of small stature but indomitable spirit, they vied in ardent courage in the charge with the Grenadiers of our own nation, and, armed with the short weapon of their mountains, were a terror to the Sikhs throughout this great combat."

Later, he states that Brigadier Penny, of the Nasiri Battalion, had been wounded. Among those recommended to "your Excellency's special favour" are Captain C. O'Brien and Lieutenant Travers † of the same battalion.

* The Sirmoor Battalion (2nd Gurkhas) was in the left centre of Gilbert's Division. It is clear therefore that the four Gurkhas who appear in the plate of the battle, mixed up with the 31st and 50th Foot, must have been meant for Nasiris. It would be inconceivable that men of the Sirmur Battalion should have strayed so far to the right.

† No officer of this name is shown under the Nasiri Battalion in the *East India Register* for 1845 or 1846. Only two officers of this name are shown: Lieutenant J. Travers (2nd Battalion Native Infantry) was adjutant of

In the G.O. by the Governor-General, dated 24th February 1846, the following passages are of special interest to the 1st Gurkhas :—

“The same gallant efforts, attended by the same success, distinguished the attack of the enemy's left, made by the 1st Division under the command of Major-General Sir Harry Smith, K.C.B., in which the troops nobly sustained their former reputation. . . . To commemorate this great victory the Governor-General will cause a medal to be struck. Her Majesty's 31st and 50th Regiments greatly distinguished themselves, as well as the 42nd and 47th Native Infantry, and the Nusseree Battalion.”

Three havildars (Jassira Rajput, Kalu Bandari, and Mastrani) were awarded the Order of Merit for their gallant conduct on this day. By a Government Order of the 18th August 1846, every officer and man of the regiment present at Aliwal or Sobraon was given the special medal struck for the campaign. Moreover, the regiment was authorised to bear on its Colours and appointments the names “Aliwal” and “Sobraon.” *

From this campaign the regiment returned to its Head-quarters at Jutogh till the 2nd Sikh War in 1848. In this it took no active part, being employed merely in guarding the passages of the Sutlej about Nandpur and the Makwal Dun against possible incursions by the rebel Sikhs from the Jalandar Doab.

By an order of the Commander-in-Chief, dated 4th September 1849, it was laid down for Local Corps that if their uniform was red their dark blue Kilmarnock cap was to have a white band woven into it. Where the uniform was green (as with the Nasiris) the band was to be dark green.

the Bhopal Contingent in both years; Ensign E. J. Travers joined the 53rd Battalion Native Infantry in July 1845. The initials of the Lieutenant Travers mentioned in the despatch are not given. Probably the officer mentioned was Lieutenant J. Travers, who may have been temporarily attached to the Nasiris in place of Lieutenant R. Hay, acting as Brigade-Major.

* These were the first battle honours actually borne; for the honour Bhurtore, though gained twenty years earlier than the Sikh campaign, was not authorised till 1874.

CHAPTER IV
THE 66th GURKHAS AND FRONTIER EXPEDITIONS
1850-1857

THE year 1850 saw a great change in the position of what had hitherto been an irregular battalion. In 1849 the Hindustani Regiments in the Punjab had been giving much trouble, and there can be no doubt that the spirit of mutiny was widespread amongst them. The main cause of complaint was that, previous to the annexation of the Sikh Kingdom, Hindustanis employed beyond the Sutlej received extra pay, as being on foreign service. With the annexation the Punjab became part of the territory administered by the Company, and extra pay for service there was stopped. The change of status of the Punjab made no difference to the native soldier in the matter of separation from his home and family, and he resented being reduced to the same pay as he would get if he were nearer home.

Sir Charles Napier, now Commander-in-Chief in India, fully recognised the danger of mutiny to the British power in India. His patience had been great, and he had, in several cases, refused to accept the proposals of his subordinates to disband mutinous regiments.

At last he had, as he considered, a good opportunity of striking a decisive blow, and promptly delivered it.

The 66th Native Infantry, on the march from Lucknow to the Punjab, halted at Amritsar.* Refusing to go to the Punjab on the reduced pay, the men tried to shut themselves up in the fort, in which there was a large magazine. This was prevented by the aid of a native cavalry regiment which, being on its way back from the Punjab, was indifferent for the time being to the question of extra pay there, to put their loyalty on no higher ground.

Sir Charles Napier, the moment he heard of this outbreak, issued the following order :—

“ The native officers, non-commissioned officers and private sepoys of the 66th Regiment are to be marched to Umballa, and then struck off from the service of the Honourable East India Company ; and His Excellency directs that the Colours of the 66th Regiment are to be delivered over to the loyal and brave men of the Nuseree Ghoorka Battalion, and that the 66th Regiment shall in future be denominated the 66th or Ghoorka Regiment.”

This change of the entire Native personnel of a regiment, without disbanding it or removing the British officers, cut the ground from under the feet of the Hindustani malcontents, whose boast had been, in this and other regiments, that if they were disbanded, they would prevent recruits from taking their place. They now found their services dis-

* Govindgarh, which is frequently alluded to, is the name of the fort erected outside Amritsar at the beginning of the nineteenth century by one of the French adventurers in the Sikh service.

pensed with under ignominious circumstances, far from their homes, and their place immediately taken by trained soldiers of a race more warlike than themselves, and thoroughly loyal.

Sir Charles Napier was very pleased with his move, and wrote to Lord Ellenborough: "I flung the Ghoorka Battalion into the scale, as Brennus did his sword, and mutiny, having no Camillus, was crushed."

Of the Gurkhas themselves he wrote: "They have a high military spirit, are fierce in war, of unsurpassed activity, and possess great powers of enduring fatigue. Very low of stature, and with short limbs, they have yet enormous muscles and vast strength, and their chests are both broad and deep. . . . The Ghoorkas will be faithful, and for low pay we can enlist a large body of soldiers whom our best officers consider equal in courage to European troops. Even as a matter of economy, this will be good; but the great advantage of enlisting these hillmen will be that, with thirty thousand or forty thousand Ghoorkas added to thirty thousand Europeans, the possession of India will not 'depend on opinions,' but on an army able with ease to overthrow any combination among Hindoos or Mohammedans, or both together."

The instructions issued to the officer commanding the Nasiri Battalion were as follows:—

"Major O'Brien is immediately to march the Nassuree Battalion to Govindgurh,* leaving its present arms, Colours, accoutrements and stores at Jutogh, and on arrival at Govindgurh he will make over his native officers, non-commissioned officers and privates to Major Troup, commanding the 66th or Ghoorka Regiment,† who is immediately to issue the arms, Colours and accoutrements of the 66th Regiment under his command to the Ghoorkas. The 66th or Ghoorka Regiment thus newly formed and constituted, is to receive the line rates of pay and 'batta' from the date of the receipt of this order at Jutogh.

"Major O'Brien will be so good as to take his measures for immediately recruiting the Nusseree Battalion to its full strength, in place of the men made over to the 66th Regiment."

Thus, not only were the native ranks of the 66th to be entirely replaced by Gurkhas, but the old Nasiri Battalion was to be reconstituted on its old footing of an irregular corps.

For the latter purpose, when he had handed over his men to Major Troup, Major O'Brien took with him, as a nucleus for his new battalion:—

* It has been suggested that the Nasiris were marched to Umballa and not Govindgarh. But these orders to Major O'Brien are clear. The author would suggest that it may have been thought undesirable for the actual disbandment of the mutinous regiment to take place in the presence of the new Gurkhas, and that the old 66th men were marched to Umballa, disarmed, either before or after the Gurkhas arrived—probably before, so as to avoid any meeting of the two bodies.

† In accordance with the prevailing custom in the Company's army at that period the regiment had a nominal full colonel—Lieut.-General Robert James Latter—but this officer was in virtual retirement at home, and had never served with, or had any real connection with, either the 66th Native Infantry or the 66th or Goorkha Regiment. Lieut.-General Latter was succeeded in 1854, as Colonel of the 66th or Goorkha Regiment, by Major-General Frederick Young, and this officer was subsequently promoted Lieut.-General on the 18th February 1856.

Lieut.-General Young had raised the Sirmur Battalion (now the 1/2nd K.E.O. Gurkha Rifles) in 1815, but he, as was the case with General Latter, had had no connection of any kind with the 66th or Goorkha Regiment. He was in virtual retirement in the United Kingdom throughout his period as full colonel.

General Young vacated his position as full colonel in 1861, and was the last full colonel of the regiment.

2 Jemadars	promoted to Subadars.
3 Havildars	„ „ Jemadars.
8 Naicks	„ „ Havildars.
8 Sepoys	„ „ Naicks.

The battalion raised by him was shown in the *East India Register* from 1851 to 1857 as the "New Nusseree (Rifle) Battalion," and it is shown as having the battle-honours "Aliwal" and "Sobraon."

The Nasiri Battalion was thus transferred from the Local Infantry to the Regular Line, and became a red-coated regiment with white facings, which it remained till 1886.

The orders to Major O'Brien distinctly direct him to leave the Colours of the Nusseree Battalion at Jutogh; but, except for these orders no evidence can be found that the Nusseree Battalion ever had any Colours and all efforts to trace them have failed. The battle-honours earned by the original Nusseree Battalion—"Aliwal" and "Sobraon"—are shown in the Bengal *Army List* for January 1852 as borne by the "66th or Goorkha Regiment (late Nusseree Battalion)."

The end of the New Nasiri Battalion was unfortunate. At the beginning of the Mutiny of 1857 the Head-quarters were still at Jutogh, with a detachment of eighty men as Treasury guard at Kasauli. There are somewhat conflicting accounts of what happened thereafter; but the following is the substance of the "Punjab Mutiny Report" on the subject, and may be accepted as the correct version.

When the Commander-in-Chief went down to the plains with the other regiments then in the hills, the detachment at Kasauli plundered the Treasury and marched for Jutogh with some 7,000 Rs. of Government money. The new Nasiri Regiment had been for some time before the news of the Delhi massacres in a high state of excitement. There were the usual stories of Government attempting to destroy their caste. It was said that their detachment at the musketry school at Umballa had used greased cartridges, without having obtained sanction to such a course from their comrades at Head-quarters. The Battalion had other grievances of an ordinary kind in respect of arrears of pay and other matters.

When the other regiments had marched for Umballa, the Nasiris at Jutogh broke out, and it was only by the exertions of the more moderate men that they were restrained from acts of violence. Exaggerated stories of their doings led to a discreditable panic amongst the Europeans at Simla, and the commencement of a general exodus.

The disturbances at Jutogh were at length allayed by Major Bagot, commanding the Battalion, and steps were taken to redress the legitimate grievances of the men. They then disavowed the mutiny of the Kasauli detachment, and confined the mutineers when they arrived. An amnesty was granted to the regiment, with the exception of the Kasauli men, and it returned to its allegiance and marched a day or two afterwards.

Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that, when it came to a question of reorganizing or dissolving the numerous Irregular Corps raised before or during the Mutiny, the new Nasiri Battalion was selected for disbandment in 1861.

The other two Gurkha Regiments (the Sirmur and Kumaon Battalions) raised in 1815, as well as the new Nasiri Battalion, continued to be shown in the *East India Register* as Local Infantry till the reorganization of 1861.

Nevertheless, an order of the 28th March 1850 directs that, whereas the Nasiri, Sirmur, and Kumaon Battalions had hitherto been regarded as Local Infantry, and received inferior pay to that of the Line, the Sirmur and Kumaon Battalions, as well as the New Nasiri Battalion, were to be admitted, from the 1st March 1850, in the case of Native Officers, N.C.O.s and Men, "to the pay, batta, pension, and all other advantages enjoyed by regiments of Native Infantry of the Line." On inquiry, these regiments had expressed "their entire willingness to perform all the duties required of corps of Native Infantry of the Line, and to proceed wherever they may be ordered."

It was subject to these conditions that their pay, etc., was raised. The battalions other than the new 66th, however, remained for the present with their old Irregular establishment of British Officers and N.C.O.s.

The services of the Nasiri and Sirmur Battalions at Bhurtpore received recognition by the issue, in April 1851, of a medal to all survivors of those who had served in that siege twenty-five years before.

In July 1850 the establishment of the 66th was fixed at eight companies. It was specially enjoined by Government that the class of regiment was to be preserved by carefully excluding from recruitment all who were not Gurkhas.*

It seems quite clear, notwithstanding an entry in the Digest of Service, that the regiment marched direct to Peshawar after becoming the 66th Gurkhas. The regiment reached Peshawar in February 1851 and was destined to have its Head-quarters there till January 1854, when it was transferred to Rawal Pindi.

From the 14th February 1851 the bayonet was ordered to be carried on the waist-belt instead of, as heretofore, on a shoulder belt.

During this period, though its station is shown as Peshawar in the *East India Register*, the regiment was on active service in several frontier expeditions which will now be described.

The first expedition on which it was engaged was that against the Mohmands of Michni who, in October 1851, had made a serious attack on the neighbouring British villages, where they destroyed much of the crops.†

The punitive force, which left Peshawar on the 25th October 1851 under Brig.-General Sir Colin Campbell, consisted of 1,593 of all ranks, including two companies each from the 61st and 98th Foot, the 2nd Irregular Cavalry, the 66th Gurkha Regiment, and a wing of

* There appears at times to have been some laxity with regard to the classes of Gurkhas enlisted, and Sir Charles Powell states that when he joined the 1st Gurkhas there were a good many castes in it which were eliminated in the next few years. How strict the selection became is shown by the Regimental Standing Orders of 1886 which lay down.

(1) Recruits to be bonâ fide Gurkhas of the Magar or Gurung classes.

(2) Khas and Thakur classes may be entertained sparingly, but never more than one in ten, and then only if of exceptional physique, or with strong family claims, and when Magars or Gurungs are not available.

Line boys, in the same proportion and under the same conditions, may be entertained. For these every consideration should be shown to sons of men who have served and died in the regiment, and every case is to be considered on its own merits, but the candidate must be up to the regimental standard. None of the following are to be entertained—Garhwalis, Kumaonis, Dhotialis, Sirmuris, Bhagatis, Mundhies, Demaies, Newars (aboriginal Nepalis). Sarkies (bootmakers or cobblers) and Lohars (metal smiths or iron-workers) may be entertained, according to regimental requirements, under a ten-year contract, with a distinct warning that they will not be promoted to the non-commissioned ranks. The recruiting party is always to consist of Magars and Gurungs. Of these two classes Lieut.-Colonel Eden Vansittart writes (*Handbooks for the Indian Army—Gurkhas*, p. 74): "Magars and Gurungs are by common consent recognized as the beau-ideal of what a Gurkha soldier should be. As these tribes have submitted to the ceremonial law of purity, and to Brahmanical supremacy, they have been adopted as Hindus, but they have been denied the sacred thread, and they rank as a doubtful order below the Kshatriya."

† See Map of North-West Frontier, Sheet I, in pocket at end of Volume.

the 71st Native Infantry, besides a light field battery and a company of Sappers and Miners.

After crossing the Kabul River, the force was joined by four companies of the Guides. On the 27th the force approached the Dab group of villages, whose inhabitants had been the principal offenders in the recent raid. The villages were found to be deserted. On the 28th the camp was moved to within two miles of them, and their destruction was proceeded with by the Sappers, covered by the rest of the force. To the desultory fire kept up by the enemy from the hills it was not considered worth while to reply. Each night during this operation the force retired to its camp on the plain, the greatest care being taken to evacuate no height till the next behind it was occupied by supporting troops. There was no loss in these operations.

Sir Colin Campbell had decided to erect a new fort at Michni, six or seven miles south-west of Shabkadr, and on this work the Gurkhas and others were employed, the Irregular cavalry being posted as a protection at Shabkadr, and at Matta about five miles north of it.

For the next few weeks there were various threats and small operations by the Mohmands, in which the Gurkha Battalion does not appear to have been seriously engaged. Early in December, owing to the increased gatherings of Mohmands, Sir Colin Campbell thought it necessary to reinforce the detachment of Irregular Cavalry at Matta, for which purpose he dispatched three companies of Gurkhas, and two of the Guides.

The only serious molestation of the force was on the 8th December when Saadat Khan, with four or five thousand Mohmands, appeared before Matta. When they arrived at a range of nine hundred yards the artillery opened fire, whereupon the Mohmands tried to get round the right flank but were stopped by the Guides.

One company of the Gurkhas and one of the Guides were sent forward in skirmishing order, supported by two squadrons of cavalry. The enemy then fell back into the lower hills where they were protected by a nala in front. As they could not be attacked there, and could not be lured out of their position, the action died out.

There was no loss on the British side, though the enemy suffered somewhat from the fire of the two guns at Matta. At the beginning of January 1852 there was still one company of the Gurkhas at Matta which, with one of the 53rd Foot, and the 2nd Irregular Cavalry, held the place. After leaving military posts at Michni and Matta, what remained of the little field force, including three companies of the 66th Gurkhas, returned to Peshawar.

The regiment was out again on the 11th March 1852, this time against the Ranizais, on the south side of the Malakand Pass.* Of this expedition we need give no details, as there was no fighting. The Ranizais gave in after the usual negotiations, and the force, again under Sir Colin Campbell, retired after marching to the foot of the Malakand Pass.

The trouble, however, was not ended; for the Ranizais repudiated their surrender, and left the hostages they had given to their fate.

This time the Akhund and the King of Swat were at the back of the Ranizais, and a much larger force, numbering three thousand two hundred and seventy of all arms, was employed. Besides the 66th Gurkhas,† there was one British Infantry Regiment (the

* See Map of North-West Frontier, Sheet I, in pocket at end of Volume.

† With a strength of six hundred rank and file, No. 7 company and recruits were left at Peshawar.

32nd), three Native Cavalry, and three Native Infantry, as well as eight guns, and a company of Sappers and Miners.

Before, however, the expedition against Swat started, it became necessary to punish the Utman Khel who, under Ajun Khan, had murdered a British official. Their villages were situated at the edge of the hills about Hashtnagar. The column, then only two thousand four hundred and fifty * strong, advanced to the Nowadun group of villages on the 11th May. Finding them abandoned, Sir Colin destroyed them and withdrew with trifling loss, having had no fighting beyond a little skirmishing at the outlying piquets of the Guides.

He then moved against Prangarh, a large village with the hills in rear and flanked by spurs and low hills. It had been prepared for defence and was, as well as the surrounding hills, occupied by large numbers of tribesmen.

The advance-guard being met by a heavy fire, the road was cleared by the artillery, whilst the 1st Punjab Infantry (which had just joined), the 66th Gurkhas, and the Guides advanced with such impetuosity that the artillery fire had to be stopped sooner than was intended. Sir Colin Campbell's report says: "The village was carried at a run, the enemy retreating to the hills behind, whence these inimitable skirmishers † drove them from rock to rock, far up the side of the high mountain, rendering the destruction of the village easy and safe. . . . The desultory fight then lasted till the object for which the Commissioner's requisition had been received, was effected—the destruction of the village and grain. Of the latter, a large quantity which had been stacked in a supposed place of safety high up the mountain was destroyed by our skirmishers. Considering that no less than ten pieces of artillery opened on this devoted village, it must be owned its people made a gallant defence. But for our guns, we should have sustained a very heavy loss, the works and flanking defences alluded to being formidable. As it is, the number of the wounded shows how the villagers held their ground as soon as the skirmishers had driven them beyond the range of artillery. The troops retired about 11 a.m., covered by a strong rear-guard in extended order, without further loss."

The total British loss was three killed and fifteen wounded. Of these the Gurkhas accounted for three sepoy wounded. The Indian Medal with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier" was granted in 1869 to all survivors of these operations.

Incidentally, during this expedition clear evidence of the complicity of the Akhund and the Padishah of Swat had been obtained, a question about which Sir Colin Campbell had had doubts which induced him to hesitate about attacking the Swatis. He now moved without hesitation towards Dargai and the Malakand Pass, through the Ranizai territory. ‡ On the 18th May he arrived before Skakote, or Iskakot, a large village into which many Swatis and fanatics had come to defend the valley. His description of the village is as follows:—

"Iskakote is placed between a very broad and deep nullah and the mountains. This nullah sweeps round in an arc from what was the left of our camp, and the march lay along the chord of it. About an hour after daylight, when two miles had been accomplished, Iskakote being two more distant, the enemy were discovered on one side of the

* 32nd Foot, 28th Native Infantry, 66th Gurkhas, each three hundred bayonets; Guides Infantry; two squadrons Cavalry; one battery Horse Artillery; two eight-inch howitzers, and a company of Sappers and Miners.

† He refers to the Gurkhas.

‡ See Map of North-West Frontier, Sheet I, in pocket at the end of Volume.

nullah, stretching in a continuous line to the village, which was their left, the ground they held on the margin of the nullah extending for about a mile and a half.

"The troops were then formed in lines of columns at quarter distance in the direction of the line of march, cavalry being sent to the left to watch the enemy's extreme right. The advance then took place by regiments from the right in open columns, the design being to break the enemy's centre with the horse artillery, and attack their whole left, which was on their line of retreat. This was accordingly done, and a sharp cannonade took place on the centre of their position from Captain Baldwin's troop, which, however, they stood with great firmness, availing themselves of the broken ground for protection.


"The two leading regiments—the Guides and 66th Ghoorkas—wheeled left into line and stormed the nullah, whilst the two nine-pounders opened fire, one to the front and one towards the village. This attack was supported by the light company of H.M.'s 32nd Regiment, and on the left by Captain Coke's Regiment of Punjab Infantry. This was very well done by the troops, the first assailants having to encounter a heavy fire maintained with much determination. A company of the Ghoorkas was engaged in hand-to-hand fight—a party of the enemy having actually charged into the centre of them."

The dispatch goes on to describe the action of the artillery in enfilading the nullah, and bombarding the village and a large burial ground, both full of the enemy, who then broke up, retiring partly to the hills behind the village, and partly towards the Malakand Pass, pursued by the fire of the guns. The enemy suffered very severe losses from both guns and cavalry, and the village, with two others, having been burned, the whole British force returned to its original camp at Shergarh.

Of his troops Sir Colin Campbell writes: "Nothing could be more satisfactory than the conduct of all, especially the Ghoorkas and Guides, on whom fell the brunt when rushing the assault. I am particularly happy in having been able to employ the 66th Ghoorka Regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel Troup, in an operation requiring all those qualities for which Ghoorkas are so justly famous." *

Sir Colin estimated the strength of the enemy at 6,000 men at least, who showed great resolution. The total British loss was eleven killed and twenty-nine wounded. Of these the Gurkha share was two N.C.O.s and six sepoy killed and six sepoy wounded. The proportion shows what a large share in the action they took.

* The Gurkhas have had no more enthusiastic admirer than Sir Colin Campbell, afterwards Lord Clyde. His opinion is of the highest value, as that of a leader of men in some of the most desperate struggles in the Peninsula (notably the storm of San Sebastian), besides being a leader of wide experience in Indian warfare.



ISKAKOT.

For his gallant conduct in this action, Sepoy Lal Sing Nagri received (in 1854) the Order of Merit, and in 1869 the Indian Medal and "North-West Frontier" clasp were awarded to all survivors of these operations.

On the 22nd May 1852 a detachment, including three hundred bayonets of the 66th Gurkhas, was sent to destroy the village of Hiro Shah. Though strong by its situation and surrounded by a loopholed wall, it had been evacuated by its inhabitants, who had retired to the neighbouring hills within matchlock range. It was only after the village had been destroyed and the troops were returning to camp, that fire was opened on them from the hills and lasted till they were back in the plain. The retirement was conducted slowly and in perfect order without loss.

After this the field force was broken up and in September the Ranizais submitted. The regiment was back in Peshawar on the 1st June 1852.

New Colours were received on the 29th August 1852. On the 2nd October Nos. 5 and 7 Companies (Lieutenants Barker and Swetenham and Ensign Macintyre) marched to garrison Michni Fort, and Nos. 8 and 9 (Lieutenant Clay and Ensign Ruxton) went to Shabkadr. These detachments returned to Peshawar, on relief by the 15th Native Infantry, on the 29th December 1852 and 7th January 1853.

At the end of November, part of the regiment again took the field; five companies of a strength of eleven British, twelve Gurkha Officers, and five hundred and ninety-one rank and file, under the command of Captains Garstin and Ross. They formed part of a field force, under Colonel Boileau, whose mission was to proceed up the Bori Valley * against the Jowakis and, in the words of the Government Order, "to inflict punishment upon them (as well as any other clans who may make common cause with them during the expedition) for making raids into British territory."

The other troops in this column were H.M.'s 22nd Regiment, the Guides, the 20th Native Infantry, one squadron 7th Irregular Cavalry, a mountain battery, two nine-pounder guns, and Sappers and Miners.

In the early morning of the 29th November, the column marched from Bazid Khel, where they were covering the construction of Fort MacKeson. Of the 66th Gurkhas, two hundred were with the rear-guard, the rest with the main body.

The first five or six miles of the road to the Shergasha Pass leading into the Bori Valley was level, but the last mile was through ravines and low hills.

The Pass was not defended by the Afridis, and the top of it was reached about 10.30 a.m., a small reserve having been left at the foot, and a turning movement having proved not to be required.

Leaving a small post on the summit, the column descended into the Bori Valley. It was intended, after completing the work of destruction, to withdraw from the valley by the Taruni entrance, a little beyond the farthest of the Bori villages. The Commissioner had assured Colonel Boileau of the neutrality of Taruni, which was in the gorge leading from the valley.

The spurs commanding the main portion of the Bori villages were crowned by Lieutenant Hodson with three companies of Guides, and by Lieutenant Turner with another company of Guides and twenty-five men of the Gurkhas. This latter body had *en route*, after advancing across the valley, taken the nearest of the villages, and driven

* The Bori Valley is south of the Khyber Pass.

a few Afridis up the hill in front of them. Under artillery fire the village was completely evacuated by the enemy and its fort was fired by the British.

Meanwhile, the 22nd Regiment and two detachments of Gurkhas under Lieutenants C. C. G. Ross and J. A. Law, covered by artillery fire, had attacked the other two villages, driven out the Afridis and fired them. The Afridis had made very little resistance on the level ground of the valley, and reserved themselves for defence on the hills behind the villages. Here they were joined by many men from their own and neighbouring clans, and put up a very strong defence, threatening at any moment to turn it into a counter-attack. The severest fighting was for the central hill, against which Lieutenant Turner's column, which included the twenty-five Gurkhas, advanced.

On the peak of this hill the Afridis had made an enormously strong position behind a breastwork, and in front of it Turner was held up under a shower of bullets and stones. There was no advancing without reinforcements, and retirement before a set of desperate Afridis, ready at the first show of hesitation to attack, would have been fatal. There was nothing for it but to hold on as best they might and call for help.

Hodson, seeing Turner's distress, sent him a company of Guides who were unable to reach him. Then two companies of Gurkhas were sent up in succession from the main body. At last, the terrible breastwork was carried with the greatest gallantry by the Gurkhas and the few men Turner had with him. According to the official account, this attack was led by Asst.-Surgeon R. Lyell of the Guides.

It was now nearly 3 p.m., the destruction of the villages had been completed, and there was not much time in which to retire from the valley before darkness fell. The main body was assembled in the valley, and the Guides were skilfully withdrawn from the hills by Lieutenant Hodson. This movement was covered by a party of Gurkhas under Lieutenant Ross, and two mountain guns. These Gurkhas and the Guides then formed the rearguard for the retirement by Taruni. This village stands on an isolated hill between two roads of exit. The main body passed by the lower road, whilst two companies of the 22nd Foot formed a right-flank guard of skirmishers on the upper. The left flank was protected by the detachment left at the Shergasha Pass, which moved along the hills parallel to the main body which it rejoined at Taruni. The gorge at Taruni was a great danger if the Taruni and other friendly Afridis who thronged the hills failed to keep their word. But they did not fail, and even warned the Bori men off pursuit in their territory.

Night fell as the force of seventeen hundred men emerged from the Taruni Pass on to the plain, and it was not till eleven p.m. that the last of it reached camp. They had been for eighteen hours marching, climbing, and fighting.

Colonel Boileau's dispatch, speaking of the capture of the heights, says it was "effected with a dashing gallantry which nothing could surpass; the Gurkhas and Guides fighting step by step, it is hard to say which was foremost."

The total loss of the British force was eight killed and thirty-one wounded; the Gurkha casualties were, one N.C.O. and three sepoy killed, one Gurkha Officer and nine sepoy wounded.

The regiment appears to have carried the new Colours which it had received on the 29th August.

These Bori operations were among those for which, in 1869, the Indian Medal with "North-West Frontier" clasp was awarded to survivors.

In July 1853 companies were again in garrison at Fort Michni and Shabkadr.

The regiment took part in no more frontier expeditions till, on the 16th January 1854, it marched from Rawal Pindi, where it remained quietly garrisoning Fort Attock and Murree for over a year. Reference to Ensign Gepp's letters from Murree of the 12th and 27th June 1855 (printed at the end of this chapter) will show the arrangements regarding residence in the summer, at that station, which it had been proposed to make the regimental Head-quarters.

In March 1855 five companies, with a strength of seven British, ten Gurkha Officers, and five hundred and sixty-four other ranks, were again on active service in the Miranzai Valley.*

The force employed on this occasion was under Brigadier-General Neville Chamberlain, who had just been appointed to command the Punjab Frontier Force, and comprised, in addition to the wing of the 66th Gurkhas, two Punjab Infantry Regiments, the Sind Rifles, 4th Punjab Cavalry, and nine light field guns, with the usual detachment of Sappers and Miners. The expedition aimed at bringing the Miranzais into order, clearing their territory of the many ruffians who had collected there, and getting in the Miranzai revenue, which was three years in arrears. As far as might be compatible with these objects, the Miranzais were not to be punished or their villages destroyed.

On the whole, the expedition was a pleasant picnic for the troops; the weather, as described by Neville Chamberlain in a letter,† was delightful. A little firing by night on the piquets hardly disturbed the force, and it was only on the 30th April that there was some fighting with 4,000 "Ghazis" from other tribes. In this the show belonged to the 4th Punjab Cavalry and 1st Punjab Infantry. The Gurkhas appear not to have been called on to participate.

Returning from this "promenade militaire" through the Miranzai Valley, the force reached Thal on the 6th May, remained there till the 17th, and on the 21st was broken up at Kohat. Survivors of these operations in due course received the Indian Medal with "North-West Frontier" clasp. The 6th October again saw a wing (British Officers six, Gurkha Officers twelve, rank and file six hundred and eighty) of the regiment, commanded by Captain Strachey, in the field.

Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 Companies again formed part of a force, under General Neville Chamberlain, of larger dimensions than that of 1855, since it included five Punjab Infantry Regiments. The object of the expedition was to punish the Turis, with whom a settlement had been made during the halt at Thal in May 1855. These people were really subjects of the Afghan Government, but as that Government could not, or would not, stop their raids into British territory, it became necessary for the British to do so.

The force assembled at Kohat numbered nearly five thousand men.* It marched on the 21st October 1856, reaching Hangu next day, and by the 24th was at Kai the border village between Upper and Lower Miranzai. The Miranzai villages had paid their revenue and were perfectly peaceful in their behaviour; but it was found that many of their criminals had taken refuge in the Zaimukht village of Torawari which, having been treated with great leniency in 1855, of course attributed it to weakness, and looked upon itself as impregnable.

The village was surprised and surrounded before daybreak on the 22nd October, and,

* See Map of North-West Frontier in pocket at end of Volume.

† Forrest's *Life of Sir Neville Chamberlain*, p. 301.

with a loss of only two sepoy wounded in it, the Zaimukhts were compelled to an ignominious surrender, and to hand over the criminals they had harboured. There was no fighting worth mention, and it is not clear if the Gurkhas were with the part of the column which surprised Torawari, or with the rest marching on Nariab, at which place the force remained till the 4th November, when it marched to Thal and proceeded against the Turis beyond the Kurram River.

It would be beyond the province of this record to follow the wanderings of the force in the Kurram Valley. No opposition was offered, there was not even any firing into the camp at night, and the valley was visited right up to the Peiwar Kotal. The troops returned to Thal, where, on the 5th December, four grasscutters were murdered, and it became necessary to punish the village responsible for the murder. An overwhelming display of force, in which the Gurkhas are mentioned as taking part, resulted in the submission of the village without any fighting. The force was broken up on return to Kohat at the end of December 1856.

On the 1st January 1857, on relief by the Kumaon Battalion, the regiment started from Rawal Pindi on the long march to its newly appointed station, Almora, where it arrived on the 17th March.

EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS FROM ENSIGN GEPP TO HIS PARENTS AND OTHERS FROM HIS JOINING 66TH GURKHAS IN FEBRUARY 1855 TO HIS DEATH IN 1858.

KOHAT, 25th March 1855.

On the 10th of this month we received intelligence that a Seik corps, which was stationed at a place called Hazara in the Hills, had received orders to go out on an expedition to assist one of two Rajahs who were fighting and we (i.e. a wing and the Head-quarters of the 66th) were to have taken the place of the Seik corps on the 11th of this month; but on the 12th came a counter order to the effect that a wing of the 66th, commanded by the senior captain, would march towards Kohat to join a force composed of the Punjab Irregulars commanded by Brigadier Chamberlain. Now (as I have not yet passed my drill) I should have been included in the first expedition, but, as in the second the Head-quarters were omitted, I should have properly remained behind. But, not liking the idea of being put on the shelf and remaining inactive whilst my brother officers were on "active service," I went to our Colonel and volunteered to go, and he immediately gave me permission, so that five other officers, viz., Captain Garstin (commanding), Lieuts. Hockley and Miles, Ensigns Havelock and Sweny, my unworthy self, and a wing of the gallant Goorkhas, after nine marches from Rawal Pindi arrived here on the 20th March 1855 being the first regulars that have ever honoured Kohat with their presence. Our red coats were quite a novelty to the Punjab Irregulars who are clothed in what they call "Khaki," i.e., cotton cloth of dark stone colour.

The object of the expedition was to chastise some refractory Hill Tribes (Afreedies), who for the last two or three years have refused most steadfastly to acknowledge our authority and pay tribute. Our only means of enforcing the former and securing the latter is to go up into their hills, burn their crops and destroy their villages, but as some of their villages are fortified and large, it is not likely that they would allow anyone quietly to destroy their houses when behind their walls they have so good a chance of *potting* an enemy without being hit themselves. A good large force is therefore required,

and it will consist of three or four Irregular Punjab Regiments, one Regiment of Irregular Punjab Cavalry, a mountain train of 9 guns and ourselves. The place where their villages are is about 70 miles from here in the hills, and at present it is quite uncertain when we shall start—some say the 29th, some the 3rd, some the 10th, but the sooner it is the better, as the weather is now getting warm, and will be dreadfully hot before we return for living in tents. We are at present waiting for a wing of an Irregular Seik Regiment, which ought to have arrived here long ago, from Peshawar to garrison this place during the absence of the Punjab Regiments. On first arriving here we were very much disgusted by being told we were to help to garrison this place whilst the Punjaubees went out on the expedition. We now hope and believe this will not be the case, for we should consider it a great insult that Regulars, and especially "the Goorkhas," should be left behind to do "chokeedaree" (i.e., policeman's work) as we call it, whilst Irregulars, and especially the Punjaubees, were sent to fight our country's battles. But at the same time it will be a marked compliment to the well-known fighting qualities of the Goorkhas to have been selected in preference to the 51st at Rawal Pindi, and the numerous regiments which are at Peshawar and only three, instead of nine, marches from Kohat. And another reason against our being preferred to the Peshawar Regiments is that all troops on this side of the Indus have extra "batta" amounting to nearly half as much more pay above what is usual, and I assure you our government, like every government, takes an extraordinary amount of care of the £ s. d. in these matters, though in many other affairs unconnected with the military it appears to be equally foolishly lavish. Nothing however is known for certain and when the Brigadier arrives here from Peshawar (he ought to have arrived here yesterday, but "*secundum morem*" of all these "bigwigs" who are never punctual, was not forthcoming) I suppose we shall know our fate. It is very possible that these refractory hill gentlemen may change their minds and "come down with the tin" as the vulgar expression is, in which case we should not participate in the present honour and glory (though a very small share of it) of our sister service.

26th. The Brigadier arrived last night and they say the Seiks will arrive to-day or to-morrow so this looks like business. Major Edwards, of Mooltan celebrity, and a Deputy Quartermaster-General of the Army are both to accompany the expedition.

This morning early the battery of Horse Artillery (which is to accompany us) made an experiment upon a wall made of mud and rock twelve feet high and five feet broad at the base, tapering up to two feet at the top, at the distance of between three hundred and four hundred yards. This wall was about the dimensions of those which surround the villages we are to attack. After firing about six or seven rounds of shot and shell at the wall the breach was considered practicable. The Brigadier was present at the experiment and appeared satisfied with it. He is quite a young man for his rank, and only a captain in his own corps. He is a man of a fair complexion, and his external appearance does not give one the idea of a man of commanding talents; he has seen, however, I believe, a good deal of service, and possesses powerful interest, to which circumstances he owes his present position. The authorities in this part of the world appear to be making the most of this expedition. My brother officers, who have seen so much of this hill warfare, quite deride the idea of the possibility of the hillmen bringing a force sufficiently powerful to cope with us, and predict that we shall not see a shot fired. In this, however, I think the authorities show their prudence, for there can be no doubt it is better to overawe them than to fight them. . . .

1st April. It appears to be quite determined that we leave this to-morrow; Captain Coke, who commands an Irregular Force here, and who also possesses the civil authority, tells us that all the hill tribes have succumbed and that we shall merely go upon a tour of inspection and survey. If the weather proves but cool, it will be a very pleasant trip, as I am told the scenery in some parts is very grand. We have adopted the Irregular costume as being on all points the most advantageous for hill warfare. My dress is simply a "Karkee" (stone coloured) tunic buttoned up to the throat, a collar and a black tie, "Karkee" trousers and a helmet-shaped "solar topee" also covered with "Karkee" cloth.

THE CAMP, NURIAB, *22nd April* 1855.

You will see by the heading of my letter that we are at a village called Nuriab, where we arrived on Wednesday last, the 18th. We have only two more marches to accomplish before "righting about," and we expect, with the time that we shall remain before the villages, that this will be about a fortnight longer, and we hope to be in Pindee again in rather less than three weeks from that time. Almost every night the piquets have been fired upon; sometimes more than one hundred shots have been expended; but as our piquets are behind "sungars" (i.e. barricades composed of mud, stones and wood) no harm has been done to them, and the only man of the villagers who has been wounded, that we know of, is a "Mullick's" (head man of a village) son who was wounded one night in the knee and is now said to be dying. Last night I was woke by firing, and was surprised that it was so close as I could hear the bullets whizzing at no great distance from my tent. In the morning a bullet was picked up in the middle of our "bazar" (which is close to my tent) which had gone very close to a "havildar's" head. It was a two-grooved rifle ball, and by this we discovered that by some mistake (we must hope that it was a mistake)* the sentries had been fired upon by the piquets, which are generally about four hundred yards in advance of them. Three of our men owned this morning that they had fired upon the cavalry piquet and were immediately put into the quarter-guard, but they said they had been fired upon first by them. No doubt there will be a Court of Enquiry, and I trust the result may turn out more favourably to both parties than the present circumstances appear to be. This force is composed of so many nations, and of such various tribes, all or many of whom have been in former times antagonistic to each other, that it requires the strictest discipline and the greatest tact in all those in authority to keep such a heterogeneous mass under proper control.

In the first place, in this force there is the wing of our regiment which, with the exception of a few Hillmen, is composed entirely of "Goorkhas," who are the inhabitants of a mountainous district in Nepaul (from which they take their name) "Goorkha"; then there are the Punjuab Regiments, horse and foot, which are composed of "Seiks," Punjaubees, Hillmen from this part of the world, and I believe also of Bengalees; then there is the Scinde Rifle Corps which is composed of "Scindians," Bombay men, and others, etc., etc. Throughout these numerous nations their outward appearance, their customs and habits, their physical distinctions, ideas and beliefs there exists as great and even greater difference as there is between the different nations of Europe.

28th April. We have just arrived at a village called Dassamund. As we left Nuriab

* It was quite accidental.

this morning at 4.15, we shall remain here, I believe, about a week, and then march to Tull, which is the limit of our territories, from which place we shall move home. The Brigadier says that if there is no opposition shown at Tull, he will allow us to return by ourselves, in advance of the force, after we have been at Tull for a day or so, and I trust this may be the case, as by this means we shall escape more than a week of living under canvas, which will soon begin to be most oppressively hot.

THULL, 7th May 1855.

We have at last come to the end of our tether. We left our last halting place, Dassamund, yesterday morning at 4 o'clock a.m., where we had been eight days. . . . This has not been quite a bloodless expedition, as on 29th April last we saw a quantity of fires on the hills at night about a mile and a half from the camp, which usually portends a visit from the inhabitants of the hills. The next morning, by the aid of our glasses, we discovered a large force of them, between fifteen hundred and two thousand, defiling along the hills with four standards, a green one, which is their sacred colour and signified that they considered themselves Gazees and were determined either that themselves should be martyrs, or bring in the head of an unbeliever. About 10 o'clock in the morning we could see them waving their "tulwars" and daring us to attack them, but finding that we were not to be moved from the plain, where we always have the advantage on our side, about ten hundred of them, headed by a white and red standard, descended into the plain with a view to cut off one of our cavalry pickets. In order that they might be induced to venture farther into the plains, and that in consequence we might cut more of them off from the hills where they were comparatively safe, no movement was made to support the piquet, which was about a mile from the camp, until the hillmen had actually fired upon them. Then a troop of cavalry and one company of the 1st Punjaub Rifles were dispatched to their assistance. Uncle Edward's kind present then proved most valuable to me, for by its assistance I had a beautiful view of the skirmish. The instant the hillmen saw the reinforcement sent out, they retreated as fast as their legs could carry them to a small hill. In their progress there, however, many of them paid with their lives for their temerity in attacking us on our own ground. On this hill they peppered into the cavalry for about five minutes, but by this time the Infantry had been able to come to the aid of the cavalry, and before this handful of men (only eighty) these cowardly hillmen turned tail and ran, occasionally however turning round and exchanging shots with the 1st who pursued them to the very top of the highest hills, and in about two hours not a man was visible. We had a few horses killed and men wounded; none killed. They lost about seventeen killed.

15th May. Since that little fight we have not been disturbed at all. I fancy it had a most salutary effect. We have been at this place, Thull, eight days already, and we hope most heartily that we may march to-morrow homeward bound. . . . Latter was the full colonel of our regiment, and all the full colonels, with the exception of a few who are on staff employ in this country, always live at home and draw £1,000 a year. His death will give us a line step—not a Regimental one. Colonels and Lieut.-Colonels are not exactly Regimental officers with respect to steps, as we only get a line step by their death or retirement. The average of a line step in a Regiment is about one in every six years for each Regiment.

THE FLATS NEAR MURREE, 12th June 1855.

There is a regular cantonment here marked out for us; large heaps of stones are collected together as government intended at one time to build barracks here and send the whole Regiment up here as a permanency, but unfortunately for us the idea has been abandoned. The cantonment is called the Flats, as being the only flat spot, for many miles round, and is a little more than three miles from Murree Hill, where almost all the houses are built. . . . By the by, speaking of Goorkhas, do you know that Regimentally you have been for the last three or four months most desperately insulting my dignity by two very simple letters, viz., N.I. affixed to the Regimental designation, and even if I have mentioned this before you must forgive the repetition and indulge my (I may say our) conceit whilst I inflict upon you a panegyric on the excellencies of "The Goorkhas" in general, and their undoubted superiority to the rest of the Indian Army. In the first place, I must tell you that about five years ago, during the commander-in-chiefship of Sir Charles Napier, a 66th Regiment of Native Infantry N.I. really existed. One day on parade, the men, in consequence of some dissatisfaction about extra batta in the Punjaub, which had just been cut down, showed some manifest feelings of a mutinous spirit, such as shuffling with their feet and behaving themselves in a disrespectful way. As there was at that time a somewhat rebellious spirit in the whole army, Sir C. Napier, immediately that this was reported to him, determined to make an example of the 66th, and disbanded them. A local corps which had been raised in the Goorkha country, which is a province of Nepaul, immediately volunteered for the line; their services were accepted and they were designated by G.O.C.-in-C. The 66th or Goorkha Regiment. They have therefore no right to be called Native Infantry, as they are not natives of Hindustan, but of a mountainous district in Nepaul. Like all mountain people they are very brave, and in all the engagements that they have been in, have behaved themselves well. They do not bear the slightest resemblance to a Hindustani, being very short, very stoutly made and powerful little men, their features approach more in caste to that of the Chinese than the Hindustani. When we invaded their country the bravery with which they defended it is proverbial, and it was only the other day that Major Edwards told us he considered them the best troops in India. They were Sir Colin Campbell's pet corps when he commanded at Peshawar, for never did an expedition leave that place without the Goorkhas accompanying it; he said he could not do without them. Our Colonel has received numerous letters from many celebrated military personages of the esteem in which they hold them. In religion they are Hindus, but far less bigoted than the ordinary Hindu, as they will eat and drink anything; they get on capitally with Europeans, and associate with, but do not condescend to mix with N.I.'s. I am sure that there is not a more celebrated corps in the world, as since the visit of the Nepaulese Ambassador to England, who was a Goorkha, of course every one has heard of them. I fear you will be quite tired of hearing their praises sung, but you must forgive my regimental esprit de corps. What good news the last mail brought us about Sebastopol—I have the honour, too, of being transformed into an Ensign or Standard or Flag, not only in India but all over the world, which is certainly an advantage. I dare say the "Queen's" will be rather jealous, though I think it is only what we deserve.

MURREE, 27th June 1855.

The first detachment of our corps comes up here in May, remains here two months, and is then relieved by another detachment from the Regiment; that again, is relieved at the end of another two months, so that all the Regiment, by degrees, has the benefit of the hill climate and escaping the hot months in turn. Three officers, one to each company, are sent up with each detachment; at present I am a supernumerary officer, as there are three up here besides myself, and plenty more up for a month's leave, which the Colonel of a Regiment is always allowed to give his officers every six months. . . . As we take a great deal of pride in our drums and fifes new ones are occasionally required; we have increased their number to thirty-two lately. Government only pays for about half that number of drums and fifes. I will tell you what my expenses are monthly, that you may see a poor Ensign does not get too well paid. My mess bill, at the lowest, comes to 80 rupees, house rent about 30, servants' wages in the cold weather 33, in the hot weather (when three coolies to pull the punkha day and night are necessary) 42, food, etc., for horse 6, moonshi 16, subscriptions to book club, billiards, etc., about 10 rupees; this amounts to 174 rupees in the cold weather; when the coolies are necessary to 183 rupees, and all the pay which I really receive in consequence of the numerous cuttings for donations and subscriptions to different funds is 184 rupees, so that in the hot weather, if you are in a house of your own and are studying with a moonshi, you have positively nothing with which you can meet the various little expenses which must occur. These are the expenses which every Ensign so high up the country as we are is obliged to incur, and I am sure I do not wonder that so many of them are in debt, and this is one great reason why I should like to march to Almorah this "Relief" as in consequence of its being so much nearer Calcutta (the expense of carriage in this country being enormous) our mess bills would be reduced by between 20 and 30 rupees, and we should get excellent houses at very moderate rents. I am sure if we don't march I have not the slightest idea where I shall live when I leave Troup's house, as there is not a single empty house at Pindee and there have been several fresh arrivals there; my only chance will be when (in November) three of my brother officers go on command for three months to a fort at Attock, a place about half-way between this and Peshawar; but even then they will most likely leave their wives behind them, and therefore be unable to let their houses, but I trust something will turn up before that time. In about fifteen months, however, I hope to have charge of a company, which will give me about 50 rupees per mensem extra, and if we are stationed at a "down country" Hill Station, I shall be able to manage famously.

RAWUL PINDEE, 16th July 1855.

I am sorry to see by the papers that we are soon to wear the new uniform, as my dress coat and my blue frock coat will in consequence be useless. The new red coatee is I hear hideous, and the chaco still worse. I can't imagine what they mean by making us appear, on state occasions or in a ballroom, dressed like superannuated whippers-in.

RAWUL PINDEE, 22nd October 1855.

Troup leaves us on the 15th of next month, as he is going home on sick certificate; he will not return to India again, as he will take his furlough at the end of three years and shortly afterwards he will get the actual command of a Regiment, and be able to

live at home a gentleman at large on £1,000 or £1,100 per annum. He has been a fortunate man as he is not now much more than fifty years old and has commanded this regiment for more than ten years, half of which time he was only a Major. The command allowance is £480 per annum, of course independent of pay. He has been very kind to me.

RAWUL PINDEE, *7th December* 1855.

Macausland is unable to order any parades, so that at present, with the exception of the Regimental duty, which comes round to me every third day, and a weekly inspection parade, I am leading a life of "otium cum dig." But I fancy when Macausland does get the Regiment together he will give us plenty of employment. I like what I have seen of our new Colonel; he appears to be a very gentlemanly man, and perfectly understands, I think, how to keep a Regiment in order; he is very lame and hobbles very much when walking, in consequence of a wound he received in the knee in some action—I think it was at the Battle of "Sobraon"—but this defect does not matter much with a mounted officer.

RAWUL PINDEE, *24 March* 1856.

A detachment, under Graves and Havelock, of three companies has been garrisoned there (at Attock) for nearly six months. The rule is that our regiment takes it in the cold weather, and the other unfortunate regiment which happens to be stationed here with us takes it in the hot season, whilst we enjoy ourselves at Murree; this appears to be rather unfair towards the other Regiment, but it is one of the advantages which accrue to a Goorkha Regiment.

RAWUL PINDEE, *6th April* 1856.

Many of our men are just starting towards their homes on a furlough of nine months. Fifteen out of every company are allowed to take advantage of it any year, and as many of them cannot afford to go, some of the turns of some of them come round about every fifth year, so that you see they are more favoured in this respect than we are.

RAWUL PINDEE, *29th August* 1856.

We shall, I suppose, arrive at Almorah either in the beginning of February or end of January; most probably there will be snow on the ground; won't it be delightfully co-o-o-old; I almost shiver when I think of it.

One of the great disadvantages of Almorah is that the regiment will be obliged to furnish a detachment consisting of four companies to a place in the hills about forty miles from Almorah called Petoraghur; of course four officers will be sent in command of them.

CAMP, KASUR, *25th January* 1857.

I must now revert again to Thull (where I left myself preparing to set out on a secret expedition which proved to be to punish a tribe of our old friends of the year before, the Wazeers, who had attacked some wretched grasscutters, killing two and wounding a third in a most dreadful manner). We marched that morning into the Wazeery country for about eight miles, where we halted for some time; the Brigadier and part of the cavalry had gone on ahead, when we heard some firing and soon received orders to

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advance. We went on about five miles farther when we saw a quantity of men on the hills above us. Our guide led us on still farther, till we arrived at the extremity of a range of mountains, amongst which the Wazeery villages are scattered; there we found the Brigadier and cavalry, and learned that one man had been shot through the leg, and that the Brigadier himself had had a very narrow escape of being shot also. The Wazeery who fired was immediately cut down. Up the extremity of this hill we were ordered to go—Macintyre in command of the Minié rifles, led the way. I came next with a company to support him, then a company of two-grooved rifles under Sweney, and the rest of the detachment. We were ordered not to fire unless they attacked us, which suggestion was almost superfluous, for as we advanced they “made themselves scarce.” We went along as fast as we could over the tops of the hills for about four miles, when we came to some villages, or rather encampments, for they do not merit the former term, being merely tents made of camel’s hair cloth. These Wazeers are a species of gipsy, as they have no fixed dwelling place. In the cold weather, driven out by the snow from Caubul, they descend to warmer valleys where they pitch their tents, cultivate the ground, and find grazing grounds for their cattle. At the end of the cold weather, when their crops are ripe, they gather them in and convey the grain upon camels to Caubul where they sell it and lead, I imagine, a life of ease during the hot weather. But I must return to my story. At this encampment we halted, the cavalry and mountain train guns joined us, they having taken a more circuitous route than ourselves. We found only a few women and some cattle about their encampment. The Brigadier and a few “sowars” rode on and joined another regiment which had been posted at the opposite extremity of the hills. There was one also at the base, so that the Wazeers were completely surrounded. When the Brigadier returned we learned that the expedition had been quite successful, and that the murderers of the grasscutters had been secured. We then, by a short cut, made the best of our way back again to camp, reaching it about dusk rather disgusted at such a fuss being made about a few cowardly Wazeeries, and very glad to find a good dinner awaiting our arrival, as we had eaten little or nothing the whole day.

ALMORAH, *2nd May* 1857.

I suppose that I shall be ordered to go to Lohughat in a few days.

CHAPTER V
THE MUTINY OF 1857
1857-1859

WE have now come to the year of the great Mutiny. We have already mentioned the outbreak of insubordination in the New Nasiri Battalion at Jutogh, and showed that it was in no way sympathetic to that of the Hindustani troops, a fact which was recognized by the Government in maintaining the New Nasiri Battalion till the Indian Army reorganization of 1861. Whether the opportunity was then taken to disband the regiment on account of the occurrences of 1857 we do not know, but it is not surprising that, when the whole army was in the melting pot, it should have shared the fate of some other irregular corps.

What the feeling over the famous greased cartridges question was in the three old battalions, the 66th Gurkhas, the Sirmur and the Nasiri Battalions, is shown by a very interesting memorandum by Lieutenant D. Macintyre,* who was, with a squad of the 66th, at the musketry school at Umballa early in 1857. He writes as follows:—

“In the beginning of 1857, when the Indian Government proposed issuing the Enfield rifle to all the troops, British and Native, a party of the regiment was sent down from Almorah to the School of Musketry at Umballa for instruction in the new arm.

“The feeling that existed amongst the men of all the parties sent down from Native regiments, their refusal to use the greased cartridges, or even those without any grease, and the popular idea at the time that the cartridges were one of the causes of the Mutiny of 1857, are now matters of Indian History. All the Gurkha squads, three in number (i.e. the 66th Gurkhas, Sirmoor and Nasiri † Battalions) were placed together, under Lieutenant Donald Macintyre, and encamped with details from other native regiments.

“After being encamped for some time with the Native Infantry details, a request was made by the Gurkhas, through one of their own officers, to be allowed to pitch their tents with those of the British soldiers. The reason stated for this was that they did not like being mixed up with the ‘Kala Log,’ as they called the Native Sepoys, whom they reported as showing a very bad feeling in their conversations regarding the use of the greased cartridges. At the same time, they requested that these cartridges might be served out to them, in order to show the Poorbiahs that they had no fellow feeling with them in the cartridge question.

“Upon the above being represented to the Commandant, Colonel Greathed, 8th King’s Regiment, he expressed his satisfaction at their conduct and at once permitted them to encamp with the British soldiers.

“On the latter completing their course, and when the range became available, greased cartridges were served out to the Gurkhas, at their own request, though ungreased ones

* Afterwards General Donald Macintyre, V.C., of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles.

† The New Nasiri Battalion formed at Jutogh.

were available had they wished for them, and they went through the complete course of firing.

"As an example of the good spirit in which the practice was carried out, it may be mentioned that on occasions when odd bundles of ungreased cartridges were accidentally served to them they were at once returned with the jocular remark that they were for the Kala Log.

"On completing their course of instruction on the 6th April 1857, the party returned to Head-quarters, and were thought none the less of by their comrades for having used the greased cartridges." *

This shows the loyalty of the three old regiments who never faltered in their fidelity to the British Government whose salt they ate.

The news of the Mutiny at Meerut on the 10th May 1857 only reached Almora five days later. The following extract from a letter written by General Sir Rowley Sale-Hill in 1899 describes the course of the earlier events at Almora :—

"We were giving a ball in the Mess House one night when the news of the Meerut Mutiny and massacre arrived, which of course created a great shock and sensation. After this there was a considerable amount of uneasy feeling and disaffection manifested by the native population in the vicinity, and the budmashes of the bazaars disturbed the community by noises at night, throwing stones into compounds, and manifesting a disrespectful demeanour to the gentlemen and ladies of the station.

"I remember also a fakir being arrested one night in the Mess compound, in an outhouse in which he had been sleeping, and being waked up at night, and hearing the Colonel and Adjutant with some men effecting this arrest. This man had the previous day been very busy going about the lines of the Regiment and bazaar preaching disaffection and mutiny, and had entered the Civil Court and abused the Magistrate, and this gentleman could not get him seized as the native policemen were evidently disaffected and would not move in the matter. The next morning the fakir was tried by a Drum Head Court-Martial and sentenced to be hanged, and this was carried out the next morning on the parade ground before the whole Regiment. Shortly afterwards a havildar † of the Regiment reported to the Colonel that he had been in a grain-seller's shop in the bazaar, and had heard some men of the company of native artillery quartered in the Fort, discussing how on Sunday afternoon, when after church all the ladies and gentlemen would be walking on the Mall, they might be disposed of. They arranged that on the next Sunday they should all be murdered, and that if the Regiment resented it, or would not join them, they could open fire on them from the Fort with the guns, and as the barracks were full of women and children, they concluded they could overawe them. The Colonel promoted the Havildar to the rank of Native Officer on the spot, and at once detailed a company to seize the Fort early in the morning, when relief of guards took place and the gate of the Fort was open. This was effected by surprise, and without any resistance, by a company commanded by Lieutenant Macintyre and myself. The artillerymen were all seized and placed in the native gaol in irons. A mass of treasonable correspondence was found in their barracks, which placed their guilty intentions beyond doubt. A General Court-

* With reference, however, to the Mutiny in the New Nasiri Battalion at Jutogh, cf. p. 35.

† He was Havildar Boodea Ale. At the end of June he was promoted Jemadar "for bringing to light an intended mutiny in the Company of Artillery at Almora."

Martial was assembled for their trial, and owing to the soft-heartedness of some old retired generals who were members, a capital sentence was not pronounced on them. The ringleaders were, as well as I can remember, sentenced to penal servitude, and the remainder to be deported to gaols in the plains. The result was that the gaol being insufficiently guarded, and by disaffected policemen, they all escaped, and made their way to the plains, and joined the rebel forces which were in possession of the whole country (after the mutinies of Bareilly Moradabad, Shahjahanpore, etc.) to the foot of the Naini Tal Hills.* This Company of Artillery was Remington's, who was not at Almora himself at the time, I think. The guns were then manned by the men of my Regiment who were thoroughly instructed as gunners by some fugitive Artillery Officers from Bareilly."

The defence of Kumaon, and especially of Naini Tal, more exposed by its position than Almora, was of supreme importance. It was full of women and children and other refugees from the mutinies of Bareilly, Moradabad, and other places in Rohilkhand. Moreover, Mr. Inglis in his narrative of events at Bareilly remarks justly that "as long as the English held Naini Tal, Khan Bahadur Khan could never feel secure; it was consequently his constant object to get possession of the place."

After the defection of the artillery, the whole Garrison of Kumaon consisted of the 66th Gurkhas with a few officers and other refugees from the Rohilkhand districts. There were also the two guns of the artillery manned by Gurkhas.

On the 18th July it had been decided to raise a fresh Gurkha Regiment, and for this purpose Lieutenant D. Macintyre was deputed, with a nucleus of one subadar, eight jemadars, seven havildars, eight naicks, and nine sepoy. The Battalion which he raised at Pithoragarh and Lahughat is now the 1/4th P.W.O. Gurkha Rifles, and was in a very few months sufficiently trained to be able to relieve the 66th of many of the duties at Almora, and set them free for the active defence of Naini Tal. The present 4th Gurkhas are thus, it may be said, direct descendants of the 1st.

At first the 66th appear to have been divided between Almora, Naini Tal, Bhim Tal and the outposts of defence at the foot of the hills towards Bareilly, which were the real danger-point.

Soon after the 10th June hordes of dacoits from Rampore and Moradabad flocked into the "Bhabar" villages just below the hills, stealing cattle and doing damage of all sorts. As Major Ramsay had not sufficient forces to protect the whole of the Bhabar on the confines of Rohilkhand, he proposed to confine the defence to the neighbourhood of Haldwani on the Bareilly road, and arranged accordingly with Lieut.-Colonel McCausland commanding the 66th Gurkhas.†

It must be remembered that at this time the British authorities in Kumaon were entirely cut off from direct communication with those in the plains, though a dâk had been arranged through the hills between Naini Tal and Mussorrie. Naini Tal was so

* Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Ramsay, the Commissioner, reports, so many of these artillery men were sent into the jail that it was overcrowded, and he was compelled for this reason, and also by the shortage of coolies at Naini Tal, to release forty hillmen prisoners to work, on the promise that if they behaved well they would be pardoned. Ramsay's narrative says nothing about an outbreak in the jail, but it is clear there was one, no doubt led by the artillerymen, in September 1857. The regimental records show that, on the 3rd December 1857, Rs. 30 were awarded to Naick Kulia Bundari and Rs. 20 each to sepoy Balbir Rana, Kalu Thapa, Sambhir Brahman and Nur Sing Khattri. These were rewards from Government for these men's conduct in suppressing an outbreak in the Almora jail and recapturing several of the prisoners on the 16th September.

† McCausland was placed in command of the Kumaon Defence Force, his place in command of the 66th being temporarily filled by Captain C. C. G. Ross.

apprehensive of attack from Rampore in the end of July that the women and children were temporarily sent to Almora.

Haldwani, below the hills, was occupied by part of the 66th Gurkhas and some of the 8th Irregular Cavalry till the 6th September when the season was at its worst, and it being thought unadvisable to risk the health of such valuable troops, they were withdrawn to the hills.

After this the local police also withdrew to the entrance to the hills about Kathgodam. On the 17th September a rebel force, estimated by Major Ramsay at a thousand horse and foot, from Bareilly seized Haldwani, but were not allowed to retain it long. On the 18th they were attacked, thoroughly beaten, and driven out of the place by a British detachment sent down for the purpose.

The principal components of this victorious detachment were seventy of the 66th Gurkhas under Lieutenant and Adjutant Tytler, besides two guns served by the Gurkhas trained as artillerymen. These guns no doubt had a great effect on the rebels, who had none. Besides these, there were forty cavalry, under Captain Maxwell, consisting of refugee officers and some loyal men of the 8th Cavalry.

Khan Bahadur Khan, the Bareilly rebel chief, had sent Bani Mir in July to Baheri to make an attack on Naini Tal. But Bani Mir had done nothing beyond the raid of the 17th September, and at the beginning of October Khan Bahadur Khan sent up Ali Khan Mewati and Hafiz Kallan Khan, with another regiment and some cavalry, to reinforce and urge on Bani Mir. The latter returned to Bareilly and, on the 6th October, the new leaders advanced to the now unoccupied Haldwani, burnt it, and seized the canal buildings at Kathgodam at the mouth of the valley leading to Naini Tal. Major Ramsay's narrative estimates the rebel strength at five thousand.

The force was too strong to be attacked by the four companies of Gurkhas sent down under the command of Captain Ross of the 66th, but it was decided to attempt to cut up the cavalry part of it. Major Ramsay's narrative says that, although the attempt to secure the cavalry failed, the British force succeeded in so alarming the enemy that, fearing an attack, they were seized with panic, cut the heel ropes of their horses, and made off helter-skelter, leaving behind all their gram and some other property. In this affair the Gurkhas lost one man killed and one wounded. A rebel sowar was caught next morning and duly hanged. The rebel leader had been wounded in the affair of the 7th.

On the 18th December part of the detachment at Naini Tal moved down, under Captain Phillpotts, to a strong position on a ridge overlooking the plains. The rest remained at Naini Tal under Captain Ross.

Khan Bahadur Khan was furious at the ignominious defeat of this force, but it was not till the 1st January 1858 that a fresh attack was made on Haldwani, which had been reoccupied when the cold season began. It was now held by four companies of Gurkhas under Lieutenant Miles when a force of about two thousand rebels with two guns attacked it on the 1st January. The attack was repulsed, apparently without loss on the British side.

By this time the position in Kumaon had become much stronger. A contingent from Nepal had arrived, and the new Gurkha Regiment, raised by Macintyre, had made so much progress that it was able to take over a good many of the duties at Almora and, if necessary, to guard the Eastern passes. Moreover, all doubts as to the general loyalty of the Kumaon people were at an end. The Head-quarters of the 66th left Almora for

Haldwani on the 1st February, leaving only one company behind under Captain Strachey.

At one time Major Ramsay says disaffected persons from the plains had attempted to make mischief in Garhwal and he had to send a company of Gurkhas there from Almora for a short time, "but with the exception of some dacoities in the early part of the Mutiny Mr. Beckett's district (Garhwal), like Kumaon, remained perfectly well conducted and loyal."

Under these circumstances, it was possible to hold Haldwani with much larger forces than before, and on the 1st February 1858 Colonel McCausland of the 66th commanded there a force of a thousand infantry, two hundred and fifty cavalry, two six-pounders, and two mountain guns. Opposed to him were two rebel forces. That of Fazl Haq, from Pilibhit and the East, consisted of about four thousand five hundred men and four guns and was at Sanda which Major Ramsay describes as thirteen miles east of Haldwani. The other force, under Kale Khan from Bareilly, was about sixteen miles south on the Bareilly road. At first these two forces were reported to be disposed for a converging attack, and it was considered that, in the naturally strong ground at Haldwani, such an attack could best be met there. Presently, however, the enemy appeared to be making preparations for a united attack. Colonel McCausland determined therefore to fall upon Kale Khan before his junction with Fazl Haq.

At 11.30 p.m. on the 9th February he left Haldwani with a force in which were included five hundred of the 66th Gurkhas and two of their six-pounder guns under Captain Ross. Marching all night through the forest, they took Kale Khan by surprise early next morning at Charpura. The rebel strength was then estimated at four thousand to five thousand infantry, over a thousand cavalry, and four guns.

Colonel McCausland's force consisted of five hundred rifles of the 66th Gurkhas under Captain Ross, besides their two six-pounder guns, one hundred and fifty men of the Nepal Contingent, sixty of the Kumaon Levy and two hundred of the Rohilkhand Horse, in all seven hundred and ten infantry, two hundred cavalry and two guns.

The little force was before Charpura before daybreak where it found the enemy encamped in a strong position about nine hundred yards from the road which was commanded by his guns. His rear and left were protected by the Paha Nadi which circled round them. The only approach to his centre and right was over rough ground intersected by nalas and covered with thick jungle, grass, and bushes.

Some of the enemy's sowars came out to inquire if the new arrivals were Fazl Haq's force which was expected that morning. McCausland at once wheeled back his advanced guard of cavalry and fired a few rounds with his guns which drew a heavy reply. He then ordered Captain Ross to leave two companies of his Gurkhas to protect the guns, whilst with the rest, and Captain Baugh commanding the Nepal Contingent and the Kumaon Levy, he advanced against the enemy's right flank. He was supported by the Rohilkhand Horse.

Whilst this was going on there was a sharp duel between the artillery of the two forces in which the rebels' largest gun was disabled. As Ross approached the rebel guns were turned on him, whilst the two Gurkha guns did great execution in the hostile ranks. The 66th and the Nepalese advanced with great steadiness, firing rapidly. Nothing could check them, though they were heavily attacked by rebel cavalry and infantry. In an hour the rebel right flank had been broken in and the village taken by the infantry who swept along the line, capturing the four guns with a rush, killing all the artillerymen,

and putting the rest of the rebels to flight. The last shot was fired about 8 a.m. and the standing camp and baggage were fired. It was time to be off, for Fazl Haq's fresh and large force might arrive at any moment, and a fresh battle with it was not to be desired.

The British force marched at once for Haldwani, where it arrived soon after noon, having marched thirty-four miles and fought a severe action in thirteen hours. When the remnants of the enemy got back to Bareilly, Khan Bahadur Khan received them with the words—"You worthless cowards! You took ten days to march from Bareilly to Charpura, only two to come back after seeing the British troops." The day was a glorious one for the 66th Gurkhas, who lost, killed Lieutenant Gepp* and two men; wounded Lieutenant and Adjutant Tytler and eight men.

For their conduct in the fight Lieutenant Tytler received the Victoria Cross, the first gained in the regiment; Colonel McCausland a C.B., Captain C. C. G. Ross, commanding the regiment, a brevet majority, and Sepoy Jasbahadur Gurung the Order of Merit. The latter had been reported by Captain Ross for gallantry as had Quartermaster-Sergeant Delahoy.

Captain Ross' letter to the Brigade Major describes the act of bravery which merited for Lieutenant Tytler the coveted V.C., and also gives some account of the action itself. He writes: "On the attacking parties approaching the enemy's position on the occasion of the action at Choorpoorah on the 10th February last, Lieutenant Tytler dashed on horseback ahead of all, and alone rode up to the enemy's guns, where he remained engaged hand to hand until they were carried by us, and where he was shot through the left arm, had a spear wound in his chest, and a ball through the right sleeve of his coat."

The defeat at Charpura took away the rebel appetite for enterprises on the road to Naini Tal, and there was only one more small affair in this direction.

At the beginning of March 1858 a rebel party, dispatched to collect revenue in the

* The following inscription on a mural tablet in St. Mary's Parish Church, Chelmsford (now Chelmsford Cathedral), speaks for itself:—

Erected to the Memory of
 THOMAS SYDNEY GEPP
 Lieutenant in the 66th or Ghorka Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry.
 Son of Thomas Morgan and Mary Lane Gepp
 of this place.
 He died on the 12th February 1858 at HALDWANI,
 near NAINI TAL, in the EAST INDIES
 of wounds received in action with the rebels
 of ROHILKHAND, at CHARPURA,
 on the 10th of the same month, in the 23rd year of his age,
 and is buried at NAINI TAL.

This Tablet was erected by order of his Brother Officers in India.

"His gallantry was most conspicuous, and the
 admiration of all His Brother Officers.
 Had he lived I should undoubtedly have
 recommended him for the Victoria Cross.
 He was instrumental in capturing three
 pieces of artillery, was much and
 deservedly beloved by every one,
 And an ornament to his profession."

J. K. McCAUSLAND, Colonel.

"Be thou faithful unto Death, and I will give thee a Crown of Life."—*Revelation* 11. C. 10. V.
 "In Christ shall all be made alive."—1 *Cor.* 15. C. 20. V.



Kilpuri area, arrived at Sitarganj, where they halted. Hearing of this, Captain Baugh marched a company of the Gurkhas and two guns * to deal with the rebels. Marching at 10 p.m. on the 3rd March, the twenty-five miles to Sitarganj were covered by the Gurkhas in time to completely surprise and surround the rebels, of whom they killed twenty-five, besides capturing all their papers, etc.

The detachment lost only one man wounded. When they again reached Haldwani, at 3 p.m. on the 4th March, the Gurkhas had given another proof of their great endurance and marching powers by covering fifty miles and fighting an action in fifteen hours. Be it remembered that this was largely night marching over unmetalled roads through forest. The halts amounted in all to three hours.

The fight at Sitarganj was the last the Gurkhas had north of Bareilly. The regiment's good services, so far, received their first substantial acknowledgment in the grant, in April 1858, of a donation of twelve months' pay and allowances to all Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, drummers, and sepoy who were on the rolls of the regiment on the 1st June 1857. The award was stated to be on account of "their loyalty and good service to the State."

On the 10th May 1858 the Kumaon Brigade was broken up. The Head-quarters of the 66th Gurkhas returned to Almora, where they arrived on the 16th May. Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Companies, under Brevet-Major Ross, proceeded to Naini Tal. On the 31st July No. 5 Company was added to Captain Ross' command, and on the 20th September there were placed at his disposal for duty at the recruiting depot at Pithoragarh—one subadar, one jemadar, two havildars, three naicks and twenty sepoy.

Medals for the suppression of the Mutiny were granted by a Government Order of the 21st September 1858.

Rohilkhand had been cleared of rebels when, on the 5th October 1858, the 66th Gurkhas were relieved at Almora by the Extra Gurkha Regiment raised by Lieutenant Macintyre in July 1857.

The 66th marched from Almora to Shahjahanpur, where it arrived on the 15th October 1858, and formed part of the column, under Brig.-General Colin Troup, which was to march into Oudh. The regiment was brigaded with the 1st Battalion 60th Rifles and the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders. The first objective of Troup's column was Sitapur.

On the 19th October the column encountered a large body of rebels at Pusgaon, some twenty miles on the road from Shahjahanpur to Sitapur. Little difficulty was found in driving them out, but unfortunately some of their cavalry, in which they were strong, got round to the supply column in rear, which was not sufficiently strongly guarded, and did some damage before they were driven off. The column remained for some days at Pusgaon.

The next fight was at Rasulpur on the 26th, where the enemy were found in position on the farther side of a deep nullah, flanked on one side by the village, and on the other by some rising ground. The 60th Rifles led the attack with the Horse Artillery, the 93rd Highlanders and 66th Gurkhas in reserve. The enemy's left was bombarded by the heavy guns, supported by one company of the 93rd. The 93rd had to repulse an attempt of the enemy's cavalry to get round the British left flank, but the Gurkhas do not seem to

* The regimental records give details of the force as follows :—Two mountain howitzers and eighteen men of the 66th Gurkhas to serve them under Lieutenant Munro; sixty-four rank and file of the 66th Gurkhas under Lieutenant Hay; forty rank and file Nepal Contingent; one hundred men of the Rohilkhand Horse (later the 16th B.C.).

have been seriously engaged. The rebels were driven from their position and pursued for five miles. There were no casualties on the British side. Next morning Troup's force moved to Naurangabad, through which the rebels had already passed. Here the Queen's proclamation of the transfer of the Government of India from the East India Company to the Crown was read to the troops in English and Hindustani.

From Naurangabad it became necessary to leave the Sitapur road and turn northwards against the strongly fortified town of Mithauli, on which the column marched at midnight of the 7th-8th November. It was ascertained that the direct road was obstructed by the enemy at a ford, but a villager led the troops by a bridge eight or nine miles farther up. After spending the night at this bridge, the troops advanced, at dawn on the 9th, to Mithauli, through thickly wooded country. The 60th Rifles and cavalry led the way, with the 66th Gurkhas and 93rd in the main body.

Mithauli was surrounded by mud walls and bastions of the Bhurtpore type, inside which was a bamboo hedge, like that round Rampur, forty feet thick. There was only one gateway on the south side, and that had to be approached through a village, where an attack must inevitably have resulted in heavy loss. All day the British artillery fired on the walls and bamboo fence without doing much damage to either. Fortunately two mortars throwing shells into the centre of the fort had a good effect in destroying the garrison's morale.

The 66th Gurkhas spent the day watching a plain to the left of the guns, and guarding the ammunition and supplies. The camp for the night was carefully piqueted, and at midnight the 93rd were ordered to lead the intended assault next morning. The necessity for this was fortunately obviated by the enemy evacuating the fort in the night. Subsequent examination of the defences showed that the assault, if resisted, would probably have been a very desperate affair. The garrison, however, appears to have been a weak one.

After dismantling the fort, which occupied several days, Troup again moved northwards with the horse artillery and light guns, 60th Rifles, a wing of the 93rd, and the Head-quarters of the 66th Gurkhas. The rest of the column, under Colonel Leith Hay continued the march to Sitapur. The rest of the 66th was with this portion. Troup's portion of the column, on the 18th November, encountered and finally defeated the rebels, at Melindi near Aliganj. Thence it turned south-eastwards to Biswah, being joined on the 28th November by Leith Hay's portion, which had reoccupied Sitapur, after dispersing some Talukdars who had collected in the neighbourhood.

Biswah was reached on the 2nd December after driving off the enemy, and the function of the force now was to prevent the re-passage of the rebels, who had been driven across the Ghagra and were being herded from all sides against the Nepal Terai. There was no more fighting here, and on the 4th March 1859 the regiment was marched in to Sitapur, where it proceeded to build lines for itself. On the 11th February 1859 an order of the Commander-in-Chief transferred, with effect from the 6th May 1858, the following from the 66th Gurkhas to the Kumaon Levy, viz., one subadar, four jemadars, eighteen havildars, twenty-five naicks and thirty-seven sepoy.

There was one more alarm of rebels recrossing the Ghagra, in consequence of which four companies were sent on the 12th April to watch the passages of the river. They were withdrawn on the 28th.

One other service in connection with the Mutiny was performed in the cold weather

of 1859-60, when six companies of the regiment were sent towards the Nepal Frontier, under Brevet-Major Ross, as part of a column accompanying the Boundary Commissioners demarcating the portion of the Terai which was to be made over to the Nepalese Government in acknowledgment of its valuable services in the Mutiny.

Meanwhile the Mutiny had necessarily thrown the whole Native Army into the melting-pot. Many regiments had ended their career disgracefully in mutiny, many new or irregular forces had come into existence, some regiments had remained faithful to their salt.

To the last-named class the acknowledgments of the Government were conveyed by the publication, on the 9th September 1859, of the names of those regiments "whose loyalty was proof against temptation, fanaticism, and threats, and who have throughout the late disturbances continued at their respective posts; some employed in their ordinary military duties, others engaged in conflict with the mutineers and rebels. H.E., the Governor-General in Council, in enumerating these faithful regiments, desires to award to them all the praise which their excellent conduct has earned; and to notice briefly the services of those which have most distinguished themselves." The list includes all the Gurkha Regiments then in existence. There is no "brief notice" of the services of the 66th attached to the Government Order (No. 1277 of 1859).

On the 30th November 1858 the 66th received a further acknowledgment of its good service by being made a Light Infantry Corps with the title of "The 66th or Goorkha Light Infantry Regiment."


The strength of the regiment was fixed, in July 1859, at ten companies of seventy men each, the proportion of Native Officers and N.C.O.s in each company remaining unchanged.

EXTRACTS FROM THE PRIVATE LETTERS OF LIEUTENANT GEPP WRITTEN DURING THE MUTINY

NAINI TAL, 20th October 1857.

I think I mentioned in a former letter the date of the first letter which I received from you upon the reopening of our communications with Bombay across the hills and via Mussoorie. Since that time I have had the great comfort of hearing regularly from you, and have written by every mail, with the exception of that which left this on the 7th instant. I will explain presently the reason for this omission. . . .

I have lately returned from a place called Bheem Tal, where I was "on command" for a week. On the 4th instant we received intelligence that a large force of mutineers had arrived at Haldwani at the foot of the hills. It consisted, I believe, of between two and three thousand footmen, a regiment (the 8th) of Irregular Cavalry and six guns. Strong piquets were sent down to guard the passes into the hills. I was sent down to take command of a company that had previously (on the first alarm) been ordered down there. All the officers who made their escape from Bareilly, Moradabad and other stations, besides the officers who happened to be here on leave, were formed into a kind of Militia and a portion of this Militia was also sent down with me. The whole piquet was under the command of the senior officer in the piquet. We remained perched up on the top of a hill for three days watching the movements of these scoundrels. Our position was defended by two rivers, at the junction of which it was located, the paths up it were very steep and difficult, and by building stockades and breaking up a bridge we



NAINI TAL DIVISION.

rendered our position impregnable. We commanded, however, the road up to Naini Tal which skirted the banks of the river on the opposite side. I must not forget to tell you that we were placed in this position to defend the Bheem Tal road, which at this point branches off from the Naini Tal and Huldwanee road. About three miles higher up on the same road, at Jhulee, was a very strong piquet from our regiment, with some more of the Militia. The object of this disposition was to endeavour to entice the enemy into the hills, allow them to advance as far as Jhulee where, upon being defeated by the piquet, we were to have come down from our high position and cut off their retreat, as you must remember we were not actually upon the Naini Tal road, and therefore would not interfere with their upward progress. The enemy were, however, much too wary to trust themselves within the hills. Consequently the Jhulee piquet was ordered up to Naini Tal again, and the one I was in was withdrawn to Bhim Tal. One night, when I had been at Bheem Tal a day or two, I received orders to start at 11 o'clock p.m. and proceed to that point from which the piquet had been withdrawn with fifty of my men. I started at the appointed hour. The night was very dark, the road steep and stony, and to add to our troubles, when we had marched about half-way a tremendous tempest came on. We arrived at our old position rather drenched. I inquired if the detachment of our regiment, under Ross, which I was to join had arrived. Being answered in the negative, we were glad to take shelter under some sheds from the rain, which was coming down with tropical violence. We waited there about four hours. As I was in perfect ignorance as to the object of this movement, you may fancy that I was speculating all the time about the purport of this secret expedition. When I was tired of waiting, we descended into the road. I found a moderately dry spot underneath a rock, and just as I was dropping off to sleep the detachment came up. It consisted of two hundred and fifty of our men, and was divided into five companies of fifty men each. I learned from them we were to endeavour to surprise a cavalry vedette which usually visited Khat Godown about 8 o'clock in the morning. I, with my fifty men, formed the 6th Company. We then, after reconnoitring, proceeded to Khat Godown. Just at this time the day began to dawn. On our arrival there we found the coast all clear, and in order to entrap this vedette, we were all concealed in the surrounding jungle. My company being the last, I was posted nearest the hills behind a kind of hedge close by and at right angles to the road; the other companies were more advanced, but at a considerable distance from the road. We had placed some men in native clothes on the road to give us notice of the approach of any adversaries. We remained there expectant and concealed till about 8 o'clock, when our scouts gave us notice that some one was approaching. Soon four "sowars" came in sight. We hoped that they would pass us without discovering us. In this, however, we were disappointed; for when they arrived at about one hundred and fifty yards' distance they caught sight of our red coats behind the hedge, and quickly right-about-faced and made the best of their way back again to Huldwanee, we waiting for about two hours longer, pleasantly refreshed by a drenching shower of rain, to see what would happen upon the report of these men to their comrades, when our scouts reported that a large force of cavalry was approaching. I had received orders not to fire until they had passed me. Soon we saw the red coats of the 8th Irregular Cavalry appear in sight (you may imagine how exciting it was) and a Native Officer with another "sowar" in advance of them. As soon as this Native Officer had passed me I ordered my men to fire. They did so, but unfortunately the greater portion

of them aimed at his horse instead of at the man himself. The horse was struck by fourteen bullets and the "sowar" wounded in the leg. He then dismounted and, using his horse as a shield, fired, and with one barrel of his rifle shot one of my poor little Goorkhas in the stomach, and another man in the hand. At this time the cavalry regiment was quite close, and the wounded "sowar" unfortunately made good his escape. If the cavalry regiment had had the pluck to charge us then, we should all have been cut to pieces, as my company only consisted of fifty men; but, fortunately for us, the other companies at this moment burst from their concealment, and fearing that they would be surrounded, they sent their horses along and halted at some distance off. The companies were then collected, but upon our marching down upon them (the enemy) they slowly retreated with the object, I fancy, of drawing us into the jungle, where our small force would certainly have been cut to pieces, and, as we had strict orders from our Colonel not to attempt to attack Huldwanee, we returned to a place a mile within the hills, breakfasted, and returned, those with Ross to Naini Tal, and myself and little party to Bheem Tal. You may fancy that we were all very tired after this expedition. Major Ramsay, the Commissioner of Kumaon, accompanied us, and it was at his suggestion that the companies were placed at such a distance from me. This no doubt was a fatal mistake; for they were so far off, both from me and the road, that they were not able either to support me or cut off the retreat of the cavalry. My company was the only one under fire. I believe four "sowars" were wounded, but I was very much disappointed at being baffled in taking or killing the Native Officer.

NAINEE TAL, 13th December 1857.

Just at the time that the Overland Mail was going out I was suddenly ordered down to the Brokerie Fort at the foot of the hills "on command." I am still, as you see, at Nainee Tal, for I was not permitted to remain many days at "the Brokerie"; some rascals who infest the foot of the hills, had made a successful expedition against a "Thannah" or Police Station at a place called "Kallah Dungee," which being immediately at the foot of the hills, on the Moradabad Road, has remained all along in our possession. A regiment of newly raised cavalry had been sent to "Kallah Dungee" to be organized there; vedettes had been posted on the roads leading to the Thannah. About forty or fifty of Khan Bahadur Khan's Sowars came suddenly upon the vedettes, and shot both of them before they could give the alarm, they then galloped on to the Thannah, cut off the head of the Thannadar, carrying it off with them in triumph, and also butchered eight of the men belonging to the Thannah. The men of the newly raised regiment were on their parade ground whilst this was taking place, and did not know that an enemy was so close till they heard bullets whizzing past them; the greater number of them were learning how to ride at the time and unarmed, but considering that there were about three hundred of them on parade, and that the enemy were only about forty strong, they certainly must have behaved very badly in not endeavouring to overtake and punish these scoundrels. On a former occasion they showed a decided deficiency in pluck also. When this affair was known at Nainee Tal a company of our men was dispatched to take care of these brave and valuable sowars. I hear that the sowars called our men their "Bhai bunds" (brethren), but that our little fellows indignantly repudiated this endearing epithet, and not wishing to be included in the fellowship of

such a genus of soldiers I was consequently sent up from the Brokerie with a company to supply the place of that ordered down to "Kallah Dungee," so here I am again at Nainee Tal.

A large body of Goorkhas under a general (a brother of Jung Bahadur's) have come to protect some territory at the foot of the hills, and about the distance of four marches from the Brokerie, and belonging to the Nepaulese Government. The general wrote to Major Ramsay our Commissioner (head civilian) here offering to send five hundred Goorkhas to our assistance, Ramsay wrote requesting one thousand, and Tytler has gone to Burrumdheo to fetch them. When they come we shall, with about five hundred or six hundred of our men, make a descent into the plains and destroy some large villages which have been annoying us by cutting off our supplies and our communications with Meerut. I hope too for the sake of our men that we may succeed in seizing a quantity of plunder, several lacs of rupees are said to be hoarded up in these villages, and it will also be an immense satisfaction to be able to punish a few more of these cowardly rebels. I fancy these Goorkhas will arrive here in about ten days, if so I fear that I shall not be able to spend my Christmas Day at Nainee Tal.

CAMP, HULDWANEE, 27th December 1857.

On my return from my trip (23rd December) I was ordered down with all speed to relieve Clay from outpost duty at a place called Kalah Dungee at the foot of the hills and about fifteen miles from Naini Tal. Ross, who was commanding the detachment of our regiment at that place, had given me leave to come up to Naini Tal for Christmas Day provided that Captain Crossman (who commands and is raising a regiment of Irregular Cavalry at Kalah Dungee) would also give me permission. This however he refused to do, as he promised to allow the other officers who were on duty at that post to go up on that day. Consequently I and the second in command of the Cavalry Regiment had to pass a disconsolate Christmas Day all by ourselves. . . . On New Year's Day I rode up with Crossman to Naini Tal and was asked out to dinner that evening. The Fates however were adverse; for about 5 o'clock p.m. I received a short note from Crossman telling me to come to him immediately. I went to him; he told me that our force stationed at a place called Huldwanee (about four miles from the foot of the hills and fifteen from Naini Tal, and consisting of about six hundred men) had been surprised by the enemy and obliged to retire, and that it was very possible that the road to Naini Tal might be open and undefended. He ordered me, therefore, to go down as quickly as possible to Kalah Dungee and bring up my company. I had not a pony to ride, so was obliged to walk down all the way, and lost my dinner into the bargain. I arrived there about 10 p.m., and got my men ready, but just as we were on the point of marching a letter came down saying that, instead of being obliged to retire, our troops had gained a victory and driven the mutineers off the field, and therefore we were to stand fast and wait for further orders. The facts of the matter were these. On the morning of the 1st, about 8.30, some villagers brought in news that some cavalry belonging to the enemy were in sight. The men were immediately ordered to stand to their arms, and Captain Baugh, who commanded our forces, and another officer went out to reconnoitre. They soon came upon four "sowars" who, upon seeing them, went to the right-about and retired slowly. Baugh then came back into camp pooh-poohing the idea of there being any





LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOHN KENNEDY McCAUSLAND, C.B.
(In the uniform of The Nusseree Battalion)
Circa 1820.

force belonging to the enemy anywhere near (he must have been infatuated) and dismissed the men to their breakfasts. The officers also went to theirs. They had not been seated more than ten minutes when they were startled by the sound of heavy guns close by them, and upon rushing out discovered that the enemy were drawn up in very strong force and had opened upon them with round shot and grape, at only a few hundred yards' distance. The men were got under arms as quickly as possible, and were so eager to take the guns that they could not be restrained but rushed on in a very disorganized state. Fortunately for them, the cowardly scoundrels turned tail and bolted. Our men pursued them for about four miles, and succeeded in killing about one hundred of them. Had there been any cavalry here at the time, instead of one hundred they might have killed seven or eight hundred. The enemy amounted to two or three thousand men, a large proportion of which was "sowars." If they had only had the pluck to charge our men, in their disorganized state, the result might have been very different. Baugh must have been perfectly mad not to have been warned by the appearance of those four "sowars" early in the morning. Any man with a grain of sense must have known that four "sowars" would never have approached our force alone. The only rational construction which could, I should think, be put upon their appearance so near us was that they were the advance guard of a strong force, and this in truth was the case. Baugh also, at the second alarm, had ordered down four guns, which had been placed in an entrenched position at the foot of the hills, to Haldwanee. The authorities at Naini Tal, I believe, did not approve of this measure either, and the result was that Baugh was superseded in the command. On the 2nd, Crossman came down to Kalah Dungee again. On the 3rd we heard that twenty-four elephants belonging to Government, and which our ally the Nawab of Rampore had been taking care of at that place, had arrived at a place about thirteen miles from Kalah Dungee. Now, although the Nawab himself is our faithful ally, yet he cannot put much faith in the good behaviour of his troops, and none whatever in that of his "ryots," so that he does not dare to send his troops too near ours, for fear of a collision. The Nawab's men had escorted the elephants to the place I mentioned above, and he requested that we would come to that place and bring the elephants in to Kalah Dungee. Crossman therefore, as soon as he heard of the arrival of the elephants, ordered us to march. We started about 3 p.m. and arrived at our destination about 8.30. On our arrival we found the elephants waiting for us, and the Nawab's "Khansaman" (as his chief official appears to be designated) who had prepared an excellent "currie" for us. It was most acceptable after our march. This man told us that he had received information that Kalah Dungee was to be attacked that very night, so, after placing some of the men on the elephants (I must tell you that our force consisted of one hundred and fifty of our men, one hundred of the Kumaon levies and fifty "sowars") we lost no time in retracing our steps. We were not, however, molested by the way, neither did we find that the enemy had tumbled into our beds or carried off all our property; but we succeeded in convoying all the elephants and twelve yoke of magnificent oxen (to draw the guns) into camp at about 4 a.m. on the 4th instant; and, after having eaten a little supper, we were uncommonly glad to turn in. The day before yesterday (the 5th inst.) the whole party of us marched to this place by a road which skirts the foot of the hills.

CAMP HULDWANEE, 28th January 1858.

We have a nice little army on a small scale here. It consists of four hundred and fifty of our men, three hundred of Jung Bahadur's men from Nepaul, one hundred men of the Kumaon levies (a worthless set these) and three hundred Cavalrymen, also forty of our men who have been formed into an artillery company; we have, too, four guns, two three-pounders and two six-pounders.

On New Year's Day the force here was attacked rather suddenly by the enemy, about two thousand strong; our force at the time consisted of three hundred of our men and the three hundred Goorkhas from Nepaul, we had neither Cavalry nor guns, whilst the enemy were strong in the former arm and brought two guns with them. They were all sitting quietly at breakfast on the 1st when an orderly rushed in and called out that the enemy were upon them; they then all rushed to their tents for their arms and had only just time to collect the men when they were saluted with round shot and grape from the enemy's guns. After waiting a short time, with the hope that they would bring their guns closer our men got impatient, so Baugh (a Captain who commands the Nepaul regiment and being the senior officer present also commanded the whole force) let them loose and with a cheer and a rush they charged the guns, the scoundrels were however too quick for them as they immediately limbered up and went to the right-about, the guns were horsed, consequently our little fellows had no chance of capturing them, which was a great disappointment to them. The rest of the brave army on seeing their guns bolting, were struck with the advisability of doing likewise, and ran so fast that they only left fifty or sixty dead men behind them. A small body of cavalry would have been of immense service on this occasion, we might then have counted the slain by hundreds instead of tens. At the time that this was happening I was on outpost duty at Kalah Dungee.

CAMP HULDWANEE, NEAR NYNEE TAL, 17th February 1858.

LETTERS TO LIEUTENANT GEPP'S FATHER REGARDING HIS DEATH.

It is with sincere and deep regret I have to announce to you the death of your son Thomas Sydney Gepp who died on the 12th inst., from the effects of wounds received on the 10th, two days previous, at the battle of Charpurah sixteen miles from this place; his gallantry was most conspicuous and the admiration of all his brother officers. Had he lived I should have recommended him for the Victoria Cross. Before he fell he cut down three men at the enemy's guns and was instrumental in capturing three pieces of artillery. He was much and deservedly beloved by every one and an ornament to his profession. His remains are interred in the burial ground at Nynneetal, and it is the intention of the officers to erect a monument over them, and they are also desirous of placing a Tablet in his parish church which I conclude is at Chelmsford. It will be consolatory to you to learn that he suffered but little pain. One wound was a sabre cut across the left arm and the second which proved fatal was a ball entering the left side immediately under the heart and, passing through the liver, was extracted on the right side, having lodged immediately under the skin. The operation gave him relief for the time, but the injury to the liver was so great as to render his recovery impossible.

I have kept his watch, chain and ring, Bible and Prayer-book with some of his hair

SCALE 4 MILES = 3 INCHES.



AINI TAL.

to be sent to you, and all other property will be sold and an account rendered to you through the Indian Government. As far as I am yet able to ascertain the estate is solvent; the whole will be forwarded to the Military Secretary to Government in the course of a month or six weeks. You will no doubt see an account of the action fought under my command and honourable mention made of your gallant son. The enclosed letter arrived half an hour after he expired, I therefore return it. You have, my dear Sir, much to be thankful for that your poor son died a Soldier's death and was not brutally murdered as many of our poor countrymen women and children have been. I have to deplore the loss of many near and dear relations, particularly a beloved son and daughter, in the horrible massacre at Cawnpore in July last. Once more expressing my heartfelt sympathy to yourself and family on the loss of so promising a Son,

Believe me, my dear Sir,

Yours truly,

F. K. McCAUSLAND,

Col.

66th Goorkhas, Kumaon Forces.

NAINEE TAL, *4th July* 1858.

On the evening of the 9th of February we received our orders to move at 9 a.m. that night [*sic*]. We marched all night, Gepp's and my company forming the two rear companies of our regiment, we marched together; at daylight we formed up in front of the enemies' camp who at once opened fire on us with round shot from a battery of four guns (we had only two six-pounders); seeing these could not silence their battery (at any rate not under a long time), the three rear companies of our regiment, together with the Nepal contingent, were ordered to storm the guns on their right flank. We advanced some way before the enemy began to retreat, and when within a few yards, say one hundred to one hundred and fifty, we threw ourselves on them at the double. Gepp was on my right; many of the enemy were cut down at their guns and many of them concealed themselves in the village. I saw Gepp with a man on the ground and in his power; this man I believe he killed, but was wounded slightly in the arm by him. I was pushing my men through the village and passed poor Gepp a little on his right fancying he was all right and out of danger. On coming back after clearing the village, I was grieved to learn he had been shot by a villain concealed in a hut. I need not add the man did not live to see the fruits of his villainy. When I came back our supports had arrived and I found Gepp being well taken care of by the officers who had come up with them. I supported him out of the village and he then said, "Write to my Father," and seemed perfectly conscious of his approaching end. We all entertained great hopes of his recovery, though I do not think he ever thought of recovering, and the doctors had very little hope but did their best for him, as did all. We had no understanding about writing to one another's friends, nor did Gepp make any other request to me or to any other officer that I know of. I have merely told you what I saw. Whether Gepp had pursued this man or not I am not prepared to say, but I am inclined to believe my version is as correct a one as possible to be obtained considering the confusion in the enemies' camp. It is very difficult to speak positively to anything, but as it struck me I have related to you.

Yours truly,

FRED N. MILES.*

* Lieutenant 66th Gurkhas.

CHAPTER VI

DHARMSALA—BLACK MOUNTAIN—PERAK

1860-1878

IN 1861 the reorganization of the Bengal Native Army was taken in hand seriously. In May 1861 the strength of all Native Infantry Battalions was fixed at six hundred privates, divided into eight companies.

The Native establishment of the company was 1 subadar, 1 jemadar, 5 havildars, 5 naicks, 2 drummers and 75 sepoy.

The 66th now became the 11th or Goorkha Light Infantry Regiment, but this title was of short duration, for the Secretary of State did not accept all the proposed changes of the Government of India. He withdrew the Gurkha Regiments from the list of Line Battalions and formed them into a separate corps with separate numbering.

The 66th Gurkha Light Infantry became the 1st Gurkha Regiment.

The Sirmoor Rifles became the 2nd Gurkha Regiment.

The Kumaon Battalion became the 3rd Gurkha Regiment.

The Battalion raised by Lieutenant Macintyre at Pithoragarh became the 4th Gurkha Regiment.

The New Nasiri Battalion at Jutogh had been disbanded.

The full designation of the regiment was now "The 1st Goorkha Light Infantry Regiment (late 66th or Goorkha Light Infantry)."

It was ruled that when the 1st Gurkhas were serving with other Bengal Native troops they were to take precedence immediately after the 10th Native Infantry.

Before this reorganization the regiment had changed its station from Sitapur to Dharmsala. The former was obviously not a suitable permanent station for hillmen, and still less for their women and children.

On the 9th November 1860 the weakly men and the women and children of the regiment started for Dharmsala, having been preceded the day before by the rest of the regiment which, from Cawnpore to Umballa, formed the escort for Sir Hugh Rose, the Commander-in-Chief. The regiment reached Dharmsala on the 21st March 1861 and furnished detachments at Plack, Madhopur, Dalhousie and Kangra. Dharmsala was destined to be the permanent home of the 1st Gurkhas, but it was not till the 29th June 1864 that this was definitely settled in writing. A Government letter of that date says:—

"It may be distinctly understood that the localities of the existing cantonment lines in which the corps are now located will be given over to them in perpetuity as their homes. I am to request that it may be explained to each corps in the clearest possible manner, so as to leave no chance of a misunderstanding hereafter, that the Goorkha Regiments are liable to be taken away from the stations allotted to them whenever the Government may see fit to do so, and that they are liable to be kept away as long as it may be convenient to Government to keep them



1ST GOORKHA LIGHT INFANTRY.
DHARMSALA.
Circa 1885.

away, and that this may be necessary in time of peace as well as in time of war, but that they will always eventually return to their own stations, and during their absence their families will remain in their homes. That the 1st Regiment will have its home at Dharmsala with its lines in the neighbourhood."

The letter is admirably clear, and it seems impossible to believe that the acutest legal mind could throw any doubt on its meaning. By the regiment it is rightly regarded as a charter fixing their location in perpetuity. Later it will be seen how proposals to change the permanent station were, on more than one occasion, finally defeated by a reference to this letter.*

On the 22nd June 1863 the regiment received new Colours.† At Dharmsala the regiment had plenty of time to settle down and establish itself comfortably in the interval between March 1861 and November 1863, at which latter period it was sent to Rawal Pindi to act as reserve for the Ambela expedition of that year.

Two companies under Lieutenant R. Sale-Hill had already been sent on the 30th September to Mian Mir as escort to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. As the rest of the Battalion passed through Mian Mir on the 2nd December on its way to Rawal Pindi these two companies rejoined it.

With the details of the Ambela expedition we have no concern, as the regiment was not called to the front, and, after remaining at Pindi from the 21st December 1863 to the 3rd January 1864, the Head-quarters and left wing marched for Dharmsala, whilst the right wing proceeded to Peshawar as escort to the Commander-in-Chief.

The left wing reached Dharmsala on the 1st April and was rejoined by the right shortly afterwards.

In this year also were instituted the posts of Second-in-Command, Wing Officer and Doing Duty Officer and new increased rates of pay for Native commissioned officers, buglers and sepoy were sanctioned.

The regiment was again on the warpath in October 1865. Marching on the 10th October for field service with the Bhutan force, it reached Delhi on the 7th November. Entraining there on the 10th, it was at Colgong on the 13th, whence it reached Caragola Ghat on the Ganges by native boats on the 15th. Thence it marched to the Buxa Duars and, on the 22nd December joined the left column of the expeditionary force. This expedition was merely an occupation of the Bengal Duars, which had just been permanently annexed in consequence of misbehaviour on the part of the Bhutanese, into details of which it is not necessary to enter. There was no fighting and, though the Gurkhas were kept there till the end of 1866, their only work was in the construction of roads, field works, etc.

The journey home was commenced, on relief by the 32nd Pioneers, on the 10th January 1867, and Dharmsala was reached on the 25th March.

Nothing of note occurred in the regiment till the 20th August 1868, when, with a strength of eight British officers and six hundred and fifty Native officers, N.C.O.s and men, it was marched by Jullundur and Mian Mir to Haripur to join the Hazara Field Force, about to operate in the Black Mountain region. A small depot of one subadar, one jemadar, five N.C.O.s and thirty-five sepoy was left behind under Major Cavenagh.


* The full correspondence on this subject is given in Appendix VII.

† For Colours and Battle Honours see Appendix IV.

We need not concern ourselves with the complicated causes which led to this important expedition, in which some nine thousand five hundred troops were employed, exclusive of the reserve. Of the five then existing Gurkha Regiments all but the 3rd were employed. The rapidity with which the regiments marched to the assembly point was in many cases very remarkable, especially considering the time of year. The 1st Gurkhas are said to have covered four hundred miles in twenty-three days.

The expedition was under the command of Brig.-General A. T. Wilde and was divided into the 1st and 2nd Brigades under Colonel O. R. Bright and Colonel J. Vaughan respectively. The 1st Gurkhas were in the 1st, the 2nd Gurkhas in the 2nd Brigade.

The advance to the ascent of the Black Mountain began from the village of Oghi in the Agror Valley on the 3rd October. Bright's Column, consisting of H.M. 19th Foot, the



THE BLACK MOUNTAIN.

1st Gurkhas, 20th Punjab Infantry, and Hazara Mountain Battery, reached the village of Kungali unopposed.* Beyond this an immediate advance had not been contemplated, but, as the enemy began to collect on a height above it, General Bright decided to disperse them before they could collect in large numbers, and to push on to spend the night at Mana-ka-Danda, a shoulder of the Kungali spur with a central peak which was occupied by the 20th Punjab Infantry. The 1st Gurkhas were posted on the approach from another spur on the right rear, with the 19th Foot in support. On the right the enemy soon began firing from the cover of woods, and about nightfall made a sharp attack on the advanced piquets, which was repulsed. During the night the 5th Gurkhas arrived to

reinforce the position. Mana-ka-Danda was now used as an advanced base for attacking the Chitabat and Machai Peaks, and the 2nd Brigade was brought up to reinforce the 1st. The enemy had retired by the morning of the 4th to their main position, on a grassy slope eight hundred yards beyond Mana-ka-Danda, with which it was connected by a narrow ridge with fir forest below it on the right. The advance against this position was led by the 1st, followed by the 5th Gurkhas, and supported by very effective fire, first from a horse-artillery battery, and later from mountain guns on the ridge. So effective was it that when the Gurkhas mounted the grassy slope they found few defenders left amongst the abattis defending the position, which they occupied without difficulty. By 3.30 p.m. Chitabat was reached. The losses of the 1st Gurkhas in this attack were three men wounded.

The 2nd Brigade remained about Mana-ka-Danda. On the morning of the 5th October

* For this campaign see also Map of North-West Frontier, Sheet I, in pocket at end of Volume.

the 1st Brigade, reinforced by the 2nd Gurkhas, moved along the crest against the Machai Peak.

Whilst the rest of the Brigade were getting their breakfast, which had been delayed by transport difficulties, the 20th Punjab Infantry and 5th Gurkhas captured the Doda Hill on the way to Machai, and were joined, for the advance after noon, by the rest of the Brigade.

From Doda Hill there was a steep descent, flanked on both sides by woods occupied by the enemy, who fired on the troops but were driven off by the mountain guns and the 20th Punjab Infantry and 5th Gurkhas.

The troops were now on a small plateau still separated from the Machai Peak by a rocky ridge. The 20th Punjab Infantry and 5th Gurkhas were then just under cover in rear of the ridge whilst preparations were made for the attack on Machai, which could only be ascended on a narrow front along a line having precipitous ground on its left and thick woods on the right.

The two mountain batteries were brought into action in rear of the ridge, whilst the 20th Punjab Infantry advanced, followed closely by the 5th Gurkhas, and with the 1st one hundred yards in rear. The 19th Foot supported the whole.

Again the mountain-gun fire was so good that the enemy retired as the infantry advanced, and it only cost them eight casualties to take the position.

The enemy fled down the spurs into the Indus Valley. The 1st Gurkhas had no casualties; all that occurred were in the 20th Punjab Infantry and 5th Gurkhas. The night was passed by the 1st Gurkhas in the centre of the position, on the Machai Mountain, close to the top of which were the 5th. The rest of the Hazara Field Force was echeloned back as far as Mana-ka-Danda. It was a night of great discomfort for the men on Machai, where it snowed and there were no tents.

The position occupied was a good one from which to conduct further operations against the tribes, whose morale had been a good deal shaken by what had happened. Moreover, the water-supply difficulty, which had been serious at first, was solved by the discovery of springs on Machai.

On the 6th the 1st Gurkhas joined the 5th in the post near the summit of Machai. Here they remained, practically unmolested, till the 12th October, by which time the Pathans' submission had been accepted and the peak was evacuated. During the retirement a small attack was made on the 2nd Gurkhas in the rearguard near Mana-ka-Danda.

On the 14th the 1st and 5th Gurkhas, the 2nd Punjab Infantry and the 24th Punjab Native Infantry were sent to occupy Kungali and the Jalgali Pass, whilst the rest of the force moved off on another punitive expedition, the course of which we need not follow.

Next day the 1st Gurkhas went, with a squadron of the 16th Bengal Lancers, from Jalgali to Chirmang to keep open the communications.

Passing through the Nandihar Valley, the whole force was back at Oghi, without any incident worth noting, by the 22nd October.

The Indian medal with "North West Frontier" clasp was granted in 1870 for this campaign "on account," says the G.G.O., "of the spirit and gallantry shown by the troops in operations which were frequently of a peculiarly arduous and harassing nature, involving much privation and calling for the display of great endurance, skill and courage."

The total casualties of the 1st Gurkhas were six men wounded, out of a total for the force of five N.C.O.s and men killed, one British officer and twenty-eight other ranks

wounded. The regiment had had a hard time, as only great-coats and no bedding were carried.

After spending November at Hassan Abdal the 1st Gurkhas started home on the 4th December, and reached Dharmasala on the 2nd January 1869.

In 1869 sanction was granted for the distribution of medals to the survivors of the frontier campaigns from 1849 to 1863, the medal being the same as that issued for the Persian War.

On the 14th April two companies marched to Simla for guard duty and rejoined at Dharmasala on the 28th November.

In 1869 Zouave tunics with slashed cuffs and serge pyjamas (in place of cloth trousers) were introduced, and in 1870 the summer clothing of the regiment was changed from khaki to white.

At the end of November 1870 the regiment was re-armed with muzzle-loading Enfield rifles.

In 1871 the 1st Gurkhas supplied the Simla detachment, and on the 18th November marched to Delhi for a camp of exercise.

Thence they were sent, on the 16th January 1872, by rail to Ludhiana District to suppress an outbreak of the Kuka fanatics, of whom one hundred and fifty under two Jats had made a raid on the Mahommedan State of Maler Kotla. Having no further following, they were suppressed without difficulty and Ram Sing, the leader of this fanatical sect, who had not accompanied the raiders, was deported. About fifty of the insurgents were blown from guns by the Deputy-Commissioner's orders, a measure of severity calculated to remove any fear of further trouble. The functions of the regiment on this occasion were confined to furnishing detachments for the forts at Ludhiana, Phillour and Umballa, and generally assisting the civil authorities. This small rising had been practically put down before the 1st Gurkhas arrived. Their employment was hardly necessary, unless as a precaution against further risings which were not probable.

The Enfield rifles which had been supplied in 1870 were brass mounted. They were now replaced by steel-mounted short Enfield rifles with sword bayonets. A new pattern of spurs for British officers was introduced.

In 1873 twenty-five sepoy were added to the establishment of the regiment. The summer clothing was again changed to khaki.

It was in 1874 that the belated honour of Bhurtpore was sanctioned to be borne on the regimental Colour, "in commemoration of the distinguished gallantry displayed at the siege of that place in 1826 by a detachment of the First Nusseree Battalion, the former title of the 1st Goorkhas." On the 30th October 1875 the regiment marched for another camp of exercise at Delhi. On reaching Ludhiana, however, it was diverted to Umballa, where it arrived on the 16th November. It had been warned at Ludhiana that it would probably be sent on active service, and this turned out to be in the Malay Peninsula, to reach which the 1st Gurkhas, for the first time, had to proceed by sea. They were the first of the Gurkha Regiments to serve overseas.*

* A contemporary issue of the "Pioneer" (Allahabad) published the following: "Perak is a state half-way down the western side of the Malayan Peninsula, with a coastline of one hundred and twenty miles or thereabouts, the country stretching inland about one hundred and fifty miles, that is about half-way across the peninsula. Down the middle of this peninsula, and therefore bordering the west of Perak, there is a mountain range, from which rivers run towards the sea. In Perak there are notably the Larut and Perak rivers; the Larut, up in the north, where the silver mines are, and the Perak river much farther south. The Perak river is said to be navigable by vessels drawing twelve feet, but the channel

Leaving Umballa on the 17th November by rail, the regiment was encamped on the esplanade near Fort William, Calcutta, on the 20th, where, for the first time, they were armed with a breech-loading rifle, the short Snider with a bayonet.

They embarked on the 26th November on the B.I.S.N. Co.'s S.S. *Malwa*.

The little state of Perak, stretching about one hundred miles along the western coast of the Malay Peninsula, with a depth of something like fifty miles inland, was at this time in a state of considerable disorder. In 1874 the local chiefs had practically placed the administration of the country under the English, but soon repented of their bargain. At the beginning of November 1875 a man posting up a British proclamation was killed, and Mr. Birch, the British Resident, was murdered. A small force sent up the Perak River against the rebels was badly repulsed, and the Governor of the Straits Settlements then telegraphed to India for fifteen hundred troops, as he feared a general rising.

The troops sent in reply, under Brig.-General J. Ross, C.B., consisted, besides the 1st Gurkhas, of six hundred of the Buffs, with four mountain guns, two five-and-a-half-inch mortars and a company of sappers and miners.

On arrival at Penang the regiment was split up into three parts, thus:—

(1) One company, under Captain Young, formed part of a Brigade under Brig.-General Ross, in which also were part of the 3rd Buffs and a detachment of the Naval Brigade.

(2) Another company, under Lieut.-Colonel Story, was attached to the Brigade under General Colburn with the 10th Foot.

(3) The rest of the 1st Gurkhas, with Head-quarters, formed part of a third Brigade, with the 80th Foot from Singapore and Hong-Kong.

The movements of the three columns must be followed separately.



is a difficult one for anything but small craft. The banks are low and swampy, covered with jungle. Here and there is a village, defended by stockades, behind which the Malays fight to the last. They are not much good on land, except behind these stockades; but they make useful pirates. They fight with the kris, the limbing or lance, and panah the bow. They also make a sort of gunpowder and tin bullets. Some of the stockades are defended by ordnance, mariams or 6-pounders and other pieces, some loaded with tin or leaden slugs. The rivers in Perak are the main lines of communication; the native roads being merely footpaths, which the Malays are always ready to attack. The men sent to Perak may perhaps see some good sport there. To say nothing of Malays, these are herds of wild elephants, two kinds of rhinoceros, and three kinds of tiger, as well as leopards, bears, boar and deer. In the Larut river there are plenty of crocodiles. . . . The Malays defend their stockades with something like the calthrops of ancient warfare. They have a way of cutting slips of bamboo about eight inches long, notched in the middle and sharpened at either end. These are stuck into the ground in a slanting direction; against bare-footed troops the 'randjoes,' as they are called, must be especially effective. With regard to the poisoned weapons of the Malays, it is said that some of the tribes have arrows poisoned with the 'Upas Radscha, made from a kind of Nux Vomica; and with the Upas Antschar, the juice of the Antiaris Toxicaria.'"

General Ross' Brigade proceeded by small steamer to the mouth of the Laroot River and some way up it. Leaving the steamer, it marched without opposition to Kuala Kangsa on the Perak River.

Before dealing with the adventures of the 1st and 3rd Columns, it is well to state what happened to Lieut.-Colonel Story's Company with the 2nd. It proceeded to the capital of the Raja of Kinta which was occupied without opposition and where the column remained unmolested till the end of the expedition.*

Returning now to General Ross' column at Kuala Kangsa, nothing happened there till the 4th January 1876, when an operation was undertaken against the village of Kotah Lama, a few miles farther up the Perak River. This village was a stronghold of brigands and bad characters who had to be disarmed.†

On the 4th January General Ross advanced by both banks of the river. On the right (west) bank were half the Gurkha company under Captain Young and a part of the Buffs. The other part of the Buffs and the other half-company of Gurkhas were on the left bank. Kotah Lama was mostly on the right bank and the orders were to disarm this part. This was accomplished successfully without loss. But the troops on the left bank were less fortunate; for, whilst the arms in the village opposite were being collected, a party of fifty or sixty Malays rushed from the jungle on the left bank. They killed Captain Hawkins, who had got separated from the rest, and three men. The Gurkhas lost one sepoy killed and two wounded and the whole force on the left bank had to fall back on the river. Half the Gurkhas were on the left and half on the right bank. Of this affair the following report was made by the Brigade-Major: "On the 4th January 1876, when at Kotah Lama, a sudden attack was made by the Malays on the small party which accompanied General Ross; the men mentioned in the margin ‡ behaved exceedingly well, especially Baskur Rana." The latter was General Ross' orderly and Colonel Young states that he behaved most gallantly and undoubtedly saved the General's life. An application for a good-service-conduct medal for him was sent to the Brigade-Major, but was returned "by order" with a reward of Rs. 50 to be given to the orderly.

We now come to the third column, comprising the larger part of the 1st Gurkhas, including the Head-quarters and about two hundred and fifty men.

The insurrection had spread to Sunghie Ujong in the neighbourhood of Malacca, where Colonel Clay with this force sailed from Penang in the S.S. *Malda* on the 6th December, reaching Malacca two days later. There one hundred men under Captain Rankin were left to protect the place whilst the rest, with some of the Buffs and half a battery of artillery, proceeded to the mouth of the Lookut River, where they disembarked on the 9th December and moved forward to Rassa. The enemy were in the Terrachee Valley and on a very strong position at the Bukit Putoos (pass). It was arranged to divide the little force into two columns: the first, under Lieut.-Colonel Sale-Hill with about one hundred of the 1st Gurkhas and some naval and artillery details, was to march by a circuitous route for the villages of Pantay and Terrachee; the other column, in which were the rest of the 1st Gurkhas, a detachment of the 10th Foot, etc., was to give Colonel

* This is Colonel Young's account. According to the regimental records he and Colonel Story had only one hundred men between them who all marched to Kuala Kangsa, whence Story with half the men went to Kinta.

† This account has been furnished by Captain (now Colonel) G. Young, the only surviving officer of the 1st Gurkhas who served in this expedition.

‡ Jangbir Basnait (killed), Jhagru Thapa (wounded), Karak Sing Thapa (wounded), Kishanbir Thapa, Chanderbir Gharti, Baskur Rana.

Sale-Hill a day's start to get on his way to the rear of the pass, which would then be attacked in front by Colonel Clay's column.

Colonel Clay, on arriving at the foot of the pass about 10 a.m. on the 20th December, had sent forward Captain Channer with a detachment of the 1st Gurkhas to reconnoitre it. So thick was the jungle that, at first, Captain Channer said it was impossible to discover the exact location of the stockade. Being directed to push up as close as possible, and try to find a suitable place for the use of guns and rockets, he and Lieutenant North, R.E., went on along the bed of a torrent till brought up by trees felled across it. Leaving a rearguard to cut through these obstructions, Channer sent out his men on either side, himself going with the left party. Moving cautiously forward through the jungle, he and the twenty-five men with him presently saw smoke from the enemy's fires, and one of the stockades, which was of logs surrounded by a palisade with numerous obstructions of pointed bamboo. The Malays, lulled into a false security, were cooking and talking, and were quite unaware of Channer's proximity. Having satisfied himself as to the easiest point of entry, he and two of the Gurkhas leapt the palisade and without hesitation went for the twenty or thirty Malays forming the garrison of the fort. Each of the gallant trio shot a Malay. Two more were killed, and then the rest of the twenty-five Gurkhas came in to the sound of the shots. The Malays, believing they were surrounded and lost, made for two other stockades, one about eighty yards distant, and the other, which completely blocked the pass, about twice that distance.

Then Channer and his men opened fire from cover on the nearer stockade. Half an hour's firing sufficed to drive the garrison from this stockade into the farther one across the pass, which also, under the steady fire, they evacuated. In the first fort a four-pounder iron gun was found.

The loss on the British side was two killed (Naick Bhagat-Sing Rai and sepoy Daljit Thapa) and two wounded. The Malay loss was certainly severe, though, as the dead and wounded had been removed, its amount was not known.

For his gallant action Captain Channer received the Victoria Cross and a brevet-majority, whilst sepoy Balbir Gharti and Jitman Thapa, who were with him in the first assault, received the Order of Merit.*

Next day Colonel Clay's Column crossed the pass and met Colonel Sale-Hill's which had marched by Pantay. The two columns met at Srimanti, which village was burnt and the guns found in it either burst or thrown into the river. Colonel Sale-Hill's men had had a very difficult march. The River Muar had to be crossed and re-crossed about twenty times, and the whole country was a trackless area of swamps and jungle, with trees felled in places, and other obstructions placed by the Malays. In one place in the Terrachee Valley a stockade was encountered. The 1st Gurkhas got in rear of this and, after a little skirmishing and a few shots from the guns, took it without loss.

Arriving at last in rear of the Bukit Putoos, an unsuccessful attempt was made to cut off the garrison now fleeing before the frontal attack.

After destroying the villages in the neighbourhood, the 1st Gurkhas returned on the 2nd January to Rassa, whence they went by boat down the River Linghy to Malacca. On the 26th they again embarked on the B.I.S.N. Co.'s S.S. *Arabia* to reinforce General

* This account is mainly based on Major F. McNair's *Perak and the Malays*. Major McNair was at that time employed in Perak as Commissioner, and afterwards officiated as Chief Commissioner, Perak.

Ross' column which we left at Kuala Kangsa, which place was reached on the 29th January.

Captain Barnett with eighty of the 1st Gurkhas and some artillery details remained behind at Rassa till the country was quite quiet and he could march about it without molestation. Since the expedition to Kotah Lama on the 4th January, the Chief of that place and other hostile Malays had been erecting stockades, and making attacks on friendlies, which necessitated a punitive expedition. Most of the Kotah Lama people had moved farther up the river to Enggar and Prek, when, on the 3rd February, in consequence of an attack on a friendly chief, Captain Barnett and Lieutenant Churchill were sent with a 1st Gurkha party across the Perak River to rescue them. The assailants were driven off, but unfortunately two friendly Malays were killed and two wounded by a mistake.

Next day Colonel Sale-Hill with his Gurkhas crossed the Perak and advanced up the left bank, whilst General Ross with the rest of the force marched up the opposite bank, both forces being covered by a gunboat on the river. The Malays were driven off with some loss by shell and rocket fire. General Ross returned that evening, but the 1st Gurkhas bivouacked at Enggar for the night and next day advanced to and burnt Prek. Crossing the river on their return at Enggar, they reached Kuala Kangsa by the right bank at 9.30 p.m. the same evening.

The power of the Kotah Lama people was now thoroughly broken, and the rebellion generally had been crushed when, on the 4th March 1876, the regiment received orders to return to India. Ten days later it marched to the mouth of the Laroot River, where, on the 18th March, it embarked on the S.S. *Arabia*, *Czarewitch* and *Himalaya*, reached Calcutta on the 30th, and entrained on the 31st for Jullundur. Marching thence by Hoshiarpur, it reached Dharmasala on the 15th April.

Its losses during this expedition were:—

Killed in Action	3 men
Wounded	4 men
Died of Disease	1 Gurkha Officer and 4 men

For the campaign a medal and clasp "Perak 1875-76" were granted in 1880 to all survivors who had been on service in the Malay Peninsula between November 1875 and March 1876. Two brass guns captured by the regiment were brought back and are now at the Officers' Mess at Dharmasala.

The regiment being now permanently settled at Dharmasala, the construction of new bachelor lines was commenced at the beginning of November 1876, and, to give time for this, all parades and drills, except musketry, were as far as possible suspended. These building operations, after being interrupted in January 1877 and again during the monsoon, were finally completed at the end of 1877.

When, on the 1st of January 1877, proclamation was made at Delhi of the assumption by H.M. Queen Victoria of the title of "Empress of India," the Government of India directed the presentation of a silver medal to a selected soldier in Indian Regiments. For this honour in the 1st Gurkhas, the choice fell upon Havildar Bahadur Thapa "as being a non-commissioned officer who has twice been mentioned for gallantry in the field, once in the Bori Pass in 1853, and more recently in the Malay Peninsula at the Bukit Pass."

In October 1877 the regimental band was instituted.

Here it will be convenient to give an account of the history of the band and of the pipers who have now become a regimental institution.

The 1st Battalion, and afterwards the 2nd, when it was created in 1886, had at first each their own band, about which there does not seem to have been anything noticeable.

Presently Colonel Rogers of the 2nd Battalion engaged a young German—Herr Wichmann—who, after serving in a German cavalry regiment, went out to India and advertised for employment. He proved a great success and, after the retirement of the Bandmaster (G. Lemon) of the 1st Battalion, it was decided to amalgamate the two bands under Wichmann, who raised the united band to a high state of efficiency which gained for it a great reputation throughout India. At one time it was able to produce as many as eighty performers. Unfortunately in 1912 Wichmann (who had been naturalized) was re-engaged for seven years. When the Great War broke out there was naturally some unpleasantness for him and his employers, owing to his German origin. However, the engagement of 1912 could not be broken and it was only on its termination in 1919 that he retired.

The pipers originated under the following circumstances:—

In November 1883 the regiment went to a camp of exercise at Mian Mir, where also were the 4th Gurkhas, the Battalion raised in 1857 by Lieutenant Macintyre at Pithoragarh. The latter regiment had just started pipers, three of whom marched round the mess table when wine was served. The officers of the 1st were much interested in this, and it was proposed to start pipers for that regiment also. There were some doubts as to how the Highland Regiments would view the adoption of their national custom by an Indian Regiment.

It was not till the 2nd Battalion was raised in 1886 that pipers were first introduced into that Battalion by Colonel Rogers, who sent his men to one of the Highland Regiments to be trained. From this it appears clear that the move was not resented in any way by those regiments. The example of the 2nd Battalion was followed soon afterwards by the 1st.

On the 18th January 1878 an urgent request was received from the Commissioner of Jullundur for assistance in quelling some disturbances in the Native State of Suket under his political control. The Raja Rudra Sen, who had succeeded in 1875, had incurred the displeasure of the Government of India by persistent misgovernment. He was deposed in April 1878. His misgovernment appears to have produced the disturbances.

Two companies under Captain Young were sent to assist in stopping the trouble which does not appear to have been anything serious. The detachment left on the 15th and returned on the 26th. From March to October 1878 the Simla detachment was supplied under the command of Major Barnett.*

* For many years after Simla first became the summer Head-quarters of Government, the guards for the residences of both the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief were supplied each year by one or other of the Gurkha regiments. Of late years other Regiments have also had their turn.

The quarters for the detachment were extremely inconveniently situated near Annandale far below both the residences for which it had to supply guards. Moreover, they were dirty and verminous. Complaints on this subject were frequently made but generally met with a financial *non possumus*.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR—CHANGE BACK TO 'GREEN'

1878-1885

IT was in this year 1878 that the Second Afghan War began. On the 25th September orders were received for the regiment to proceed at once to join the Southern Afghanistan Force assembling at Multan.

Leaving Dharmasala on the 3rd October, the regiment reached Amritsar on the 12th and Montgomery on the 29th. Here it was rejoined by Major Barnett and the Simla detachment. Here also the new leather yoke accoutrements were issued to it. Marching again on the 31st October, Multan was reached on the 9th November. After halting there till the 18th, the regiment entrained for Sukkur, which was reached on the 21st. The 2nd Infantry Brigade of the Multan Field Force consisted of the 59th Foot, 1st and 3rd Gurkhas, and 12th (Khelat-i-Ghilzai) Regiment. The Brigade was commanded by Brig.-General R. J. Hughes.

The services to be performed here were more irksome than honourable, consisting in the supply of fatigue parties for the unloading and stacking of stores and the numerous similar operations required at the base of the army. There were of course innumerable guards for all departments to be supplied. On the 2nd December 1878 Lieutenant R. C. Temple was sent with two companies on escort duty and only rejoined Head-quarters at Kandahar in February 1879.

On the 16th December Lieutenant Ozzard went with two more companies as escort for 13/8 Royal Artillery. One of these companies rejoined Head-quarters in January at Dadur. Lieutenant Ozzard, with the other, acted as escort to General Primrose, commanding the 1st Division, up to Kandahar, where it rejoined Head-quarters on the 13th February 1879.

In December 1878 the strength of the regiment was raised. The establishment then stood at 16 Gurkha officers, 80 N.C.O.s, 16 buglers, 825 sepoy. Total, 939 of all ranks.

Meanwhile, the remaining four companies with Head-quarters remained at Sukkur till the 26th December. The regiment was now commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Sale-Hill, as Colonel J. S. Rawlins had been compelled by ill-health to relinquish the command.

The four companies still there started from Sukkur as escort of a large convoy of Ordnance stores marching to Kandahar. There were in the regiment's care eleven hundred camels and one hundred mules and the loading and unloading of these animals gave the men several hours' hard work each day. It took the convoy till the 23rd January 1879 to reach Quetta, where a badly needed halt of six days was made before resuming the march to Kandahar.

On the 1st February Killa Abdulla was reached, and here the troubles were vastly increased by a heavy fall of snow on the 2nd, the day before the crossing of the Khojak Pass had to be commenced. The mortality amongst the camels had already been very

heavy; four hundred out of the eleven hundred had died, and the remaining seven hundred had to take on their loads, with the result that they were generally overladen. The first operation was the clearing of a path in the snow, no light matter. The plains camel on snow is not happy, even going uphill; where it came to descending on the other side of the pass, he was almost hopeless. Hill camels should have been collected, but were not, and the unfortunate plains animals had to be kept on their legs with the aid of ropes.

When the pass had at last been negotiated, the heavy ammunition had to be left behind in charge of the 1st Punjab Infantry, as provisions were short at the front and one hundred camels had to be sent on with them. Reaching Kandahar on the 13th February the 1st Gurkhas were attached to Brig.-General Nuttall's Brigade of the Kandahar Garrison and remained there till the 26th February, when they received orders to return to India with General Biddulph's force.

During its stay at Kandahar the regiment performed much escort duty, the details of which are not of much interest.

The regiment was to form part of the column returning to India by the Thal Chotiali route.

The march to the rendezvous at Khushdil Khan ka Killa was a very trying one. Torrential floods filled every watercourse at times and held up the troops for days; the roads were strewn with dead camels giving out a pestilential stench, and the camping grounds were in a terribly insanitary state. The snow on the Khojak Pass held up some of the troops, till a sudden thaw made matters worse by the floods due to the melting snow. Then followed heavy rain for three days and a thunderstorm, which left the camp of the 15th Hussars knee deep in mud.

When General Biddulph, after an equally trying march, joined the troops collected at Khushdil Khan ka Killa the 15th Hussars and 1st Gurkhas had gone ahead fifteen miles. The force was now organized in three columns, the infantry of that commanded by Colonel R. Sale-Hill consisting of the 32nd Pioneers and 1st Gurkhas.

On the 21st March the rest of the 2nd column caught up the 1st Gurkhas and 15th Hussars. For the first sixty miles the 2nd* column was in advance, the 3rd following a day behind. Then the order of march was reversed. There was little to note in the march of the 2nd column through a little-known country. The 3rd had been attacked by some Ghazis, who killed a man of the 70th Foot, and one morning there was something of a panic in the 2nd, owing to a report that there was no water at the next camping ground. In the Leghari Barkhan Valley the force was divided, most of it going by Fort Monro to Dera Ghazi Khan. The 1st Gurkhas and 15th Hussars took a more southerly course to Mithanhot and Khanpur, entraining at the latter place on the 23rd April.

The 1st Gurkhas reached Mian Mir by rail and marched thence viâ Batala to Dharmasala, where they arrived on the 8th May 1879.

The grant of six months' donation batta for service in Southern Afghanistan was some consolation for a period of very hard and unpleasant work, with no fighting to vary the monotony.

The curtain had not long descended at the end of the first act of the Afghan drama when it was again rung up on the news of the massacre of Cavagnari's Mission at Kabul in the beginning of September 1879. It was not until the 17th December that the 1st

* These two columns were numbered 2nd and 3rd. The 1st had gone back earlier.

Gurkhas received orders to proceed as quickly as possible to Peshawar. Marching on Christmas Day, commanded by Colonel Sale-Hill, they were at Amritsar on the 2nd January 1880, whence, two days later, they entrained for Jhelum. From Jhelum it was a fifteen-days' march to Peshawar, where the regiment arrived on the 20th January and proceeded to Jamrud, where it found itself a unit of the 2nd Brigade Reserve Division. The Division was commanded by Major-General Ross, C.B., under whom the regiment had served in the Malay Peninsula. The Brigade was commanded by Colonel Sale-Hill, who was succeeded in command of the 1st Gurkhas by Lieut.-Colonel Story.

Leaving Jamrud on the 1st February, the regiment reached Ali Masjid, where it remained till the 6th March on convoy and piquet duties and furnishing detachments for neighbouring posts.

Moving on the 7th March to Landi Kotal, it was posted to the 3rd Brigade, commanded by Brig.-General Gib. About this time the Reserve Division was broken up and the 1st Gurkhas found themselves posted to No. 1 Moveable Column under Brig.-General Arbuthnot, C.B., and ordered to Sufed Sang (Gandamak), where they arrived on the 29th March. On the 4th April No. 1 Moveable Column moved out to punish the Khujianis, who had recently attacked Fort Battye on the road east of Gandamak. The duties during this small expedition are said to have been very heavy, especially at night; but there does not appear to have been any fighting, and when four villages and some towers had been destroyed the tribesmen submitted and paid the fine imposed.

There was another excursion into the Hissarak Valley on the 12th April, to enforce payment of a fine imposed on the Ghilzais for the murder of an officer and raids on the lines of communication. About six miles from Perwan the enemy were dislodged from a high ridge overlooking Hissarak by shelling and by the advance of the 51st K.O. Yorkshire Light Infantry. The 1st Gurkhas marched down into the valley in support, and two companies and a mountain battery covered the advance to Mazulla Khan's Fort, where the 1st Gurkhas were on the right of the bivouac. The enemy fired heavily during the night and endeavoured to rush the piquets.

During the 13th, 14th and 15th there was some skirmishing with the enemy, and on the 14th the 1st Gurkhas took part in a reconnaissance up the valley. The enemy were met about three miles from the bivouac and some villages were destroyed. On the 16th the towers of Mazulla Khan's Fort were blown up and, the fine imposed on the tribes having been paid, the expedition returned to Gandamak. They were still fired on as they marched.

Once more the Moveable Column was out, on the 3rd June, across the Kabul River and into the Lughman Valley on a similar mission. The opposition from the enemy was trivial, but the intense heat caused a good deal of suffering.

On the 16th June command of the Moveable Column was assumed by Colonel Sale-Hill.

On the 29th July the 1st Gurkhas were moved to Jagdalak, where they were employed in patrolling the road and supplying detachments for outlying posts. They had a detachment at Seh Baba.

On the 11th August the return march to India of the Moveable Column No. 1 commenced, Jalalabad being reached on the 13th, and the frontier passed ten days later.

The part played by the regiment in this second half of the Afghan War had been hardly more interesting than that in Southern Afghanistan. There was only one casualty





GENERAL SIR ROWLEY SALE SALE-HILL. K.C.B.

HONORARY COLONEL.

13th May, 1904—23rd March, 1910.

in action. Disease took a heavier toll, causing the death of twenty-seven men. The one casualty in action was a man mortally wounded, probably in the Hissarak expedition.

The regiment's only substantial reward, shared with the rest of the troops serving in Northern Afghanistan and the Kurram, was the grant of batta, ranging from Rs. 180 for a subadar down to Rs. 18 for a sepoy. In 1881 the regiment was allowed to bear the battle honour "Afghanistan 1878-80" on its Colours. Colonel Sale-Hill was made a C.B. for his services in the late war and Subadar Major Jitbir Khawas, for the same reason, was promoted to the 1st Class of the Order of British India and given the title of "Sirdar Bahadur."

The regiment, on return from Afghanistan, reached Peshawar on the 25th August, where it received orders to go to Kohat. From Kohat it went to Khushalgarh and on to Jhelum, which it reached by march on the 13th September. Here it entrained for Amritsar and marched again to Dharmsala, arriving there on the 26th September, when Colonel Sale-Hill again assumed command from Lieut.-Colonel Story. A new badge had been sanctioned in July 1880 for the officers' helmets and the men's Kilmarnock caps. The bugle was surmounted by the crossed kukris and over them was the number of the regiment.

During 1881 and 1882 the 1st Gurkhas remained in cantonments at Dharmsala, furnishing a garrison of one hundred men for the fort at Kangra.

On the 26th May 1881 the regiment was inspected by Brig.-General Cobbe, C.B., commanding Lahore Division. During this year also seven new bachelor barracks were built and the "khalassis" lines were rebuilt.

In January 1882 the establishment of the regiment was fixed at eight companies with—

8 Subadars,
8 Jemadars,
40 Havildars,
40 Naicks,
16 Buglers,
800 Sepoys.

In the hot weather of 1883 Captain Churchill commanded H.E. Viceroy's Guard at Simla, furnished by the 1st Gurkhas.

In this year also new Snider rifles were received from the Ferozepur arsenal to replace those which had been supplied (not new of course) before the Malay Peninsula expedition and which were now worn out. Another change was the introduction of khaki uniform for summer wear.* There had been several changes between "khaki" and white before this.

At his second inspection of the regiment, on the 7th June 1883, Major-General Hume, C.B., wrote: "The 1st Goorkhas is in very good order."

On the 28th November 1883 the regiment marched for Mian Mir, where it arrived on the 12th December, to take part in a camp of exercise. It formed part of the 1st Infantry Brigade commanded by Colonel P. Story of the regiment. A depot of fifty men was left at Dharmsala and the Kangra detachment also remained behind. Starting back on the 28th January 1884, it reached Dharmsala on the 8th February and spent the rest of the year there uneventfully, except for an inspection by General Hume on whose

* The white drill was dyed khaki in the regimental bazar.

report the Commander-in-Chief remarked: "This report shows the 1st Gurkhas to be in very good order and well commanded."

In March 1885 was held at Rawal Pindi the great camp of exercise and Durbar for the edification of Abdur Rahman, the Amir of Afghanistan. The regiment marched on the 16th March to Pathankot, whence it was taken by rail to Rawal Pindi on the 22nd.

Here they were encamped on a plain on the outskirts of the Viceregal camp, with most of the other troops. The regiment was in the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Major G. F. Churchill commanded the Battalion temporarily during the absence of Colonel Story in command of the 2nd Brigade. The whole affair was mainly political, designed to show off part of the British Army in India to its best advantage and to impress the Amir. Besides numerous reviews and parades, the Nepalese General Shamsher Jang Bahadur was invited to inspect the regiments there present of his own countrymen in the British Service—the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Gurkhas. This inspection was evidently connected with the then maturing proposal to add second battalions to the existing Gurkha Regiments.

A day or two after their arrival at Rawal Pindi the Gurkha Regiments were ordered to line the roads in cantonments for the state entry of the Viceroy. As Lord Dufferin passed down the section of the road lined by the 1st Gurkha Light Infantry, he remarked to Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief: "I thought all Gurkha Regiments were dressed in green." He was informed that the 1st was the only one dressed in scarlet.

Next day, Colonel Story commanding the 1st, received an official letter from the Adjutant-General saying that His Excellency the Viceroy had suggested that the 1st Gurkhas might be invited to change their uniform from red to green, so as to bring them into line with all the other Gurkha Regiments. It was expressly stated, however, that there was to be no coercion whatever, and that the men themselves were to decide the issue.

Next morning Colonel Story addressed the men on parade and told them to think the matter out and give their decision next day. That night was mainly spent in the tents discussing the matter. The verdict was unanimous against the change, and was supported by the following arguments:—

(1) That the change would injuriously affect recruiting, since recruits arriving at Gorakhpur always asked which was the "Lal kurti paltan" as they wished to join that.

(2) That the 1st was the only Gurkha Regiment which carried Colours on parade, and that it would be most reluctant to give them up, as it would have to do if dressed in green.

(3) That recruits were invariably sworn in on the Colours, and it was feared the custom would have to cease with the change to green uniform.

Colonel Story replied to the Adjutant-General accordingly, and the matter dropped for the moment.

Next year, 1886, however, the 2nd Battalion was raised and the command was given to Major Rogers of the 4th Gurkhas. Naturally he was in favour of a green uniform for his battalion, and of course the two battalions must be dressed alike.

The upshot was that Colonel Young, who had succeeded Colonel Story in command of the 1st Battalion, received a letter from Head-quarters saying that the Gurkha Officers were to be asked whether they would consent to a change of uniform from red to green.

These officers were still opposed to the change, but saw that the Government were intent on it. Their reply was conveyed through Subadar Major Matbir Sing Thapa in the words "Huzur ka hukm." The formula was a clear indication of the feeling of dislike for the proposed change and of resignation to the wishes of Government. The reply to Simla was sent accordingly consenting to the change. Nevertheless, the change was certainly distasteful to the Gurkha Officers and men. With the younger British Officers, at any rate, it was popular.

It has been stated above that one of the objections raised to the change was that it would no longer be possible to swear in the recruits of the 1st Battalion on the Colours as had been the practice. With the 2nd Battalion there was no such difficulty, as it never carried Colours, being a green-clad regiment from the beginning.

For the 1st Battalion the difficulty was got over by a promise that the practice of swearing in recruits on the Colours should continue. Accordingly, when recruits of the 1st Battalion were sworn in, a guard with two Gurkha Officers proceeded to the Officers' Mess, in the ante-room of which the old Colours are hung. The Colours were then carried up to the parade ground for the swearing in and afterwards returned to their place in the ante-room. This procedure was abandoned later.*

From Pindi, Dharmsala was reached, after return from the 1885 camp, on the 10th May. The regiment had to march all the way. The Battalion was inspected on the 8th June by Major-General Murray, C.B. In the Annual Inspection Report for the year the Commander-in-Chief remarked: "The 1st Gurkhas is in good order and the condition of the regiment is very creditable to Colonel Story and those under him."

There was yet another camp of exercise in November 1885, this time for the edification of the officers representing Foreign Powers. It was held at Delhi in the presence of Lord Dufferin the Viceroy and Sir F. Roberts, Commander-in-Chief. For this camp the 1st Gurkhas were absent from Dharmsala from October 1885 till the end of February 1886.

* See Appendix IV.



CHAPTER VIII
RAISING OF THE SECOND BATTALION—SIKKIM
1886-1891

IN 1885 the question of raising 2nd Battalions of the existing Gurkha Regiments was taken up by the Government of India, and, satisfactory arrangements with regard to recruiting having been made with the Nepal Government, Second Battalions were ordered, in February 1886, to be added to the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Gurkhas.*

The new battalion was formed on a nucleus from the old Battalion, consisting of—

2 Subadars,
3 Jemadars,
12 Havildars,
21 Naicks,
139 Sepoys,
2 Buglers.

The first European Officers of the 2nd Battalion were—

<i>Commandant</i>	Major G. W. Rogers, D.A.A.G. (Musketry), Meerut circle (from 4th Gurkha Rifles).
<i>Wing Commanders</i>	Major J. Corse Scott, 4th N.I. Captain G. Hawkes, M.S.C.
<i>Wing Officers</i>	Captain R. Fulton, 33rd N.I. Lieutenant G. S. Ommaney, 10th N.I. Lieutenant A. V. Hatch, M.S.C. (Adjutant). Lieutenant S. R. Master } Lieutenant A. C. B. Johnson } B.S.C. (Prob.).
<i>Medical Officer</i>	Surgeon R. N. Stoker.

Hereafter British and Gurkha Officers, and all other ranks, have been interchanged between the two battalions with the greatest freedom and frequency.

There was a good deal of difficulty in finding a suitable place for the lines of the new battalion at Dharmsala. Eventually the spur near Kajlot Village was decided on.

In April 1886 the right wing of the 2nd Battalion was sent up to this spot, with orders to hut themselves before the breaking of the rains, as the 1st Battalion could only provide temporary accommodation for the Head-quarters and left wing of the 2nd.

After the rains the left wing of the 2nd Battalion moved up to Kajlot, where it was found necessary to enlarge the new cantonment by including the whole of the village. Building operations could not be begun till the villagers had cut and carried the growing crops. At the end of the year there was still insufficient shelter for the 2nd Battalion,

* The 2nd Battalion 3rd Gurkhas was not raised till 1891.

and permission had to be obtained for two companies to occupy the barracks of the British troops till they were required in March 1887.

Lieut.-Colonel G. Young succeeded to the command of the 1st Battalion on the 1st January 1886, on the retirement of Colonel Story. The Simla detachment was supplied by two companies under Lieutenant Kerr, who was left at Umballa on the way back from Delhi.

There is nothing to record for 1887 except the following. In February the enlistment of twenty supernumeraries for each Gurkha Battalion was sanctioned. The Commander-in-Chief's remarks on the annual inspection were: "The report on the 1/1st Gurkhas is very satisfactory and shows the battalion to be in thoroughly good order. His Excellency is glad to see the improvement in musketry since last year and hopes it will continue." The years 1888 and 1889 require very little notice. There was another camp of exercise at Mian Mir at the end of 1888, at which the 1st Battalion was present and the inspection remarks continued to bear testimony to its efficiency.

On the 1st April 1889 fifteen recruit boys were entertained as an experiment for one year and the supernumeraries allowed to each battalion were reduced from twenty to fourteen. The rebuilding of the married quarters was completed, giving accommodation for two hundred families. A new armourer's shop was built by the Military Works Department and the old one was handed over to the regiment.

In July 1887 Subadar Major Matbir Sing Thapa was admitted to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India. On the 30th July 1888 the 2nd Battalion received orders for its first active service with the Sikkim Expeditionary Force. Six companies, with a rank-and-file strength of five hundred, were to be sent. The new Martini rifles for the battalion had already started from Ferozepur arsenal, but it was decided that the portion of the regiment proceeding on service should retain their Sniders till their return, which it was expected would be within a month or two. As a matter of fact, they were away for thirteen and a half months. The Martini rifles only reached Dharmsala on the 22nd September 1888.

The six companies, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Rogers, left Dharmsala by wings on the 7th and 8th August. Major J. Corse-Scott, Second-in-command, and Lieutenant R. D. Angelo, being ill, had to be left behind, and the former died at Dharmsala on the 27th August 1888. His successor was Major C. A. R. Sage from the 35th Sikhs, who joined the battalion at Gnatong on the 24th August 1888.

It was the middle of the rains when the six companies left Dharmsala and the march to Pathankot was very trying. On the 10th August the wing in rear made a double march of twenty-eight miles in order to catch up the leading one at Pathankot. This march included the crossing of the River Chakki in high flood by torchlight. This difficult and dangerous passage was accomplished without any mishap. From Pathankot the journey to the camp of the Expeditionary Force at Gnatong was partly by rail and partly by march. Of the last march from Darjeeling to Gnatong, Colonel W. I. Ryder, then a subaltern in the battalion, writes:—

"I have a vivid impression of the march from Darjeeling. We started late and got into our first camp after dark, desperately hungry, to find that only two boxes of mess stores had turned up. We crowded round these, and our feelings can be imagined when the boxes were opened and contained an ample supply of soap—nothing else. We had no dinner and no breakfast next morning. Conse-

quently when we reached Kalimpong, the next stage, after climbing a steep mountain on empty stomachs, we were more like wolves than British Officers. Luckily for us we were most sumptuously provided for in the way of food at Kalimpong. We none of us forgot the hospitality we received on this occasion. The march up to Gnatong was exceedingly strenuous, as it led across steep five-thousand-feet ridges and deep hot valleys. It poured with rain the whole time and both ridges and valleys were full of voracious leeches.

"In Gnatong the outstanding fact in my memory was the great friendship struck up between the men of the Derbyshire Regiment and our own men. The former were an exceptionally fine corps and our men had a great respect and admiration for them. This feeling lasted on for years and some of the men corresponded with each other for a long time.

"Once in Gnatong the piquet duties were severe owing to the continued rain and mist."

The causes which led to the trouble in Sikkim began with the persistent disregard by the Raja of the treaty of 1861 in the matter of his residence in his own State. He had settled himself in Thibet and evidently meant to remain there, pleading that he had been forbidden by the Chinese envoy at Lhasa to visit the Lieut.-Governor of Bengal at Darjeeling. The Thibetans had taken a hand in the affair when it was proposed to send a mission to Lhasa and had sent troops into Sikkim and blocked the road maintained by the Government of India. Disregard of such matters was likely to be misinterpreted in Sikkim and the neighbouring States as weakness on the part of the British Government. There was nothing for it but to send an expedition to bring the Thibetans and the Sikkim Raja to their bearings.

After further attempts to induce a peaceful settlement, a force, under Colonel T. Graham, R.A., was ordered out. It consisted, on the 25th February 1888, of four guns R.A., two hundred men of the 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment, Head-quarters wing of the 13th Native Infantry four hundred strong, and about seven hundred of the 32nd Pioneers.

With the earlier operations we are not concerned, and it will suffice to say that the force drove the Thibetans who had blocked the road at Lingtu out of their fort and across the passes into the Chumbi Valley. Colonel Graham was not permitted by the Government of India to follow them over the border and inflict punishment which would keep them from repeating their incursions into Sikkim. His force settled down in an entrenched camp at Gnatong, which is on a plateau twelve thousand feet above sea-level and a few miles north of Lingtu. The Thibetans had attacked Gnatong in May and been badly beaten off, but again Colonel Graham was not allowed to follow over the passes into Thibet. When the troops were being brought back to Darjeeling in July, the Thibetans grew bolder and assembled in large numbers. Colonel Graham was obliged to ask for reinforcements. Amongst those sent were the six companies of the 2/1st Gurkhas.

The day after their arrival Graham's force consisted of three hundred and eighty-six of the Derbyshire Regiment, seven hundred and ninety-one 32nd Pioneers, five hundred and fourteen 2/1st Gurkhas and four guns. Of the appearance of the Gurkhas Captain Iggulden in his account of the 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment in this campaign writes: "The whole of the Gurkhas are now here and very useful and smart they look. They are a young lot of soldiers, having been raised only two years, and are very keen

for a fight with the Thibetans." In front (North) of the camp at Gnatong the road to the Jelapla * was crossed at right angles by the Tuko Ridge over which it passed by the Tukola. On this ridge the 1st Gurkhas supplied a piquet of fifty rifles daily, and each afternoon a patrol of a British officer and thirty men went out to reconnoitre the Thibetan positions on the Nimla, the next pass on the road northwards.

The weather, with the monsoon still blowing, was detestable at twelve thousand feet. Everything was ready for the advance on the Jelapla when weather conditions should permit, and the troops waited anxiously in considerable discomfort (though huts had been built) for the arrival of that day.


On the 12th September a patrol of the 2/1st Gurkhas under Lieutenant Ryder went to reconnoitre towards the Pemberingo Pass on the Thibetan frontier a couple of miles south-east of the Jelapla. When they were in the valley below the pass they surprised, thanks to the clouds and mist, a small piquet of Thibetans in a "sangar" at the east end of the Bidang Lake. Being called on by Lieutenant Ryder to surrender, the Thibetans attempted to escape and in the struggle which ensued two of them were killed, one was captured, and the other two escaped. The Gurkhas had no casualties.

Of this patrol Colonel Ryder writes :—

"We were actually ordered to capture a piquet as it was essential to secure a prisoner in order to get information. I remember the stalking of the piquet well, as it was exciting and took a long time, and to do it we had to get well into the enemy's country. At one critical moment, when we were all lying on our faces on the wet stones and moss quite close to the 'sangar' we were stalking, the bugler, whose name I forget, suddenly started a violent fit of coughing. He was violently kicked and punched by those nearest him, and in despair he turned his bugle mouthpiece into the wet ground and started coughing into the broad end. The sounds he got out were startling, but luckily the enemy never heard him.

"Stoker, our medical officer, came with me on this show, just to see the fun, and, I am sure, enjoyed it as much as anyone."

Next day another prisoner was captured by a party under Subadar Drig Sing Gurung and two more of the enemy were shot. There were frequent exchanges of mus-



* La = pass.

ketry fire, but generally at too long range for the Thibetan arms to do any harm. From the prisoners taken some useful information was obtained. On the 21st September the 2/1st Gurkhas supplied a covering party for four hundred Pioneers sent forward to work on the road between the Tukola and the Nimla to reconnoitre which a company of the Derbyshires and two guns advanced.

On the 22nd the Thibetans made an attempt to surprise the daily piquet of the 2/1st Gurkhas which proceeded at dawn under Jemadar Hanbir Thapa to the Tukola and on towards the Nimla. On this occasion the usual piquet went out towards the Nimla and found itself nearly surrounded by a yelling crowd of Thibetans, who opened fire from a range of only one hundred yards. The men stood firm and fired steadily. When a few of the Thibetans had been killed or wounded the rest fled. There appear to have been no Gurkha casualties.

There was still heavy rain on the 23rd, but early on the 24th it was reported that the Thibetans had advanced in the night and were threatening an attack on Gnatong. Apparently they had got even more tired of waiting than the British and sought a final decision.

The morning piquet, under Jemadar Jawala Kanait, found the enemy in great force, and, as the mist cleared off, it was discovered that during the night they had built a great loopholed wall beginning eight hundred yards to the left of the Tukola, and extending across it to a total length of nearly three miles. The amount of work done in so short a time indicated the numerical strength of the Thibetans. In addition they were still busy throwing up "sangars" 1,000 yards nearer Gnatong.

The right of the enemy's position rested on the Tukola Peak (fourteen thousand two hundred feet), the centre on Mount Paul, and the left on "Trigonometrical" Peak, both very elevated points. The greater part of the front and rear of this position was covered with thick rhododendron scrub, so interlaced as to form a formidable military obstacle. The ridges and paths leading to it from Gnatong were clear, as were those from it over the Nimla Ridge and Kufa Valley to the Jelap and Pemberingo Passes. The piquet of the 2/1st Gurkhas was recalled by bugle and the troops made a hasty breakfast before advancing to the attack.

The attack was arranged in three columns: that of the right, the weakest, under Colonel Halkett, was to hold the Thibetan left; the centre column, under Colonel Sir B. Bromhead, was stronger; whilst the main column, under Colonel Graham himself, was the strongest and was to assault the right of the enemy's position on the Tukola.

Even on the British right the enemy, under the fire of two guns, began to give way early and abandon their wall. The centre column, also, by 10.15 a.m. was within three hundred yards of the centre of the Thibetan position, whence it sent a small party of Pioneers to get into touch with the left or main attack. The left attack was divided into three lines:—

First line—three companies 2/1st Gurkhas under Captain G. H. Robinson.

Second line—three companies 2/1st Gurkhas under Lieut.-Colonel G. W. Rogers.

Third line—three companies Derbyshire Regiment.

There were also four guns.

The advanced guard was formed by one of the three Gurkha companies of the first line, under Lieutenant G. S. Ommaney.

When this advanced guard reached the last knoll on the British side of the Tukola

Peak it found there the detachment of Pioneers, under Lieutenant Holland, from the centre column.

The whole first line of the main column now, about 10.30 a.m., closed up to this knoll, and here Captain Robinson received verbal orders to storm the Tukola Peak, taking Holland's Pioneers with him.

The enemy had been firing all along the line without doing much damage, and was already shaken by the few shots the guns had been able to get in at the wall as the mist cleared from time to time.

As soon as the Gurkhas had recovered breath after their climb to the knoll where they found Lieutenant Holland, they went forward against the peak on which was the enemy's left. The rest of the column followed on the road.

The Thibetans held on to their wall till the Gurkhas and Pioneers were within fifty yards, when they broke and fled, leaving the wall to be immediately occupied by the stormers.

As the enemy retreated over the Nimla they were pursued by the fire of the British guns from the Tukola Peak. The 2/1st Gurkhas were now divided up for the pursuit. Two companies joined the centre column in the pursuit along the main road, whilst the rest, under Colonel Rogers, moved along the wall on the ridge directly towards Mount Paul, one company being kept in the valley on the left. Colonel Rogers and his men pursued the enemy over Mount Paul and only halted about noon near the entrance to the Pemberingo Pass. They had caught up the fugitive enemy and inflicted very heavy loss on him as he was driven down into the Pemberingo Valley. At that time the other two Gurkha Companies with the centre and left column were on the Nimla.

The four companies of Gurkhas were now ordered to the north end of the Bidang Lake to halt till General Graham joined them.

At 2 p.m. the advance on the Jelapla began, the guns coming into action again as the Jelap Valley was reached. In this valley the infantry formed for attack, the 2/1st Gurkhas on the right, the Derbyshire Regiment on the left of the Jelapla Stream. As they advanced against the walls covering the pass the enemy, after showing some disposition to stand and doing some firing with jingals and matchlocks, wavered, broke and fled over the pass. The defences were occupied almost without opposition.

The total British loss was: *Wounded*, Lieut.-Colonel Sir B. Bromhead and Lieutenant A. C. B. Johnson (2/1st Gurkhas, accidentally wounded by his own revolver); and three sepoy, one being a Gurkha. Sir B. Bromhead was wounded when calling on three Thibetans to surrender. He had incautiously omitted to draw his sword or his revolver and was wounded and in imminent danger when his life was saved by the arrival of rifleman Nar Sing Saru of the 2/1st Gurkhas, who bayoneted one of the Thibetans and put the other two to flight. For this act of gallantry Nar Sing received the Order of Merit.

The Thibetans engaged at Tukola were estimated at eight thousand with about twenty jingals and small guns which were carried off early in the day.

That night was spent very uncomfortably in heavy rain on the Jelapla, more than fourteen thousand feet above sea-level.

Next day an advance of ten miles was made to Rinchingong with no more opposition than a few long shots from scattered enemies.

On the 26th September the troops marched to Chumbi, where the mother of the Raja of Sikkim was found. Having destroyed all military stores there, they returned to two miles south of Rinchingong.

On the 27th the whole force returned to Gnatong, a very trying march of fifteen miles in heavy rain and over the Jelapla, Nimla and Tukola.

On reaching Gnatong, as a garrison was to be maintained there and winter was approaching, the huts were improved and made more comfortable for a stay at this great altitude.

On the 8th December the Head-quarters of the battalion and four companies moved back to Rhenok, leaving two companies at Gnatong to garrison the fort, along with three companies of the Derbyshires. On the 9th February 1889, on relief of this garrison, the two Gurkha companies started to rejoin their Head-quarters.

On that date the Head-quarters and four companies were inspected at Rhenok by His Excellency Sir Frederick Roberts, Commander-in-Chief in India.

On the 17th August 1889 the six companies received orders to return to Dharmsala, which was reached on the 22nd September after an absence of over thirteen months. The Indian Medal (1854) with clasp "Sikkim 1888" was granted to those engaged in the operations above described.

Immediately on the return of the 2nd Battalion to Dharmsala it had its Sniders replaced by Martini Henry rifles.* The 1st Battalion had already received theirs in September 1888.

It was in 1889 that the 1st Battalion had to discontinue carrying their Colours on parade or in the field. The regiment still continued to carry Colours, and as has already been mentioned retained their red white-faced uniform, inherited from the 66th Native Infantry till 1886. They were now like the other Gurkha Regiments, a regiment in green uniform, and it was an anomaly for such a regiment to carry Colours. The 2nd Battalion never had any Colours.

The old Colours of the 1st Battalion were directed to be kept in regimental custody, in the Officers' Mess or elsewhere, as honourable memorials of the past.

In July 1890 there occurred at Dharmsala a very severe outbreak of cholera, which carried off about one hundred and fifty men, women and children.

It originated with two pilgrims from Hardwar, who took up their residence in the Kotwali Bazar. There they contaminated a "kul" † which had its source in the stream close to this bazar and flowed past the latrines used both by the bachelors and the married families of the 1st Battalion.

The barracks were at once evacuated. The bachelors were encamped on the Chetru spur, and the married families on some open ground behind the parade ground. The precaution was in vain, and the virulence of the disease was so great at first that deaths occurred within a few hours of seizure. It gradually became less virulent. The deaths among the Gurkhas, excluding women and children, were one subadar, six havildars, three naicks, two buglers and one hundred and three sepoy.‡ This was the second outbreak of cholera since the regiment had been stationed at Dharmsala, and the Simla authorities seriously considered the question of abandoning the station.

* The general re-armament of the Native Infantry with the Martini-Henry rifle only took place in 1892-3 when the British Infantry had received the Lee-Metford magazine rifles.

† "Kul," the vernacular word for an artificial water channel led off from a ravine for drinking or for irrigation purposes.

‡ Before the disease had worn itself out it became a saying amongst the Gurkha ranks that the goddess Devi was incensed with the regiment and intended to take a Royal Guard of the strength of a complete old company, viz. one subadar, one jemadar, six havildars, six naicks and one hundred lance-naicks and sepoy. The almost exact coincidence of the deaths with these figures is curious.

Financial considerations at once played a considerable part, for the Government had only just expended large sums in providing land for the newly raised 2nd Battalion. The Commander-in-Chief, on the other hand, was, on strategic grounds, in favour of transferring the 1st Battalion to Abbottabad. Now, however, the Government of India referred to the orders of June 1864, under which the 1st Gurkhas were promised that Dharmsala should be their Head-quarters in perpetuity. This decided the question against a removal.

The Medical Authorities, however, pointed out that the existing quarters of the 1st Battalion in Lower Dharmsala were close to rice fields which bred mosquitoes and fever. The men had been debilitated by fever, and were susceptible to an epidemic. It was therefore decided to remove the British detachment altogether from Bhagsu, and put the 1st Battalion in their place.

The double-storied stone barracks would, however, hold less than half the battalion, so additional land was acquired on which to build bachelor and married barracks. The stone barracks were in any case not well suited to accommodate an Indian Regiment.

In connexion with this outbreak of cholera, the Commander-in-Chief's remarks on the 1891 inspection report may be quoted as follows :—

“ This is a satisfactory report and shows that the 1st Battalion 1st Gurkhas is in an efficient state and fit for service. The battalion suffered greatly from a severe outbreak of cholera last year, and the manner in which discipline was maintained and the men kept up their spirits was very creditable to all ranks. I am glad to see that there has been an increase of 12·28 points in the ‘figure of merit’ and the Assistant-Adjutant-General reports that the general musketry efficiency of the battalion is satisfactory.”

In November 1890 the 2nd Battalion took its turn at a camp of exercise at Mian Mir, and only returned to Dharmsala in February 1891. The name of the regiment was changed in the same month from the “1st Gurkha Regiment” to the “1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.”

CHAPTER IX

WAZIRISTAN

1891-1895

IT was again the turn of the 1st Battalion to go on active service when it was ordered, on the 1st May 1891, to proceed to Rawal Pindi and join a new Hazara Field Force. Leaving Dharmasala with a strength of seven British, twelve Gurkha Officers, and five hundred and three rank and file, it reached Pathankot on the 5th May. After halting there till the 20th, it proceeded to Rawal Pindi and on to Seri, where it was attached to the Field Force commanded by Major-General W. K. Elles, C.B. A depot under Captain Powell, consisting of one British, three Gurkha Officers, and two hundred and eighty-five rank and file, remained at Dharmasala.

The operations were over before the 1/1st Gurkhas joined, but it had been decided to keep a force in the country until Government should be satisfied that the local chiefs were strong enough to maintain order and prevent the return of Hashim Ali, nominal chief of the Hassanzai and Akazai clans. On the 9th June orders were received to withdraw all troops to India except the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 1/1st Gurkhas, 4th Sikh Infantry, 28th Bengal Native Infantry, a mountain battery, and a company of Sappers and Miners. These troops, under Brig.-General Hammond, V.C., D.S.O., were to continue to occupy the crest of the Black Mountain, as well as Seri and Oghi. Whilst this garrison remained, arrangements were made for settling the country, and on the 2nd December 1891 the force was withdrawn. Entraining at Rawal Pindi on the 10th December, the 1st Battalion reached Dharmasala on the 16th. So far as it was concerned, the operations had been quite bloodless.

On the inspection report of the 2nd Battalion by Major-General Lord Frankfort in July 1892, the Commander-in-Chief remarked: "A very satisfactory report, showing that the 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas is in a very efficient condition, creditable to Lieut.-Colonel Rogers and all concerned. The musketry report is very satisfactory, the shooting is good and also the firing discipline, and much interest is taken by all ranks in this important subject. Place in order of merit 10th, having gained 8 places since last year."

On the 1st November 1892 both battalions went to a Camp of Instruction at Chabil near Mian Mir. Arriving there on the 13th November, they commenced their return on the 12th December, and were home at Dharmasala on the 24th.

There was another camp of exercise at Ferozepur in November 1893, to which the 2nd Battalion only went, marching by Hoshiarpur and getting back on the 7th January 1894.

In consequence of the arrangements made by Sir Mortimer Durand at Kabul in 1893, it became necessary for British and Afghan Commissioners to demarcate the new boundary of Waziristan. The intentions of the Indian Government were strictly peaceful, and every precaution was taken to bring it home to the tribes that there was no intention of

interfering with their internal affairs, the only desire being to establish peace. The tribes seemed to be generally disposed to give a friendly reception to the Commission. The Wana Wazirs had already invited the Indian Government to take over their country and this was considered a favourable opportunity for accepting the invitation. Nevertheless, it was considered advisable to hold a considerable force ready on the frontier, in case trouble should arise with the Wazirs.

The main body of the escort was to be located in Spin or Wana, and to consist of a squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry, a Punjab Mountain Battery, the 1st Battalion 1st Gurkha Rifles, 3rd Sikhs, 20th Punjab Infantry, and the usual Sappers and Miners. This force was to be called the "Waziristan Delimitation Escort." A reserve for it would be kept at Dera Ismail Khan. The 1st Battalion 1st Gurkha Rifles, under Major G. H. Robinson, Officiating Commandant, started from Dharmasala on the 22nd September 1894, with a strength of nine British and fifteen Gurkha Officers, and seven hundred and twenty-four rank and file, and reached Dera Ismail Khan on the 29th, having crossed the Indus in record time. At Dera Ismail Khan it remained till the 11th October, when the escort, under Brig.-General A. H. Turner, left for Wana.*

Karabkot was reached on the 23rd, and there Captain A. G. B. Lang was left for a few days to complete and garrison a post, with the assistance of some Sappers and Miners.

Wana was reached on the 25th by the main body of the escort. A few shots had been fired into the camp at Karabkot in the night of the 24th, one of which severely wounded a Gurkha naick. On the 25th a large jirga of Wana (Ahmadzais) came in. Though they appeared pleased at the arrival of the troops, shots were again fired into camp that night.

The site for the camp was fixed at the eastern end of the Wana Plain, which is about thirteen miles long by eleven in breadth. The danger at Wana was not from the local people, but from the Mulla Powindah, a man who had been for some years settled in Mahsud territory, and had been seeking revenge for personal grievances into which we need not enter.

On the 28th October it was reported that the Mulla with a following of some eight hundred men, principally of the turbulent Abdur Rahman Khels and Abdullais, was moving to Kaniguram, where he hoped to gather more adherents and make an attack on the Wana camp.

General Turner at once called in Captain Lang's detachment from Karabkot, and telegraphed for a battalion and two guns to be sent from the reserve brigade to Jandola.

On the 30th a strong reconnaissance, including two hundred and fifty Gurkhas, went up the Tiarza Nala towards Khaisora. It reached the Tiarza Kotal, some ten miles to the North-east and overlooking the Khaisora Valley, unopposed; but a few shots were fired at it as it returned.

In the evening of the 1st November it was positively ascertained that the Mulla Powindah was at Torwam in the Khaisora Valley with a following of about two thousand five hundred men. Piquets were accordingly doubled, the camp was generally strengthened and the men were ordered to be under arms at 4 a.m. sitting up in their tents with a blanket over them till given permission to go to sleep again. In the event of an attack, the outlying piquets were to fall back on the camp.

In order to explain the attack which was made in the early morning of the 3rd

* See Map of N.W. Frontier, Sheet III, in pocket at end of Volume.

November, in the repulse of which the 1st Gurkhas played so great a part, it is necessary to give a detailed account of the camp and the scheme for its defence. The camp was situated to the immediate West of the Toi River, the left bank of which formed the Eastern limit of the piquets on that side. On the right (East) bank of the Toi a range of hills rose steeply; on the left bank the ground was much cut up by ravines, notably by two large ones running from the West. Between these two ravines were the various camps of the force.

About three hundred yards from the river was the camp of the Political Officer, in a very exposed position chosen by the officer himself in order to allow free access to him of the jirgas. The troops were quartered in a line of camps running nearly East and West from a point two hundred yards North-west of the Civil camp. They faced North in the following order (from right to left): 3rd Sikhs, Sappers and Miners, Mountain Battery, Staff, 20th Punjab Infantry, 1st Punjab Cavalry, Commissariat, Hospital, 1st Gurkhas. The Gurkhas were thus on the extreme left of the main-body camps.

The camp was surrounded by piquets, intended only for observation, and ordered to fall back at once before a serious attack. We need only go into details regarding the positions held by the Gurkhas. They held No. 8½, which was in rear of their camp West of Piquet Hill.

No. 9 was three hundred yards from the Gurkha camp on the Southern ravine, No. 10 rather farther out on the Northern ravine, whilst Bogey Piquet was on a ravine tributary to the Northern ravine, and No. 11 was at the Western end of another ravine still farther North. Nos. 8½ and 9 had orders to fall back before an attack on the Gurkha left support, the others on the right support, and the whole then on the main body.

The greater part of the Gurkhas were thus on the left flank of the camp, but a detachment of "H" Company, under Captain Powell, was posted in an old serai five hundred yards North-east of the camp, about two hundred yards from the left bank of the Toi. This detachment had orders to attack in rear any of the enemy moving on the camp from that direction. The general distribution of the battalion was then roughly as follows :—

In piquets	80
Detachment to North-east	100
Main body	500

The nights of the 2nd and 3rd November had passed quietly when, as on the preceding day, the troops were waked at 4 a.m. and those in the camp sat in their tents fully accoutred. At 5.30 three warning shots were heard, apparently from the direction of the Gurkha Nos. 9 and 10 Piquets. A Gurkha, by placing his ear to the ground, had detected the stealthy movement of men in the neighbouring ravines. He was sent back to warn the supports, but was killed in the sudden attack before he could arrive.

The three shots were almost immediately followed by a wild outburst of yells and tom-toms as about five hundred desperate fanatics rushed Nos. 9 and 10 Piquets, and passed on to the camp. Of the No. 10 Piquet three were killed, two wounded, and the remaining two only escaped owing to the darkness. The enemy who passed No. 9 were checked by the left support on which the piquet fell back. This support, under Lieutenant Lang, made a gallant resistance in which Subadar Padam Sing Rana was killed. This broke up the enemy into two parties, one of which moved to its left and joined the

**TO ILLUSTRATE ATTACK BY MAHSUD WAZIRIS
ON NOVEMBER 3rd 1894**



attackers of No. 10 Piquet in the assault on the left flank of the Gurkha camp. The other continued along the Southern ravine for a short distance, and then turned to the left against the rear of the Hospital and the Commissariat camp. Some of these succeeded in breaking through and doing much damage among the transport animals, penetrating even into the cavalry lines, and cutting loose the horses in an attempt to create a stampede. To return to occurrences on the Gurkha left, so sudden had been the attack, which broke on the camp within three minutes of the first alarm, that the men had only time to get out of their tents and form small rallying bodies. The reserve of the regiment, under Major Robinson, succeeded in forming a rallying square in the centre of the camp which, fighting desperately hand to hand with the Ghazis, stopped their progress along the main street of the camp from West to East. Here the killed included the Jemadar Adjutant of the Regiment, Kharak Sing Nagarkoti, whilst Lieutenant and Adjutant Angelo died on the 30th of November of his wounds, and Captain Lang was severely wounded. There were similar fights with the rallying bodies in other parts of the camp where they happened to have formed, but naturally no full description can be given of these isolated conflicts, in which the men fought back to back against the Ghazis. One such combat is specially noted in the North-West corner of the camp, where Lieutenant Herbert was dangerously wounded. His party was attacked in front and rear when in single rank.

Whilst the 1st Gurkhas were thus stopping the first great rush of the enemy, it was realized that the main attack was on the left flank, and two companies, the reserve of the 20th Punjab Infantry under Colonel Meiklejohn, were ordered to reinforce them. A company was also sent up from the 3rd Sikhs.

Advancing westwards through the camp with the bayonet, the 20th Punjab Infantry men cleared it of such Ghazis as were still left in the intervening parts, and reached the 1st Gurkha camp, which had already been cleared. The 1st Gurkhas, 20th Punjab Infantry and 3rd Sikh Companies now formed line on the left flank of the camp and repulsed two fresh but less-determined attacks of the enemy. In this they were much assisted by the light of star shells, which enabled them to get in several effective volleys.

It was 6 a.m. and day was dawning even in the shadow of the Eastern hills. The enemy's fire was slackening, and they were already beginning to retreat over the plain northwards towards the Inzar Pass. The squadron of Punjab Cavalry was launched in pursuit, followed by the mountain battery and part of the 3rd Sikhs, 20th Punjab Infantry and Sappers and Miners. In this the 1st Gurkhas, except those with Captain Powell, were not asked to take part. They had already done more than their share in this the severest combat in which they had so far been engaged in frontier warfare.

The following account of Wana has been contributed by Major-General Sir C. H. Powell, Honorary Colonel of the Regiment. Though in part it repeats the account given above, it gives some further details, especially as regards what occurred at the Serai.

"The Political Officers informed General Turner that persistent rumours were afloat that the Mahsuds intended attacking the camp either on the 2nd or the 3rd of November.*

"The G.O.C. consequently gave orders for the troops to accoutre at 1 a.m. on the 2nd, so as to be ready for eventualities. He added, however, that, in consequence of the

* Sir C. H. Powell wrote 4th or 5th. We have taken the liberty of altering dates throughout in accordance with the official account and regimental record.

cold it would be sufficient for officers and men to remain in their tents and not to take up the alarm posts.

"The night of the 1st/2nd passed off quietly. Orders were issued after breakfast for the 1st Gurkhas to detail a reconnaissance to the Inzar Kotal to see what was going on, as it was pretty certain that any attack would come either from this Kotal or up the river-bed, through the Tangi.* I was in command of this reconnaissance, and Colonel Mason, R.E., Intelligence Officer, accompanied me. We reached the Kotal without incident, and we searched the jungle-covered valley beyond with glasses, but could see no signs of any hostile movement.

"After about half an hour, I decided on retreating to camp, but no sooner had we turned our backs on the Kotal than sniping commenced and continued half-way to camp.

"I asked Colonel Mason what he thought of the possibility of the camp being attacked this night.

" 'Well,' he said, 'I myself intend getting into pyjamas, that much do I believe in the rumour.'

"When I reached the camp Colonel Robinson told me that the General had ordered him to detail one hundred riflemen to garrison the empty 'serai' which lay on the right flank of the camp, as it was thought most probable that the enemy would come up the river and attack from that quarter, if they came at all.

"I got Robinson to put me in command, as I thought it promised to be a good show. We were not to move till well after dark, so as to give no inkling of what was on foot. The movement was, of course, kept a dead secret, except from those whose business it was to know, and the chief one of these was the Colonel of the 3rd Sikhs, Colonel Thompson, because his regiment occupied the right flank of the Brigade camp. I was instructed to report myself to General Turner before marching, in order to get his definite instructions.

"The Staff Mess was just finishing dinner. 'What are my orders, Sir?' I asked the General. He replied, 'I want you to occupy the "serai." Nobody will know you are there. It has never been occupied before. If the enemy do attack us, I believe they are pretty sure to come up river and assault the right flank of our camp, in which case they are bound to pass your "serai." Now I don't want you to fire a shot at them, but to let them slip by you, and then to have at them in their rear with cold steel.'

"I remarked, 'What about the 3rd Sikhs, Sir? they are sure to fire at anyone assaulting their camp.' The General replied, 'No! I have told Colonel Thompson that he is not to fire, but to have at the Mahsuds with cold steel as well, and that you will attack them in the same manner in their rear.'

"After leaving the General, I passed through the 3rd Sikh camp and took the opportunity of reporting myself also to Colonel Thompson and to tell him what orders I had just received from General Turner, and I commented particularly on the fact that the 3rd Sikhs had orders not to fire in case of being attacked, but merely to charge with the bayonet.

" 'Yes,' said Colonel Thompson, 'but do you think that it would be human nature for my men to resist firing when my camp is attacked? Of course they will fire.' We spoke just outside his Mess tent, and while we stood there suddenly there shot up into the sky the blaze of a big bonfire on the ridge across the river to the right rear of the

* Tangi = defile or gorge.

camp. What can that be for, we all wondered, but there was no explanation beyond the probability of its being a camp fire of some of the tribesmen, though what they could be doing there on that bleak ridge this cold night we could not think. I pondered over these things as I marched off to my 'serai,' and turned them over more than once during the course of that night. My first business was to shut the gates and then to place sentries at the four corners. The walls were high, and had to be reached up mud steps. From here we got a good command of the surrounding country. The men just piled arms and lay down in their great-coats and went to sleep. I brought a quantity of reserve ammunition with me, notwithstanding my instructions to 'have at them with cold steel only.'

"It was about 8 p.m. when we took up our quarters in our snug little fort. That big blaze on the ridge had soon died out; another cause for wonder.

"Dead silence now reigned. Not a sound from the camp, or any other direction. Sleep for me I never thought of, and I spent the chilly night at my sentry posts, the important ones being those facing the Kotal and the Tangi. It was a beautiful starlight night and not a breath of wind. Hour after hour passed; the quarter-guard gongs told me these.

"Suddenly—it was between 4 and 5 a.m.—I looked over my shoulder and saw flames leap forth into the darkness of the night in exactly the same spot on the ridge as the bonfire of last evening. I felt certain now this must portend something, but before I had time scarcely to think, the most fiendish yells, accompanied by tom-toms and firing, broke the stillness of the night. The camp was being attacked in earnest, but the sounds all came, so far as I could judge, from the farther side of the camp, i.e. the side on which the 1st Gurkhas lay.

"It now flashed through me quite clearly the meaning of those two bonfires, lit on exactly the same spot on that commanding ridge: the one in the evening was to give the tribesmen, who were assembled at some distant spot beyond our piquets, the line to attack on; and the rekindling of this bonfire at dawn was for the same purpose.

"I peered into the darkness in front and towards the Tangi, expecting the attack which surely would be made from this direction as well. But there was no sound, no movement. Bullets from the direction of the camp came whistling over our heads, but these of course were easily explained, as there was soon terrific firing going on.

"Before very long the mountain gunners got to work with their little guns, and threw star shell to front and flank, which thus enabled me more easily to search the ground with eyes and glasses. But, beyond the sound of a few stragglers moving in the grass, there was no sound or sign of anything. These stragglers I judged to be probably wounded Waziris escaping.

"Dawn was now breaking fast, volley firing told me that our troops were getting the ascendancy, and the savage cries of the attackers and the tom-tomming grew fewer as dawn got mastery over the darkness.

"I was now able to see more clearly what was going on. The mountain guns now changed from star to live shell, firing at the tribesmen who were now retreating direct for the pass. As I watched, I could see the troops in camp forming up, and it was evident they were marching off in hot pursuit. I said to myself that there was now no possibility of an attack being made from my direction, so I quickly decided that I would start off in pursuit myself, as there could be no possible reason for holding on to this 'serai' any longer.

"I glanced at the ridge behind me where the bonfires had been lit. The skyline was studded with tribesmen, and so were the sides of the Tangi. But I judged these to be not, however, attackers, but just villagers who had collected there ready to fall on the camp and loot it, had the attack proved successful, as they doubtless thought and hoped it would be. The fact that these heights were thick with hundreds of people pretty well proved that every jack man in the whole district around knew quite well that an attack was to be made this very night; otherwise how came they to be on the ridge at dawn?

"Leaving a guard in the 'serai,' I sallied forth and acted as a flank guard to the column advancing from the camp. Not far ahead we came upon a few wounded Waziris who were escaping towards the Tangi. Farther on, where the grassy plain of Wana meets the gradual slope towards the Inzar Pass, we came upon more and more of these wounded, several of whom were lying unable to move. Some showed fight and were of course dealt with.

"The jungle gets thicker up the slope, and it was therefore necessary to search the ground very carefully. It was while working through this that my little force of some eighty men came up with the right of the column from the camp. We went as hard as we could, since there was no opposition to speak of, and the enemy being, as usual, lightly laden, and fleet mountaineers, got the legs of us. We topped the Kotal and down the other side for a few miles. A section of the battery was with us.

"As it seemed hopeless to catch up these fleet Waziris, the commander of the pursuing column called a halt, and after a brief delay, we retreated back over the Kotal and made for camp. The camp we found in considerable disarray, as the General had ordered the Camp of Exercise style of camp, which we had been so foolishly reposing in all this time, to be changed for a 'perimeter' one. Stones were being collected, a low wall arose all round the camp, with a ditch on either side, and alarm posts were now ordered in the ditch behind this wall, with supports and reserves at suitable points. There was a hopeless mess of Waziri equipment and their war material lying scattered about, but by evening all the wounded, attackers and attacked, had been collected in the Field and other Hospitals in camp. Several of our men, in collecting the wounded, were attacked by Waziris lying, themselves desperately wounded, on the ground; one poor fellow got his jaw blown to pieces by a pistol. Another had cuts from a sword, both arms and both legs nearly severed, and his head gaping from a fearful wound—this happened while he was lying asleep in his hut.

"In a day or two we got straight in camp, and improved our defences in every imaginable way. We had many night scares during the succeeding weeks that the camp was again to be attacked, and the strain was considerable. But nothing happened.

"In due course the reserve troops, which had been in readiness at Dera Ismail Khan, arrived, and preparations were made for an advance on Kaniguram and Makin—into the heart of the Mahsud country."

Of the conduct of the 1st Gurkhas on this occasion General Turner's dispatch said:—

"The brunt of the fighting fell on the 1st Gurkhas. This regiment, although taken at a disadvantage, behaved with the utmost gallantry and steadiness, and succeeded after severe hand-to-hand fighting, in clearing their camp of the enemy. The whole of the troops displayed excellent discipline, and a noticeable feature of the fight was the perfect order and absence of all confusion in the camp, under very trying circumstances; there was little wild firing and in parts of the camp not directly attacked, there was no firing at imaginary enemies."

The strength of the enemy was estimated at three thousand men, of whom about half were engaged. They were believed to have lost about three hundred and fifty in killed alone.

The total British loss was forty-five killed and seventy-five wounded, including followers. A number of rifles and some cash were carried off and many transport animals were killed or wounded. The casualties in the 1st Gurkhas were the heaviest they had yet suffered in any one action. The killed were Subadar Padam Sing, Jemadar Kharak Sing Nagarkoti; wounded, Captain A. G. B. Lang (severely), Lieutenant R. D. Angelo (died of wounds), Lieutenant C. Herbert (dangerously), and forty-one rank and file, of whom several died later, besides ten followers.

There were mentioned in despatches, Major G. H. Robinson, Lieutenant R. D. Angelo and Lieutenant C. Herbert.

The well-deserved rewards were :—

To be Brevet Lieut.-Colonel: Major G. H. Robinson.

D.S.O.: Lieutenant C. Herbert.

The 3rd Class Order of Merit was conferred for their gallantry on: Havildar Balbhadur Gurung, Naicks Hira Sing Thapa and Lachman Thapa; Bugler Dhan Sing Bhandari; Riflemen Gubdu Gurung, Nar Sing Gharti and Basu Gurung; 2nd Class Hospital-Assistant Ganuram Newar. In Battalion Orders of the 3rd November 1894 it is recorded that "The Officer Commanding begs to thank the officers and men of the Regiment for their behaviour during last night's attack, and is glad to inform them that the General Commanding has sent the undermentioned telegram to the Commander-in-Chief in India: 'The pluck and steadiness of the 1/1st Gurkha Rifles last night, under the most trying circumstances, was beyond praise.'"

In Escort Orders of the 4th November is the following :—

"The General Officer Commanding has much pleasure in publishing to the troops the following telegrams which have been received from Their Excellencies the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, and congratulates the troops on the praise they have earned."

From H.E. The Viceroy :—

"Have heard with greatest satisfaction of gallant repulse of attack on camp and congratulate you on success of your arrangements, and officers and men on pluck displayed. Regret losses and hope to hear good accounts of wounded. Please convey this message to troops."

From H.E. The Commander-in-Chief :—

"I congratulate you warmly on steady stand made by your men, and am rejoiced to hear of your personal safety. Regret the loss of officers and men. Please keep me informed of progress of wounded."

Congratulatory telegrams or messages were also received by the regiment from 1/3rd Gurkha Rifles, 4th Gurkha Rifles, 4th Punjab Infantry Recruiting Depot, and from Colonel Story, Colonel Young, General Sale-Hill, Captain Kerr, Colonel Churchill and other former officers of the regiment.

In consequence of this attack and the report of renewed activities on the part of the Mulla Powindah, the Government decided on further operations. On the 2nd December three brigades were formed, the 1st was the brigade hitherto known as the Delimitation Escort, of which the 1st Gurkha Rifles was a unit. The 2nd Brigade assembled at Tank, and the 3rd near Bannu. The whole force was styled the Waziristan Field Force

and was under the personal command of Sir William Lockhart. On the 16th December orders were received for the 1st Brigade to advance into the Mahsud country from Wana. The objective was Kaniguram via the Sharawangi Kotal. The 4th Gurkha Rifles had joined this brigade on the 14th. Marching on the 18th the brigade halted for the 19th at Jumai Kot whence a reconnaissance was pushed out to the pass, whilst the rest of the column destroyed the houses of the Shabi Khel in Torwam.

Crossing the Sharawangi Kotal, Kaniguram was reached on the 21st by a road which was much worse than anticipated. This, and some annoyance from Mahsuds on the flanks and rear of the column, caused much delay and the rearguard only reached camp at midnight. On the 22nd at Makin the 3rd Brigade was met, and on the same day some villages were destroyed by a column of six hundred men and two guns of the 1st Brigade who were fired on during the operations and lost two officers and four men wounded. The 1st Gurkhas were apparently not with this column.

From Makin a series of punitive expeditions was carried out by six small columns, each of which bivouacked out for two nights.

General Turner's column alone encountered some opposition in the Baddar Valley on the 29th and 30th. Two men (not apparently of the 1st Gurkhas) were wounded by snipers.

On the 2nd January 1895 a column, in which were included the 1st and 4th Gurkhas, marched from Kaniguram into the Shinkwai Valley and, after destroying more hostile villages, reached Jandola on the 9th. Next day the 1st Brigade was ordered to Wana by the Gumal Pass and arrived there on the 12th without incident. The 1st Gurkhas appear to have arrived only on the 19th. In March 1895 the operations were complete, and punishment had been meted out to all the Mahsud tribes involved in the attack on Wana. The Indian Medal with clasp "Waziristan 1894-5" was sanctioned for these operations. The 1st Gurkhas on their return reached Dharmasala on the 28th March 1895.

CHAPTER X
PUNJAB FRONTIER—TIRAH
1894-1900

DURING the absence of the 1st Battalion on Field Service, Dharmsala had been visited on the 27th October 1894 by H.E. the Viceroy (Lord Elgin), for whom a guard was provided by the 2nd Battalion. After him came H.E. the Commander-in-Chief, Major-General Sir George White, K.C.B., who inspected the battalion on parade and expressed his satisfaction with all he saw.

On the 7th November 1894 the 2nd Battalion, with a strength of four hundred and thirty-six, marched to Lahore for the Viceroy's Durbar. It remained at Mian Mir for a Camp of Instruction and returned to Dharmsala on the 2nd January 1895.

In the end of February 1895 a team of the 2nd Battalion was very successful at the Lahore District Assault at Arms at Mian Mir. It won the first prize for physical drill and for bayonet fighting for the Indian Army.

On the same day (28th March 1895) as the 1st Battalion returned to Dharmsala orders were received for the 2nd to join the 1st Reserve Brigade of the Chitral Relief Force at Rawal Pindi. The 1st Battalion had brought back its full organized transport and this was now transferred to the 2nd, which left Dharmsala on the 30th under command of Major C. A. R. Sage,* with a strength of six British, fourteen Gurkha Officers and seven hundred and nineteen rank and file. Its field strength had been completed by the transfer of thirty men from the 1st Battalion. Entraining at Pathankot on the 2nd April, the battalion joined the Reserve Brigade at Rawal Pindi on the 5th. This brigade was commanded by Major-General G. N. Channer, V.C., who had gained his decoration with the 1st Gurkhas in the Malay Peninsula.

From Rawal Pindi the brigade moved by rail to Nowshera and on by march to Hoti Mardan. Here the 2nd Battalion passed a generally uneventful time. The only notable incident was a severe storm on the 7th May which did much damage in the camp, especially in the quarters of the Gurkha Officers. In spite of the great heat no tents were provided till the 3rd June. On the 15th August the breaking up of the Reserve Brigade was ordered, and the 2nd Battalion marched back to Nowshera, railed thence to Pathankot and reached Dharmsala on the 23rd August after an uneventful absence, under rather unpleasant conditions, with no real active service. In April 1895 the 1st Battalion moved its quarters to new ones just above those of the 2nd Battalion. The severe epidemic of cholera in 1890 had aroused suspicions as to the healthiness of the old quarters, but it had taken nearly five years to settle on a new site. The barracks formerly occupied by

* Under ordinary circumstances the command of Lieut.-Colonel Rogers, first commandant of the 2nd Battalion, would have expired on the 18th February 1893. He was granted an extension till 1st September 1894. On 6th March 1894 he exchanged commands with Major Sage, who took over the 2nd Battalion and Colonel Rogers finished his term with the 1st.

the British troops now furnished quarters for the right wing and the rest of the year was spent in building lines for the left wing.

In this year, 1895, the Officers' Messes of the two battalions, hitherto separate, were amalgamated by mutual consent, and it was decided to build a new Mess House on the spur just below the British Barracks, which was a convenient position for both battalions.

1896 was uneventful, a great deal of it being employed in building huts in the new lines. The 1st prizes for physical drill and bayonet fighting were again won by the 2nd Battalion at the Lahore Assault at Arms.

From March to December 1897 the 1st Battalion provided H.E. the Viceroy's Guard at Simla.

The 2nd Battalion received telegraphic orders on the 1st August 1897 to mobilize and proceed with all speed possible to join the Malakand Reserve Brigade at Hoti Mardan. The battalion, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Sage, with a strength of seven British Officers and seven hundred and twenty-four other ranks leaving Dharmasala on the 5th August, reached Pathankot on the 8th and, entraining the same night, was at Nowshera on the 10th. There, however, orders were received to go on to Peshawar.*

On the 17th August news reached the Commissioner and General Elles that an attack on the Khaibar Rifles post in the pass was to be expected next day, the enemy being an Afridi "lashkar," ten thousand strong. In consequence the 2nd Battalion was ordered to move out early on the 18th as part of the Moveable Column then kept at Peshawar for the general protection of the neighbouring frontier against the Afridis who were in a state of ferment. Seven companies proceeded to Jamrud, whilst the eighth was sent, with fifty men of the 9th Bengal Lancers, to reinforce the garrison of Fort Bara. An attack on both these places had been threatened, but the Afridis, learning of their reinforcement, abandoned this part of their project in favour of an attack on the Khaibar posts only.

The only action taken by the column at Jamrud was to move out on the 23rd August to the mouth of the pass where the R.H.A. Battery fired at a range of three thousand yards on the Afridis attacking Fort Maude. This drove them off, but the Fort was evacuated shortly after by its garrison.

Preparations were now being made for the invasion of Tirah, the most important and largest frontier expedition yet undertaken. Before this, however, it was necessary to punish the Mohmands and the Hadda Mullah, who was reported to be in communication with the Afridis who had attacked the Khaibar posts and proposed co-operating with them in simultaneous attacks on the British Frontier. He was also trying to organize an attack on the Khan of Dir, whose territory he was about to invade. That might endanger the Chitral Road.

The British plan of campaign included an advance by the Malakand Force, under Sir Binden Blood, and co-operation with him by Major-General Elles, C.B., moving into the Mohmand country from Shabkadar.

The 2/1st Gurkhas left Jamrud to join General Elles' force at Shabkadar on the 9th September, together with the 28th Bombay Pioneers and No. 3 Mountain Battery. At Shabkadar, on the 13th, they were assigned to the 1st Brigade commanded by Brig.-General R. Westmacott, C.B., D.S.O., the other units being the 1st Somerset Light Infantry, and the 20th Punjab Infantry.

The 1st Brigade led the advance on the 15th September, camp at Shalamai being

* See Map of N.W. Frontier, Sheet I, in pocket at end of Volume.

reached without opposition. The march was difficult and trying by the bed of a nala in intense heat and with very little water. So bad was the road that camels could not pass and had to be left behind till the 18th.

On the 17th General Westmacott advanced six miles with part of his force to Nahaki. The right wing of the battalion remained at the foot of the ascent to the Nahaki Pass to guard the transport and only rejoined on the 21st at Nahaki.

On the 21st September another long and trying march took the brigade to Lakarai. No opposition was met with. At Lakarai Sir Binden Blood met General Elles and lent him his own 3rd Brigade and a Mountain Battery of the Malakand Force to aid in dealing with a hostile force of over four thousand men reported to be at Bedmanai.


On the 22nd Elles' force moved to the neighbourhood of Kuz Chinarai, where it was joined by the reinforcements above mentioned.

From this camp the road to the Bedmanai Pass led for two or three miles south-westwards before turning due south at the mouth of the pass. The summit of the pass (3,850 feet) is about a thousand feet above the starting-point, and just below it begins the nala forming the road from Kuz Chinarai. On the east of the pass is a height rising another fifteen hundred or two thousand feet on which the enemy had "sangars." The plan of attack was for the 3rd Brigade to move along and west of the nala direct on the pass, whilst the 1st (including the 2/1st Gurkhas) followed the line of heights forming the eastern edge of the valley and ending in the fortified height above the pass just mentioned. With the details of the movements of the 3rd Brigade on the right we are not concerned.

On the left the advance was led by the 20th Punjab Infantry supported by the 2/1st Gurkhas, with the 28th Bombay Pioneers in rear. Starting at 7.15 a.m. the 20th Punjab Infantry pushed steadily on, driving the enemy from the heights in succession. They were well supported by No. 3 Mountain Battery and it was not found necessary to call in the assistance of the Gurkhas. By 10.30 a.m. the sangars on the height East of the Kotal were occupied, and the enemy were in retreat in several directions. The largest body of them moved along the continuation of the eastern ridge till they reached a large sangar on the top of the Yari Sar height, about twelve hundred feet higher than that above the pass. The approach to this was up a steep bare grassy slope and the 1st Gurkhas were now called up to assist the 20th Punjab Infantry which pushed on, covered by the fire of the Gurkhas and of the mountain battery. By 11 a.m. this height also was captured and the retreating enemy were suffering from the fire of the maxims which had kept up throughout with the firing line of the 20th Punjab Infantry.

The enemy were not in great strength, probably not more than seven or eight hundred, and the resistance offered was extremely feeble, as is shown by the total British casualties of one man killed and three wounded. Of these one killed and one wounded belonged to the 2/1st Gurkhas. The 3rd Brigade had had an equally easy success on the right. After the action the 1st Brigade, with two mountain batteries, moved down the south side of the pass into the Bedmanai Valley, whilst the 3rd returned to Kuz Chinarai.

On the 24th the 2/1st Gurkhas led the advance to Sarfaraz Kila. At a low pass about three miles short of the latter place, the enemy were observed trying to empty some water reservoirs by cutting their banks. The guns opened on them and the two leading companies of Gurkhas, under Lieutenant W. C. Anderson, went forward at the double, a



THE MOHMAND FRONTIER.
1897-1898.

movement which resulted in the flight of the tribesmen before they could seriously damage the tanks. That night a few shots were fired into the camp, wounding one sepoy.

What happened on the 25th September and afterwards is very fully described in the Digest of Service of the 2nd Battalion. That account, supplemented by the published official account, is closely followed in the following narrative.

The brigade, after a march of twelve miles, arrived about 11 a.m. on the 25th, at the mouth of the Jarobi Nala. From this point a village was seen about a mile up the nala. To cover the advance of the troops on this village, the battalion was ordered to crown the heights on the left. This was done by the left half battalion supported by the right, no opposition being met with.

Soon after the left half battalion had taken up its position a helio message ordered half the battalion to take over the duty of escorting the battery in the valley below in place of the 20th Punjab Infantry who were required to cover the advance on another village farther up the valley which was now seen.

Soon after the right half battalion had reached the battery, heavy firing indicated that the 20th Punjab Infantry were hotly engaged. They had been charged by some Ghazis who were driven off with a loss of half their numbers. The right half battalion under Colonel Sage was now ordered up to support them and cover their retirement. "A" Company was sent in advance for this purpose.

At 3.30 p.m., after the destruction of the fortified places in the valley, a retirement was ordered and was covered by the right half battalion, the companies passing through one another and taking up fresh positions till the bend in the nala was reached where the guns originally had been. Here the Bombay Pioneers were in position to cover the further retirement. The enemy did not follow up the retirement with any vigour, and such of them as did were high up on the hills on the left, where the left half battalion with a few volleys effectually stopped all attempts to outflank the left of the Bombay Pioneers. At the mouth of the glen the left half battalion rejoined the right, the Bombay Pioneers passed through, and the battalion again took over the duty of covering the retirement to the camp at Tor Khel which was reached at dusk without further molestation. The battalion had no casualties on this day. "B" Company, which was on piquet on a hill twelve hundred yards from camp, had a very unpleasant night without food, water, or greatcoats.

On the 26th the brigade was split into two parts. The battalion with a wing each of the 20th Punjab Infantry and Somerset Light Infantry and the 3rd Mountain Battery, all under Colonel Sage, marched westwards, destroying some villages on the way and encountering only slight opposition which caused no loss. At Khwarina this force rejoined the rest of the brigade. On the 27th the battalion took part in the punishment of the Khuda Khel Baezai who had some well-fortified villages near Khwarina on the right bank of the Bohai Dag Nala. About a mile from the villages the battalion formed for attack over open ground. When seven hundred or eight hundred yards from the village, fire was opened by the enemy, mainly on the main body in rear of the 2/1st Gurkhas who formed the firing line. The guns then opened on the villages, forcing the enemy to retire to the semicircle of hills in rear.

"E" and "F" Companies, under Lieutenant Bateman-Champain, were now sent forward with orders to climb the heights well to a flank so as to take the enemy in flank. Having advanced some distance, they were temporarily held up by fire from the heights

on both sides of them. "A" Company, under Lieutenant Rose, being sent to support them, the advance was continued and the heights crowned, the enemy retiring westward along the heights. As it was seen that the attack had been drawn farther to a flank than was originally intended, and that the three companies were fully employed, two more companies under Major Martin were sent to support them and crown the heights on their left. These took post on the most commanding ground on the ridge. The remaining three companies advanced on the village which was found to be empty, and passing through it two of them climbed the heights immediately behind and a little to the right, whilst the third remained at the foot in support. This company was subsequently joined by "D" Company recalled from the right attack. On these two companies the enemy maintained a desultory fire which caused no damage.

On receipt of orders to retire, after destruction of the village, the companies on the right were first drawn back. They had three wounded men to bring in which somewhat delayed them. The retirement was satisfactorily accomplished, the companies passing through one another and giving mutual support. The companies in the centre then closed on those on the left and descended to the village without further loss. The retirement was covered by "C" under Captain Hatch. The casualties of the day were five wounded, one of them very severely.

The same evening the troops marched to Kung, where a well-earned rest was enjoyed on the 28th. They had been continually on the move since leaving Nahaki on the 21st, with very little time for cooking and eating. The willingness of the battalion had gained the praise of all who witnessed it.

After a night of much sniping on the camp, by which one Gurkha was wounded, the troops marched back unopposed to Nahaki.

On the 3rd October they started to return to India and reached Peshawar on the 6th, the strength of the battalion then being ten British and fourteen Gurkha Officers and seven hundred and seventeen rank and file. There had been a good deal of fever among the men after leaving Nahaki, otherwise the health of the battalion was good. Of the conduct of the troops under his command the G.O.C. wrote: "I cannot speak too highly of the 20th Punjab Infantry and the 2/1st Gurkhas, on whom the brunt of the work fell. I could wish for no better regiments for hill fighting under their respective commanders."

At Peshawar the battalion received orders to join Brig.-General Hamilton's 3rd Brigade at Kohat, which was reached on the 12th October. The brigade, besides the 2/1st Gurkhas, included the 2nd Derbyshires (their old friends of the Sikkim Expedition), the 1st Devons, and the 30th Punjab Infantry. At Kohat, owing to an accident, General Hamilton had to give over the 3rd Brigade to Colonel Yule of the Devons. The 1st Division, of which it was a unit, was under Major-General Penn Symons, C.B., and the whole Tirah Field Force was commanded by Sir W. Lockhart, the C.-in-C. in India, in person. The Brigade marched from Kohat on the 17th October and on the 20th, the day of the second storming of the Dargai Heights, it reached Shinwari, the advanced base of the main column. For the second attack on the Heights the Derbyshires were temporarily lent.

The road passable for wheeled traffic ended at Shinwari, and baggage had to be reduced to a minimum, as camels were too slow moving for a campaign begun so late in the year, and only mules and ponies were available. A baggage guard of an officer and forty-five men was left at Shinwari as well as thirty-six weakly men. On the 23rd the

battalion marched to the village of Mahomed Jan and on the following morning to Kangur Boor where they bivouacked on the west of the divisional camp. Brig.-General R. C. Hart, V.C., C.B., here took over command of the brigade.

This march, thanks to the capture of the Dargai Heights on the 20th, had been unopposed, except by the difficulties of the track itself. It led due North to Karappa over the Chagru Kotal.

On the 25th a foraging party was sent up the Khanki River. It consisted of a wing each of the Derbyshire and Devonshire Regiments, the left wing of the 2/1st Gurkhas, under Captain Hatch, and four mountain guns, the whole under the command of Colonel Yule of the Devons.

Under a dropping fire from the tribesmen on the hills which did no harm, the column moved four and a half miles to the village of Ramadan which was occupied without opposition. Ramadan stood on the left bank of the Khanki some eighty feet above the stony bed. Beyond the river to the south was the Samana range scored by small valleys between wooded spurs. To a small village up one of these, a quarter of a mile below Ramadan the column accompanied the transport which was to be loaded up with grain and fodder. Ramadan was to be held by the Derbyshire Regiment till the convoy was on its way home. Before it was started the enemy had begun to attack Ramadan from the north, and to give much trouble to the Derbyshires holding it. When the convoy was fairly started, the place was evacuated, but the retiring troops had to fight a sharp rear-guard action with the tribesmen following them almost to the Karappa camp. In this the Derbyshires lost six men wounded (one mortally), the Devons three, and the 2/1st Gurkhas three, and one missing who was afterwards found.

The night of the 25th was one of much sniping and of threats of attack in which between thirty and forty casualties occurred, though there were none in the 2/1st Gurkhas.

The camp was fairly quiet after this. It now contained about seventeen thousand fighting men, many followers, and twenty-five thousand animals. The road by the Chagru Kotal had been so improved as to admit of camel transport, which facilitated the supply of the seven hundred tons of food, not to speak of other things, required daily by this large force.

The next obstacle to the advance northwards into Tirah was the Sampagha Pass, the foot of which lay five miles from Karappa. On the 28th the whole force moved three and a half miles on the road to the village of Gandaki ready for the assault of the pass next morning. In this march the 3rd Brigade moved through the low hills on the right. So far there was no opposition, and on arrival the 1st Gurkhas and Derbyshire Regiment were sent on across the Kandi Mishti Nala to occupy some low hills in full view of the pass which was being reconnoitred by the Staff.

The advance to these hills, which formed the first artillery position next day, was opposed only by desultory long-range fire, which however unfortunately severely wounded Colonel Sage of the 2/1st Gurkhas and wounded one rifleman. Major Martin took command of the battalion when Colonel Sage was wounded. After this reconnaissance the Brown Hills, as they were called, were evacuated and the 2/1st Gurkhas and Derbyshires retired towards Gandaki. There was much sniping in the night, but none of the casualties caused were among the 2/1st Gurkhas.

The plan for the attack next day was for the Derbyshires again to seize the Brown Hills as an artillery position; the 1st Devons to occupy the village of Nazeno on the

right which had been seen to be strongly occupied on the 28th; the 2/1st Gurkhas to move towards the left and occupy the village of Kandi Mishti as a protection to the left flank of the main advance. The 2/1st Gurkhas reached their post with but slight opposition, as did the Derbyshires in the centre and the 1st Devons on the right. Both flanks being now protected, the main attack, led by the 2nd Brigade, passed through on the right of the Derbyshires against the front of the pass. With the details of this we are not concerned. When the 2/1st Gurkhas had occupied their position about Kandi Mishti their functions were complete, unless an attack was attempted on the left flank. As none such occurred, the battalion remained passive spectators of the frontal attack which resulted in the capture, with trifling losses, of the pass by 11.15 a.m.

The 2/1st Gurkhas held their position till 4 p.m. on the 30th October, when they crossed the pass to Mastura in the valley beyond, where they arrived three hours later.

On the 31st October the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Brigades moved out early to the attack of the Arhanga Pass. When the 1st Devons and 2/1st Gurkhas moved in the same direction at 10 a.m. they found, on reaching the foot of the pass, that it had already been carried and the main force had passed over into Tirah. They then returned to the 1st Brigade which remained at Mastura as a connecting link between the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes.

Later, on the 31st October, the 2/1st Gurkhas went with part of the Derbyshires and some cavalry to raid villages a couple of miles down the valley and returned with one hundred mule-loads of fodder without having encountered any opposition.

On the 5th November two companies each of the Derbyshires and 2/1st Gurkhas went out, under command of Major Smith-Dorrien of the Derbyshire Regiment, to some villages towards the Waran Valley three or four miles off. These were found to be occupied and some twenty or thirty men from them were seen to move up on to the neighbouring hills. To protect the foraging party, which had six hundred mules with it, a company of the 2/1st Gurkhas was sent on to a hill commanding the right flank whilst the rest moved up a nala to the villages with flanking companies out on either side. The enemy opened fire at long range whilst the grain was being loaded from the villages in succession. Covering parties had to be pushed out in front as well as on the flanks. The villages having been cleared of their supplies, a retirement by successive companies was successfully effected. Sepoy Chaturia Thapa of the 1st Battalion (attached 2nd) distinguished himself by defending single handed a wounded "drabi" whom, as well as his mule, he saved from capture. One Gurkha was severely wounded.

The 8th was a red-letter day for a road piquet on the Arhanga Pass under Subadar Balwant Sing Mahat. They succeeded in surprising about two hundred and fifty tribesmen who were lying in wait for convoys. So complete was the surprise that the enemy made off as fast as they could, without inflicting any casualties on the piquet. Seven dead of the enemy and four wounded, all with their rifles, were left on the field and the wounded were taken prisoners. It is only under such circumstances of complete rout that the tribesmen leave dead or wounded or rifles behind. It was believed that about thirty more wounded were carried off. The Subadar received well-merited commendation for his action in Brigade and Divisional Orders.

There was another large foraging party on the 13th, consisting of two companies 2/1st Gurkhas under Captain Hatch, and one each of the Derbyshires, Devons, and Jhind Infantry, with a squadron of the 18th Bengal Lancers. Starting at 9 a.m. when they had

moved about two and a half miles up the Mastura Valley, one company of Gurkhas was sent to crown some heights on the left commanding the line of route. Presently, as the rest of the force moved on, a large village full of supplies was found and the mules were loaded up. Whilst this was being done, the tribesmen began collecting in all the neighbouring villages and on the surrounding heights and firing at the foragers. The Lancers were sent on to the next village beyond, but the mules with them had to be withdrawn to the first village as the fire was too hot for loading beyond it.

The enemy were working round the right flank, attempting to intercept communication with the camp. They kept well out of rifle range and there was no artillery present. To prevent this encircling movement, Captain Hatch, at his own suggestion, was sent off with the other Gurkha Company to go as hard as they could lay legs to ground to a commanding height a mile and a half off. The height was successfully seized, an operation which effected its object. There were attacks on the Devons in the farther village and on the Derbyshires supporting them.

At 12.30 it was getting too dangerous to wait longer in the hopes of more forage. The retirement began fighting all the way. Two halts had to be made. The first was to facilitate the withdrawal of the 2/1st Gurkhas from the height on the left flank. They had been seriously threatened and compelled to fix bayonets as the tribesmen attempted to charge. The charge, however, was broken up by the fire of the companies on the low ground.

The next halt was to let Captain Hatch and his company come in.

The enemy followed up till 3 p.m. when the troops were within half a mile of home.

The total casualties were seven wounded, including Captain Bowman of the Derbyshire Regiment severely wounded. The Devons had two wounded, but the 2/1st Gurkhas had no casualties.

Besides these foraging expeditions, the battalion and the rest of the brigade had a strenuous time in the Mastura Valley, and on the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, in furnishing patrols, piquets and escorts for convoys.

On the 5th December General Symons, commanding the 1st Division, inspected the 2/1st Gurkhas and in expressing his satisfaction with all he saw mentioned that General Hart had reported the battalion as having done excellent work ever since it came under his command.

On the 7th December began the evacuation of the Maidan Valley by the troops beyond the Arhanga Pass. At the same time the 1st Brigade started from Mastura, on its way to Peshawar, down the Mastura River. During the passage of General Gaselee's 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division the right wing of the 2/1st Gurkhas, under Captain Ryder and Lieutenant Anderson, was detached to hold the Arhanga Pass. When the wing was on its way to rejoin the 1st Brigade next day, it was followed by tribesmen and one man was wounded by their fire. That night the 1st Brigade spent at Mishti, a march below Mastura.

On the 8th it marched to Haidar Khel, and on the same afternoon General Symons, escorted by one company each of the Derbyshires and 2/1st Gurkhas, reconnoitred a pass leading North into the Waran Valley into which it was decided to make an expedition next day, for there were old scores to be wiped out with its inhabitants.

At daybreak on the 9th December the left half battalion and Head-quarters 2/1st Gurkhas moved out to occupy this pass. They were followed at 7.30 by six companies

each of the Derbyshires, Devons, 30th Punjab Infantry, 21st Madras Pioneers, and the Nabha Infantry, with two mountain batteries. The two remaining companies of these regiments went down the Mastura River to the next camp with the baggage and transport.

The main force, which had encountered no opposition, was on the top of the pass about 9 a.m. and descended for its work of destruction in the Aka Khel villages of the Waran Valley. The western end of the valley was assigned to the Derbyshires and 2/1st Gurkhas, the Devons took the neighbourhood of the Mullah Sayad Akbar's residence, whilst the 30th Punjab Infantry were left on the ridge near the pass.

It appeared that most of the Aka Khels had gone off after Sir W. Lockhart's force marching in the Bara Valley and very soon fifty or sixty of their villages were blazing. That brought back the Aka Khels who collected on the hills as the force, having completed its work of destruction, began to retire, with the Derbyshires and 2/1st Gurkhas acting as rearguard. The retirement was not by the pass over which it had come, but Eastwards down the stream in the valley which joins the Mastura farther down. The 30th Punjab Infantry on the range crossed in the morning, were therefore a guard for the left flank in the retirement which was begun about 2.30. The Aka Khels followed up, but the British losses from their fire were very small and the Gurkhas suffered none. The force reached Hissar at 7.30 p.m. and units there met the baggage and transport and the guards that had marched by the Mastura.

General Symons, who had watched the operations from the pass, issued the following order:—

“Major-General Symons desires that you will kindly convey to the Officers Commanding the Derbyshire Regiment and the 2/1st Gurkhas his appreciation of the skilful manner in which the regiments conducted their retirement in the Waran Valley on the 9th instant. The Major-General asks that these remarks may be communicated to the companies engaged on that day.”

In conveying the above, General Hart added: “The Brig.-General has much pleasure in communicating the above remarks of the Major-General Commanding which are thoroughly deserved.”

Hissar was left on the morning of the 10th December and the march continued down the Mastura which had to be crossed and recrossed several times. Andhkhel, at the foot of the Sapri Pass, was reached that day. The 11th was spent in improving the road over the Sapri Pass, by using which a large bend in the Mastura River was cut off. When it was crossed next day it was found to be very difficult, and would have been very dangerous had there been an enemy defending it. The passage was only completed by the rearmost units during the night.

After this the brigade again passed the Mastura River and reached Bara Fort without further adventure.

Bara being reached on the 15th, the brigade moved again on the 18th to Jamrud, whence it was to proceed on another expedition into the Bazar Valley, whilst another column cleared the Khyber Pass and restored the damaged posts.

The movement of the 1st Division started on Christmas Day 1897, the 1st Brigade on the right marching by the Alachi Pass, whilst the 2nd crossed the Chora Pass farther South. General Hammond's force proceeding up the Khyber protected the right flank of the 1st Brigade.

The 1st Gurkhas formed the rearguard on the 25th December and only started from camp at noon. By 3 p.m. it had only progressed a mile, for its way was blocked by a convoy of twelve hundred mules, besides the regimental baggage of the brigade. Only two miles more had been accomplished when darkness fell, and, in consultation with the Royal Sussex, the next regiment in front guarding the convoy, it was decided to bivouac where they were, in a ravine offering good facilities for defence. The mules were accordingly unloaded in the ravine, three companies of 2/1st Gurkhas formed piquets to the right, left and rear, whilst the rest remained distributed for the defence of the animals.

The night passed quietly and the march was resumed at 7 a.m. on the 26th, though the last of the mules were not clear of the ravine before 11 a.m. When Karamma was reached, without incident, the rest of the brigade had already started for a seven-mile march to Berakhas which however ended in its halting for the night at Burg only three miles from Karamma. Karamma, marked on the map as a single village, turned out to be a considerable area of more or less scattered houses with towers, of which one group was Karamma. After an hour-and-a-half halt at Karamma for the men to feed, the 2/1st Gurkhas followed; but the last of the baggage was not out of Karamma till 5.30 p.m., so the camp had to be left with many precautions against night attacks.

Four companies under Captain Hatch extended and covered the rear, moving from ridge to ridge, the other four under Captain Ryder forming a reserve to them.

Soon after leaving Karamma, the road, which was exceedingly bad and covered with large boulders, passed through a narrow defile between heights till within half a mile of Burg. The companies, now that it was dark, closed up and fixed bayonets, but as the men could only move in single file, owing to the nature of the road, progress was very slow and it was 9.45 p.m. when the last company reached Burg (only three miles from Karamma), work having started at 7 a.m. The night was pitch dark, and it was only owing to General Hart's precaution of having bonfires lighted at short intervals that the road could be followed. Fortunately the enemy did not follow along the heights. Had they done so casualties could hardly have been avoided. Piquets all round the valley were left out by General Hart, but it would have been easy for single men to slip through them in the darkness. General Hart complimented the regiment on its good work on the 25th and 26th December. They had been assisted by four companies of the Derbyshires and four of the 30th Punjab Infantry sent back at daybreak on the 26th towards Alachi.

The 27th was spent at Burg in blowing up the towers of the village.

On the 28th the return march was commenced. General Hart, hoping to surprise the enemy who had collected in rear of him at Karamma, proposed a night march reaching Karamma before the Afridis were astir. For purposes of mystification, orders were issued in the evening of the 27th for a march to Chura in the opposite direction to Karamma. The real direction of the march was not disclosed till the troops paraded at 4 a.m. on the 28th in a steady downpour of rain which it was hoped might help to keep the tribesmen at home in Karamma. There could be no bonfires this time to light the way, and the troops had many broken shins and tumbles as they groped their way along the boulder-strewn road.

The advanced guard started at 4.45, the main body, with which was the 2/1st Gurkhas, about an hour later. The advanced guard was in position overlooking Karamma soon after 6 a.m., full of hope that the enemy had not taken alarm. It was not light

enough for an advance till 7 a.m., so the advanced guard had to wait, shivering and soaked to the skin, for that hour and the arrival of the main body. Then they went on to Karamma only to be bitterly disappointed by finding the enemy entirely gone and not a soul in the place. In this advance five villages on the left were assigned to the 2/1st Gurkhas as their objective whilst the Derbyshires took the five on the right. It was surmised that the bogus orders for Chura had defeated their own object by inducing the Afridis at Karamma, on hearing of them from their spies, to hurry towards Chura to head off the British.

During the 28th numerous towers and fortified houses were destroyed. The day was very wet and the night after still worse, especially for the men on piquet. The 30th Punjab Infantry and some sappers were sent on to the village of Alachi on the 28th so as to be able to improve the road and cross the pass early on the 29th.

At 8 a.m. on the 29th the 2/1st Gurkhas and 21st Madras Pioneers started, still in pouring rain, for Alachi. To the 2/1st Gurkhas fell the duty of piqueting the heights on either side to protect the march of the column. By the time the Alachi Pass was reached the whole battalion was absorbed in this duty. The piquets were constantly under heavy fire, often from ranges short enough for the use of slugs, and as they were often enveloped in mist their withdrawal was a matter of difficulty and danger. Altogether the 2/1st Gurkhas were fortunate in losing only one man wounded. The Derbyshires with the rearguard were less fortunate in losing six men wounded. Yet Captain Slessor of the Derbyshires says: "The Gurkha piquets . . . were for a considerable time under a closer and heavier fire than our own piquets."* Even when the Alachi Pass had been crossed the enemy continued to follow up closely, though without causing much damage. At one point, when the rearguard of the Derbyshires took cover in a ravine, the 2/1st Gurkhas covered them from the flanking heights and finally themselves became the rearguard till Ali Masjid was reached shortly before dark. Captain Ryder, Lieutenant Anderson, and Subadar Balbir Gharti are mentioned as having done specially good service on this day.

On the 30th December, when the rest of the 1st and 2nd Brigades returned to Jamrud, the 2/1st Gurkhas and the Kohat Mountain Battery were left to garrison Ali Masjid, where they had to bivouac on the "Ridge" till tents could be sent up.

The Derbyshire Regiment came up again to Ali Masjid from the 5th to the 11th January 1898 and the 1st Brigade was re-formed there on the 27th for a fresh expedition designed to expedite the final surrender of the Afridi tribes who had not yet paid their fines, especially the Zakka Khels of the Bazar Valley.

The plan was for the 1st Brigade to occupy the line of the Chura River so as to block the exits on that side from the Khajurai Plain, in which the flocks and herds of the Afridis were believed to be. The 2nd and 4th Brigades would close the exits in other directions, whilst the 3rd Brigade from Bara would sweep towards them.

The 1st Brigade left Ali Masjid at 1 a.m. on the 29th with the Derbyshires in the right column, the 2/1st Gurkhas in the centre and the Royal Sussex on the left, the Madras Pioneers and a company of sappers following the right column. Captain Hatch was temporarily commanding the 2/1st Gurkhas, Major Martin being on leave. The 2/1st Gurkhas and Royal Sussex both moved down the bed of the Khyber stream, then turned southwards and joined up with the left of the Derbyshire Regiment which they prolonged on the Chura River. There was no fighting of any sort for the 1st Brigade, the Chura people

* *The 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment in Tirah*, p. 158.

displaying no hostility; but the march was long and trying owing to the severe cold and the necessity for fording the river several times. The only column which did have a fight was the 4th Brigade, with which we are not concerned. The 1st Brigade started on its return journey at 1 p.m. and was back at Ali Masjid about 5 p.m. after a twenty-mile march quite devoid of adventure.

Nothing of note happened till the night of the 18th February when a tremendous thunderstorm broke on the camp after midnight. Tents were in some cases blown away entire, in others thrown down and torn to shreds, animals stampeded, and there was fearful confusion. In the morning scarcely a tent was standing. After this there was work at times in furnishing covering parties for the Pioneers working at improvement of the Chura Road, and on the 9th March the 1st Brigade was inspected by Sir W. Lockhart. On the 14th the British Officers of the 2/1st Gurkhas dined with their friends and associates of the Derbyshires, whose hospitality was returned on the 24th. Both evenings were very cheery.

On the 19th March preparations for a fresh attack on Chura at last brought even the Zakka Khels to heel and they paid up their fines. There were sports on the 18th and 19th.

On the 1st April the Derbyshire Regiment was sent back to Jamrud, as hostilities were practically at an end, and the Royal Sussex followed. On the 7th April the battalion marched to Landi Kotal where they remained till the 6th June when they left for Dharmasala, arriving there in separate wings on the 17th and 18th.

In a letter, addressed to Colonel Sage on the occasion of their leaving Landi Kotal, General Seymour wrote:—

“Your Regiment had done admirable service throughout the campaign and has well maintained in the field the best traditions of our Gurkha soldiers.”


In the course of the operations against the Mohmands, in Tirah, and in the Bazar Valley, the losses of the battalion in action (exclusive of deaths from disease) had been:—

Wounded: British Officer	1 (Colonel Sage)
Killed: Rank and File	1
Wounded: „ „ „	14

The India Medal 1895 with clasps “Punjab Frontier 1897-98” and “Tirah 1897-98” were awarded to all who had served in these campaigns.

The 1st Gurkhas were also authorized to wear on their badges and appointments the battle honours “Punjab Frontier” and “Tirah.”

Majors E. W. F. Martin and C. H. Powell were made Brevet-Lieut.-Colonels, and Captain W. I. Ryder, Brevet-Major. During the absence of the 2nd Battalion on service the 1st Battalion had been busy with the building of their new lines in the upper cantonment at Dharmasala. In January 1899 the 2nd Battalion was again successful in physical drill and bayonet fighting at the Assault-at-Arms, though this time only the second prizes were won. On the 6th February 1900 Lieut.-Colonel G. H. Robinson succeeded Colonel Sage in command of the 2nd Battalion.



CHAPTER XI

THE EARTHQUAKE AT DHARMSALA

1900-1905

ON the 26th May 1900 the 2nd Battalion was rearmed with '303 Lee-Metford magazine rifles. As, however, these were required for issue to troops proceeding to China, they were temporarily withdrawn and Martini-Henry rifles were reissued. Lee-Enfield magazine rifles were finally issued on the 23rd September 1901, when, as part of the annual musketry course had already been carried out with the Martini-Henry, it became necessary to recommence it with the new rifle.

The 1st Battalion appears to have been rearmed in April 1901,* and to have gone through its whole course for that year with the Lee-Enfield rifle. On the 24th and 25th October 1900 the two battalions left Dharmsala to take part in the Lahore Division hill manœuvres near Dalhousie. On completion of these manœuvres the 1st Battalion proceeded to Charri to complete its musketry course and only reached Dharmsala on the 23rd December. The 2nd Battalion returned direct from manœuvres to Dharmsala, which it reached on the 14th December. In November 1901 the 2nd Battalion was ordered to proceed to Kohat for temporary garrison duty. It arrived there by half-battalions, on the 30th November and 8th December. With it went, by special permission, the band of the 1st Battalion, so as to avoid breaking up the combined band. At Kohat the battalion remained, without incident, till the 28th June 1902, when it returned to Dharmsala, arriving there on the 3rd July.

In March of the same year the G.O.C. on the Punjab Frontier had presented Captain J. Muscroft with the Royal Humane Society's Bronze Medal and a certificate, in recognition of his gallantry in saving some natives from drowning in a river in Jubaland. His merit was enhanced by the fact that the river was known to be infested by crocodiles.

At the Coronation Durbar at Delhi on the 1st January 1903 the 1st Gurkhas were represented by Subadar Major Gangadhar Thapa of the 1st Battalion, with one havildar and one rifleman.

In 1903 the title of the regiment was once more changed and it became the 1st Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment). The addition of "The Malaun Regiment" was a welcome commemoration of its birth in 1815.

In October 1903 both battalions took part in District manœuvres, and on the 30th November started for more manœuvres at Gujar Khan, near Rawal Pindi, from which they returned to Dharmsala on the 22nd December. The manœuvres had been a time of very hard work, exposure, and marching, but wonderfully few men broke down.

There is nothing to record in 1904 till the 11th September, when the regiment lost Major A. C. B. Johnson, who died after an illness of two months.

* This statement is based on the recollection of Lieut.-Colonel E. M. Lang, who was adjutant at the time. There is no record of the exact date.

On the 17th September the 1st Battalion left Dharmsala *en route* for Chitral, which it was to garrison in relief of the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles. After the usual march by road to Pathankot the battalion went by rail to Nowshera, whence it marched by the Malakand Pass to Chakdara, Dir, and Kila Drosh which was reached on the 10th October. From Kila Drosh one double company was sent to garrison the fort at Chitral. As will be seen, this move to Chitral was very fortunate for the 1st Battalion, as it saved the main body from being involved in the great earthquake of 1905.

On the 4th November 1904 the 2nd Battalion went into training camp in the Hoshiarpur District. It was back in Dharmsala on the 6th February 1905. It would have been well for it had its absence lasted just two months more.

In 1904, following a practice that had long existed in the British Service it was decided to ask Indian Regiments if they would care to suggest the name of any former commanding-officer, who had subsequently reached the rank of Major-General or higher, for appointment as Honorary Colonel of the Regiment. The proposal was received with enthusiasm and the name of General Sir Rowley Sale-Hill, K.C.B., was sent in as being the most distinguished former commanding-officer still living. He was appointed Honorary Colonel on the 13th March 1904 and held the appointment till his death on the 23rd March 1916.*

On Tuesday the 4th April 1905 the home of the regiment at Dharmsala was destroyed, with heavy loss of life and property by the terrible earthquake which occurred between 6 and 6.15 a.m.

The 1st Battalion, with the exception of the depot, was at Chitral, and in March the 7th Gurkha Rifles (now the 2nd Battalion 8th Gurkha Rifles) had been located temporarily in the Battalion's Bachelor Barracks at Dharmsala. The families of the 7th were in temporary huts five miles away at Charri.

It will be remembered that when it was decided, after the cholera outbreak of 1890, to move the 1st Battalion up the hill alongside the 2nd, the right half of the 1st Battalion had been accommodated in two heavy stone double-story barracks formerly used by two companies of British Infantry. Extra space required for the larger numbers of the Gurkhas was obtained by building in the verandahs. These buildings, as they stood in April 1905, were about as fatal a death trap in an earthquake as could well be conceived. The houses of officers and other residents in Dharmsala were very little safer, being built of rubble masonry in lime mortar, with roofs of huge oak timbers covered with heavy slate. Excepting the Officers' Mess, completed in 1896, there was not a single roof supported on properly designed trusses.

The lines of the 2nd Battalion and of the left half of the 1st had walls of rubble in mud mortar for several feet up, with sun-dried bricks in mud mortar above. The roofs were of slate. The spring had been late with very unsettled weather all through March, which accounts for the fact, stated by Colonel W. J. Evans, that, though orders for early parades (6.30 a.m.) had actually issued for the 3rd April, they were suspended, and parade on the 4th remained fixed for 9 a.m. Consequently when the earthquake occurred at 6 or 6.15 a.m. hardly anyone in the whole station was astir.

The shock was short but very violent, lasting only four or five seconds. Though it

* On the 19th December 1916 Major-General Sir Charles Herbert Powell, K.C.B., was appointed Honorary Colonel in succession to Sir R. Sale-Hill.

was distinctly felt in Calcutta and Chitral and other distant places, its destructive radius was practically confined to Dharmsala, Kangra, and the immediate neighbourhood.

In that area hardly one stone was left upon another. In almost every case the sleeping inhabitants were crushed before they could make a movement to escape. Amongst Europeans Captain Stansfield of the 7th Gurkhas and Mrs. Hatch, wife of Major Hatch of the 2/1st, got out through large French windows standing open to the verandahs. Mrs. Hatch returned to her husband, who had not got out in time, and the house fell about them, Mrs. Hatch fortunately being only slightly injured and Major Hatch unhurt. Another fortunate escape was that of a jemadar of the 2nd Battalion, who, on his way to the magazine to issue ammunition, was already outside the magazine waiting for his orderly who had gone to fetch the keys. As he waited, looking towards Kangra town and fort fifteen miles to the South, he saw the whole course of the earthquake. First there arose from Kangra a great cloud of what seemed to be yellowish smoke, but was really the dust of the falling houses. Cloud after cloud arose in quick succession as the neighbouring villages were struck, and then destruction began at the end of Dharmsala farthest from the magazine. Building after building as it fell threw up its cloud of dust, and finally the trees about the 2nd Battalion quarter-guard rocked and bent with the shock. The jemadar (Narpu Sing Gurung) was thrown to the ground by the violence of the shock. When he picked himself up uninjured, Dharmsala as a station had ceased to exist.

In the lines of the 2nd Battalion and in the left half of the lines of the 1st, occupied by the 7th Gurkhas, the mortality was heavy. Yet from barracks which had low walls and were comparatively light in construction, with numerous doors, the majority of the men were able to reach the open, or were helped out by their comrades in time.

The old two-storied barracks, in which were the right wing of the 7th Gurkhas, fell under the shock like a house of cards, causing an appalling mortality amongst the occupants. The European houses were almost as bad, and the occupants who were not killed outright were buried and imprisoned and many injured in various degrees.

The gloom of this terrible disaster was lightened by instances of heroism and devotion on the part of all ranks and classes.

Notwithstanding their own grievous losses, the first and instantaneous movement of the Gurkha ranks was to go to the help of their British Officers and their families. But for their help, many of those who were rescued must have lost their lives. Their conduct was beyond all praise, not only at the time of the earthquake, but in the days following when the local population had fled, leaving their dead unburied and a probable cause of pestilence. Whilst life was to be saved the Gurkhas worked unceasingly and uncomplainingly, as they did in the later days.

Nor must we omit to render tribute to the splendid work done both by officers of the regiment and by the ladies who were rescued uninjured. Personal sorrows and losses were laid aside by all in the brave endeavour to render assistance.

Their services were afterwards acknowledged by the award of the Royal Red Cross to Mrs. Hatch, Mrs. S. Clay and Mrs. C. H. Clay. Mrs. S. Clay was working hard at the rescue of another family in less than two hours after she had herself been widowed. The Commander-in-Chief, in acknowledging the services of officers, mentioned specially Major A. V. Hatch, Lieutenants W. J. Evans, H. Holderness and D. S. Orchard. The Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab also sent a special acknowledgment of these services,

mentioning particularly Lieutenants W. J. Evans and Orchard, Subadar Narpu Sing Gurung, Jemadar Khial Sing Gurung, Havildars Dilbir Thapa, Tikaram Kumal, Rajpal Rai; Naicks Arjun Giri, Gangaram Khatri; Riflemen Bhartadal Limbu, Tilka Gharti and Bahadur Thapa.

When a deputation of the regiment went to Benares in February 1906 to thank H.R.H. The Prince of Wales on his becoming Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment he presented medals of St. John of Jerusalem for their services in the earthquake to the following :—

Silver Medals. Lieutenants W. J. Evans, D. S. Orchard, and Havildar Khial Sing Gurung.

Bronze Medals. Havildar Kishen Sing Karki and Riflemen Churamani Thapa and Dharm Sing.

Lieutenant B. O. Duff received the silver medal from the Viceroy in 1907.

The table on opposite page gives in convenient form the losses by death or injury in the 1st and 7th Gurkhas.

The losses of property were very heavy and serious for officers whose houses and furniture, which on an average had cost them £1,000, were their own property. Sympathy was widespread and generous. The Commander-in-Chief opened a fund for the officers to which the subscriptions were so generous that it is believed all officers received their own estimated value of the property they had lost, though it actually cost them more to replace the houses in a suitable manner.

Nor was warm-hearted sympathy confined to officers and their families individually. At the next regimental dinner of the Rifle Brigade £275 were collected for the benefit of the officers as a body. The following letters speak for themselves.

HORSE GUARDS,
WHITEHALL, S.W.,
29th June, 1905.

DEAR COLONEL POWELL,—

At our regimental dinner held on 30th May, at which I presided, it was unanimously resolved by a very large gathering of Riflemen, to open a subscription amongst past and present officers of the Regiment, as a token of our regard and sympathy for our fellow Riflemen who have suffered so severely from the earthquake at Dharmasala.

The sum which I have so far received amounts to about £275, and this I have lodged with Messrs. Cox & Co.'s Bank, until such time as I may hear from you as to what you would wish done with it.

Our only desire is to express our sympathy and comradeship with our fellow Riflemen, and I feel, therefore, that the best course to pursue is to consult you as to the disposal of the money.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) ARTHUR,

Field-Marshal,

Colonel-in-Chief, Rifle Brigade.

Colonel C. H. Powell,
1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles,
Chitral,
INDIA.

	British Officers.	Ladies.	Children.	G.O.s and their Families.		Rank and File.			Public Follow-ers.			Private Follow-ers.		
						Men.	Women.	Children.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Men.	Women.	Children.
Killed	Capt. S. Clay, 7th G.R.	Mrs. Robinson Miss A. Robinson Miss B. Robinson Mrs. Holderness Mrs. Cooper, Nurse to Mrs. Battye Mrs. Wichmann, wife of Bandmaster	2 children of Major Battye 1 child of Bandmaster Wichmann	Jemadar Goria Pun, 7th G.R.	-	4	2	10	-	-	-	5	1	16
	Capt. James Muscroft, 1st G.R.				-	46	2	9	-	-	-	7	7	20
Dangerously Injured					1	134	-	2	-	-	1	1	1	2
					-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Severely Injured	Col. G. H. Robinson Lt. A. E. Johnson Lt. H. Holderness Bandmaster Wichmann All 1st G.R. Major C. H. Clay Capt. A. C. Wall Both 7th G.R.	Mrs. Battye Mrs. Wall Miss Hall, Nurse to Mrs. Wall		Sub.-Major Karnbir Thapa, Bahadur- Subadar Aitdhaj Rai, Subadar Dhanbir Thapa All 7th G.R.	-	4	2	-	-	-	-	4	-	
					-	22	-	1	-	-	-	2	2	-
Slightly Injured		Mrs. Hatch Mrs. S. Clay		Sub. Birbal Nagarko- thi Sirdar, Bahadur- Sub. Dhanraj Thapa, Jem. Tamu Thapa All 7th G.R.	-	28	-	-	1	-	-	4	-	-
					-	26	5	3	-	1	-	1	-	-
Uninjured	Maj. A. V. Hatch Lt. W. J. Evans Lt. B. O. Duff Capt. C. Stansfield Lt. B. Hartwell Maj. P. Hehir, I.M.S.	Mrs. C. H. Clay	1 child Maj. Battye 1 Child Maj. C. H. Clay 2 children Capt. Wall		-	45	30	27	1	-	-	4	-	-
					-	117	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
N.B.—1. Lt.-Col. J. W. Cowley, comdg. 7th Gurkhas and Mrs. Cowley arrived from leave on the afternoon of the day of the earthquake. 2. Capt. H. A. Wake, 7th G.R., was in camp with the families of his Regt. on the Charri Common 5 miles below the station and came up at once.														

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84, CADOGAN PLACE, S.W.,

14th September.

DEAR COLONEL POWELL,—

H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught directs me to thank you for your letter and is glad to hear that our small collection may be of some use to our brother Riflemen. I am writing to Messrs. Cox & Co. to pay the money into Grindlay's as directed by your letter. In the event of it being necessary for you to provide new Mess Equipment, H.R.H. would suggest that the R.B. donation might possibly be used in this direction as a permanent testimony to the fellowship existing between us, but he advances this suggestion as an idea and nothing more; for he, in common with his Regiment, would prefer to leave the matter entirely in your hands.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) W. N. CONGREVE,

Colonel, R.B.,

Pte. Sec.

The money was, in accordance with the suggestion in Colonel Congreve's letter, spent on a thirty-foot teak dining table for the new Officers' Mess, with two sideboards, and a billiard table, which are held to be exclusively the gift of the past and present officers of the Rifle Brigade.

The warm summer and the torrential rains of Dharmsala have again clothed the station in green and, save for a corner in the Churchyard and a few lichen-covered stones marking the sites of the old houses, few outward traces of the great disaster remain.*

The serious damage to buildings of all kinds in Dharmsala reopened the question of whether it should be retained as a civil or military station. As regards the Civil Station, it was finally decided to rebuild the Civil offices on the old site of the 1st Gurkha barracks in Lower Dharmsala. As for the 1st Gurkhas, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener,

* Amongst the buildings destroyed by the earthquake was the Officers' Mess. This seems a convenient place in which to give a short history of the Mess houses at Dharmsala.

The first building used for a Mess, after the regiment was permanently located at Dharmsala in 1864, was "Orange Grove," next door to the Dak Bungalow and close to the regimental hospital in Lower Dharmsala. It was on the upper edge of the lines.

About 1880, when the regiment was commanded by Colonel Rowley Sale-Hill, the married officers (there was only one unmarried officer and he was on furlough) decided to remove the Mess to a building on the hillside above the Kotwali bazar. It was far above the Cantonments and close to the married officers' houses. It was convenient enough for them, but not so for the adjutant, who had to live in cantonments so as to be close to his work. He and other officers raised strong objections, and dining at the Mess was reduced to the minimum necessary to earn the Government contribution of Rs. 100 per mensem.

After the cholera outbreak of 1890, when the 1st Battalion was moved to Bhagsu, it was decided to build a Mess for both battalions on a site below the British Barracks.

Captain E. W. F. Martin was the prime mover in this matter, and the architect of the new Mess. It was in part a double-storied building, the billiard room being on the upper floor. It was a solid and imposing house and the rooms were partly panelled.

In the earthquake this Mess was completely destroyed. Practically everything in it was smashed by the fall of the building. As for the Mess plate, it was recovered almost shapeless; cups, bowls, and vases all flattened. It was sent home to the Goldsmiths and Silversmiths Company who were fortunately able to restore it most successfully. After the earthquake the site of the old stone British Barracks was, as will be mentioned presently, made over to the regiment for the erection of a new Mess. Here a new house was built. The site is an ideal one, and the view from it is described as almost unequalled in the Indian hill stations. Below it is spread the Kangra Valley, not a flat plain but a great sea of minor hills and ravines filling the space between the main range and the outlying Siwaliks. Beyond the Siwaliks is seen, in clear weather, the plain of the Punjab, seamed by the great rivers from which it takes its name. To the South-west lies, sixty miles away, the railway terminus of Pathankot, to and from which the regiment has so often marched going on or returning from its campaigns.

would have liked to have them nearer to the N.W. Frontier; but that would have interfered with the scheme, then in progress, for the redistribution of British and Indian troops, and it was decided they must remain within the area of the Lahore Division. Lord Kitchener did not like Dharmsala as a station, and other places were considered, Bakloh, and a site in the Simla Hills. For various reasons, financial and others, these were found to be unsuitable.

A regimental history seems scarcely the place to discuss the arguments advanced for and against continuance at Dharmsala. It was, amongst other things, again pointed out, as had been done in 1890 after the cholera outbreak, that the 1st Gurkhas had been promised Dharmsala as a permanent home. This promise had always been looked upon as a solemn charter greatly prized by officers and men, the abrogation of which would have been regarded as a breach of faith. Eventually the Government of India agreed to allow Rs. 1,20,000 for the reconstruction of the barracks of both battalions, and the work of building was carried out by the men themselves. The old stone barracks were demolished, as beyond possibility of use. Their site, as already stated, was given over to the British Officers to build their new combined Mess for both battalions.

The bachelors of the 1st Battalion, being thus deprived of their quarters, were transferred to the site of the old married quarters, and the married families were given some newly acquired land on which to build their quarters.



CHAPTER XII

THE REGIMENT BECOMES THE PRINCE OF WALES' OWN, AND LATER, ON THE ACCESSION OF KING GEORGE V, KING GEORGE'S OWN

1905-1914

IN September 1905 Lieut.-Colonel A. V. Hatch was appointed to command the 2nd Battalion in succession to Colonel G. H. Robinson retired.

We left the 1st Battalion at Chitral, where it remained till it started back to India on the 17th October 1905. Arriving at Rawal Pindi on the 3rd November, it was detained to take part in the manœuvres arranged to coincide with the visit of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, now King George V. The 2nd Battalion had also been sent up for these manœuvres, leaving Dharmasala on the 27th October for Burhan, the scene of the manœuvres. The two battalions had not met since the departure of the 1st for Chitral.

Both were brigaded with one battalion of the 4th Gurkha Rifles under Brig.-General Pollock, C.B., commanding the Jullundur Brigade. On the 8th November a great review of some forty thousand troops was held by His Royal Highness on the Khanna Plain.

The band of the regiment played before His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales on three occasions here, and at Amritsar on its way back to Dharmasala, which was reached by the 1st Battalion on the 13th, and by the 2nd on the 14th December.

In this year the establishment of one tindal and three lascars was abolished and the men were transferred to the combatant ranks. Also the establishment of naicks in each battalion was raised from forty to forty-six, which however made no change in the total strength, as a corresponding number of riflemen were reduced.

On the 1st January 1906 a telegram was received from the Commander-in-Chief announcing that His Majesty the King had approved His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales being Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, the assumption of the title of "Prince of Wales' Own," and the bearing on appointments of His Royal Highness's badge.*

The title of the Regiment now became "The First Prince of Wales' Own Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment)."

A telegram was at once sent to the Military Secretary:—

"Please convey through His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to His Majesty the King the great feeling of delight of the Regiment at the distinguished honour conferred by His Majesty in naming Your Royal Highness as Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment."

* It is noticeable that these orders approved the carrying of the badge on the *Colours*. If Simla could make a mistake of this sort in 1906 it is clear the same might have been done in 1850 in the orders to Major O'Brien (cf. p. 34 *supra* and Appendix IV).

The Prince replied by telegram :—

“ I thank you and all ranks for your kind telegram. I am proud to become Colonel-in-Chief of your Regiment.

“ (Signed) GEORGE, P.”

From Sir Rowley Sale-Hill, Colonel of the Regiment, a telegram of congratulation was received as follows :—

“ Officers, N.C.O.s and Riflemen of the Malaun Regiment. I desire to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on the honour that has been accorded to you in being nominated the Prince of Wales' Own and in having His Royal Highness as your Colonel-in-Chief. This honour is especially welcome at the present time when your splendid conduct in the late lamentable catastrophe illustrated the grand spirit and discipline which you possess and which conduct was a matter of great pride to me as having the honour of being your Honorary Colonel.

“ I felt and expressed the great sympathy I had for you at the time and I feel sure that this recognition of your past history and service will nerve you to maintain, and in the future, add to your reputation and renown.”

The following officers proceeded to Benares and had the honour of an audience with His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales on the 27th February 1906 : Lieut.-Colonel A. V. Hatch, Lieutenant and Adjutant W. J. Evans, Subadar Majors Sarabjit Thapa and Karan Sing Gurung. His Royal Highness expressed his gratification at becoming Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment and conferred the silver medal of St. John of Jerusalem for services in the earthquake on Lieutenant W. J. Evans. His Royal Highness also presented autographed photographs to the Commandants. Subadar Major Sarabjit Thapa, as senior Gurkha officer, received later from His Royal Highness, at Gwalior on the 7th March, the Silver Medal of the Victorian Order. Subadar Bhagatbir Gurung of the 1st Battalion received it at the same time.

At the beginning of January 1906 both battalions went to Kangra to carry out the “ Kitchener ” inspection test. In March the regiment was rearmed with the Lee-Enfield short rifle and the new bandolier equipment.

During the rest of 1906 and 1907 there is nothing to be recorded in a regimental history. There were the usual inspections, local manœuvres, and training camps, and a good deal of time was occupied in rebuilding the lines destroyed by the earthquake. This naturally interfered to some extent with ordinary regimental work, a fact which was duly recognized and allowed for by inspecting officers.

At the end of April 1907 Colonel Powell went to officiate in command of the Ferozepur Brigade. This proved to be the end of Colonel Powell's command, as he was confirmed in command of the Ferozepur Brigade and was a little later promoted Major-General and transferred to command the Jullundur Brigade. Major W. I. Ryder officiated for Colonel Powell till the 29th July, on which date Brevet Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Walker, V.C., 4th Gurkha Rifles, arrived and took over officiating command of the Battalion, Major Ryder reverting to second in command of the 2nd Battalion.

In May 1908 both battalions were sent to Jullundur during Sir James Willcocks' short expedition into the Zakka Khel and Mohmand Country. This affair need not be dwelt on, since both battalions were merely used to relieve other units sent to the front. The battalions returned to Dharmasala at the beginning of June.

During this year (1908) the rebuilding of the lines was completed, with the exception of the band barracks. The new Officers' Mess was finished on the 31st October. The band barracks were finished in 1909.

After the inspection of the regiment by Major-General C. H. Powell, C.B., at the end of March 1909, a regimental week was held to celebrate the opening of the new Officers' Mess. There were entertainments of all sorts, from dances and a torchlight tattoo to the contest for the Gurkha "Khud" Race. The trophy for the latter was at that time held by the 5th Gurkhas, who courteously agreed to the contest being at Dharmsala instead of Abbottabad. It was won by the 1/6th Gurkhas.

In July 1909 the Wolseley-pattern helmet was prescribed for British Officers, and an application for a white instead of a black helmet was refused.

The most notable event of 1910 was the change of the title of the Regiment to "The 1st King George's Own Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment)," which was made in consequence of the succession to the throne of King George V. on the death of King Edward VII. The present badge was submitted for sanction, but was not approved till February 1913. The design of the Prince of Wales' badge had only been sanctioned in July 1909. A committee of officers of both battalions was held to assimilate the dress of the regiment. The committee's decisions were embodied in the Regimental Dress Regulations of November 1910.

In April 1911 Subadar Major Puranbahadur Chand and Jemadar Adjutant Jitbahadur Thapa of the 1st Battalion, with Subadar Major Sarabjit Thapa and Subadar Padam Sing Burathoki, of the 2nd, proceeded to England with the Indian Contingent to be present at the King's Coronation on the 12th May.

The next event of note was the Coronation Durbar of King George V. at Delhi in December 1911.

At this both battalions were present, leaving Dharmsala in November. The Battalions were commanded, the 1st by Lieut.-Colonel A. G. B. Lang, the 2nd by Major Thompson, of the 1st Battalion, as a temporary measure, owing to Colonel Ryder's absence on furlough and Major E. D. Money's temporary employment as Assistant Military Secretary to the King.

The following guards were furnished by the regiment :—

9th December. Chief's visits. King-Emperor's Guard. 1st Battalion.

10th December (Sunday). King-Emperor's Guard. 2nd Battalion.

12th December. Durbar and State Dinner. King-Emperor's Escort. 1st Battalion.

13th December. Reception of Volunteer and Indian Officers. King-Emperor's Guard. 2nd Battalion.

King-Emperor's Guards-of-Honour were furnished on the 9th December by the 1st Battalion.

The regiment also supplied guards for the European Ladies' Camp and were one of the regiments on guard of honour in the arena on the Durbar-day. The band was amongst the massed bands.

The King was photographed on the 13th December in the midst of the Officers, British and Indian, of his own regiments. After the presentation of Indian Officers on that day, he presented large autographed photographs of himself and H.M. the Queen-Empress for the Officers' Mess at Dharmsala.

After the Durbar concentration had dispersed, the regimental band went to Allahabad,

where it had been engaged to play at the Exhibition. The organizers of the Exhibition awarded the band a gold medal. The band returned to Dharmsala on 8th March.

During 1911 and 1912 both battalions were at Dharmsala. The establishment of each battalion was revised in this year to the following:—

British Officers.—1 commandant, 4 double company commanders, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 7 double company officers, 1 medical officer. Total, 15.

Gurkha Officers and N.C.O.s.—1 subadar major and 7 subadars, 8 jemadars (including jemadar adjutant), 40 havildars (including havildar major), 46 naicks (including drill naick), 810 riflemen (including lance-naicks), 14 supernumeraries, 15 recruit boys. Total, 926 Gurkha ranks.

Recruit boys to be sons of old soldiers bred in barracks and enlisted only in the band, bugles, drums, pipes, and signallers.

In February 1913 coats for all riflemen were introduced in place of blouses in service dress. Seal leather cross belts and pouches for wear in full dress were adopted by the general desire of British Officers.


On the 8th September 1913 the 2nd Battalion, at Field Service strength, left Dharm-sala *en route* for Chitral. To bring the Battalion to full war strength, the following details were attached from the 1st Battalion: Jemadars Baliram Rana and Gajia Thapa, with 11 rank and file. Going by rail from Pathankot to Nowshera, the battalion marched to Kila Drosh where it arrived on the 2nd October.

Before it left the Jullundur Brigade, Major-General Carnegy, C.B., commanding the Brigade put on record in a farewell-order that:—

“The Major-General-Commanding has known this battalion for many years, and throughout his acquaintance the battalion has maintained a very high standard of efficiency, both in barracks and in the field.”

The 2nd Battalion remained at Kila Drosh till the outbreak of the Great War without any incident worthy of record.

The 1st Battalion passed its time uneventfully at Dharmsala till the outbreak of war.



CHAPTER XIII

THE 1ST BATTALION IN EGYPT—FRANCE—FESTUBERT

1914-1915

THE 1st Battalion was at Dharmsala when, on the 8th August 1914, it received orders for immediate mobilization. It was to be completed to full strength by drafts from the 2/4th Gurkhas, and, after providing for a depot, was to start at War strength, plus the first 10 per cent. reinforcement. It was the furlough season and though the men were recalled they were often too far away to be got back in time. There was no lack of the will to return and one man at least rejoined just as the battalion entrained at Pathankot.

It usually took ten days to get transport for the battalion to move from Dharmsala. On this occasion the Civil officers displayed most commendable activity, sending out Europeans to personally collect the animals and carts. In less than forty-eight hours they had collected transport which, though rather a mixed lot, was sufficient to get the battalion to Pathankot.

At 11.30 a.m. on the 11th August the battalion marched out of Dharmsala for Pathankot where it arrived on the 14th at 7.30 a.m. On the 16th it entrained for Bombay as a unit of the 9th (Sirhind) Infantry Brigade of the 3rd (Lahore) Division. The other battalions of the Brigade were the 1st Highland Light Infantry, 125th Napier's Rifles and 1/4th Gurkha Rifles. The last named was the regiment which had been raised in the Mutiny by Lieutenant D. Macintyre of the 66th at Pithoragarh.

The battalion arrived in Bombay early on the 19th and at once proceeded to embark on the S.S. *Purnea*, an operation which was completed by 4 p.m., when the transport moved outside the dock, and on the 23rd anchored in the harbour. Next day she sailed for the Arabian coast, and it was not till the 31st that it was learnt that Marseilles was the ultimate destination of the Lahore Division.

The voyage to Aden in the teeth of a strong monsoon was naturally very trying for men who had never even seen the sea before, and their sufferings from seasickness were no laughing matter.

The officers who were with the battalion at the outset were:—

Lieut.-Colonel J. M. Home	Joined at Bombay
Major C. Bliss	Started with Battalion
Major M. E. Dopping Hepenstal	Joined in Egypt
Captain T. C. Burke	Started with Battalion
Captain W. J. Evans	" " "
Captain C. H. Giffard	Joined at Bombay
Captain B. O. Duff	Proceeded with the advanced party
Captain H. L. Scott	Joined at Bombay
Captain W. B. Northey	Started with Battalion

Lieutenant H. I. Money	Joined in Egypt
Lieutenant G. S. Kennedy	" " "
Lieutenant G. S. W. St. George	" " "
Lieutenant W. St. J. Carpendale	Started with Battalion
Lieutenant L. B. Rundall	Joined in Egypt
Captain F. O'D. Fawcett, I.M.S.	Started with Battalion

At the outbreak of the Great War, Captain A. Young was Brigade-Major of the Garhwal Brigade. He proceeded with his Brigade to France.

There remained at first with the depot :—

Captain W. P. Crookshank	Joined in Mesopotamia 1916
Lieutenant H. D. Minchinton	Joined in France 1915

During the voyage from Bombay the battalion was reorganized from an eight-company to a four-company basis so as to conform to the British organization. Thus No. 1 double company became "A" and so on.

On the 9th September the battalion disembarked at Suez where No. 1 Company remained, whilst the rest proceeded to the second zone of the Suez Canal defences. Here the three companies were responsible for the Ismailia ferry at the north end of Lake Timsah and a distance of four kilometres north of it. No. 1 from Suez held the southern four kilometres of the Canal.

The Sirhind Brigade as it happened was the first to reach Egypt which was far from being an advantage, as they were commandeered to do guard there, whilst the others went on to France. The 4th Gurkhas were on the Canal between Ismailia and Port Said, the 125th Rifles were at Ismailia and the Highland Light Infantry at Cairo and Port Said, Brigade-Headquarters at Ismailia.

The period during which the battalion remained on the Suez Canal does not call for a lengthy description. Trench digging in the sand was a wearisome exercise, and occasionally futile. Colonel Hepenstal relates that the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt came to inspect trenches constructed with considerable labour. Unfortunately, there was a very heavy dust storm the night before, and by the time General Maxwell arrived the trenches had been blown away and there remained hardly any signs of what had been quite an elaborate defensive position.

Not long after arrival on the Canal a Lancashire Territorial Division arrived to take over the Canal defences. Their commissariat had gone wrong, and officers and men were half-starved. The former were provided for by the Officers' Mess of the 1st Gurkhas. As for the men, the Gurkha Riflemen gave a pleasing instance of their good nature and their friendship for the British soldier. The Lancashire men were provided for breakfast with the Gurkhas' entire rations for the day ready cooked. They fully appreciated the food, and would probably have done so still more had they known that the Gurkhas had gone out for their day's work on empty stomachs in order to supply their comrades of the British Regiment. What had really happened was only discovered later.

There was some trouble with native Egyptians selling liquor in the lines; but a stop was put to this when one of them was caught and handed over to the Police Havildar of the 4th Gurkhas.

In addition to trench digging, the battalion's duties were chiefly guarding various

posts, daily patrols in a steam launch, and supplying or strengthening guards at Port Said.

There was no enemy to be seen, and this rather uninteresting work continued till the 21st November when, all the three companies being now together they entrained for Alexandria *en route* for France. "D" Company had boarded the transport at Port Said to clean her up and had gone round with her to Alexandria. On the 22nd they, as well as the 1/4th Gurkhas, embarked on the S.S. *Mounteagle* in which they sailed shortly after midnight.

Arriving at Marseilles without incident (it was too early in the War for the U-boat danger) the battalion was rearmed with Mark III rifles, Mark VII ammunition and machine guns to take this new ammunition.

At Marseilles the 10 per cent. reinforcements were handed over to the Base Depot. The battalion at full strength left Marseilles on the evening of the 1st December. At Orleans, on the 4th, they detrained, in very wet weather after a very tedious journey, marched to camp and received their baggage wagons and other transport. Entraining again next morning, they reached billets at Merville on the evening of the 6th, and on the 7th marched, followed by the 1/4th Gurkhas, to billets at Locon, four or five miles behind the Neuve Chapelle-Givenchy front trenches.

The good people of Locon had not, so far, had any Indian troops billeted on them, and were inclined to resent the idea. But the Gurkha at any rate soon succeeded in overcoming their prejudice against him, as is illustrated by the following anecdotes related by an officer. He says that, on one occasion, he went on his rounds fully expecting to return to find strained relations between his men and the farmer on whom they were billeted, who had been openly hostile. He returned to find the host all smiles. He was telling the men to take what straw they wanted and, in apologizing for his former attitude, said that the Gurkhas had found several eggs in his barn and had brought them to him. "Your men," he added, "must be very good men; if they had been French 'poilus' they would not only have kept my eggs but would be cooking and eating my chickens by now."

On another occasion an old lady locked up her barns and positively refused to have them occupied. Failing to get round her by argument or persuasion, the officer told his subadar he had better break open the barns. The subadar asked permission to arrange matters in his own way, which was accorded. When the officer returned, half an hour later, he found the old lady smiling and happy, serving out clean straw to the men, and doing all she could to make them comfortable. As for the subadar, he had a room to himself, with a feather bed and clean sheets, and was sitting in an easy chair by the fire drinking hot coffee. How he had managed the matter was not known, but the result was eminently satisfactory, and was one more tribute to the universal popularity of the Gurkha.

Not only were the little men popular with the inhabitants but they always displayed a wonderful cheeriness and good humour in the terrible trials of the War, whether fighting in the heat of Mesopotamia, or in the cold of the Western front, whether fully fed or, as happened at times in the East, very short of food. The only thing that did succeed in depressing them to some extent was the awful misery of the flooded Flanders trenches.

In the night of the 11th-12th, the 1st Gurkhas marched to Festubert where they

relieved the 2/8th Gurkhas, of the Bareilly Brigade, in trenches, an operation in which they were treated to their first taste of German shelling, and had two men wounded.

They and eighty men of the 8th Hussars were now in the left section of the brigade trenches, with two companies of the Highland Light Infantry on their left. The detachment of 8th Hussars presently handed over their trenches to the 1st Gurkhas.

The following extract from a letter written by an Officer in the trenches gives an idea of the position and of the horrible discomfort of the trenches.

"Our front was about seven hundred and fifty yards long, with only one communication trench leading to the rear. This trench was very narrow and in places was thigh deep in water, or sticky mud which was worse. The fire trench was also very narrow, and for the greater part of its length the bottom consisted of the afore-mentioned deep sticky mud. Except on the right of our line, the trench had become so deep through constant cleaning out that the men could not fire over the parapet, but only through very faulty loopholes. When we took over our trenches we found that the enemy had been allowed to run five saps up to within 5 yards of our parapet.

"The system we used gave our men (at first at any rate) forty-eight hours in the trenches and twenty-four in reserve. Unfortunately this proportion could not be maintained owing to losses, etc., and also when in reserve the men had little rest. There was always lots of work to do, repairing the communication trenches, carrying up food, water, ammunition, etc., all of which had to be done at night. The reserves were constantly under unaimed rifle and snipers' fire, and were regularly shelled.

"All ranks suffered a good deal from cold and want of sleep, especially the latter.

"The enemy always maintained a steady and accurate fire on the trenches, which was varied from time to time by bursts of very heavy fire. In this their main objects seemed to be to destroy our loopholes and prevent us from repairing them.

"At first our men were inclined to reply to the enemy in an indefinite way, but this was stopped, and after a while we seldom took the trouble to answer the enemy's fire, unless movement was detected in his lines."

The following note on the early situation as regards the 1st Gurkhas has been contributed by another Officer of the regiment :—

"To understand the action in December 1914 it is necessary to bear certain points in mind.

"The battalion had left India armed with the Mark I rifle. At Marseilles these were changed for Mark III rifles firing Mark VII ammunition. Until the battalion moved into the trenches in front of Festubert no man had ever fired with the weapon with which he was armed.

"The weakness of the artillery both British and German at this period of the war, owing to the shortage of ammunition, had a marked effect on the infantry fighting.

"Of all weapons the rifle is the most deadly, unless the violence of its fire can be counteracted. Failing the counteracting effect of artillery fire, both sides had to go to ground. This led to stalemate and a search for a weapon which, taking the place of artillery, would suppress the rifle sufficiently for infantry to move, i.e. to attack. The weapon was found in the trench mortar and hand bomb.

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"Until well on in 1915 the Germans were well ahead of us in both these arms. The German hand bombs were detonated by an automatic wet-proof fuse. The British bombs were fired by a length of safety fuse lighted by a match. In wet weather and in the muddy slime in which the fighting took place it was impossible to keep matches dry. The British bomb became useless just when most wanted.

"In regard to trench mortars. The only mortar in use by the British was one improvised from 18-pounder shell cases and two-pound jam tins. Its short range and inaccuracy (it had no sights) made it useless as a covering-fire weapon. It was used only to harass the enemy in his trenches.

"This weapon was completely outclassed in range, shell power, accuracy and numbers by the German trench mortars. The latter were, in the absence of sufficient artillery, very effective covering-fire weapons.

"To these two weapons the enemy added mines, and so obtained complete covering-fire dominance.

"The trench system which the battalion had to defend consisted of three lines, a front-line trench, a support trench, and a reserve trench. The two first mentioned were connected, in the battalion area, by a communication trench.

"The front-line trench was not the carefully sited and built work that we are apt to imagine. It had been evolved rather than built. Originally a ditch, it had afforded cover to the advanced troops during the preceding British offensive. When they could make no further progress these troops had consolidated it and it became the front line of the British defensive system. Most of the country round drained in to this ditch-trench so that its floor was usually from six inches to one foot deep in muddy slime. To obtain a firm footing this slime had been scooped out from time to time and thrown on the parados. This made the trench too deep for effective defence. To fire from it at all a fire-step about three feet above the floor-level had to be built up with bricks, wood and anything procurable. In the greasy wet the men in their heavy equipment found it very difficult to climb on to the fire-step from the floor, while to climb out of the trench at short notice was an impossibility.

"The support trench was a good and fairly well drained work, but its field of fire was limited to about fifty yards, the distance of the front-line trench from it, owing to the excessive building up of the front-line trench parados as mentioned above.

"While vigorous efforts were made by the battalion, by the other troops of the brigade, and by our predecessors to remedy many of these defects the lack of men and materials and the condition of the ground rendered progress very slow. It must be admitted, too, that all was not done that after events showed to be necessary.

"The reserve trench was a shallow trench in low ground. It had a good field of fire but was flooded flush with the parapet, and all attempts at drainage failed. In defending it the men stood in water over their waists. No one who experienced it will ever forget the feeling of mangel-wurzels bobbing up through the water as they detached themselves from the trench floor into which they had been stamped to form a firm standing. Ordinarily this trench garrison lived in the houses of Festubert close in rear.

"When the battalion first took over these trenches Lieut.-Colonel Home wished to give up the front-line trench and to build a new trench immediately in rear of it. His idea was to drain this new trench into the existing front-line trench and so make the

latter a very efficient obstacle in front of the former. It should be mentioned that no barbed wire existed on our front.

"Lieut.-Colonel Home wished to hold the new trench, when made, lightly with a few bombing observation posts only and to make the support trench his main defensive line.

"Had his plan met with approval, there is little doubt that the enemy's attack on the 20th December would have failed completely. The main British plan, however, was based on moral grounds. The Command had decided that as the whole British line might well be considered untenable if one allowed oneself to do so, the only hope of holding it lay in a stern insistence on a defence to the last of every inch. No voluntary withdrawal was permitted, and local expediency had to give way to the general plan.

"Arising from the general policy outlined above, the battalion in its sector was originally distributed as follows:—

"In the front-line trench Two companies and two machine guns.

"In the support trench One company, and in sub-section local reserve One company.

"To ensure that the policy of giving up no ground should be observed and in order that the offensive power of the reserves should not suffer, the minimum number of rifles, below which the garrison of the front-line trench and of the company in local reserve should not be allowed to fall, was definitely laid down. As the daily casualties, killed, wounded, sick and employed grew, so the front-line trench garrison and the local reserve had to be fed from the support trench. This process continued until on the day of the enemy's attack (the 20th December) the bulk of three companies was in the front-line trench, with only a few details from each in the support trench.

"The enemy's method of attack suited the circumstances exactly. Covered by the fire of trench mortars, the enemy's infantry attacked the front line over the open. Though this attack made no progress, it held the front-line garrison to its ground. At the same time, the enemy exploded a number of mines under the front-line trench opposite his sap heads as well as, in all cases on the brigade front except in the battalion area, opposite the communication trenches. Storming parties issuing from the saps passed through the front line via the gaps created by the mines and seized the practically unoccupied support trench beyond.

"The effect is shown in the narrative.

"The confused and confusing nature of the fighting is hard to describe. The area was a marsh covered with a network of ditches and of used and unused trenches.

"Rifles, ammunition, food, and clothes were constantly covered in greasy slime which made it impossible to grip anything tightly. All movement was slow and painful. Clean and serviceable rifles became blocked with mud and useless in a few seconds. The only infantry-fire weapon that could be relied upon was the German hand bomb. All the troops, both British and German, wore balaclava caps and at 200 yards' distance it was almost impossible to distinguish mud-smeared Germans from mud-smeared British or Gurkhas."

On the 13th December an old communication trench was discovered, leading from just in front of the trenches recently occupied by the Hussars, back towards the German trenches. Captain Evans was ordered to attack this during the following night and put a block in it, not more than thirty yards from his own front, at a point to be decided by Major Gardner, R.E., who accompanied the party as technical adviser. At 1 a.m. the party broke through into the communication trench. At the head of it was Rifleman

Jitman Thapa, with fixed bayonet and rifle at the ready, followed immediately by Captain Evans and Major Gardner, with Captain Money who commanded the bombing party. The Germans had disappeared, leaving behind rifles, bombs, picks, and shovels, which were removed under the protection of the bombers.

A block was made at a point within the thirty yards' limit prescribed, and six men were left to guard it. It would have been better placed rather farther forward, but the orders as to the thirty yards were so positive as to leave no discretion to the men on the spot who could, and did, judge better. Scarcely had Captain Evans got back and reported when a message was received that the party at the block had been bombed out and every man wounded.

During the next three days there was constant sapping work, with bombing and the usual bombardment by the Germans of the billets at Festubert.

In the evening of the 18th "D" Company of the 1st Gurkhas, commanded by Captain T. C. Burke with Lieutenant L. B. Rundall as his subaltern, was ordered to attack a German trench at 5.30 next morning. They were then to work to the right along the trench to meet the 4th Gurkhas attacking in that direction.

This enterprise was part of a general and simultaneous attack to be made, by the Sirhind and Ferozepur Brigades, on the German trenches. At 5.30 the Gurkha attack was not ready, a fact which is explained in the Brigade diary as due to the ammunition and bomb supplies not being up. Captain Burke reported to the officer in command of the left section that it would be impossible for him to attack before daybreak, and in reply received orders to "postpone the attack on the sap" and not to carry it out without further orders. How these orders came to be misunderstood is not clear, but the fact remains that, between 10 and 10.30 a.m. Burke decided to attack with a platoon of about thirty men, and went over. The platoon at once encountered a terrible machine-gun fire by which it was practically exterminated. Both Burke and Rundall were killed, and of the rest twenty-four including the Jemadar commanding the platoon were killed, or wounded. Only a remnant of half a dozen men got back unharmed to the British trench.

This was a most unfortunate affair. The Brigade diary characterizes it as "gallant but obviously impossible" whilst the Divisional diary says that the G.O.C. Sirhind Brigade stated that Burke "very inadvisably elected to disregard the order that the attack would not take place." It adds that "all ranks showed the greatest gallantry in resolutely attempting such an operation in daylight." It appears that, just before he made his unfortunate attack, Captain Burke received an order in two lines as follows:—

" You are to attack at once
On receipt of orders from G.O.C."

He appears to have read the first line, but not the qualifying second line. The order was seen and initialled by another officer as he passed it to Burke; but curiously enough a sapper officer, who was with Burke at the time, seems to have made the same mistake as he did and to have read it as an order to attack at once.

THE DEFENCE OF GIVENCHY.*

The 20th December witnessed a great attack by the enemy on the fronts of the Meerut and Lahore Divisions. The preceding night had been very wet and in many

* See map to face p. 134.

places the rain had caused the "banquette" to slip away, thus rendering it impossible, especially for little men like the Gurkhas, to fire over the parapet. Moreover, the bayonets were unsatisfactory. This was due to the clogging of the springs by mud. In these trenches the loopholes were laid so low that the rifle and bayonet rested on the ground, and the vibration of each shot picked up a certain amount of mud which found its way into the bayonet spring, with the result that bayonets sometimes fell off. This trouble was not experienced elsewhere.

The front trench is described in the German report mentioned later as being situated on a ridge which commanded the ground both East and West of it. About sixty yards behind this was what the German describes as a well-built cover-trench, that is the trench held by the Local Reserve.

The troops in the left sub-section of the Sirhind Brigade defences were disposed as follows :—

<i>First Line</i>	.	.	One company Highland Light Infantry with two maxims and two companies of the 1st Gurkhas with two machine guns
<i>Support Line</i>	.	.	One company 1st Gurkha Rifles
<i>Local Reserve</i>	.	.	One company Highland Light Infantry, one of the 1st Gurkhas, and half the 125th Rifles.

A heavy bombardment was succeeded by the explosion of German mines which blew in the trenches in several places and was followed by the attack of overwhelming numbers. A German report, afterwards found on the body of a dead German Staff Officer, shows that the enemy had his saps pushed forward in some cases to within three paces of the British trenches. The latter on the other hand had no advanced sap heads. Very complete and successful arrangements were made for the simultaneous explosion of mines blowing up the British trenches at every one of these sap heads, which were spread over a front of about one thousand yards. From each there issued a storming party of half a section of infantry and twelve Pioneers. A second storming party of a section of infantry between every two saps rushed forward simultaneously and made for the rear trenches of the British.

The following account of what happened on the 1st Gurkhas' front is taken from the report of Captain Kennedy.

The Germans had succeeded in getting into the trench* at a point towards the left of the 1st Gurkhas, but had been beaten back elsewhere. Captain Kennedy was to the right of this point and, as his front was clear, he ordered his men to fire on the Germans as they emerged from the sap opposite to which they had reached the British trench. Presently he had to go towards the right and bomb another point which was seriously threatened. After relieving it, he organized a party to defend a traverse between him and the point where the Germans had broken in. It consisted of bombers and men with serviceable rifles, with one of the machine guns. The other machine gun was placed so as to enfilade an attack on this traverse. These arrangements would protect any retirement down the communication trench further to the right leading to the support trench.

* That is apparently the trench fifty or sixty yards behind the firing line. The front trench seems to have been practically wiped out by the explosion of the ten mines.

At 11.30 Kennedy received news that Captain Money had been killed and Major Bliss badly wounded. He then went to the right to the junction of the fire trench with the communication trench. Here he found Captain Tarrant of the Highland Light Infantry in command, who asked him to take charge in the centre whilst he (Tarrant) was getting into communication with the O.C. 1st Gurkhas.

About noon Kennedy received orders to hold on as long as possible but, if forced to do so, to retire on Festubert, covered by the Local Reserve from the reserve trenches, 600 yards in rear. Presently news came in that the enemy had broken through on both flanks and were working down the communication trench in rear. Some men were sent to hold up the enemy who might be in the communication trench, and at the same time news was received that the party at the traverse had been destroyed, including their machine gun. The water-jacket of the other gun had split, and it also had to be abandoned presently. Another traverse, nearer the communication trench, had also been lost. At 12.30 p.m., the position in front being quite untenable, an orderly retirement was made to the support trench which was partly occupied. There were no bombs left, and part of the support trench being in the enemy's hands, a further retirement to the reserve trenches had to be made. Kennedy specially mentions the steady handling of his men by Jemadar Puran Sing Gurung.


The German report already referred to mentions that "in the dug-outs of the trench which was destroyed by the mines a large number of Indian corpses were found still sitting; they had apparently been suffocated."

Another account of this action is given in the following extract from the Officer's letter already quoted:—

"On the 9th day the enemy made a general attack. They began by exploding mines at the head of most of their saps, and followed this up by a frontal attack. In our front they were repulsed with loss, those who had entered our trenches by the exploded saps were driven out by counter attacks by our men. The enemy had however captured portions of the fire trench to our right and left, and were thus able to get behind us.

"They seized our unoccupied support trench and worked down it from both sides towards our only communication trench. Many of our men were shot down from the rear, and, most of our bombers having been killed and our M.G. having been put out of action by the explosions which preceded the attack, our men were at a great disadvantage. Captain Tarrant, H.L.I., who had assumed command of our section when Major Bliss was wounded, finally decided to retire. Our communication trench having been cleared at the point of the bayonet, the retirement was carried out in good order. The men behaved with the greatest pluck and coolness. No. 1 Company was in reserve this day, and was not allowed to reinforce the fire trench. It was placed in the reserve trench, and acted as a *point d'appui* for the retiring firing line. The enemy made no serious attempt to take these trenches. In this fighting Captain Money, S.M. Mansing, Jemadar Hira Gurung, Subadar Ramsaran, and Subadar Lalbir were killed, and Major Bliss and Subadar Sublal were wounded (both have died since). All these officers behaved with great gallantry. The battalion held their ground for three hours after all the other trenches of the brigade had been captured by the enemy, and only retired for fear of being completely cut off."

GIVENCHY 1914
Loss of 1/1st G.R. Trenches
15 DECEMBER 1914.



Yards 500 400 300 200 100 0 500 yards

The casualties of the 1st Gurkhas in these their first big fights on the Western front had been very severe.

British Officers, Killed or Died of Wounds. Major C. Bliss, Capt. H. I. Money, Capt. T. C. Burke, Lieut. L. B. Rundall.

Indian Officers, Killed. Subadars Ram Saran Rana and Sublal Gharti.

Wounded. Jemadar Sasidhar Thapa.

Missing. Subadar-Major Man Sing Thapa,
Subadar-Lalbir Thapa,
Jemadar-Hira Gurung.

Other Ranks. Killed, 50; Wounded, 71; Missing, 30.

Jemadar Sasidhar Thapa was awarded the Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class.

The brigade was still East of Festubert on the 21st and 22nd, and on the 23rd it was relieved and withdrawn to billets in Auchel, in the Vendin-Oblighen area.

It was in the trenches at Festubert that many of the regiment developed really bad trench feet. When they were relieved it took the battalion nine hours to cover the six miles march. So bad were the men's feet that, if one of them took off his boots, he could never get them on again. Officers and men suffered much, and none of them ever forgot that march.

At Auchel on Christmas Day the Secretary of State for War's telegram "Best Christmas wishes to all Corps" was received, and on the 27th there was a change of commanders. Brig.-General Brunker went to officiate in command of the Lahore Division, whilst the Sirhind Brigade came under Colonel Walker, V.C., an officer who had been second-in-command of the 1/1st Gurkhas in 1907-1909, and had more recently commanded the 4th Gurkhas, in which he had been before he joined the 1st. The 4th Gurkhas it will be remembered was the regiment raised in 1857 by Lieutenant Macintyre of the 66th.

CHAPTER XIV

FRANCE, NEUVE CHAPELLE, YPRES

1915

ON the 4th January 1915, Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Anderson with four Gurkha officers and two hundred and forty-six rank and file joined the battalion from the Base Depot at Marseilles, and Colonel Anderson took command, vice Lieut.-Colonel Home recalled to England. On the 7th the battalion was inspected by Field-Marshal Sir John French accompanied by Sir J. Willcocks.

Nothing noticeable occurred till the 15th, when the battalion went by motor 'bus to Zelobes, and on to Richebourg St. Vaast by march. The brigade now consisted of the 1st Highland Light Infantry, 4th Seaforth Highlanders, 1/4th Gurkhas, besides the 1/1st Gurkhas. It was to relieve the 4th (British) Brigade in the front line and the 1st Gurkhas took over trenches from the Coldstream Guards. "A" and "B" Companies were in firing line with two machine guns, the other companies being in support. The front line was mostly loopholed houses fifty yards in rear of the trenches which were to be manned as occasion required. There was a forward line three hundred yards in front of the trenches, but it was so full of water that it could only be held by outposts told off from the front line.

There was no fighting for the rest of the month, and the only casualty was one man grazed by a spent bullet. The battalion took its turn with other units in front line, or in reserve. On the 17th, and again on the 23rd, heavy snow fell, which was perhaps less trying for the Gurkhas than for the other Indian troops. From the 23rd the battalion was back at Auchel where it had been on the 15th.

During their turns of trench holding there used to be annoyance from German propaganda in the form of papers sent over on "dud" rifle grenades. One lot consisted of pictures of Indian prisoners in Germany thoroughly enjoying themselves. The letter press vaunted the German superiority, and pointed out the uselessness of resistance. The writing was in Hindi. It was ultimately decided to send a reply in the same language. The reply was concocted by some of the Gurkha signallers noted for their command of vernacular terms of vituperation. The result seems to have been a masterpiece in that art; indeed, parts of it were so bad that the men did not think them fit to show to the officers. With the addition of an English postscript, it was sent over tied to a rifle grenade fired into the German trench. There were no more letters after that.

On the 1st February a march of ten miles took the 1st Gurkhas to Calonne, on the 8th they were at Lacouture, and on the 9th the Sirhind relieved the Bareilly Brigade in the trenches between Festubert and the Rue du Bois where they were busy working on the trenches and where they received a reinforcement of about one hundred men from the Assam Military Police under Captain Johnson and Lieutenant Goût.

On the 16th there were some small incidents. An enemy working party was stopped

by fire, and sixty of the enemy trying to advance up an old communication trench were also stopped by rifle and machine gun fire. Bakhtbahadur Gurung and Bajbir volunteered to go out, and returned with some useful information. The former had a particularly lively time. Starting out at midnight, stark naked save for a loin-cloth, and armed only with a "kukri" he got close to the German trenches. Eventually he only escaped detection by a search light by plunging into a ditch full of water from which he returned dripping and half dead of cold. A good deal of rubbing and some strong liquor soon revived him.

On the 21st Major C. Bateman-Champain joined the battalion from the 5th Gurkha Rifles.

During the rest of the month nothing occurred beyond the usual trench routine of reliefs, and general misery in the wet ground. The strength of the battalion at the end of the month was 11 British officers and 650 other ranks.

The first ten days of March passed in the same way. On the 11th the Sirhind Brigade took the place of the Dehra Dun Brigade in the trenches five hundred yards East of Neuve Chapelle, after losing nine men wounded by shelling on the road. The battle of Neuve Chapelle had begun on the 9th.

The 12th began with a three hours' bombardment, by which Subadar Biria Gurung and Jemadar Tikaram Kamal were killed. An enemy counter attack was repulsed.

Orders had been issued for an attack at 11 a.m. with the N.W. edge of the Bois de Biez as its first objective.* It was to be made by the Jullundur (left) and Sirhind Brigades (right), the former directing. Both brigades were placed under orders of Brig.-General Walker of the Sirhind Brigade. Lieut.-Colonel Anderson temporarily commanded the Sirhind Brigade and Major C. Bateman-Champain the 1st Gurkhas. On the left of the Jullundur Brigade the line of attack was to be prolonged by the 25th (British) Brigade, of the 8th Division. Owing to mist which hampered registration by the artillery, and to the Jullundur Brigade not being in position, the attack had to be postponed for two hours.

In the Sirhind Brigade the leading battalions were to be the 1/4th Gurkhas on the right, supported by the 1st Gurkhas in reserve, the Highland Light Infantry on the left followed by the 15th Sikhs. The 4th Liverpool (Special Reserve) now attached to the brigade, were in special reserve. They had replaced the 4th Seaforths transferred to the Dehra Dun Brigade. The 15th Sikhs had taken the place of the 125th Rifles, transferred to the Bareilly Brigade. The Sirhind Brigade now had five battalions though by no means strong ones.

At 12.30 the British bombardment began, and under cover of it the brigades advanced rapidly to the front line, held by the Garhwal Brigade, from which the assault was to start.

The two leading battalions carried a line of trench just on the near side of the Rivière des Layes brook, killing many Germans and taking two hundred prisoners. This enabled the 1st Gurkhas and 15th Sikhs to move into their places, the 1st Gurkhas in echelon on the right rear of the 1/4th Gurkhas, the 15th Sikhs behind the junction of the Highland Light Infantry and 1/4th Gurkhas.

Meanwhile, the 25th Brigade, who had started at 12.30 p.m., had made little progress.

When the bombardment ceased at 1 p.m. the Sirhind and Jullundur Brigades pushed

* See map to face p. 138.

forward across the Rivière des Layes and over about five hundred yards of open ground beyond it. They were now well ahead of the 25th Brigade on their left, and consequently their left was enfiladed by heavy machine gun fire from a group of houses and a redoubt at the N.W. corner of the Bois de Biez.

The Jullundur Brigade, having lost heavily, was held up by the fear of further exposing its left flank. Though the three battalions of the Sirhind Brigade were never very heavily engaged, they also, for the same reason, found it impossible to progress. The attack remained held up till 5 p.m. when a fresh bombardment was tried, but still no progress could be made by the infantry. The enemy still held firmly along the N.W. edge of the wood, and in a breastwork with several redoubts one hundred yards in front of it. That night the 1st Gurkhas dug themselves in in an orchard.

The casualties of the day had been—Captain and Adjutant G. S. Kennedy killed by a sniper whilst acting as staff officer to Lieut.-Colonel Anderson, Subadar Biria Gurung, Jemadar Tikaram Kumal and 15 rank and file killed. Wounded, Major C. Bateman-Champain (very severely), Captain Fawcett, I.M.S. and 44 rank and file. "Captain Kennedy's death," writes Colonel Anderson, "was a great loss to the regiment. Besides being an excellent adjutant, he was always cheery and the best of comrades."

Before dawn on the 13th "A," "B," and "D" Companies were withdrawn to a trench and redoubt three hundred yards in rear, "C" with the machine-guns remaining in the orchard. The three former companies were heavily shelled, and their parapet was hit by a heavy shell which buried Subadar Major Bhagatbir and six men who had to be sent to hospital. Major Dopping-Hepenstal rejoined on this evening.

The casualties of the day were: *Killed*—two men; *Wounded*—Subadar Major Bhagatbir Gurung, Jemadar Dalbahadur Thapa and nineteen men.

On the morning of the 14th it was found that the enemy had made a new trench in continuation of the road along the N.W. edge of the Bois de Biez.

From the 14th to the 18th the battalion was constantly under very heavy shell fire and engaged in collecting captured arms and equipment and improving the captured trenches which had to be made to face in the opposite direction. At night the dead, mostly Germans, had to be buried and old German communication trenches filled in or double blocked. On the night of the 17th Major Hepenstal and a party filled in an important trench known as the Crescent Trench and the Sappers and Miners double blocked the trench running out from the Crescent towards the enemy.

Next morning when Colonel Anderson, Major Hepenstal and Captain St. George (successor of Capt. Kennedy in the adjutancy) were working out plans for the ensuing night they found the shelling so hot that they were obliged to evacuate the dug-out in which they were. This was a German dug-out which in the days of its construction had been under the front parapet. Now owing to the change of owners it was under the parados and therefore much exposed. The three officers now went and knelt one behind the other as close as possible. A shrapnel shell burst right over them, and though it seemed that they must be completely sheltered one of the bullets wounded Major Hepenstal in the back of the neck, fortunately not seriously.

Being relieved on the 19th by the 47th Sikhs, the battalion went into billets at Richebourg St. Vaast, was under orders of the Jullundur Brigade from the 20th to 23rd, and from then till the 12th April in various billets and trenches in the neighbourhood of Neuve Chapelle, with nothing to note beyond the usual incidents of trench warfare,

including having to bale out trenches after heavy rain. On the 13th April it was inspected by General Keary, commanding the Lahore Division, and on the 19th by the Commander-in-Chief. The battalion was congratulated on its gallantry at Neuve Chapelle. On the 19th, also, Major Hepenstal, Captain Johnson, and several men were severely burnt in putting out a fire at a farm.

At this time preparations were being made for a fresh British offensive south of Neuve Chapelle. This offensive was afterwards launched on the 9th May.

On the 23rd April, however, the Germans anticipated the British offensive by their first gas attack at Ypres. This attack broke the Allied line on a front of about five miles north of Ypres and opened what is known as the Second Battle of Ypres 1915.

The break in the Allied line on the 23rd April exposed the communications of the whole of the British troops in the Ypres salient. Among the British and French reinforcements hurried towards Ypres to meet the danger was the Lahore Division.

On the 24th April the Sirhind Brigade was about to relieve a brigade of the Meerut Division in the line near Neuve Chapelle. These orders were cancelled and the night of the 24th April saw the battalion moving by a twenty-two mile forced march northward towards Ypres. A further eight miles on the 25th landed them in hutments at Ouderdom.

The task allotted to the Lahore Division for the 26th, and following days, was, in conjunction with French reinforcements, to attack the enemy on the front of the break in the Allied line with a view to forcing the enemy to stand on the defensive and so to prevent him from gathering the fruits of his initial success.

That this task was accomplished speaks highly for the courage and determination of all the troops, British, Canadian, Indian, and French, engaged.

The actions on the 26th, 27th and 28th were fought without any form of protection against gas. On the latter day masks improvised from ladies' veils, cotton waste and sal ammoniac were served out. The value of these masks it must be admitted was more moral than material. The enemy's successes on the 23rd had deprived the Allies of the use of a large proportion of their artillery, and the enemy's temporary and local air and artillery superiority resulted in our infantry being given quite inadequate artillery support, in spite of the devoted efforts of our gunners.

On the 26th the Sirhind Brigade after marching through the outskirts of Ypres assembled about St. Jean, N.E. of Ypres, as reserve to the Jullundur (right) and Ferozepur (left) Brigades attacking northwards.

The Sirhind Brigade was paraded for inspection by Sir James Willcocks, who congratulated each unit separately on its behaviour at Neuve Chapelle.

At 4 p.m. the Highland Light Infantry and 4th Gurkhas were sent forward to support the Jullundur Brigade and consolidate positions in rear of the front line. The casualties of the 1st Gurkhas on this day, from shell fire, were one man killed and eleven wounded. That night they spent in bivouac just behind a ridge from the crest of which the German position could be seen one thousand four hundred yards off on the other side of a gently sloping valley.

During the night the Highland Light Infantry and 4th Gurkhas had been sent out to dig an advanced trench four hundred yards from the German line, as a starting point for the assault. They were withdrawn before dawn. The Jullundur Brigade, having suffered severely, was withdrawn to the rear in the evening of the 26th.

The attack of the 27th was to be made East of the Ypres-Langemarck road, which formed the demarcation between the right of the French 4th Moroccan Brigade and the left of the Sirhind Brigade. On the right of the Sirhind the Ferozepur Brigade was to advance. The Ypres-Langemarck Road, after running a little West of North to within one thousand yards of the German position, turned to a N.N.E. direction which would necessitate the Sirhind Brigade also changing direction if the demarcation line was to be maintained.

The two Gurkha battalions were to lead its advance, the 4th Gurkhas, supported by the Highland Light Infantry on the right, the 1st followed by the 15th Sikhs on the left, the 4th King's Liverpool in reserve. The division was to advance as the French advanced beyond the road.

The opening bombardment was to commence at 12.30 p.m. and continue till 1.15. When it ceased, the two Gurkha battalions had got forward to some enclosed ground on the downward slope of the valley, and were ahead of the Ferozepur Brigade on their right and the French on their left. Consequently they were subjected to heavy enfilade fire from the left which had caused the 1st Gurkhas to turn N.N.W. so as to face it. Here both battalions were held up, the 4th which had maintained its N.N.E. direction, rather earlier than the 1st Gurkhas, and they settled down to a fire fight which lasted till 4 p.m.

The 4th Gurkhas, thanks to the support of the 4th King's Liverpool, now went forward a bit, but with heavy loss to both Gurkha battalions and the Liverpool. By 4.30 p.m. there remained only two unwounded British officers in each of the Gurkha Battalions. The 1st had established themselves in advance of three French heavy guns which had been abandoned on the 22nd. Two of these were taken to the rear at night.

At 5.30 p.m. a fresh bombardment enabled the Highland Light Infantry and 15th Sikhs to push forward slightly, but they were still one hundred yards from the German trenches.

At 7 p.m. the French assaulted under cover of heavy artillery fire, and the Sirhind Brigade also advanced. Ten minutes later the French were streaming back, and the Sirhind Brigade, fearing an attack on its exposed left flank, stopped its attack and wheeled round the 15th Sikhs to protect its left.

The Brigade was then ordered to consolidate its position, and the two Gurkha battalions, on being replaced by the Highland Light Infantry and 15th Sikhs, were withdrawn to reorganize. During this day Captain H. L. Scott of the 1/1st Gurkhas was acting as Brigade-Major. His conduct was highly commended in Brig.-General Walker's report, from which the above account is mostly taken. Though blown out of his observation post by a shell, Captain Scott insisted on carrying on.

When Captain Evans was wounded in the leg Rifleman Pahalman Gurung helped him to a ditch, threw up cover, and took good care of him. For his conduct on this day Pahalman Gurung received the I.D.S.M.

The casualties of the 1st Gurkhas were:—

Officers. Lieut. and Adjutant G. S. W. St. George, died of wounds next day.

Wounded. Capts. W. H. Darley, W. J. Evans, P. J. Gofft, 2nd Lieut. E. J. C.

Ashmore, Subadar Puran Sing Gurung, and Jemadar Lilbir Thapa.

Rank and File. 15 Killed, 9 Missing, 71 Wounded.

Gas had been used by the Germans, but, owing to a change of wind, it appears to have done harm to themselves rather than the British.

During the rest of the month the battalion, in support trenches, was heavily shelled and stood to arms at times ready to support a French attack, which did not come off.

On the night of the 27th Captain Johnson rejoined the battalion and on the 28th Captain Antram and Lieutenant Sutcliffe joined. On the latter day the battalion by combined rifle and machine gun fire was instrumental in bringing down a German aeroplane which fell on the right of the battalion and was captured.

On the 29th there remained with the battalion only two regular officers—Lieut.-Colonel Anderson and Captain Johnson. Captain Scott was therefore brought back from the Brigade Staff to take over the duties of Adjutant in place of Lieutenant St. George who had died on the 28th from wounds received on the previous day. Of him Colonel Anderson writes: "Lieut. St. George's death was a great loss, the battalion losing a very smart and capable officer. He was shot through the lung, standing beside his commanding officer, by a stray and half spent bullet."

On the 1st May it was arranged with the French that an attack by them on Hill 29 should be supported by the Sirhind Brigade, which was now on their right rear. The 1/4th Gurkhas were to lead the attack on the right, supported by the Highland Light Infantry, whilst the 1/1st Gurkhas on the left would be supported by the King's Liverpool, the 15th Sikhs holding the advanced trenches as reserve.

The 1st Gurkhas were drawn up in a fold of the ground one thousand five hundred yards from the enemy's position. To reach effective rifle range, the battalion had to traverse a long open slope exposed to artillery and machine gun fire. This it was decided to do at the greatest possible speed. The men dashed forward with great spirit, and reached the bottom of the valley, after halting twice to take breath, with small loss, as the enemy's fire had not fully developed, owing to the speed of the advance. Having crossed the valley, the Gurkhas pressed up the opposite slope to a double line of trenches about five hundred yards from the enemy, where they halted to rest. The artillery bombardment had now ceased, and a further advance could only be under heavy rifle fire.

Brig.-General Walker personally congratulated Colonel Anderson on the élan with which the attack of the 1st Gurkhas was carried out. A staff officer also told him that a French officer who was watching the attack kept on repeating: "C'est magnifique! C'est magnifique!"

Of the time spent here Colonel Anderson writes: "An incident while waiting for orders in this trench has impressed itself on my memory. Captain Scott and I were together. The Germans were registering with pretty big stuff with a view to getting the exact ranges. First a shell would fall one hundred yards in front of us, then one hundred yards behind, then fifty yards in front, then fifty yards behind and so on till we both thought the next shell must drop in the trench itself and on the top of us; when suddenly to our amazement and huge delight the guns were switched off and began firing in quite another direction. Just behind the trench we were in was the crater of a very big shell with the dead bodies of some fifteen French 'poilus' lying round the lip of the crater. The shell must have landed right in a section of the advancing French and killed the lot."

About two hundred yards in front of this double trench was a shallow trench full of French troops who masked the Gurkhas' fire. The French were invited to open fire to cover a fresh advance. "This," says the battalion diary, "they appeared unable to do."

The ground leading to the German position was a glaxis slope, and their wire, four feet deep, was uncut.

The French not being prepared to attack, the Gurkhas were ordered to stand fast, and after dark were withdrawn to a point half a mile North of St. Jean and at mid-night marched for Ouderdom, which they only reached at 5 a.m. on the 2nd. On the 1st May Naick (acting havildar) Ramkishan Thapa of the 1st Gurkhas earned the Order of Merit for gallantry in laying a telephone wire, during which operation he twice had to get his detachment renewed, as all had been killed or wounded.

The casualties on this day were Captain A. E. Johnson and Subadar Sasidhar Thapa wounded. Rank and file: 6 killed, 62 wounded, 3 missing.

The men had had a very exhausting day, without food, and carrying two hundred rounds of ammunition besides the equipment usually carried by the first line transport.

For the next twelve days there is little to note. On the 4th May Captain Heyland, 5th Gurkha Rifles and 2nd-Lieut. Herbert, I.A.R.O., joined the battalion. By the 5th May the Lahore Division was back in the Neuve Chapelle neighbourhood again. On the 8th the battalion was inspected by General Keary, commanding the division, who read out Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's congratulatory letter. During an attack on the 9th by the Meerut Division, the Sirhind Brigade was in corps reserve and had no fighting.

THE BATTLE OF FESTUBERT.

On the 15th the Sirhind Brigade took position in rear of the Garhwal Brigade, behind the Rue du Bois, to support an attack by that brigade, on the 16th, which failed.

Owing to heavy shelling on the 15th, the battalion had one man killed and ten wounded. The battalion moved from its dug-outs in the Rue des Berceaux on the 18th to support an attack by the Garhwal Brigade, which did not materialize.

The battalion casualties were: Subadar Ram Sing Thapa (2/5th Gurkhas) and eight men wounded by shell fire.

Next day the 1st Gurkhas moved into front line in place of the Highland Light Infantry. On the 20th May General Keary wrote to Headquarters of the Indian Corps regarding the 1/1st Gurkhas. "Strength before the present operations was 618. The spirit of the men is good. The regiment badly requires more regular officers, as it has only three. If it is given time to re-organize and get drafts, I recommend that it be retained as a separate unit. If it cannot get drafts, it should be amalgamated with the 1/4th Gurkha Rifles."


He wrote in precisely similar terms of the 4th, which had only four officers, but fortunately amalgamation was not found to be necessary.

On the 21st Captain E. W. Antram and six men were wounded. On the same day Lieut.-Colonel Anderson and Captain Scott had a very narrow escape. They were sitting on the floor of a ruined farm with their backs against the wall studying a map and writing orders when a "crump" burst in the next room, blowing the roof to pieces, killing one man and wounding six.


ATTACK ON THE FERME DU BOIS.*

Orders were received for a fresh attack on the 22nd. In this the brigade was to attack on a three-battalion front, Highland Light Infantry on the left, 1st Gurkhas

* See map on p. 145.



THE YPRES SALIENT.
1 APRIL—2ND MAY.
1915.



JULIEN.—SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES.
 4 APRIL—1ST MAY,
 1915.

centre, 4th Gurkhas right. The 1st Gurkhas were to attack with three companies one behind the other on a front of two platoons at 1 a.m., "A" Company leading, followed by "D" and then "C."

Thanks to a very effective barrage and the protection afforded by the Ferme du Bois and a ridge, the farm was reached with very slight loss. The advance continued, still with only slight loss, for one hundred and fifty yards down the forward slope, at the bottom of which was a deep ditch with three feet of water, and wire cut by the artillery between it and the enemy. The right attack had been held up by the ditch and uncut wire.

Heavy fire now met the battalion from front and right flank, but "A" Company, as soon as it was reinforced by "D," charged across the intervening thirty yards, stormed the trench, killed some fifteen Germans, and forced the rest back to another trench twenty yards beyond. From that trench the enemy began making bombing counter-attacks from both flanks and their second line.

Captain A. R. Mellis and Lieutenant H. P. Sutcliffe had been wounded earlier, and in the course of the counter-attacks Lieut. A. A. Heyland and 2nd.-Lieuts. H. B. Herbert and S. G. Fry and R. S. Gamble were killed. The command, in the absence of British officers, was taken by Subadar Jit Sing Gurung who, at 2.30 a.m., reported that the first line had been taken, but could not be held without reinforcements.

Captain Mellis afterwards received the Military Cross.

Meanwhile, the attack on both right and left of the 1st Gurkhas had been held up at the ditch owing to the wire being intact on those fronts, and it had been decided to abandon the enterprise.

Before he received orders to retire, Jit Sing and his men had already been forced to fall back to the ridge, where they captured a German on patrol.

Besides the officer casualties above detailed, the battalion lost, Rank and File, Missing, Believed Killed—58, Wounded—55.

Trench warfare on the Western Front has been described as consisting of long periods of great boredom and discomfort, punctuated by intervals of intense excitement. The period between the end of the Battle of Festubert and the beginning of the Battle of Loos in September 1915 was punctuated by very few excitements. During it the 1st Gurkhas, as well as the rest of the Indian corps, were going through the usual routine of service in the front trenches, in support, or in reserve, subject to bombardments of varying intensity, with casualties of varying number, and plenty of hard work training and improving defences.

The only incidents which require mention are the following :—

On the 23rd May Captain Greatwood, 123rd Rifles, and Lieutenant MacGillivray, I.A.R.O., and on the 25th Captain A. H. Webb, 5th Gurkhas, joined the battalion. On the 1st June Captain Giffard and on the 2nd Lieutenant Carpendale rejoined. On the 19th Captain Giffard was appointed Adjutant in relief of Captain Scott appointed Staff-Captain Jullundur Brigade. Other officers who joined during this period were :—

23rd June . . .	Lieutenant Broad, I.A.R.O.
24th June . . .	Lieutenant Brown, I.M.S., relieving Captain Fitzgerald.
20th July . . .	Lieutenant Minchinton with a draft.
2nd August . . .	Captain Wilberforce Bell, Indian Political Dept.
20th August . . .	Six New Army officers attached to the Battalion for instruction.

24th September . . . Major Dopping Hepenstal rejoined.
27th September . . . 2nd Lieutenant Sorby, I.A.R.O.
4th October . . . 2nd Lieutenant Keatinge, I.A.R.O.

In the beginning of June the battalion was inspected by Mr. Asquith, accompanied by Sir James Willcocks.

On the 10th July the following medal-ribbons were presented by the Divisional Commander :—

Rifleman Jitman Thapa, I.O.M., 2nd Class.
„ Kansi Gurung, I.D.S.M.
„ Khamba Sing Gurung, I.D.S.M.
2nd Class S. A. S. Jemadar Mahadeo Parshad, I.D.S.M.

For a short period at the end of July the battalion was attached to the Garhwal Brigade.

On the 16th August it was paraded for the edification of Monsieur Pichon and a party of French journalists.

On the 31st August, at an inspection by General Keary, the regiment was congratulated on its exploits, and Russian decorations (the St. George's Cross and Medal) were presented to Subadar Puran Sing Gurung, Rifleman Jitman Thapa, and, posthumously, for Rifleman Balbir Thapa who had been killed.

Rifleman Balbir Thapa was also awarded the Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class.

On the 20th September Lord Kitchener inspected the battalion and was pleased with its appearance, remarking that the men looked fit and well.

On the 5th September Sir James Willcocks ceased to command the Indian Corps, and was replaced by Lieut.-General Sir Charles Anderson, K.C.B.

THE BATTLE OF LOOS.

From the 21st September began the heavy bombardment of the German trenches preceding the Battle of Loos. The function of the Indian Corps in the ensuing attack was to advance, with the Meerut Division, towards Maquissart, whilst the Ferozepur and Jullundur Brigades of the Lahore Division held the line and assisted the attack with smoke screens.

At 8 a.m. on the 25th the Sirhind Brigade advanced in two lines from its second-line trenches, at Croix Barbée and Rouge Croix, to the Rue Tilleroy. The 1st Gurkhas were on the right of the first line, with the 4th Liverpool on their left, Colonel Anderson commanding both.

At noon the Dehra Dun Brigade was ordered to attack in support of the Bareilly and Garhwal Brigades. As soon as the Dehra Dun Brigade had cleared off its ground, the 1st Gurkhas and 4th Liverpool were to move to a line behind the left of the Meerut Division and attack Southwards to clear the Germans from the Meerut Division front. The Jullundur Brigade would co-operate with the two battalions, at first by fire, and eventually by an advance. This operation was first postponed till 2.30, and then cancelled. The Sirhind Brigade returned to its old position in the second line without having been engaged, beyond being shelled. The 1st Gurkha casualties were :—

Lieut.-Colonel E. E. Bousfield (123rd Rifles, attached 1st Gurkhas) killed, and three men wounded.

The remainder of the battalion's time on the Western front may be dismissed very

Attack on la Ferme du Bois, midnight 22nd & 23rd May, 1915.

The map illustrates the tactical situation during the attack on la Ferme du Bois. Key elements include:

- Units and Positions:**
 - 4th King's Liverpool Regt. (Brigade Reserve)
 - M.G.R. H.Q.
 - B Coy M.G.R.
 - H.L.I. (Heavy Light Infantry)
 - Forming up area
 - 1st G.R. (German Rifle)
 - 2nd G.R.
 - 3nd G.R.
 - 4th G.R.
 - 5th G.R.
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 - 92th G.R.
 - 93th G.R.
 - 94th G.R.
 - 95th G.R.
 - 96th G.R.
 - 97th G.R.
 - 98th G.R.
 - 99th G.R.
 - 100th G.R.
- Geographical Features:**
 - Ruin du Bois
 - Ferme Cour à l'Oue
 - Small German Post
 - Ditch
 - Water
- Tactical Actions:**
 - H.L.I. Attack
 - M.G.R. Attack
 - 1st G.R. Attack
 - 2nd G.R. Attack
 - 3rd G.R. Attack
 - 4th G.R. Attack
 - 5th G.R. Attack
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briefly, being a continuation of the same monotonous trench warfare. There was much rain, and the trenches were muddier and more trying than ever. From the 28th September the 1st Seaforth Highlanders rejoined the brigade and the 1st Gurkhas were in trenches about Givenchy, on the extreme right of the Lahore Division, resting their right on the La Bassée Canal. On the 10th October 2nd Lieutenant Keatinge and one man were wounded. The battalion was in trenches or reserve in this neighbourhood till the 13th October when they were employed in a demonstration, combined with a bombardment of the German trenches, the only tangible results of which were casualties of one killed and one wounded. This operation is described in the Divisional diary as a feint which drew the enemy's fire better than had been expected. It appears to have been mainly designed to get information and try smoke screens.

From the 27th October to the 10th November the 1st Gurkhas were on loan to the Jullundur Brigade, and were chiefly employed in making trenches. They then rejoined their own brigade at Berguette and Rebecq.

Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Anderson and Captain H. L. Scott were mentioned in Sir John French's despatch of the 30th November 1915, for "gallant and distinguished services in the field." On the 16th January 1916, Colonel Anderson was gazetted C.M.G. and Captain Scott M.C. On the 25th November they were inspected by H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, who read the King's message to representative detachments of the Indian Corps. At the end of November and beginning of December they were at Recklingen and Ligny in miserably cold wet weather, returning to Rebecq on the 13th.

The 1st Gurkhas entrained at Berguette on the 13th for Marseilles, which was reached two days later. After a busy time loading baggage and picking up the seventy or eighty men of the Base Depot, the battalion sailed, with the 27th Punjabis, 47th Sikhs and the Head-quarters of the Sirhind Brigade and Lahore Division, on the transport *Franconia*.

Touching at Alexandria on the 22nd, they were at Port Said on the 23rd, and there learnt that their destination was Basra.

The rest of the month was spent at sea en route for Basra.

The officers who sailed with the Battalion on the *Franconia* were:—

Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Anderson.
Major M. E. Dopping-Hepenstal.
Captain W. Greatwood.
Captain C. H. Giffard (Adjutant).
Lieutenant H. D. Minchinton.
Lieutenant D. G. MacGillivray.
2nd Lieutenant R. N. D. Broad.
2nd Lieutenant D. O. O'Reilly.
2nd Lieutenant W. J. Sorby.

CHAPTER XV

MESOPOTAMIA

ATTEMPTS TO RELIEVE KUT—BATTLE OF THE DUJAILA REDOUBT

1916

THE *Franconia* reached Koweit in the Persian Gulf on the 5th January 1916, and there the 1st Gurkhas transhipped to the S.S. *Kentucky*, which reached Marghil 7 p.m. on the 7th. Here the battalion was transferred during the 8th to barges attached to river steamers for the voyage up the Tigris, on which they started at 11 p.m. Captain Crookshank, from the depot in India, joined here. On the 15th the Battalion reached Orah on the right bank of the Tigris and disembarked. They were put upon outpost duty guarding the shipping.

The situation in Mesopotamia at this time was as follows: General Townshend, with the remains of the forces which had fought at Ctesiphon, was blockaded in Kut-al-Amara; the relieving force, under the command of General Aylmer, had fought the action of Shiekh Saad on the 6th–8th January, after which the Turks had retired on their fortified position at Hanna on the left bank of the Tigris, but had again advanced to Wadi. There they had been once more attacked on the 13th January, and had again retreated to Hanna. These actions were on the left bank of the Tigris. Operations on the right bank were now commencing. The following general remarks are contributed by an officer of the battalion:—

“The evils of lack of preparation for war and of the want of uniformity throughout the Empire were now once more demonstrated.

“The battalion reached Mesopotamia armed with Mark III rifles and Vicker’s machine guns both designed to fire Mark VII ammunition.

“In Mesopotamia Mark VI ammunition only was available. There were insufficient Mark I rifles in the country to rearm the troops. As a result the men went into action with Mark III rifles, Mark VI ammunition and a printed pamphlet exhorting them to aim three feet six inches high right at five hundred yards and proportionately at other ranges.

“It is hardly surprising that, as a Tigris Corps communique was careful to inform us, Turkish prisoners compared the shooting of the troops recently arrived from France unfavourably with that of the troops of the original Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force.

“On arrival in the country the Indian infantry was ordered to discard the four-company organization and to revert to the old double-company system. British infantry was permitted to retain the four-company system.

“The resulting confusion was somewhat abated by later orders under which Indian infantry companies were to be called half Double companies, and platoons quarter Double companies.

"For some unknown reason co-ordinates in Mesopotamia were measured at this time from the north-east corner of squares instead of from the south-west corners.

"As the maps showed little but the River Tigris and were on a scale of one inch to forty miles this perhaps mattered little until some months after the arrival of the battalion when some larger scale and squared Tigris Corps sketches were issued.

"The Sirhind Brigade now resumed its number and was henceforth known as the 9th (Sirhind) Brigade or more commonly simply as the 9th Brigade.

"It now consisted of—

"The 1st Highland Light Infantry.

"The 1/1st Gurkha Rifles.

"The 1/9th Gurkha Rifles.

"The 93rd Burma Infantry."

FIRST ATTACK ON HANNA.*

On the 16th January a force known as the Right Bank Column was formed of the 1st and 9th Gurkhas and the 93rd Burma Infantry, all under Lieut.-Colonel W. Y. Campbell, for the purpose of co-operating with the attack by the 7th Division on the left bank on the 21st January. On the 19th this column, strengthened by one company of the 1st Manchesters and two sections of the 22nd Mountain Battery, was ordered to take an Arab village on the right bank about four miles N.W. of Orah, and generally to clear up the situation on that bank.

This village, which faced a point on the left bank about two miles above the Turkish front lines, was occupied without resistance, and a line of outposts was set up West of it, running S.S.E. from the river bank. The 1st Gurkhas were on the right nearest the river, the 9th on their left. Major Hepenstal then went, with "C" Company of the 1st Gurkhas and the company of the Manchesters, to see if any Turks were to be found on the right bank near the river. He found none, but came under heavy fire from the left bank which caused casualties of eight men wounded.

On the 21st an attack by the 7th Division on the left bank succeeded in taking the first Turkish trenches at Hanna, but the captors were again bombed out of them.

The 9th Gurkhas now held the outposts from the Arab village for twelve hundred yards S.E. with the 1st Gurkhas extending East from their left and the 1st Manchesters and three companies of the 93rd beyond them as far as a mud fort on the right bank. The line thus faced generally South across the Northward bend of the river.

The fourth company of the 93rd was near the river with machine guns. The artillery was on a mound behind the company of the Manchesters.

The day was one of pouring rain. Two men were killed and one was wounded, apparently by fire from across the river.

On the 22nd, owing to the company of the Manchesters being sent to the left bank, the 1st Gurkhas' outposts had to be extended so as to take their place covering the guns from the South.

In these positions they remained till the 31st, working hard at improving trenches. The position was unaltered during the first eleven days of February, and nothing noticeable occurred beyond some firing at long range at Arab raiders, and three or four casualties from Turkish snipers.

* See map to face p. 164. General map of Mesopotamia to face p. 174.

The difficulties of living about this time are illustrated by a story contributed by General Anderson. On the 26th January the battalion rounded up some cows and a calf, and it was decided to kill the calf for the officers' mess. The men, being Hindus, it was of course impossible to ask any of them to kill the calf, so the unpleasant task fell to the lot of the junior officer. The execution and cutting up of the victim were duly carried out, and most of the officers enjoyed the subsequent meal. The only exception was the unfortunate butcher for the occasion, whose recollections of the scene were too poignant to permit of his partaking of the flesh.

On the 12th February the battalion, on being relieved by the 59th Rifles, returned to the camp at Orah. On the 13th Major Hepenstal took out one thousand men (two hundred and fifty from each battalion of the brigade) to work at trenches in the Sanna position, which extended Southwards from the river a little above the Arab village. Khaki drill uniforms were served out to the men. Work on the Sanna position continued till the 21st, when the brigade, now consisting of the Highland Light Infantry, 1st and 9th Gurkhas, and 93rd Burma Infantry marched out in the afternoon and bivouacked in the Sanna position.

On the 22nd the 9th Brigade left Sanna at 2 a.m. and marched three miles due West when the 1st Gurkhas, on the right, and Highland Light Infantry on the left, were ordered to deploy and move due North into the Falahiyah Bend of the Tigris where they entrenched, about five hundred yards in front of the guns, at dawn. The 9th Gurkhas and 93rd formed a defensive line farther upstream beyond the bend. A dozen mounted Arabs, trying to escape from a village on the left bank, were accounted for, and at 6.20 a.m. the guns in rear began to bombard a Turkish camp beyond the river, stampeded the animals in it and caused the Turks to strike it hurriedly. The 1st Gurkhas now entrenched on the edge of the right bank and sent their machine guns to face North at the apex of the bend opposite where the camp had been.

During the night the Turks were heard digging in on the left bank opposite the battalion, and were harassed all night by rifle and machine-gun fire.

Soon after dawn enemy cavalry and infantry were seen passing down stream on the left bank, and were badly punished by the machine guns at the bend, which were believed to have caused about one hundred casualties, with a loss to themselves of only one man wounded.

On this day the battalion received a draft of 160 men under Captain Antram, 2nd Lieutenant Harrop, and Jemadar Gajia Thapa.

The position remained unchanged till the 28th, but the Turks had now dug in on the left bank and sniped vigorously, causing two or three casualties each day. On relief by the 47th Sikhs, the battalion went back to Divisional Reserve on the 28th.

SECOND ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE KUT. ATTACK ON THE DUJAILA REDOUBT.*

There was heavy rain on the 29th February, and on the 1st and 2nd March the 1st Gurkhas were in camp at Abu Ruman just above the Falahiyah Bend preparing for the projected attack on the Dujaila redoubt, which was designed to turn the right of the Turkish position of Es Sinn, on the right bank of the Tigris, and roll it up.

On the 3rd the battalion, with the Highland Light Infantry, went out to make mounds, fifty yards apart, to demarcate the road to be followed in the operation, which

* See map to face p. 164.

was originally intended for the 4th, but had to be postponed on account of rain, and only started in the night of the 7th-8th.

The order of march for the brigade was in line of half-battalion columns in fours with the first line transport between the battalions.*

The 1st Gurkhas were on the right of the line, with the 93rd Burma Infantry, 9th Gurkhas, and Highland Light Infantry, in that order, on their left.

The point of assembly for the attack on the Dujaila redoubt, called Ruined Hut, was about a mile North of the Umm al Brahm marsh and about ten miles East by North of the Dujaila redoubt. From this point the 9th Brigade (Sirhind) was to march slightly West of South for six miles to a point on the Dujaila Canal or depression, nearly four miles East of the redoubt. At this point were some advanced Turkish trenches which the Brigade duly struck at 4 a.m., but found unoccupied. At daylight they were approaching the southernmost bend of the depression, in the dry bed of which they had marched, since striking it. The Dujaila redoubt and Turkish camps bore North-west about three miles away. The 9th Brigade was in Column B, which had been preceded by Column A, which was to pass farther Westwards and cover the assault on the redoubt, which was entrusted to B.

Colonel Anderson's impressions of the position are thus recorded by him: "The night march had been a complete success and was a very brilliant performance. The 9th Brigade were in their proper position by daylight on the 8th and there is little doubt if the brigade had been ordered to attack at once the Dujaila redoubt would have been captured with little loss. It was, however, not till 9.45 a.m. that the attack was launched. This delay enabled the Turks to bring across large reinforcements from Kut on the left bank and to meet our advance with a very heavy fire from previously prepared trenches running South from the Dujaila redoubt and into which they disappeared. Once in their trenches we could see nothing of the Turks, whereas the Turk had a magnificent field of fire.

The guns of Column B now began shelling the Dujaila redoubt and camp, and the 9th Brigade pushed forward with the 1st Gurkhas on the right and the 93rd Burma Infantry on the left. The 9th Gurkhas were in support and the Highland Light Infantry in reserve. The right of the 1st Gurkhas rested on the Dujaila depression as it ran nearly North past the Eastern side of the redoubt. They had special orders not to enter the depression which was likely to be raked by fire from the redoubt. There had been delays, and the deployment was not completed till 9.25 a.m. Twenty minutes later the advance began. Many Turks were now seen advancing on the West of the redoubt.

They disappeared into trenches running South from the Dujaila redoubt and then curving round to the West.

At 10.5 the Turks opened fire, and ten minutes later the 9th Gurkhas were sent up to reinforce the heavily engaged firing line.

At 10.40 the 93rd on the left were held up by fire from trenches on their left, and the 1st Gurkhas had edged off to their right into and partly over the depression. The Officer Commanding the 1st Gurkhas reported that Turks were moving to the East side

*So says the diary. It would seem more probable that the 1st line transport followed. The mounds fifty yards apart constructed on previous days would seem to indicate a front of that breadth into which had to be fitted thirty-two men in eight columns of fours. The General Orders allowed 1st line transport and field ambulances either to be fitted in between columns or to follow on as broad a front as possible.


of the depression. To meet this threat to the right flank, two platoons of the Highland Light Infantry, with two machine guns and two platoons of the 9th Gurkhas, were sent to the East side of the depression.

At 11.15 four more machine guns were sent over the depression under the Brigade Machine Gun Officer.

Progress was slow, and at 1 p.m. the Highland Light Infantry were moved into the firing line for the assault.

The 93rd had by noon reached a low bank which, though believed at the moment to be close to the redoubt, was in reality fifteen hundred yards short of it. They and the 1st Gurkhas had advanced by rushes a few hundred yards over an open and bullet-swept plain. The assault originally ordered for 1 p.m. was postponed till 2.10 p.m., the preceding three minutes to be occupied by an intense bombardment of the redoubt. Though the 9th Brigade was much farther from the redoubt than had been supposed, Colonel Campbell, commanding it, was told he must do his best to get forward.

The Highland Light Infantry, now on the right of the 1st Gurkhas, were again held up after getting forward about two hundred yards. Nor was any further progress possible after a fresh bombardment at 2.30 p.m. The whole line had only got forward to about fifteen hundred yards from the redoubt.



So far, the casualties, which were numerous, had been suffered chiefly from the fire of the trench South of the redoubt. Now a heavy fire from the fort itself, and from a trench running Eastwards from it across the depression, began to take effect.

At 3.30 the Brigade was still held up, as was the 28th Brigade which had been attacking on its left.

At 5.15, under cover of a fresh bombardment, an advance was tried. The Highland Light Infantry advanced to within twelve hundred yards of the redoubt, but the rest of the line could make no progress. The whole was under a severe cross-fire from the redoubt in front, and from the Turkish trenches on both flanks.

When darkness fell on the field, it was apparent that the attack must be abandoned for the present. The 1st Gurkhas were sent back to Brigade Reserve in a nullah, after they had collected and brought in the wounded. They were in reserve by 10 p.m.

At 1 a.m. on the 9th March orders were received for all units to retire and form up on the bend of the Dujaila depression, which the 1st Gurkhas reached after 5 a.m. and where they took up a position covering the North bank of the depression. At 11 a.m. the withdrawal was continued, with the 1st Gurkhas acting as advanced guard of the brigade. The bodies of Captain Crookshank and Captain Giffard had been buried at the bend of the depression.

Lieut.-Colonel Anderson was the only British officer left at the end of this day of those who had gone into action in the morning. Orders had been given that each battalion was to have two officers at Brigade Head-quarters as a reserve in case of heavy losses. As soon as the battalion received orders to form the brigade reserve the two officers who had been left behind came up and, with the help of the Gurkha Officers, assisted the Commanding Officer in getting the battalion together, the companies having become separated during the attacks and in collecting and bringing in the wounded and burying the dead as far as possible.

At 5 p.m. the battalion had reached the Pools of Siloam, two miles North of the Umm al Brahm marsh, where orders were received to go on to Orah. That camp was only reached at 10.45 p.m. on the 9th. The men who had been marching and fighting for nearly forty-eight hours, short of water and food, were naturally thoroughly done up.

The British casualties in this unfortunate battle had been about three thousand five hundred, of whom about one thousand were killed or missing, the latter category being probably synonymous with killed.

In the 1st Gurkhas the list was very heavy.

<i>British Officers.</i>	<i>Killed.</i>	Captain W. P. Crookshank.
		Captain W. Greatwood (123rd Rifles, attached 1/1st Gurkhas)
		Captain C. H. Giffard (Adjutant)
<i>British Officers.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	Major Dopping-Hepenstal.
		Captain Minchinton.
		2nd Lieutenant Harrop, I.A.R.O.
<i>Gurkha Officers.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	Jemadars Gajia Thapa and Dadhi Gurung.
<i>Rank and file.</i>	<i>Killed, 18; Wounded, 94; Missing (believed killed), 6.</i>	

For his services this day Subadar Kalu Gurung received the Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class.

Colonel Anderson writes :—

"The death of Captains Crookshank, Greatwood and Giffard was a grievous loss to the battalion which could ill afford the loss of three such fine officers and gentlemen. Captain Crookshank, much to his sorrow, had been left in command of the depot when the battalion had left India for France and was delighted to join the battalion on arrival at Basra and all ranks were glad to see him again.

"Captain Greatwood (123rd Rifles, attached 1st Gurkha Rifles) had been with the battalion since May 1915. He was a very good officer and popular with all ranks. When poor Giffard was hit he was by my side, he had picked up a rifle and had been firing at some Turks who could be seen running to take up a position at the head of the Dujaila depression. He was in the act of bending down to place the rifle on the ground when he was hit. As the attack had been held up for the time being I lay down and supported Giffard in my arms and made him as comfortable as possible. He told me he was not in pain. About this time Minchinton came up to ask for orders and an orderly, I think of the Highland Light Infantry, with a message that at 5.15 p.m. there was to be another combined attack and all units were to do their utmost to push on. Both Minchinton and the orderly were hit, Minchinton in the shoulder, the orderly in the leg. I told Giffard I must leave him . . . but I left Giffard's Gurkha orderly with him, telling him to look after and not to leave the Adjutant Sahib. When the attack had fizzled out I noticed Giffard's orderly passing a few yards off. He told me Giffard was dead. In Giffard I lost a very dear personal friend and as good an adjutant as any C.O. could wish to have. He made the third adjutant I had lost—Captain Kennedy at Neuve Chapelle and Lieutenant St. George at Ypres being the other two."

Though no stretchers were available the bodies of Captains Crookshank and Giffard were carried back the same night by their men.

A Divisional Order issued after the battle of the Dujaila redoubt says of the Sirhind Brigade: "It is estimated that in fifty-one hours during two sleepless nights (8th and 9th March) the brigade marched thirty-seven miles and fought a severe action, losing 730 of all ranks out of 2,350. This feat could only be accomplished by the greatest devotion to duty, gallantry and efficiency."

The 10th March was a disturbed day, followed by a similar night, owing to Turkish shelling from the South-east. On the 11th the battalion was sent to dig in at Sodom about four miles West of Sheikh Saad, the object being to meet any attempt at a Turkish advance between the Umm al Brahm marsh and the right bank of the Tigris towards Sheikh Saad.

Here they remained till the 14th, when the 1st Gurkhas, on relief by the 36th Sikhs, moved to Shand Shanty, North-east of Twin Canals, where they were in reserve to the brigade occupying positions between Twin Canals and Thorny Nala. On the 23rd Captain Baldwin joined for duty and on the 28th Major Hepenstal and 2nd Lieutenant Keatinge rejoined. On the 29th the brigade was relieved by the 37th and moved into the camp vacated by the 36th Sikhs, sending "D" Company and one machine gun, under 2nd Lieutenants Keatinge and Sorby, to relieve a company of the 36th Sikhs at Sodom.

In these positions they remained till the 5th April, when the whole battalion (the company from Sodom having rejoined the previous day) marched to Highland Nullah, a ravine tributary of Thorny Nullah about three thousand yards North-west of Twin Canals. Here Major Hepenstal temporarily took command, as Colonel Anderson was ill.

Next day the battalion was sent as reserve to the 8th Brigade at Abu Ruman. The 1st Gurkha machine guns, under Lieutenant Broad, were lent to the 47th Sikhs, and on the 7th there was an artillery bombardment of the Turkish positions across the river at San-y-yat.

The floods, due to the melting of the mountain snows, were now in full force, and there was much work to be done in making and repairing "bunds," in order to keep the floods as far as possible within bounds.

On the 9th the Turks on the left bank attacked the 7th and 13th Divisions, and the 1st Gurkha machine guns enfilading the enemy came under artillery fire by which they lost one killed and three wounded.

THIRD ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE KUT.

On the 11th April the battalion rejoined the 9th Brigade which was ordered to support the 7th Brigade in an attack on the Turkish line running S.W. from the Tigris at Bait Aissa. The march was postponed, owing to a storm, and on the 12th the brigade was ordered to support the 8th near Abu Ruman. Nothing happened here, and on the 13th the brigade returned to its recent position, two miles from Bait Aissa.

After a very wet and windy night, the 7th Brigade on the right, with the 9th on the left, rushed the Turkish piquet line, starting at 3.45 a.m. on the 15th. The 1st Gurkhas were in support behind the 9th and the Highland Light Infantry. The operation was completely successful. The 1st Gurkhas were not called up, but suffered a loss of one man killed and four wounded by shell fire.

ACTION OF BAIT AISSA.

On the 16th positions were taken for the storming of Bait Aissa next day.

The Turkish lines of Bait Aissa ran from the Tigris South-west till they cut another line running due South from the Chahela Mounds, some three miles farther West.

The attack was to be made by the 7th Brigade on the right and 9th on the left, with the 8th in support. On this occasion the 1st Gurkhas were in front in two lines fifty yards apart. The 9th Gurkhas followed twenty-five yards behind; in support were the 93rd Burma Infantry, and in reserve the Highland Light Infantry. The artillery began registering at 6.30 a.m. and a quarter of an hour later the British bombardment became intensive.

The infantry advance began a few minutes before 7 a.m. under a heavy rifle fire from front and left flank. The fire, being high, did not do much harm, and by 7-8 a.m. the 1st Gurkhas were in the front Turkish trench, and the 9th Gurkhas started bombing S.W. down the trench.

The 1st Gurkhas then pushed on to a water-course in front.

At 7.20 a.m. the 9th Gurkhas rejoined the 1st who by 7.25 had advanced thirteen hundred yards, taken three trenches, killed about one hundred and fifty Turks, and taken a few prisoners and three machine guns. The bombers and machine-gun section are mentioned as having done particularly well. So far, Lieutenant Sorby had been badly wounded leading "C" Company, Captain Baldwin had been shot through the thigh, but had continued leading and was one of the first to enter the first trench. 2nd Lieutenant Keatinge had been slightly wounded early in the attack. The losses had not been heavy up to this point.

The taking of the first three Turkish trenches had been accomplished so rapidly that the supporting guns did not lift in time to avoid shelling the Gurkhas. Owing to the formation of the ground the artillery observers could not see their artillery flags. 2nd Lieutenant Keatinge, who gained the Military Cross for his conduct on this day, there-upon seized an artillery flag, swarmed up an old telegraph post in full view of the enemy, and tied the flag to the top. There it could be seen by the gunners who at once lengthened their range, thereby avoiding many casualties which otherwise must have been inflicted on the Gurkhas.

The 7th Brigade had been equally successful on the right, and the consolidation of the positions gained was vigorously set about. At 12.30, when congratulations were received from the Corps, Division, and Brigade, everything was still going well. About this time "A" and "C" Companies were moved to the left to strengthen the line held by the 9th Gurkhas, and at 3 p.m. two platoons, under Captain Antram, took over a trench held by the 9th, who had captured three guns earlier in the day.

Consolidation continued till towards evening when the enemy was seen to be massing opposite the captured front. The Highland Light Infantry and 47th Sikhs were ordered to reinforce, but the three companies sent from the former arrived too late to save the situation.

At 7 p.m. the counter-attack broke out in great force, the battalion diary estimates it at two divisions. Two platoons of the 1st, and one of the 9th Gurkhas, held on in the captured gun position till the enemy were within fifty yards, and then fell back Eastwards. Meanwhile, "C" and "D" Companies of the 1st Gurkhas, supported by a company of the 47th Sikhs and half a company of Highland Light Infantry, had been heavily attacked. Here 2nd Lieutenant Broad was wounded in the neck.

At 7.30 p.m. the Turks rushed the salient, which was occupied by part of the 9th Gurkhas, "C" and half of "A" Companies of the 1st, and some of the Highland Light Infantry and 47th Sikhs. The O.C. 1st Gurkhas at once threw back, at right angles to its former line, that portion of the line which was held by "B" and "D" Companies, one company of the 47th Sikhs, and half a company of Highland Light Infantry. By this he hoped to prevent a farther advance of the enemy. However, there was no time to take up the new alignment properly, as the units were much mixed. Ammunition was running low, and the enemy were in too great strength to be stopped. The battalion diary says that great efforts were made to rally the different parties, but that, owing to the paucity of British Officers, it was impossible to control the retirement. It is improbable that any number of British Officers could have done so, for the brigade diary states bluntly that by 7.5 p.m. the whole line held by the 9th Brigade was broken, and that the retreat was in disorder, followed by equally disordered Turks who, at one time, got as far forward as Twin Pimples, the starting-point of the morning. There the enemy came under the fire of a few men collected by Brigade Head-quarters one hundred yards N.E. of the Pimples. Being also under close-range artillery fire, the Turks at last fell back to the trenches they had held in the morning.

Colonel Hepenstal, who went through the whole of this night fighting, says it was a very mixed up affair, as it was often impossible to tell friend from foe.

At 10.30 p.m. reinforcements arrived from the 39th Brigade; but it was not till next morning that the enemy, after attacking throughout the night, fell back to Bait Aissa and in front of it.

The total loss of the Brigade was 546. The 1st Gurkhas had four British Officers (Captain Baldwin, Lieutenant Sorby, Lieutenant Broad and 2nd Lieutenant Keatinge) and four Gurkha Officers wounded. Of rank and file there were 9 Killed, 35 Missing (believed killed) and 90 Wounded.

For his services this day Subadar Dhirjia Thapa received the Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class.

At 6 p.m. on the 18th the 1st Gurkhas went back to reserve at Rhodes Piquet, about two thousand yards in rear of the trenches from which they had advanced on the morning of the 17th.

On the 21st the battalion received the congratulations of the O.C. 3rd Division on its conduct on the 17th, and on the 22nd was held in readiness to support an attack by the 7th Division beyond the Tigris on the San-y-yat position, but was not engaged.

On the same day Major W. J. Evans joined from the depot in India, and next day Colonel Anderson, on recovery, took over command.

On the 24th April an attack was made on the Turkish trenches in front of Sinn Banks and on the Sinn Abtar redoubt. The enemy had now fallen back to the Es Sinn position on the right bank of the Tigris.

The 9th Brigade, moving forward at 3 a.m., was in assembly position at 4.30. The attack started with the Highland Light Infantry leading on the right, 93rd Burma Infantry on the left, supported respectively by two companies each from the 9th and 1st Gurkhas. The remaining two companies of each of the Gurkha Battalions were in reserve.

The first line and supports went straight through the first Turkish trench and on to another eight hundred yards farther. This was held by Major Evans and Captain Antram with "A" and "B" Companies, whilst Major Hepenstal, with "C," was ordered to make a protective flank on the left. As, however, the line was being badly enfiladed by shells from the left, Colonel Anderson decided to dig a new trench at right angles to the Turkish one. This being done, it was occupied by "C" and "D" Companies, with two companies of the 9th Gurkhas on their left. During the evening the 8th Brigade moved up on the left, the 7th on the right of the 9th.


The losses of this day were—Captain Antram and Subadars Santbir Rana and Dhirjia Thapa wounded. Of rank and file—9 killed and 39 wounded.

The position remained the same, save for some small intercompany changes, till the 29th, when General Gorringe (who had now replaced General Aylmer) and General Keary visited the line, and the 9th Brigade, on relief by the 37th, went into rest camp two miles in rear. The heat was intense and the flies terrible. On this day General Townshend surrendered at Kut.

On the 1st May Lieutenant Carpendale rejoined. On the 3rd a draft of fifty men, mostly returned wounded, under 2nd Lieutenant Griffin, joined. On the 5th the battalion was inoculated against cholera.

The 1st Gurkhas remained in rest camp at One Ball Post till the 7th May, being inspected on the 2nd by Sir Percy Lake, the new G.O. Commanding-in-Chief.

On the 8th they relieved the 2nd Rajputs and 59th Rifles in front line, on a front of two thousand four hundred yards protected by six redoubts in first line and six more in support two hundred yards behind. Here they remained till the 18th. On the 10th a draft of 90 men, mostly from the 3rd Gurkhas, arrived, and on the 11th Captain Baldwin rejoined. On the 16th Major Hepenstal received the D.S.O., immediate reward for con-



spicuous gallantry in leading his battalion in the attack at Bait Aissa under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire—Subadar Harkbir Limbu received the I.D.S.M., from the Divisional Commander.

On the 19th the battalion, on relief, went back to One Ball Post, marching the same evening to bivouac at the point fixed for concentration of the 3rd Division.

At 3 a.m. the battalion marched, as advanced guard of the Division, along the Jumailat Ridge, S.W. of the Umm al Brahm marsh.

The division halted on the ridge, and presently was ordered to advance along it two miles nearer to the Dujaila redoubt. That famous redoubt, before which the battalion had suffered so severely on the 8th March, was now found to be empty, and was occupied by the 9th Brigade, the 1st Gurkhas being encamped on the North Mound of it. On the 24th two platoons were sent to occupy the Sinn Abtar redoubt.*

At the Dujaila redoubt the battalion remained, digging wells and rounding up hostile Arabs, till the 16th June without any incident of importance.

On the 3rd June Major Hepenstal went out with three hundred of the 1st, a detachment of the 9th Gurkhas, and two guns to support the cavalry burning standing crops. The same function was performed during a cavalry reconnaissance on the 7th, and on the 10th Lieutenant Carpendale and fifty men ambushed some Arabs and inflicted a few casualties.

On the 16th Colonel Anderson again fell ill. A few days later Major Evans went sick and was invalided to India.

After two days at the Brigade Reserve Camp, the 1st Gurkhas moved, on the 18th June, to Chahela, where they remained till the 24th July, supplying guards and escorts and piqueting roads.

The same sort of thing went on when the battalion moved to the Narrows camp on the 24th July. There was no fighting, the weather being too hot for active exertion by European, Turk, or Indian. It was too much even for the flies, and the sandfly alone seemed to flourish in day temperatures reaching fabulous heights. The only point in which the climate was not so bad as India in the hot weather was the comparative coolness at night.

In August it was cooler and morning and evening parades could be resumed, not to speak of trench digging.

The following are the only events requiring to be chronicled in the months of August, September, October and November :—

8th August. Lieut.-Colonel Anderson rejoined and took over command from Major Dopping-Hepenstal.

10th. On this date scurvy had appeared and forty-seven men were distinctly suffering from it, whilst one hundred and sixty others were suspect.

20th. Captain Antram and Lieutenant O'Reilly rejoined.

4th September. 2nd Lieutenant Webb joined.

6th. Truce from 4 a.m. to 7 p.m. for exchange of prisoners.

16th. Draft of eighty-one Riflemen and two followers joined.

* It is said that General Gorringe cabled home that he had "taken" the Dujaila redoubt. This was of course made much of in the English newspapers. A few days later a Turkish aeroplane dropped the following message in the British lines: "The next time we evacuate a position, please ask General Gorringe not to say that he captured it."

18th. Lieutenant E. M. West (3rd Gurkha Rifles) joined.

22nd. Lieutenant B. M. Blakeston, I.A.R.O., joined.

Colonel Anderson took over command of 8th Brigade, vice Brig.-General Edwards sick, till the 1st October, when he returned to the battalion on General Edwards' recovery.

4th October. Captain W. B. Northey and Lieutenant F. Williamson, I.A.R.O., joined.

17th October. 2nd Lieutenant D. M. Chisholm, I.A.R.O., joined.

26th October. Colonel Anderson commanded the 9th Brigade, during General Campbell's illness till the 5th November.

6th November. Lieutenant D. D. Gracey and 2nd Lieutenant J. Snodgrass with a draft of ninety-six Other Ranks and two followers joined.

The weather was now getting cold at night and serge clothing was issued on the 29th.

In the *Gazette* of India of the 19th October the following names appeared as mentioned by Sir Percy Lake in connection with operations between the 19th January and 30th April 1916:—

Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Anderson, C.M.G.

Captain H. L. Scott, M.C.

Captain M. C. Baldwin.

2nd Lieutenant F. W. Keatinge.

Jemadar Pahar Sing Gurung.

Naick Jasbir Newar.

Dafadar Bahadur Khan (Mule Corps).

Rifleman Gangamani Thapa.

2nd Class Sub. Asst. Surgeon Sudama Ram (I.S.M.D.).

The *London Gazette* of the 29th December 1916 contained the list of honours and awards for services rendered in connection with the military operations in Mesopotamia. The promotions and appointments dated in each case from the 3rd June 1916.

Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Anderson to be Brevet Colonel.

Captain H. L. Scott, M.C., to be D.S.O.

Captain M. C. Baldwin to be M.C.

2nd Lieutenant F. W. G. Keatinge to be M.C.

On the 9th December the battalion marched to Highland Nala, and took over from the 2/7th Gurkhas on the 17th to Sinn Abtar, and on the 18th it relieved the 124th Baluchis in front line West of the Pentagon. On the 12th December the kit of officers and men had been cut down to "operation scale." On the 17th, 2nd Lieutenant Chisholm with one Gurkha Officer and one hundred and four other ranks were detached as Corps Guard. Next day Colonel Anderson took over command of the 9th Brigade and Major Hepenstal that of the 1/1st Gurkhas.

The battalion was now near what were known as the Kut East Mounds, opposite the East side of Kut.

The enemy's field guns were active at this time and the men had hard work digging trenches day and night. On the 30th a forward communication trench with a T head was being made when a covering party was fired on. 2nd Lieutenant C. B. Patterson was killed, and Captain F. Williamson wounded. Of other ranks three were killed and five wounded.

On the 31st new T heads, opposite Bund or Mound piquets, were each occupied by a garrison of one Gurkha Officer, fifty men, and one Lewis gun.

The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is pointed out that the study of history is not only a means of understanding the past, but also a means of understanding the present and the future. The author argues that the study of history is essential for the development of a nation and for the progress of the world.

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MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES HERBERT POWELL, K.C.B.

HONORARY COLONEL.

19th December, 1916.

CHAPTER XVI

MESOPOTAMIA—OPERATIONS FOR THE CAPTURE OF KUT

1917

EVER since the failure of the last attempts to relieve Kut preparations had been going on for the renewal of the attempt to advance by the British Army. The Turks, wanting in enterprise and always fighting best on the defensive, had made no serious attempt to interrupt the course of the preparations. They had drawn back nearer to Kut on the right bank of the Tigris, and had left the British to occupy unopposed that Es Sinn line which had caused them such heavy losses in March and April 1916. At that time it was vital to the Turks covering the siege of Kut. With the fall of that place it ceased to be so. The Tigris Corps had been reorganized into the 1st and 3rd Indian Corps. The 1st Indian Corps under Lieut.-General Sir A. S. Cobbe consisted of the 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions. During the summer machine guns had been withdrawn from infantry battalions and organized into Infantry Brigade companies, No. 133 Company being attached to the 9th (Sirhind) Brigade.

OPERATION RESULTING IN THE CAPTURE OF KUT.

In December 1916 the general forward movement began. The 13th and 14th Divisions moved first and secured positions covering the Hai Bridgehead and across the Hai.

The 3rd Division was, however, to start the ball rolling by the attack and capture of the Khadairi or Mahomed Abdal Hassan Bend (commonly called by those who took part in this action the Kut East Mounds), the name of two parallel lines of mounds about twenty feet high, running parallel to the river about two hundred yards from it in the West of the Bend. The Turks held this loop of the river with two lines of trenches from bank to bank, with their line of communication and retreat across the river at the bend in the loop. The degree of resistance that they would put up was not known, but it was thought that with the river behind them they would not be inclined to stay long, and many thought that they would not even wait to be attacked.

The Division moved up by brigades from their various camps which they had held during the autumn, the 8th Brigade moving on the 16th and the 9th Brigade on the 17th; the 7th Brigade was in reserve and moved up later. A night march across a trackless waste brought the battalion at dawn to the Pentagon, a strong post on the large nala called the Dujaila depression running from Megasis Fort to the Dujaila Redoubt. Orders were received to move forward at once and relieve the 124th Baluchis of the 8th Brigade in a line of very incomplete trenches about 1 mile due W. of the Pentagon, which they had started to dig the night before. These trenches were from twelve to fifteen hundred yards distant from the most advanced Turkish piquets, which were themselves one thousand to twelve hundred yards distant from their first or outer

main line. The Brigade moved forward with the battalion in the centre, 105th on the left, and 93rd on the right.

No cover from view or fire was available but, thanks to the very open formation in which they moved and the erratic practice made by the Turkish guns, there was not a single casualty. The 105th on the left were not so lucky and suffered some loss, the Brigade Commander who moved forward with them being among the wounded, with the result that Colonel Anderson went off during the day to take command of the Brigade and Major Hepenstal took over command of the battalion.

The trenches were found to be little more than scratches in the ground, and the battalion stayed in them until the 22nd, digging day and night. The ground was the very hardest encountered and despite their long experience and practice, nearly every officer and man had very badly blistered hands. During this period 2nd Lieutenant Griffin was evacuated to hospital sick with fever, and 2nd Lieutenant Chisholm was sent to Corps Head-quarters for duty with the corps guard which had been furnished by surplus and weakling men of the battalion. The Turks shelled the working parties daily, but their ammunition was nearly all "dud" and merely caused amusement by the antics of the duds after hitting the hard ground. Patrols were sent out nightly. One daylight patrol commanded by 2nd Lieutenant C. B. Patterson trailed its shirt for about a mile 600 yards from the Turkish trenches, was heavily fired on but suffered no loss, and brought back very useful information about what trenches were occupied and unoccupied. On the evening of the 22nd "A" Company under Ty. Captain F. Williamson, I.A.R.O., moved forward fifteen hundred yards and occupied without opposition a Turkish advanced post, twelve hundred yards distant from their main line. This was wired and consolidated during the night. The Highland Light Infantry had moved forward on the left at the same time and occupied and established four posts from the river bank opposite but slightly N.E. of Kut towards the post established by "A" Company.

On the 23rd the battalion moved into these posts after relief in their old line by the 93rd, a most unpleasant business in a pitch-dark rainy night. The Highland Light Infantry moved over to the right, and the 9th Brigade then held a line from the river bank in the East to a point half-way round the loop, 1/1st Gurkha Rifles on the left, Highland Light Infantry in the centre, 93rd on the right, and 105th in reserve behind the right centre. The battalion had up till now been speculating as to the exact reasons for this game of chess, but when it spent the nights of the 24th and 25th December in digging communication trenches up to its posts from a deep nala some two hundred and fifty yards behind, the tactics of the higher command became apparent. The idea was to establish posts forward, link them up with each other by fire trenches, and to the rear posts by communication trenches and then push forward again, continuing the process until the line was near enough to the Turkish position for the assault.

The 26th to the 29th were spent in linking up the strong posts by fire trenches in almost continuous rain, which, unpleasant as it was, had its advantages in that the ground was easier to dig up and the Turk was too cold to trouble very much about what was happening in front of him. During this period only five other ranks were wounded.

On the 30th, the next forward posts were to be established. These were called "T-heads" by the sappers and came to be known as such by all.

The battalion was ordered to dig two communication trenches forward about three

hundred yards to two T-heads which were to be made by the Sappers and Miners, and which were to be occupied and finished before dawn.

These T-heads were about six hundred yards from the Turkish main line.

The post on the left, that is on the river bank, was made and occupied and the communication trench dug and completed with very little loss, the Highland Light Infantry providing the covering party.

On the right, two platoons under 2nd Lieutenant C. B. Patterson as a covering party and two hundred men under Ty. Captain F. Williamson, I.A.R.O., as a working party were detailed to cover and dig a three-hundred-yards communication trench from a post at the extreme south of the Kut East Mounds to a T-head which was to be established at a point on the Mounds which was slightly higher than the rest, and was looked on with jealous eyes by the numerous battery commanders and F.O.O.s supporting the brigade.

Unfortunately, a very vivid flash of lightning revealed the presence of the covering party moving forward to take up its position, and the Turks (probably a strong patrol) poured in a heavy fire, killing 2nd Lieutenant Patterson and three other ranks and wounding Captain Williamson and five other ranks.

Nevertheless the trench and T-head were completed and occupied by dawn, each by a platoon of the 1/1st Gurkha Rifles.

On 1st January the moving-forward process was continued, and yet another T-head was to be dug two hundred yards farther up the Mounds, which was to be connected to the T-head in the river bank called the Bunds T-head by a fire trench.

The first Gurkhas provided a covering party under Subadar Nandu Gurung which remained out all night close to the Turkish trenches, with a loss of Jemadar Mandhoj Gurung killed and four other ranks wounded. A patrol under 2nd Lieutenant L. V. Webb, I.A.R.O., was sent out from the Bund T-head to discover if the enemy held that portion of their line in strength. After twice coming under heavy fire, the patrol was compelled to retire.

The new trench was occupied by three platoons of "D" Company and the new T-head by a platoon of "C" Company at dawn.

Battalions Head-quarters moved up as well.

The next day the Turks shelled the new positions and our guns replied vigorously. The battalion had seven men wounded, some of whom were from shell bursts from our own guns whose ammunition was very unreliable.

The next three days were spent in sapping outwards from the most forward Mounds T-head, the battalion improving the trenches after the sappers. Trench-mortar emplacements were dug in the Mounds and vigorous patrolling took place every night. In the Mounds one of the patrols had a brush with an enemy patrol which lay up for them and lost one man killed and seven wounded. The Turk was busy during the night repairing his wire and trenches.

On the 6th a deserter came over, who stated that the Turkish troops were ill fed and overworked. The sap from the Mounds T-head was finished on the 7th and occupied by two platoons of "C" Company, and two more trench-mortar emplacements were dug.

Our guns kept up a fairly heavy fire throughout the day on the enemy trenches and seemed to do considerable damage to their wire.

By the 8th January preparations for the assault were complete.

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On the night of 8th and 9th demonstrations had been made on all fronts to prevent the Turks reinforcing the garrison at Mahomed Abdul Hassan (the Khadairi Bend). The enemy's position on the Hai was heavily bombarded; the cavalry were despatched on a raid to Bugailan while at Sann-y-yat four raiding parties entered the Turkish trenches.

It afterwards transpired that the enemy sent a whole regiment over to the Bend on the night of 8th/9th, so that these demonstrations did not deceive them.

The Turkish front line on the battalion's immediate front was divided into three lines of trenches, the third line being in four deep nullahs running from the river, called the Quadruple Nala, parallel to the other two. It was known that there were machine guns in the second trench in strong posts on the Mounds, and that a very strong post existed near the river bank in the same trench. The Mounds themselves ran for some four hundred yards beyond our next forward post and were only forty yards apart.

The battalion was ordered to attack with two companies, "C" under 2nd Lieutenant E. M. West and "D" under Ty. Captain D. D. Gracey with 2nd Lieutenant L. V. Webb, the companies advancing in eight lines up between the Mounds till the first trench was reached. "C" were then to turn left and clear the front line to the river and then move forward and join hands with "D" in the Quadruple Nala. "D" were to move straight forward up the Mounds, capture the machine gun nests in the second line, and on emerging from the Mounds move to their left, capture the second line and establish themselves in the fourth nala, which was the final objective, from which no forward movement, except of patrols, was to be made without orders from Brigade. A Company of the Highland Light Infantry was to support the attack. The remaining two companies were disposed, "A" under 2nd Lieutenant J. Snodgrass in the front line moving up after "C" and "D" had evacuated it, and "B" Company under Captain W. B. Northey in piquets along the river bank in rear.

The 105th attacked on the right of the battalion with the 93rd on their right, the Highland Light Infantry being kept in local reserve.

"C" and "D" concentrated at 5 a.m. on the 9th in the advanced Mounds trench and listened with a great deal of satisfaction to a heavy bombardment by guns, howitzers and trench mortars from 7.30 a.m. to 9, the last quarter of an hour from 8.45 to 9 being particularly intense and reminiscent of Neuve Chapelle.

At 9 a.m. the front lines moved off into a heavy mist and, as can be imagined with such a dense formation necessitated by the narrow space between the Mounds, were extremely grateful to the mist for covering their movement. The first trench was reached without loss and "C" Company turned to the left and cleared the front line, taking some thirty prisoners and killing or wounding the remainder of the garrison with little opposition; the attack from the flank was most unexpected and the Turks did not put up a very bitter resistance, except on the river bank where the garrison of a strong post were inclined to resist; but our bombers successfully coped with this difficulty. 2nd Lieutenant E. M. West was wounded in this operation and Subadar Harkbir Limbu took command of the company. "D" Company moved straight forward up the Mounds, and met with no opposition till two platoons swung over the Mounds to attack the second line towards the strong post on the river. The remaining two platoons went up the Mounds and rushed the machine-gun post at the enemy end but found the trench mortars had dealt faithfully with it and its garrison. The enemy second line and the nalas were, however, full of Turks who had escaped the bombardment by sheltering in excellent

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dug-outs in the deepest nala, and were not much affected by the shell fire like their comrades in the front line. The two platoons on the left were met with a withering fire and were held up. 2nd Lieutenant Webb was mortally wounded and died in hospital three days later. The two platoons on the right, after emerging from the Mounds, swung left and bombing up the second line towards the river enabled the other platoons to advance. The Turks resisted strongly and attempted to counter attack. This was driven back with the help of a platoon of the Highland Light Infantry and an irresistible assault was made which carried the company to its final objective in the fourth nala, sweeping all before it. In the words of the official eye witness to the force: "The 1/1st Gurkhas carried the redoubt in the Mounds, pushed along the sand-hills, and bombed down the river bank as far as the fourth nala. The Gurkhas saw red and translated their vision into fact; two hundred Turkish dead were found within a radius of three hundred yards the next morning." Only a few prisoners were taken.

"C" Company came up too late to assist in the assault, but helped to drive back a small counter attack made by the Turks about ten minutes after the objective was reached. By this time, the mist had lifted somewhat and the work of consolidation and communication was much hampered by enfilade and reverse shell fire from across the river from the direction of Kut. Wounded brought back the news of the great opposition encountered to Battalion Head-quarters and also, that all three British Officers had been killed or wounded. 2nd Lieutenant J. Snodgrass was sent up to report, but communication had been established by the time he arrived. The wire had been broken twice and at the third attempt to get back news, Captain Gracey had the telephone blown out of his hand by a shell, which knocked him and his signalling havildar over, but luckily failed to explode.

Many intrepid acts of bravery were performed during the fight, two outstanding being worthy of notice. One Gurkha, a survivor from France, possessed himself of a bucket of bombs and dashing through the Turkish counter attack laid a trail of dead Turks up to and beyond the fourth nala, his dead body being discovered one hundred yards ahead in the communication trench badly mutilated by a bomb, but with six to seven dead or wounded Turks within bombing range in front of him. There is no doubt that his wonderful dash had resulted in the second Turkish counter attack being very poorly executed. The second was that of a Turkish officer—a fine big man who led his men to the first counter attack; leaping straight out of the trench into the arms of the attacking platoons he shot three Gurkhas with his revolver before he had his brains dashed out by Lance Naick Bhadru Pun.

Bomb and kukri played a great part in the success of the attack, but Lewis Guns, when they were not out of action through stoppages, helped materially with covering fire at critical moments and their Nos. 1 and 2 acted with great boldness. This was the first time they had been used in an attack in Mesopotamia.

The casualties were, besides the two British Officers mentioned, Gurkha Officers 2 killed and 3 wounded, Other Ranks 33 killed and 51 wounded, 2 missing (believed killed).

The remainder of the operations redounded greatly to the credit of the Turks, whose courage when fighting with their backs to the wall is proverbial. The 8th Brigade had with difficulty, and after sustaining heavy casualties, taken the Turkish line, but were unable to advance till the 10th.

In the evening "C" and "D" Companies were relieved by the 105th Mahratta

Light Infantry and occupied Sapper Trench and a new communication trench from it, pending establishment of the line in front by the 8th Brigade.

The 10th was a quiet day on which congratulations were received from the Army and Divisional Commanders. The enemy fell back to his last position facing South-west across the bend. The 1st Gurkhas did not move.

On the 11th the battalion (less "B" Company near the river) relieved the Highland Light Infantry in Brushwood Nala, facing the right of the enemy's new position.

This line being enfiladed by shrapnel from across the river, two men were killed and eighteen wounded before the battalion was properly dug in. That afternoon an attack by the 8th Brigade was repulsed.

During the 12th the 1st Gurkhas had about two hundred and sixty rifles facing the enemy trenches and one hundred and forty near the river on the left. Subadar Nandu Gurung was wounded.

The 1st Gurkhas had no more fighting here and "C" and "D" Companies returned on the 14th to the Dujaila and Sinn Abtar neighbourhood.

On the 19th they were called up again for the attack by the 7th Division on the Turkish position in the Mahomed Abdul Hassan bend. The enemy, however, evacuated it and there was no fighting for the battalion. When the battalion was again back at Sinn Abtar on the 21st the Army Commander presented medal ribbons at a Divisional parade, Captain Gracey receiving the Military Cross, and Havildar Tilbikram Rana and Naick Kharakbahadur * Gurung the I.D.S.M.

On the 22nd, Colonel Anderson, on being relieved in the Brigade Command by Brig.-General Campbell, returned to the regiment which had been commanded meanwhile by Major Hepenstal. On the 26th, 2nd Lieutenant G. K. H. Cochran, Highland Light Infantry, joined for duty. For the rest of the month the battalion was posted in the piquet line, with its left on the Shatt-ul-Hai on a three-mile front, with the 105th Mah-rattas on its right. This was near Bassouria, about four miles South of Kut. The rest of the 9th Brigade extended the line of piquets to the East.


On the 30th January the cavalry rounded up a large herd of cattle, sheep and goats. As they had to pass through the Gurkha piquets on return toll was taken of them in the shape of several sheep for the officers and goats for the men which made a welcome addition to the somewhat meagre rations then obtainable.

Large flocks of geese used to pass over the lines at dusk and of them also toll was exacted by the Lewis-gun detachments who made excellent practice. One of the bag was sent to General Marshall then commanding the 3rd Corps. When Colonel Anderson saw him a few days later he asked how it had been got. Colonel Anderson with some misgivings explained, but was relieved at the explanation being received with the remark that "it was excellent practice for the men."

On the 18th February the battalion was relieved in the piquet line by the East Lancashire Regiment and moved to camp near Brigade Head-quarters, again taking over the piquet line on the 20th, besides four more posts from the East Lancashire Regiment.

On the 23rd a Greek doctor and an Arab scribe surrendered to one of the battalion piquets. They had deserted from the Turks at Baghailah, had been wandering about for four days and had been stripped by the Arabs. On the 28th, Lieutenant E. V. R. Bellers joined with a draft of eighty other ranks.

* This Naick received it for gallantry at Bait Aissa on the 17th April 1916.



DEF AND CAPTURE OF KUT.
 1917.

Meanwhile, on the 23rd February, the British had crossed the Shumran bend above Kut. In this operation the 9th Brigade had no active share, and it was only on the 26th that the 1st Gurkhas were ordered to a point on the left bank of the Tigris three miles above the Shumran bridge where the 3rd Division was concentrating. They had a difficult march during a pitch-dark night, as it rained hard, no one knew the way, and only by the aid of lanterns could the path be seen at all. They crossed the bridge at 8 a.m. on the 27th, and were in camp two hours later. The next few days were occupied in clearing the battlefield of the 23rd-24th.

The 1st Gurkhas were also guarding some Turkish guns recently captured. The units which had previously had charge of these had taken no measures to recover the missing breech blocks. The Gurkhas were not told to search for them, but the men of their own accord proceeded to do so, and soon recovered nearly all the missing parts which had been carefully buried in the Tigris close by.

On the 2nd March, Lieutenant West and 40 other ranks rejoined from Field Ambulance.

By the evening of the 6th March the Brigade (less the 93rd) had moved up-stream to Imam Mahdi.

On the 14th the right wing of the 1st Gurkhas was between Ash and Azizieh, the left forward at Zeur.

On the 17th Head-quarters and the right wing were at Zeur, the left going on to the river Diyala. Next day the left wing passed through Baghdad to a camp two miles beyond it, the right and Head-quarters reaching the Diyala by Suliman Pak. On the 19th the latter passed through Baghdad and encamped in a palm grove beyond the old Turkish cavalry barracks. The battalion was under orders to report to the 3rd Corps at Baghdad, and then rejoin the Brigade up the Diyala.

OPERATIONS FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE POSITION AT BAGHDAD.

On the 20th the battalion marched to Khan Bani Saad, eighteen miles, and on the 21st to Baquba, fifteen miles.

The excellent oranges purchased here at sixty-four per rupee were much appreciated by officers and men. Colonel Anderson says they were the best he ever tasted.

At Baquba Colonel Anderson received a telegram from General Keary's column directing him to march next day if possible and to wire strength and condition of both the 1st Gurkhas and the Dorsets who had replaced the 1st Highland Light Infantry in the 9th Brigade. Forty-six men had to be left behind suffering from sore feet.

Abu Jisra (fifteen miles) was reached on the 23rd where the Division and the rest of the Brigade were found.

The battalion had marched one hundred and thirty miles from near Kut under very trying circumstances, but the men held out splendidly and were specially praised by the G.O.C., Lahore Division, at a conference held on the 22nd. Of this march Colonel Dopping-Hepenstal writes :—

"We did a forced march from near the Shumran crossing to Baghdad, some hundred miles. The going was very bad and the troops suffered greatly from sore feet. Many fell out on the way. I was in command of the half battalion, and I have never seen greater pluck displayed than during that march. Not a man fell out, although I used to

see the blood actually oozing out of their boots. Many of their feet were fearfully ulcerated and in a terrible condition."

On the 23rd the battalion marched to Shahraban* and thence, at 11 p.m. with mule transport only, to the foothills of the Jabal Hamrin range, four or five miles to the east of the Kizil Robat road, and about twice as far from the point of issue of the Diyala from the mountains. The march was a trying one with many halts for the bridging of unfordable nalas, and when day broke there was still a considerable distance to be covered to the foothills.

The following account of the ensuing operations, like that of the taking of the Khadairi Bend, has been contributed by an officer who was present, Captain Gracey.

The Brigade marched at night on the 24th March with orders to get into position on the left of the Turkish position to attack it in flank and roll it in.†

It failed to get into position owing to lack of pontoons to bridge the second canal, which had been flooded by the Turks. This must have been so as previous reconnaissance had revealed it dry and easily ramped and crossed by all arms. Since leaving Abu Jisra all the dispositions of the 3rd Division were easily seen by the Turks from their Jabal Hamrin position and it was obvious to them on the 24th even that an attempt would be made to turn their left flank. They had seen the daylight reconnaissance on the 24th without a doubt, and the Divisional Cavalry, 13th Lancers, had been active on that flank during the 23rd/24th.

The failure to bridge the second canal resulted in the Brigade bivouacking between the two canals in such cover, shallow nalas, etc., as it could find during the whole of the 24th. The bridging of the second canal was undertaken during the day, but was a slow performance as the Turks shelled it continuously and accurately. It was not completed till dusk. It was now obvious to the most ignorant Turkish soldiers what was up. The advanced Turk piquets on their right kept up a heavy fire all day on the 24th and all night 24th/25th on the 8th Brigade on our left, and practically pinned them to their trenches along the canal. Casualties were heavy from the fire. I believe the F.F. Regiment (59th) lost forty casualties in their advanced piquets.

The 9th Brigade marched at 9 p.m. towards the Turkish position in the hills with the intention of getting as near their flank as possible and (this was the crux of the thing) so far from their actual flank that deployment for the attack would not be much harassed. They bivouacked some three hundred to four hundred yards from the foothills during the night of the 24th/25th, and though only a few hundred yards from the advanced Turk piquets were not disturbed. The Brigade bivouacked in diamond formation and piquets were put out about two hundred yards—animals in the centre. Troops were too tired to dig and no effort was made to entrench, but use was made where possible of existing cover, sandhills, shallow nalas, etc.

The Brigade marched at dawn on the 25th, again in diamond formation, 1/1st Gurkha Rifles left, Dorsets advanced centre, 105th right, and the 93rd in local reserve—rear centre. Head-quarters with 93rd. Mules, mess equipment, etc., etc., were taken as if the Turks had already been defeated and a most amazing optimism prevailed among the Brigade and Divisional Staff. The British Officers and men were far from being optimistic and had formed the opinion on the 24th after the failure to cross the 2nd nala that the whole show was doomed to failure. Battalions were very depleted

* See map to face p. 174.

† See map to face p. 168.

after the march up by sore feet and sickness and were also very tired as they had not had a rest since leaving Azizieh.

The orders were that the 1/1st Gurkha Rifles should advance into the middle hills, seize a strong position and form a pivot on which the Dorsets and 105th were to wheel to their left, and form up for an assault along the Turkish position from their left flank along the hills.

The 1/1st Gurkha Rifles themselves moved with "D" some four hundred yards on the left flank and "A," "B," "C" in that order practically abreast.

Orders were not to trouble about the Turk piquets who were passed through by "D" Company as they were shaking their blankets after their night's heavy sleep. They speedily retired, firing a few shots as they went, and performed half their task by giving valuable information to the Turks in their main line of the impending attack. It was ridiculous to watch the Turks step out of their trenches and watch us pass, the first man out rubbed his eyes with astonishment, called a pal who then called the others; they all watched us pass from about three hundred yards' range wondering what on earth it was all about. We could have taken them easily. They then hopped back into the trench and fired at us for a bit and then raced off back up a nala.

The main column of the 1/1st Gurkha Rifles reached an ideal position among the hills with scarcely a casualty and halted to allow the Dorsets and 105th to swing round on them.

The position faced west with "A" on the right, on two small precipitous knolls, "B" in a crescent-shaped hillock with very steep sides in the centre with one platoon and Head-quarters of "C" on the left on the same hillock, and the remaining platoons of "C," one some two hundred yards to the left on a long ridge, and two two hundred yards farther on guarding the junction of two nalas and the left flank.

"D" had had no information that the Battalion had halted and had moved forward. One platoon was left under Lieutenant Gracey on a small knoll to watch the nala and Helio Hill and act as a connecting file while Lieutenant Bellers with the three remaining platoons reached a hill some eight hundred yards ahead of the battalion.

Here the Turks were plainly visible in great numbers in an entrenched position on a plateau higher than his mound and only a few hundred yards away.

He therefore took up a position in the mound and sent back information.

In the meantime the Dorsets and 105th Mahrattas were advancing on the right and wheeling round to the left.

The Dorsets came under very heavy fire, and their leading company was very badly handled and lost ground. The remaining companies took up a position half right and slightly forward to that of the 1st Gurkha Rifles' position, and though they made frequent efforts to move forward were pinned to their ground by extremely accurate and powerful artillery, machine-gun, and rifle fire.

The 105th on the extreme right had come across little opposition to start with, and had seized a prominent and high hill near the top of the main ridge. This was not in the Turk main system but well on their flank. The enemy, however, launched a very powerful attack at this hill before the 105th had time to reorganize or consolidate after their march through the extremely broken and difficult foothills. They were driven off the hill and forced to fall back—some distance to the right rear of the Dorsets.

The right flank was terribly exposed and attempts to recapture the hill were in

vain. The Turks brought up machine guns which throughout the day kept up a most accurate and persistent enfilade and reserve fire on the position held by the Dorsets and the 1st Gurkha Rifles.

All this while at the 2nd canal our guns were vainly endeavouring to cross. The first gun had broken the bridge and the enemy artillery made it impossible to mend it or build another, till late in the afternoon.

Artillery support, except by long-range fire, was not available, and the broken nature of the country made observation and recognition of friend and foe practically impossible, so that what few shells were fired at the Turks from our guns during the day did no damage at all. In fact, their shells fell much closer to our positions than to those of the Turk.

"D" Company held their ground for about an hour, but with both flanks exposed and his line of retirement likely to be cut at any moment, with the broken nature of the ground which enabled the enemy to mass unseen for attack within a few hundred yards, Lieutenant Bellers was forced to retire with very valuable information, and after considerable loss, to the main position.

The connecting platoon with Lieutenant Gracey had also found their hillock untenable and had retired to the main position about half an hour beforehand. The Turks were on much higher ground and, while themselves remaining concealed, could pick up targets very easily.

Their shooting was extremely accurate. By about 11 a.m. it was obvious to all that the attack was a failure and sound tactics would have been to have made an orderly retirement to the canals. This was not to be, however. The 105th on the right and the Dorsets in the centre were successively driven back. The 93rd came up, with two companies on our right.


The two platoons of "C" Company on the left had taken a small knoll above the nala in front of their position, but were unable to move forward from it. The Turks attacked them under heavy covering fire and drove them back with loss to their original position, 2nd Lieutenant B. M. Blakeston being killed. 2nd Lieutenant Sheridan replaced him in command of these two platoons. Lieutenant Gracey with one platoon of "D" was sent to the intermediate ridge as a flank attack was expected, as the Turks were seen to be reinforcing their troops from Helio Hill on that flank.

Four machine-guns under 2nd Lieutenant Williams of the 133rd Machine Gun Company came to help and were posted so as to sweep the front of the left-flank position and also cover the visible approaches to the main battalion position.

A small Turkish attack on "A" Company was driven back easily, but a concentrated fire on our left, and the reports received of a heavy Turk attack impending on our left, and also a number of enemy working round our left flank, made Colonel Anderson send Major Hepenstal, with Lieutenant Gracey, who had come back to show him the way, to help Lieutenant Sheridan and take command of the left flank.

No sooner had they quitted the shelter of the main battalion position than a furious attack burst on the whole length of the position. The Turks had worked up the numerous nalas with considerable skill, aided by their excellent covering fire from their machine guns, and had massed in force a couple of hundred yards away.

The battalion was, however, equal to the occasion. A fresh supply of ammunition and bombs had been received and the Turk was beaten back with very heavy loss.



FIRST ACTION OF THE JABAL HAMRIN

25th March 1917.

Sketch to illustrate 1-1st G.R. Share.

The Platoon of "C" had rushed back to its original position, and as Major Hepenstal was receiving the news from a runner that Colonel Anderson had been badly hit through the chest and Captain Northey, through both cheeks, he himself received a bullet through the chest at short range.

Captain Northey afterwards received the Military Cross.

The Turks, however, had had a bad knock, and finding that our left troops were standing firm, they did not attempt to approach our position again, but merely harassed us with machine-gun and rifle fire. They directed the most furious attacks against the right and centre troops of the Brigade. By 2 p.m.* it was obvious by looking at the plain that a general retirement was in process. It was a most disheartening spectacle, but was made a bit more cheerful by seeing two companies from the Manchesters and 124th Baluchis of the 8th Brigade advancing in battle formation across the plain to our help. These troops took up positions along the foothills in order to cover the retirement.

By 3 p.m., nearly an hour after the right flank had been forced to retire, no orders had been sent to the 1st Gurkha Rifles or the 93rd, who were holding their ground, but were in great danger of being outflanked. Orders were asked for and were at length received that the battalion was to retire to the canal and reorganize there.

The scattered nature of the ground, and the mixing up of the companies, with the casualties sustained, made an orderly retirement difficult. Two platoons of "C" Company under 2nd Lieutenant Sheridan remained as a rearguard while the remainder slipped away.

In the hills the rearguard suffered little loss as the Turks had been so badly handled in their efforts to close with the 1st Gurkhas and 93rd Burma Infantry that they were chary of attacking them again. Lieutenant Sheridan was among the last to retire and was wounded, and had to be left. He was captured later by the Turks, who treated him quite well.

On debouching into the plain, the scattered platoons and sections came under very heavy machine-gun and artillery fire from the Turks who had crept down into the foothills, and a number of men were killed and wounded during this phase of the retirement, among whom were 2nd Lieutenant Cochran and Subadar Major Harkbir Limbu, Burma Military Police attached.

The bridge over the 2nd canal had been broken again by shell fire by the time the battalion arrived back and many men and animals swam across, others getting across on a single plank which had been thrown across in a narrow place.

A number of "D" Company retired in a westerly direction, but were fired on by the Turkish piquets in front of the 8th Brigade, and had to make their crossing near the bridge like the rest.

Many wounded men were brought in by their comrades at very great personal danger as the fire across the plain was hellish.

Others crawled in during the night. One man arrived with a broken leg and a bullet in his body the next morning, and told a horrible story of the looting of bodies and the killing of the wounded by Arab tribesmen who had swarmed over the plain during the night.

He himself had escaped by pretending to be dead and had had his pockets rifled and his leg broken by a rifle butt as the swine left him.

That is what I can remember of the fight at Jabal Hamrin on the 26th March 1917. In a battle of this description one's recollections are apt to be hazy, one's own little

* See map to face p. 170.

environment and feelings rather swallowing up any idea one had of the general situation at the time. I have, however, tried to put the battle down as accurately and fairly as I can. There is no question that despite their tired and weak condition, despite the villainous nature of the terrain, hindering as it did the attackers and helpful as it was in every way to the defenders who knew it well, despite the forlornness of the situation as it appeared at 2.30 p.m. with the plain below covered with men and animals retiring, the 1st Gurkhas stood firm and prevented the annihilation of the whole Brigade. This may sound exaggerated, but had they not withstood and beaten back the second Turk attack, the whole position would have gone, the Manchester and 124th's Companies coming up to cover the retirement would have been caught in the plain, and the Turks would not have stopped in the foothills as they did when the retirement took place eventually. It is interesting to note that, despite recommendations sent in for very gallant conduct and extreme bravery, one award of the I.O.M. was given only and that to a Gurkha Officer who was fifth in the order of recommendations.

It was common property on the night of the 23rd/24th and on the 24th, when the Brigade was bivouacked in full view of the Turks that, even though it was reported that the Turks holding the hills were a demoralized force who had retired with their tails between their legs from Baghdad, the attack next day was doomed to failure. The Turk is never better than when fighting a rearguard action. G.H.Q. were never more fatally optimistic than when describing the retreating Turks as a beaten and cowed enemy than in Mesopotamia in 1917 and what is more, our troops were tired and numbers were weak. Promises of a three-days' rest in Baghdad had not been carried out and the Brigade had been marching mostly at night, in filthy dust for ten days, the last two nights and days, with scarcely any sleep at all.

It turned out, as all know, that the troops holding the hills were two of the finest Turkish divisions with Peninsular records who had retired at their leisure from Persia followed at a respectful distance by a few Russian Cossacks, not through any pressure from the Russians, but owing to strategical considerations forced on them by the capture of Baghdad by the British.

It meant that a weak Brigade, of some fifteen hundred troops at the outside, without artillery support was attacking in a wonderful natural position two strong Turkish divisions who had eighteen to twenty guns to support them, and who had not only had time to improve the natural strength of the place, but had watched every move of the attacking force as from an aeroplane for the last two to three days before attack.

The battalion had gone into action with 11 British and 13 Gurkha Officers and about 380 other ranks. The casualties were:—

Killed. Lieutenant Blakeston, 2nd Lieutenant Cochran and Jemadar Ranbir Thapa. Other ranks 17.

Wounded. Lieut.-Colonel Anderson, Major Hepenstal, Captain Northey; Subadars Baliram Thapa and Nain Sing Gurung; Jemadar Dalbir Thapa, and 75 other ranks. Colonel Anderson, Major Hepenstal and Captain Northey were all very severely wounded within a few minutes of each other. The two former were both shot through the lungs and a bullet passed through both Captain Northey's cheeks.

Wounded and missing. Lieutenant F. S. Sheridan; Subadar (acting Subadar-Major) Harkbir Limbu and forty-two other ranks, besides one S and T driver.



On the 26th the 1st Gurkhas went to rest North of Shahraban where the Brigade received a telegram of congratulation on its conduct from Head-quarters.

Next day "A" Company spent on guard at the bridge at Pul-i-Mikdar, and during the rest of the month the Brigade was held in readiness to support the 8th Brigade if necessary. On the 31st the Turks appeared to be evacuating their position on the Jabal Hamrin.

On the 1st April the 1st Gurkhas were guarding the Kizil Robat road in rear of the 8th Brigade, with piquets on the hills near the Jabal Hamrin Pass.* The enemy had now completely evacuated the left bank of the Diala and next day Cossacks were at Kizil Robat and on the surrounding plain.

On the 3rd April the Brigade started back towards Baghdad, which was reached on the 6th after passing through Baquba on the 4th. Marching by day in the great heat was so trying that most of the distance was covered at night.

At Baghdad the 1st Gurkhas took over the piquets of the 20th Punjabis at the Iron Bridge, on a line from the point where the road crosses the railway West of Zobeida's tomb to the Masudiyah Canal, and along the left bank of the Canal to the right bank of the Tigris. In this position the battalion remained all through the rest of April, May, and June, with only slight changes of detail. There was nothing doing beyond the furnishing of escorts, searching Arab encampments, and constant trouble with floods and the cutting of embankments by Arabs.

When Colonel Anderson and Major Hepenstal were both severely wounded at Jabal Hamrin, the command had fallen temporarily to Captain Williamson, an Indian Civil Servant. Major W. J. Evans had been sent to India sick in June 1916. He was now back in Mesopotamia and had been appointed to the officiating command of the battalion in April 1917 and had assumed it about the 23rd at Baghdad.

Colonel Anderson, though absent from the battalion owing to his wound, did not complete his tenure of command of the 1st Gurkha Rifles till the 19th February 1919.

After the action at Jabal Hamrin on the 25th March 1917 Colonel Anderson, Major Dopping-Hepenstal and Captain Northey were all sent to India where after being in the Gaekwar's Officers' Hospital at Bombay Colonel Anderson and Captain Northey were sent to England via the Cape and Major Hepenstal to the command of the Depot at Dharmasala. Colonel Anderson, eventually passed fit for light duty, returned to India and took over command of the Depot from Major Hepenstal on the 17th November 1917. That officer left Dharmasala on the 6th January 1918 to take up the appointment of second-in-command of the 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkha Rifles with a view to taking over command of it on vacation by Colonel E. D. Money.

Colonel Anderson took over command of the 1st Infantry Brigade at Quetta on the 11th March 1918.

Captain Northey was eventually appointed recruiting officer for Gurkhas at Gorakhpur.

Colonel Anderson's own conspicuous success in command of the 1st Battalion from January 1915 to March 1917 appears in the narrative. In addition to his Brevet and C.M.G., he was awarded, in July 1916, the Russian Order of St. Anne (with swords).

He specially desires that this history should contain an expression of his appreciation of Major M. E. Dopping-Hepenstal (now Colonel Dopping-Hepenstal, C.B.E., D.S.O.). He writes:—

"Hepenstal was my second-in-command and right-hand man from the time I took

* See map to face p. 174.

over command of the Battalion in France on the 4th January 1915 until we were both shot through the lungs at Jebel Hamrin, Mesopotamia, on the 25th March 1917. A most reliable and sound officer. A loyal friend, with the heart of a lion. He was three times wounded, and on the 19th April 1915 very severely burnt, together with Captain Jolinson and several men, in putting out a fire at a farm. Hepenstal's injuries necessitated his being sent to England and for months he was unfit for duty, and to this day bears the scars and marks of the burns." He was awarded the Croix de Guerre in addition to his C.B.E. and D.S.O.

On the 7th July detailed orders were received for the movement of the Feluja Column under command of Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Evans.

The column consisted of one troop 32nd Lancers, the 215th Brigade and 66th Battery R.F.A., the 93rd Burma Infantry, and the 1st Gurkhas, with Field Ambulance, etc.

The head of the column passed the Iron Bridge at 6 p.m. on the 7th and was joined by the 1st Gurkhas as advanced guard at Umm Massahr. At Nukhta, which was reached at 5 a.m. on the 8th, there was no proper shelter, and a very indifferent water supply, the want of which was much felt in the great heat. Day temperatures at this time were as high as 128°; at night they were over 106°.

After another very trying night march in great heat and with very little water, the column, with the 1st Gurkhas still acting as advanced guard, was near Feluja on the left bank of the Euphrates. The objective was the Saklawie Canal, running from the left bank of the Euphrates some miles above Feluja, to the Tigris.

Orders were now issued for concentration of the column at Sinal Zibau and "A" and "B" Companies of the 1st Gurkhas were sent into the piquet defence lines in the position occupied by the 2/7th Gurkhas, whilst "C" and "D" replaced the Connaught Rangers. The duties finally taken over by the 1st Gurkhas at Feluja were distributed as follows:—

"C" Company on the left bank of the Euphrates, holding the outer and inner perimeters with four and ten piquets respectively, the inner being night piquets only.

"D" Company, on the right bank, holding the bridge-head defences, and posting a guard at night on the pontoon bridge.

By 10 p.m. on the 9th the 7th Brigade had left Feluja with only the 1st Gurkhas and some details as garrison.

On the 10th July "A" and "B" Companies, under Lieutenant Bellers, went to the Saklawie Canal and relieved the 91st Punjabis.

On the 11th news came in that the advance of the 7th Brigade from Dhibban, opposite the mouth of the Saklawie Canal, on Ramadie * had failed, and its further prosecution been cancelled. The sufferings of the men from the heat and want of water had been terrible.

Nothing more noticeable happened till the 15th when Lieutenant Bellers, with one hundred weakly men, was sent on towards Baghdad in motors. The rest of the battalion followed in the night of the 16th/17th, again suffering much from heat and want of water before it reached Mussahr at 7 a.m. on the 17th.

Next day it marched to Kadhimain, a suburb of Baghdad on the right bank of the Tigris, and remained there, with nothing to note, till the 28th, when it entrained for Mushadiyah, on the railway twenty miles North of Baghdad, to relieve the 105th Mah-rattas.

* See map of Lower Mesopotamia to face p. 174.

The billets in a "serai" at Kadhimain had proved very unhealthy. There had been much sickness and a change was necessary.

The strength of the battalion about this time was 10 British and 13 Gurkha Officers with 911 other ranks.

The battalion remained on the railway at Mushadiyah, Sumaichah and Beled during the whole of August and September. During this period there is nothing worth noticing, as the work was mostly of the usual sort under such circumstances, patrolling the line, furnishing guards and escorts, looking out for hostile Arabs, etc.

At the end of August news was received that Lieutenant Sheridan, who was wounded and missing on the 25th March, was a prisoner.

During September the following rewards were notified :—

Lieut. H. G. Powers, M.C., Lance Naick Jagat Chand and Rifleman Judbir Thapa, I.O.M., Rifleman Bhairapsing Gurung, I.D.S.M.

There was little change in October, on the 14th of which month the battalion marched to Imam Abdul Quadr.

It was about this time that the *London Gazette* of 15th August was received, containing mentions in despatches of :—

Major Hepenstal; Lieutenant Powers; Subadars Nandu Gurung and Baliram Rana; Havildar Churamani Gurung (killed); Naicks Bhadrasing Gurung and Bhadru Pun; Lance Naick Jagat Chand; Naick Bhadrabir Gurung, and Rifleman Bhairapsing Gurung and Judbir Thapa.

Subadar Bhagatbir Thapa gained the I.O.M., and Colour Havildar (Head Clerk) Bijesing Khattri the Meritorious Service Medal.

The battalion, at the end of October, had 1,023 rank and file, with 11 British and 15 Gurkha Officers.

TIGRIS OPERATIONS 1917—ACTIONS FOR TEKBIT.

On the 1st November the battalion moved up the railway by Istabulat to a bivouac one mile West of Samarra, and at 7.30 p.m. on the 2nd, Captain Strahan and Lieutenant Gray, with the machine guns and Lewis guns, formed a precautionary outpost line in rear of the 7th Brigade. They were followed later by one hundred and twenty men to form a piquet line for the 9th Brigade. The march in the dark was difficult. That same night the 9th Brigade marched Northwards along the Tekrit road. In the fighting at Tekrit on the 5th November the 1st Gurkhas took no active share. That night they were at Aujar Nala, after a very long march of thirty miles in twenty-two hours, during which only five men fell out.


The marching at night was intensely cold, and the flies during a halt in the day-time at Daur were almost intolerable.

A very small party had been left under Major Minchinton at Samarra. By the 10th the Brigade had advanced to Huwaisilat Post, from which it returned to Samarra, and on the 15th the 1st Gurkhas were posted in the Al Ajik defences just North of Samarra, where they held about a thousand yards on the right bank of the Tigris on which their right rested. Here they remained till the end of 1917, doing field exercises, practice attacks, firing, and other training. At this time the British Officers with the Regiment were :—

Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Evans.
Major H. D. Minchinton.
Captain G. C. Strahan (2/6th Gurkhas).
Captain F. Williamson (I.A.R.O.).
Captain E. V. R. Bellers (2/1st Gurkhas).
Lieutenant D. D. Gracey.
Lieutenant D. G. MacGillivray.
Lieutenant D. O'Reilly.
Lieutenant H. G. Powers.
Lieutenant J. O. Fulton.
Lieutenant S. R. Macdonald.
Lieutenant C. E. Gray (1/3rd Gurkhas).
Lieutenant W. H. H. Lindquist.
Lieutenant J. A. Pereira (I.M.S.).
Lieutenant J. Snodgrass (Orderly Officer, G.O.C. Brigade).

There were 16 Gurkha Officers and 1,051 rank and file.





CHAPTER XVII

MESOPOTAMIA—PALESTINE—EGYPT—HOME

1918-1920

THE battalion, occasionally sending a detachment to Huwaisilat, remained at Al Ajik till the 12th March, when it moved four miles to Stonehenge Camp and on the 18th to Istabulat. Thence a sixteen-mile march took it to Beled on the 19th, and by the 24th it had reached the rest camp at Hinaidi on the outskirts of Baghdad.

On the 26th it started on its journey down country, on its way to a new front. Entraining on the 26th, it reached Kut and proceeded down the Tigris by water to Amara.

On the 9th April it went by train to near Basra where, on the 26th, it embarked for Koweit on the S.S. *Chakdina*. Transshipping at Koweit to the S.S. *Tagus*, it sailed for Suez on the 28th April, arriving there on the 12th May, and proceeding next day by train to Ismailia. Marching thence to Kantara East, it again entrained for Ludd in Palestine, which was reached on the 31st, and the battalion encamped with the 9th Brigade at Haditha, four miles from that place.

The battalion being very strong at this time, Captain Williamson, with four Gurkha Officers and two hundred and sixteen men, was sent to Surafend to form a company of the 4/11th Gurkhas.* On the 20th June the rest of the battalion (less one hundred men in hospital with "two days fever") was set to road making, under orders of the XXI Corps.

On the 23rd the 1st Gurkhas relieved the 1/4th Northamptonshire Regiment of the 54th Division in the right section, centre sub-section of that front. The whole front which ran along rocky hills was continuously wired and furnished with strong points, and a new listening post was now set up by the Gurkhas on the Haram Ridge.

This position was about ten miles North of Ludd and about the same distance from the Mediterranean coast. The line consisted of a chain of hills at the foot of the mountains of Judea, intersected by steep and rocky "wadis" which made movement difficult. The centre section was on a flat corn-growing plateau. The roads were few and chiefly bad pack tracks, but there was good lateral communication behind the front system of defence by the Wadi Deir Ballut. The front system was a line of mutually supporting works with strong points on commanding sites behind them to act as pivots for counter attacks in the event of any of the front-line works being lost. No man's land was from two thousand to three thousand yards wide.

On the 30th June a patrol of a lance naick and two men got in daylight from the listening post to within one hundred yards of the enemy line and brought back useful information without suffering any loss.

* This battalion, then being raised, consisted of this detachment and three other similar ones from units in Palestine.

On the 3rd July, 2nd Lieutenant Gaul and four men crossed the Bureid Ridge in front and, after spending six hours on patrol, returned safely by the same route. They also gathered useful information.

On the 5th, Subadar Bhadrabir Thapa and twenty-two men lay up to ambush enemy patrols. They saw none, but discovered that the Bureid Ridge was no longer occupied.

There were several more patrols of this sort. One, of Subadar Kahar Sing Ale with nineteen men, on the night of the 10th got close up to the wire in front of a Turkish platoon when they were given away by the barking of dogs, which again defeated a second attempt.

Another night patrol, on the 16th, had to retire after throwing some bombs, and yet another was fired on and had to retire.

For the rest of the month, after the 18th, the 1st Gurkhas were out of the first line, and on the last day of it were moved up North-westward into the new 9th Brigade area opposite "Brown Hill," where they remained in rear till the 13th, when they were moved to the front, on the extreme left of the 3rd Division. Next day Lieutenant S. R. Macdonald went out with a party to reconnoitre the Hadrah road. Just as he was cutting a wire he was challenged and covered by a Turkish sentry. He and his party were lucky to get back unharmed under the heavy fire which followed.

On the 24th August the battalion was withdrawn from the front line, and on the 30th Acting Subadar-Major Kalu Gurung was awarded the 2nd Class of the Order of British India.

From the 24th August till the 14th September the battalion was training hard at Mulebbis.

On the 14th September the 1st Gurkhas relieved the 2nd Battalion the Dorsetshire Regiment in the left sub-sector of the front.

On the 16th a British aeroplane crashed a thousand yards in front of the British and only two hundred yards from the Turkish lines. Lieutenant Barry, with two Gurkha Officers and eighty men, went out from Haiyeh Wood to rescue the pilot and observer; but before they could arrive the Turks had dragged the plane and the observer over the ridge. The Gurkha party followed up and reconnoitred the first line of Turkish trenches, which had been evacuated, but the observer was lost and the party had to retire with one casualty.

The wounded pilot was brought in by an advanced sentry group.

THE BATTLES OF MEGIDDO—BATTLE OF SHARON.

The 18th September was the eve of Allenby's great advance, which practically concluded the campaign on the Palestine front. On that day the 1st Gurkhas closed on to the edge of Bosche Wood and took up its position for the advance of next day.

The utmost secrecy had been maintained regarding the coming operations. Full disclosure was not made even to Commanding Officers till the night of the 18th.

The disposition of the Brigade for the attack was as follows:—

In front line on the right were the 105th Mahrattas with the 2nd Dorsets on the left.

A hundred yards behind the Mahrattas were the 93rd Burma Rifles, and the 1st Gurkhas were in a similar position behind the Dorsetshire Regiment. The last named had one company in front line, two in second and one in third, the reason being that they

had to leave one company to consolidate during their advance. The other battalions had two companies in front and two in second line, twenty-five yards behind. In the 1st Gurkhas "D" and "C" Companies were respectively on the right and left of the first line with "B" and "A" in support. On the right of the Sirhind Brigade was the 7th (Indian) Division, and on the left the 232nd Brigade.

Zero hour was fixed for 4.30 a.m. and the direction of the attack was N.E. as far as Hill 283, after which it was to turn due East. The 75th Division, on the left, was not to turn Eastwards, but to go straight on to Et Tireh.

The advance started, at the rate of one hundred yards per minute, three minutes before zero, as the bombardment was to lift for the first time seventeen minutes after zero whilst two thousand yards had to be covered to reach the objective. As the guns lifted at 5.7 a.m. the Dorsets had captured the first three objectives, and just before this the 1st Gurkhas had encountered their first resistance. "D" Company had edged to the right and was partly mixed up with the 93rd Burma Infantry. A platoon had even gone beyond them. This platoon under Jemadar Ane Thapa got among the 27th Punjabis and acted on its own account for some time.

It did fine service, and, when held up by a field battery and machine guns, the Jemadar outflanked them with his Lewis guns and captured the whole battery. "Kukris" were freely used on this occasion in rushing the trench.

The morning was dull and cloudy which, with the addition of the dust and smoke of the bombardment, made it very easy to lose direction, and very difficult for officers to control beyond a very short distance. The Turkish barrage had begun soon after the British, but did surprisingly little harm. This was perhaps due to the Turks using H.E. shells instead of shrapnel. Nevertheless one section of the 1st Gurkhas was hit and lost every man but one. This one unwounded man picked up the Lewis gun belonging to the section and carried it, as well as three hundred and seventy-six rounds of ammunition, till he joined another section.

It was 5.7 a.m. when the 2nd Dorsets rushed the third Turkish trench and began consolidating. The 1st Gurkhas were close behind, and here Lieut.-Colonel Evans was wounded in the shin by a shrapnel bullet, but remained on duty all day. "A," "B," and "C" Companies were exactly in the position intended, but "D," as already mentioned, had edged to the right. Meanwhile, Captain and Adjutant Powers, with the Head-quarters party, had also gone to the right and was with "D" Company and the 93rd when they were threatened with a counter-attack. Lieutenant Lindquist at once ordered "D" to charge and broke up the Turkish preparations for counter-attack. In this affair Captain Powers was killed by a bayonet when attacking a Turkish machine gun singlehanded. "D" now again came into touch with "C" on the left.

Captain Gracey with "C," finding himself out of touch with the right-hand battalion of the 75th Division on his left, echeloned one platoon on his left so as to protect that flank and regain touch.

"C" had met with a good deal of resistance from Turks overrun by the Dorsets. In one instance a Gurkha, seeing his platoon held up by a machine gun, worked round on his own initiative till he was behind the gun, jumped into the trench, killed two men with his "kukri," and took the rest prisoners.

The 1st Gurkhas "leap-frogged" the Dorsetshire Regiment at the third trench and advanced so rapidly on their first objective, Hill 283, that they reached the Turkish

N

trench at its foot at 5.45, when the British "heavies" were still pounding the slope in front. From the leap-frogging point to Hill 283 was about three thousand yards. The trench was a disused one and was empty. During this advance the 1st Gurkhas had captured six field guns, four 5.9 inch, and one 4.1 inch. They had passed the guns without noticing them in the smoke and dust. It will be remembered that the right platoon of "D" captured six more field guns.

It was 6.15 a.m. when the artillery lifted from the hill and the 1st Gurkhas advanced to the top, beyond which they found excellent dug-outs which had been hastily evacuated by their garrisons, who were seen fleeing beyond them. The Lewis guns opened on the fugitives, of whom many were killed or wounded. The Turkish horse lines were captured, but the animals in them were a mangy half-starved lot, worth absolutely nothing. About eight hundred yards North of the Hill "C" Company halted to fire at some Turkish cavalry about five hundred yards off.

At 7 a.m. the battalion wheeled to the right and advanced on the gardens North of Kilkilieh. The 93rd, which had gone too far to their right, were presently brought into line on the 1st Gurkha right. As however the 75th Division had continued Northwards towards Et Tireh when the 9th Brigade turned Eastwards, the left of the 1st Gurkhas was exposed. At 7.37 the 1st Gurkhas and 93rd found themselves held up by machine-gun and rifle fire from the North on this flank. The fire came from a Turkish party in an entrenched position. Against these there moved, on their own initiative, Subadar Kahar Sing Ale and Jemadar Ramkishan Thapa with their two platoons most skilfully supporting one another with fire, and finally rushing the trench together. Without themselves having any casualties, they captured six officers, one hundred and thirty other ranks; two machine guns, and an automatic rifle.

On the opposite flank Subadar Jangia Rana had dealt equally efficiently with another Turkish post which he charged with his men. They took the post and killed many Turks with their kukris, besides taking twenty and exterminating with Lewis-gun fire those who attempted to escape.

The exposure of the left flank necessitated a fresh halt N.N.E. of Kilkilieh to reconnoitre. Here about 2 p.m. the 105th came up on the right of the 93rd, and the Dorsets into reserve. This was at 10.30 a.m. and before advancing into the hills it was necessary to ask Brigade Head-quarters for artillery and machine-gun support in case of further resistance. It was 5 p.m. when the advance continued, the 93rd supplying the advanced and right-flank guards whilst the 1st Gurkhas guarded the exposed left flank. When half a mile on the road up the valley to Jiyus had been covered, "D" Company, supported by "C" on the extreme left, were held up by machine-gun fire. "A" and the battalion scouts were sent to aid "C" and "D." It was not till they saw the 75th Division, now advancing from the West, that the Turks retired.

In trying to work round the flank of these machine guns the 1st Gurkhas lost more heavily than they had done during the rest of the day.

The Brigade now bivouacked where they were, rather short of Jiyus which had been prescribed as the final objective of the day.

The casualties had been :—

Killed. Captain Powers, M.C., and eight other ranks.

Wounded. Lieut.-Colonel Evans, Jemadar Dhanbir Pun, and thirty-six other ranks.

Missing. Eight men, mostly found later.

The night was quiet, but no rations reached the 1st Gurkhas, and it was not possible to find water to replenish the two bottles carried by each of the men. The equipment carried by the men on this day was heavy (about 56 lb.), whilst even the officers carried about 40 lb.

For their services on this day Captain Gracey received a Bar to his Military Cross and Captain Lindquist, Subadar Jangia Rana and Subadar Kahar Sing Ale received the Military Cross.

The march continued on the 20th at 5 a.m. The men had had no rations, and the day was windless and stuffy, so that the march was very trying at first. After passing Jiyus, a breeze sprang up, water was found and things improved. The 1st Gurkhas acted as rearguard. The road was a mere footpath over the hills and the column had to move in single file.

On reaching Baka, at 4 p.m. there was a false alarm of an attack. The 1st Gurkhas were ordered to the front, and then sent to occupy a line N.E. of Kefr Kuddum with the Dorsets on their right. There were still no rations, and the men were very hungry.

On the 21st the battalion advanced on Kusein, a village overlooking the Samaria-Nablus Road, over very rough and difficult hill paths. A body of one hundred and fifty of the enemy led by German Officers was seen moving Eastwards along high ground. An attempt to capture them failed, but one or two casualties were caused by Lewis-gun fire.

When an outpost line was formed at Kusein, with the Dorsets on the right of the 1st Gurkhas, more of the enemy were seen moving East out of range. Rations had come up at last, just after the 1st Gurkhas reached Kusein on the 21st. From there, looking down on the Samaria-Nablus Road the whole country-side was seen strewn with the wreckage of the defeated and fleeing Turkish Army, which was being bombed by low-flying aeroplanes. There were deserted trains on the railway above the road, the engines still with their steam up. At Messudieh Station large quantities of rolling stock had been captured by the cavalry before it could move off.

On the 22nd an advance was made to Beit Iba where, next day, the G.O.C. Brigade conveyed the congratulations of the Divisional General to the Battalion, and added his own.

On the 24th the Brigade concentrated at Messudieh. On the 26th it moved back to Jiljulieh, South of Kilkilieh, and remained there for a month doing salvage work.

On the 27th October commenced the march to Damascus, which need not be described, as all fighting was at an end for the 1st Gurkhas. They were two days short of Damascus when, at 10 p.m. on the 11th November, news was received of the Armistice on the Western Front. With the aid of a tea tray used as a gong, the men were aroused to hear the good news, which was celebrated with many demonstrations including the firing of Verey lights, which alarmed and stampeded the mules and gave a disturbed night to those who had to collect them.

Damascus was reached on the 13th November, and here the 1st Gurkhas remained undisturbed till the 23rd May 1919, when they were sent to Kantara by rail, arriving on the 28th. Here the following Brigade Order was issued by Lieut.-Colonel H. A. Case, D.S.O., commanding 9th Infantry Brigade, before the 1st Gurkhas left Damascus.

“On the occasion of the departure of the 1st K.G.O. Gurkha Rifles the O.C. 9th Infantry Brigade desires to express to all ranks of the Regiment his appreciation

of the consistently good work performed by the Regiment as a unit of the Brigade, and the regret he and the whole Brigade feel at the severance of a connexion so honourable. He feels confident that, in the future as in the past, the Regiment will maintain that high standard of efficiency and duty which has characterized its association with the 9th Infantry Brigade."

Colonel Case had commanded the 2nd Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment on the 19th September, so knew well what the Battalion had done then. It had been hoped that the Regiment would go home to India, but riots and disturbances in Egypt necessitated their being kept for the rest of the year at Ismailia, where they had little or nothing to do, and passed a pleasant time, though naturally disappointed at not going home.

For their services during the campaign in Palestine Colonel Evans received the Distinguished Service Order, Subadars Jangia Rana, Santbir Rana and Bhadrabir Rana all received the Order of British India, 2nd Class, while Colonel Evans, Captain Minchinton, Captain Powers (killed), Subadar Kalu Gurung, Jemadar Ane Thapa and Jemadar Gajbahadur Thapa were mentioned in despatches by Lord Allenby.

On the 30th November Lieut.-Colonel Evans, who had commanded the battalion since April 1917, left on retirement, the command being taken over by Major A. Latham.

At the end of December 1919 the battalion sailed for India in the transport *Franz Ferdinand* and reached Bombay on the 8th January 1920. Owing to an epidemic of influenza on the transport the battalion was sent to a segregation camp near Ahmednagar till the 26th January.

On arrival in India the following messages were received by the officer commanding:—

- (1) From the Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief Egyptian Expeditionary Force.


"On your departure from Egypt and the Egyptian Expeditionary Force please express to all ranks my high appreciation of the services they have rendered and their admirable spirit and conduct in all circumstances. Your Battalion has entirely upheld the fighting traditions of your race and of the Indian Army. I thank you and wish you all a safe return to India."

- (2) From the Commander-in-Chief in India.

"On your return to India from field service overseas His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief extends to you and all ranks under your command his heartiest welcome and congratulates all on the gallantry and devotion with which they have maintained the high traditions of the army."

The battalion proceeded by wings by rail on the 26th and 27th January to Pathankot. Thence it marched to Charri Camp, where it remained from the 4th to the 8th February for the performance of the purification ceremony of "Pani Patiya." On the latter date it marched the five miles into Dharmsala, being played in by the regimental band and the pipers of the 2nd Battalion.

Demobilization commenced immediately on arrival at Dharmsala, while all those entitled to it were divided into two batches for four months' war leave. The first batch was despatched at once to their homes.



CHAPTER XVIII

THE SECOND BATTALION IN INDIA

1914-1919

AT the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914 the 2nd Battalion, with the exception of its depot at Dharmsala, was still garrisoning Chitral, with a strength of 13 British and 15 Gurkha Officers and 735 other ranks. In July it had been informed that it would be relieved in October, but was altered this and on the 12th August the battalion was told to stand fast in Chitral. It now began to suffer from having to supply drafts, directly or indirectly, to the 1st Battalion. On the 22nd October Jemadar Tikaram Kumal, I.D.S.M., and 77 other ranks were sent from the depot to France, and they were followed by 16 more on the 24th November. To replace these, 3 Gurkha Officers and 70 men were sent from Chitral to the depot, and their place was taken by a similar number sent to Chitral. It was necessary to maintain the Field Service strength of the battalion at Chitral, though its best-trained men were required for the front. Another 80 N.C.O.s and men were withdrawn for France in June and July 1915.

At last, on the 27th July 1915, the battalion was relieved at Chitral by the 1st Brahmans and started on a very hot march through Dir for Dharmsala. At Chakdara it was stopped and joined the Malakand Moveable Column on the 4th August 1915. That Column consisted, besides the 2nd Battalion, of half a battalion each of the 1st Durham Light Infantry and 35th Sikhs, the 46th Punjab Infantry, 96th Infantry, 32nd Pioneers, two sections 25th Mountain Battery, a battery R.F.A., a squadron of Guides Cavalry, etc. It was commanded by Brig.-General Beynon, C.B., D.S.O. Colonel W. I. Ryder, who had commanded the battalion so far, handed over command, on completion of tenure, to Lieut.-Colonel E. D. Money, C.I.E., on the 20th August.

On the same day commanding officers were informed at a conference that the Swatis were reported to be marching from the East down the left bank of the Swat River under Mullah Sandaki, and it was intended to march out next day to Haibatgram about eight miles east of Chakdara. This place was reached without opposition, and a well-fortified perimeter camp was prepared and piquets posted on the surrounding hills.*

News now came in that the Swatis were gathering in considerable numbers at Guratai, a few miles farther up on the left bank, and in the Shumazai Valley. A couple of miles east of Haibatgram the Landakai Spur projects northwards as far as the left bank of the Swat, and to reach Guratai this spur has to be crossed by the Landakai Pass. The G.O.C. therefore ordered this pass to be occupied with the ridge.

The left-half battalion of the 2/1st Gurkhas and the 46th Punjabis, both under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Mockler, were selected to occupy the ridge and form the

* See Map of the N.W. Frontier, Sheet I, in pocket at end of Volume.

outer piquets east of the fortified camp. This was done, and a Buddhist ruin on the ridge was used to make a strong fort in the centre of the line.

During the night of the 28th–29th August the whole of this line of piquets was heavily attacked by Swatis from the east from 9.15 p.m. till dawn. The attacks, which were very vigorous, were all repulsed. The most notable incident in this night fighting occurred at the small piquet commanded by Colour Havildar Jagatsher Gurung of the 2/1st Gurkhas. Here a strong body of the enemy crept right up to the loopholes. Jagatsher Gurung greatly distinguished himself in this affair, was mentioned in despatches, and received the I.D.S.M. as a reward for his conduct. The Swatis were driven off in the end. Several dead bodies were found close under the “sangar” defending the post, and the ground beyond showed traces of many other dead or badly wounded having been dragged away under cover of darkness.

At daybreak the right half of the Battalion and a wing of the 82nd were sent out to reinforce the piquet line on the Landakai Ridge and to replenish the supply of ammunition.

Covered by this force, the remainder of the Moveable Column employed the 29th August in moving out and shelling the villages on the right bank of the river and the Kak Fort, which was completely destroyed. During these operations a party of Buners was reported to be above the northernmost piquet on the Landakai Spur. No. 1 Double Company was sent, supported by a section of the 25th Mountain Battery, to disperse them.

At 5 p.m. the whole force was back in the fortified camp, and for the next five nights there was continual sniping of the piquets and camp, though little damage was done.

On the 5th September the whole force was withdrawn to its original camp at Chak-dara, where for the next week it was subject to constant sniping at night. The only serious casualty in the Battalion was Rifleman Akhbar Gurung, who was shot through the lungs by a Martini-Henry bullet but recovered.

Sniping was now stopped by the erection of searchlights at certain points in the camp.

At 5 a.m. on the 21st September the 2/1st Gurkhas received orders to proceed to Peshawar and join the brigade commanded by Brig.-General Nigel Woodyatt, an officer who had himself been attached for a short time to the 1st Gurkhas in the early days of his service. By 9 a.m. the battalion had started on the nineteen miles of hot march to Dargai. There it entrained at 6 p.m. for Nowshera, where it changed from the narrow on to the broad-gauge line at midnight, and was at Peshawar at 6 a.m. on the 22nd. The trouble on this occasion was with the Mohmands, who had already been heavily defeated at Hafiz Kor on the 5th September, but had again assembled in the same neighbourhood.

In the morning of the 23rd the battalion marched to Adozai—sixteen miles—where it joined the 3rd Infantry Brigade, of which the other units were the 1st Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment and the Guides Infantry.

The Risalpur Cavalry Brigade, under General Crocker, and the 4th Infantry Brigade, under General Christian, were already assembled there. The battalion received a draft of thirty-three men from the depot to replace casualties in the Swat operations. On the 8th October the 3rd Brigade marched to Subhan Khwar, whence the Mohmands, estimated

at nine thousand men, were attacked at Hafiz Kor by the 1st Peshawar Division. In this action the battalion does not appear to have been seriously engaged, as it had no casualties. It returned to camp with the rest of the division at 7 p.m.

On the 11th October the 3rd Brigade returned to Nagoman, where it occupied a perimeter camp till its return to Peshawar on the 29th. At Peshawar it was rearmed with the Mark III rifle.

General Woodyatt's remarks on the battalion, when he inspected it in December, are as follows:—

"The Battalion was only with me about two months. The men are a particularly fine lot and must be older than any battalion which has been sending drafts oversea. The men move very well and turn out splendidly. I was much struck by the smartness of the guards furnished by this battalion. Owing to the Battalion's long stay in Chitral, the standard of training is hardly high enough, but the new commandant has realized this and will, I am confident, very soon put things right, if he has not done so already. The Battalion is fit for service."

On the 25th December 1915 the 2nd Battalion reached Dharmasala after nearly two and a half years spent on or beyond the N.W. Frontier. Here it remained till the 12th December 1916, a period during which it was constantly drawn upon to reinforce the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia. Large numbers of recruits came in and were trained. Consequently the total numbers of the battalion were often very high. In July the total was 1,705, besides 11 British Officers, 4 Gurkha Officers and 384 other ranks seconded to the 1st Battalion. On the 11th October another large draft of one British and one Gurkha Officer with 161 other ranks was sent to Mesopotamia.

In that month also a complete 5th Company was raised, consisting of 4 Gurkha Officers, 10 havildars, 10 naicks, 4 buglers, 200 riflemen and 50 recruits. On the 1st December this company went to join the 2nd Reserve Gurkhas which was being raised at Ferozepur, and which afterwards became the 3/5th Gurkha Rifles.

On the 12th December 1916 the battalion proceeded to Burhan near Rawal Pindi to join the 16th Indian Division concentrating there. Every available man, recruits included, went with the battalion.

The battalion now formed part of the 44th Brigade, the other units of which were two British Territorial Battalions (the 1/1st Kent and 2/6th Royal Sussex), and the 1/4th Gurkha Rifles.

Early in March 1917 the 44th Brigade moved to Serai Kala for Brigade training, but had hardly arrived there when it received orders for active service.

Trouble had been brewing for some time with the Mahsuds, when matters were brought to a head by their attacking the British post at Sarwakai on the 1st March. The Derajat Moveable Column had been moved up from Tank to Sarwakai, and the 44th Brigade was now ordered to Tank in support. Leaving Serai Kala on the 7th March the 44th Brigade was concentrated at Tank on the 11th, and next day marched fourteen miles south-west to Jatta. On the 18th the battalion, leaving the rest of the Brigade at Jatta, marched to join the Derajat Moveable Column which it reached at Kajuri Kach on the Gumal River about twenty miles as the crow flies west by south of Jatta.

On the 1st April, as there had been no more Mahsud raids in the interval, the Moveable Column with the 2nd Battalion returned to Tank. The battalion now returned

to Dera Ismail Khan on the 8th April and reached Lahore Cantonment on the 12th. Leaving Lahore on the 14th, it was back in Dharmsala on the 18th.

The lull in operations in Waziristan was deceptive, and on the 12th May the battalion was again under orders to join the South Waziristan Field Force, this time as a unit of the 45th Brigade under Brig.-General Luard. The other units were the 2/6th Royal Sussex, 55th Rifles F.F. and the Mahindradal Regiment of the Nepalese Contingent.

Leaving Dharmsala on the 23rd May, Pathankot was reached on the 26th. Here the complement of Lewis guns was made up to eight, the two machine guns being also retained.*

Tank was again reached on the 28th in a temperature varying in tents from 110° to 120°. Water, too, was so scarce that the camp had to be moved twice.

On the 1st June "D" Company was ordered to Zam Post, seven or eight miles north-west of Tank, to assist in piqueting the road from Zam towards Khirgi higher up the Tank Zam River, during the concentration of the Field Force at Jandola, some five miles farther west on the same stream.

About 5 a.m. on the 7th June there arrived at Zam Post from Tank a large convoy of ammunition convoyed by the 1/25th London Regiment, part of the 2/1st Gurkhas, the 23rd Mountain Battery, and other details.

Before they arrived "D" Company had been ordered out to piquet the road towards Khirgi as usual. Objections had been raised on account of the darkness, but the company started whilst it was still pitch dark. As they moved they were attacked by an ambush of some five hundred Mahsuds. The Company only numbered eighty-nine men with two British Officers. Of this fight the official account says:—

"The terrain where this took place is flat and stony and covered with small bushes. The enemy attacked the advanced screen and attempted to surround the whole party, but were driven off after a fight lasting twenty minutes and retired in the direction of the Shuza. Our casualties were thirty-five killed, 2nd Lieut. Foster and seventeen other ranks wounded, and three missing. 2nd Lieut. Foster was shot by a wounded Mahsud lying on the ground after the fight was over."

The Mahsuds' loss was believed to have been very heavy. The troops escorting the convoy from Tank were not near enough to be able to support the company. 2nd Lieutenant Foster's wound was very severe.

"C" Company was sent to reinforce Zam Post, whilst the remainder of the escort with the convoy marched on to Khirgi piqueting the road for themselves.

For gallantry in this action the following immediate awards were made:—

Subadar Kaluram Thapa, I.D.S.M.

Naick Gopalsing Thapa, I.O.M., 2nd class.

On the 8th June the battalion joined the rest of the 45th Brigade at Jandola.

On the 12th June the 45th Brigade on the right, the 43rd in the centre, and General Baldwin's Brigade on the left moved out against the enemy near the junction of the Tank Zam and Shahur Rivers about three miles above Jandola. The Mahsuds retired up the former river without fighting. The 2nd Battalion went beyond the hill on which the

* See Map of the N.W. Frontier, Sheet III, in pocket at end of Volume.

enemy originally were to another hill about five hundred yards farther north. A few Mahsuds were seen from here and shots were exchanged without harm. At 10.30 a.m. "D" Company led the retirement, followed by "C." A few small groups of Mahsuds followed—about thirty in all. Two of them were killed by the machine gun. The battalion, which had no casualties, was back at Jandola by 1.30 p.m. The general advance commenced on the 14th June when the 45th Brigade advanced to Chagmalai on the Mastang stream close to the mouth of the Shahur Tangi* and encamped there. The only opposition was to a piquet of the 1st Gurkhas under Jemadar Harisaran Karki who had to be supported by artillery but suffered no casualties.

On the 15th the 45th Brigade piqueted the Shahur Tangi during the passage of the rest of the force to Haidari Kach four or five miles westwards up the Shahur. The 45th Brigade returned to Chagmalai in the evening, and on the 16th was busy piqueting the Tangi and improving the road for transport.

On the 17th the 45th Brigade followed the rest to Haidari Kach.

During a reconnaissance towards Burwand on the 18th the battalion encountered slight opposition but had no casualties.

On the 19th the whole force marched for Burwand which lies four or five miles west of Haidari Kach up the Shahur. A strong post with the 21st Punjabis and 127th Baluchis remained at Haidari Kach as line-of-communication troops to keep open the road from the base at Tank to the striking force.

The 1st Gurkhas, being the first to find the piquets, incurred a good deal of opposition all day but appear to have had no casualties. Besides them, the whole of the 43rd Brigade was employed to find the fifty-six piquets required. It was reported that a lashkar had collected at Ispana Raghza farther on.

Water was a great difficulty, for about Burwand the Shahur runs largely underground. About noon it began to rain, which caused a spate in the stream and gave a supply of water which, owing to the underground course of the stream, was little better than liquid mud. The Gurkha piquets, which of necessity had to go out before the rain, had no water at all to take to their posts.

All the piquets encountered considerable opposition and had to be supported by artillery whilst fortifying their posts. Firing continued all night, and a piquet of the 54th Sikhs, which the enemy favoured with their special attention, had to beat off a heavy attack with bombs.

On the 20th June the force moved forward two and a half miles to Ispana Raghza † just above where the river disappears underground and where there is a perennial supply of water. The village and tower were occupied; the 2/1st Gurkhas furnished the rear-guard. The camp here was strongly entrenched and defended by "sangars."

On the right (north) flank of this position the enemy had occupied the Nanu Pass, from which he continually sniped the 2/1st Gurkhas whose position faced in that direction.

Beyond this pass, in the valley of the Spli Toi, ‡ is the village of Nanu which was being used as a base by the lashkar now in the field. Considering that its destruction would have a useful effect on the Mahsud morale, General Beynon decided to attack it on the 21st.

* Tangi = gorge.

† Raghza = a sloping plateau on the edge of a valley.

‡ Toi = stream. Narai = pass or kotal. Tangi = gorge.

The Nanu Pass is commanded by three rocky eminences on the north-west on which the Mahsuds had constructed "sangars" facing the British. The attack was entrusted to the 45th Brigade, and the 1st Gurkhas were employed on the right of the pass, "D" Company being ordered to occupy a high isolated hill on that side of the pass, whilst "A" and "B" in front, with "C" in support, were directed on a point about nine hundred yards to the right of the pass. The 2/6th Sussex advanced on the pass itself, whilst the Mahindradal Regiment was required to take the positions on the left of it, the 55th Rifles being in reserve.

In front of the battalion, which came under fire as soon as it left camp, was a steep ascent of two thousand feet. The Mahsuds, firing from a range of about eleven hundred yards, were using ranging bullets which emitted a small white puff on impact. There was considerable opposition, but the battalion was never checked in its advance to its objective which was attained with a loss of one signaller killed and seven men wounded.

The Mahindradal Regiment had a tougher job on the left and had their supervising officer, Major Bagot-Harte, killed and forty-five other ranks killed or wounded. The ridge on either side of the pass being now in British hands the 2/6th Sussex moved through it in pursuit of the enemy who was also harassed by low-flying aeroplanes. The Sussex, supported by two mountain guns, piqueted the surrounding hills whilst the sappers destroyed the village of Nanu, an operation which was completed by 2 p.m. when the retirement to camp commenced and was carried out by 4.45 p.m., the enemy making no attempt to follow beyond the pass.

On the 23rd June the 11th Rajputs and the Mahindradal Regiment were left to guard Ispana Raghza whilst the rest of the force advanced up the Shahur to Narai Raghza, about seven miles. The 45th Brigade led and the 2/1st Gurkhas were again employed in piqueting. There was a certain amount of opposition, but the battalion had no casualties. The last of its piquets were in camp by 5.30 and there was the usual sniping during the night. During the march, a little below Narai Raghza, the most difficult Tangi yet encountered had to be forced. Though only forty yards long the gorge in places narrows to only twelve feet.

On the 24th June the 43rd Brigade was ordered to take the Shrawanai Pass and hold it whilst the 45th passed through and proceeded to the destruction of the villages and towers of the Nana Khel tribe in the Khaisora Valley.

By 9 a.m. all was ready for the passage of the 45th Brigade and from the top of the pass the 2/1st Gurkhas were ordered to advance to a tower some two and a half miles beyond it, to secure the tower, and to destroy the village in the neighbourhood.

The whole battalion was required for piquets in this operation, except "D" Company which, with the 2/6th Royal Sussex, was engaged in destroying the long and straggling village of Abbas Khel. During this operation the Mahsuds made a determined attack on two platoons of the 55th Rifles but were driven off when they were within three hundred yards of it.

After the destruction of several villages and towers the retirement commenced and the summit of the pass was reached by 3 p.m. The Mahsuds followed closely till within three hundred yards of the pass where the 43rd Brigade, which had been standing there all day, took over the provision of a rearguard and the force returned to camp without further incident at 6 p.m.

On this day the battalion lost one man killed, one wounded and missing, and seven wounded.

On the 25th June the Political Officer being of opinion that sufficient punishment had been inflicted on the Mahsuds who were sending in peace emissaries, the force retired to Ispana Raghza. The rearguard of the 45th Brigade, the last to leave, was fired on as it left camp, but otherwise there was no trouble.

By the 28th the water supply at Ispana Raghza was drying up and the 2/1st Gurkhas were sent to reconnoitre a possible camping ground two and a half miles higher up. A few Mahsuds only were seen, of whom "C" Company Lewis gun claimed to have killed one at a range of nine hundred yards. Next day the force moved to this new camp at Bhoji Khel. Here peace negotiations began and rifles were brought in, amongst them many of those which had been lost by the 1st Gurkhas in the fight near Zam Post.

The full number of rifles, however, was not brought in and, as the jirga began to be truculent, a fresh advance was ordered for the 2nd July; but at the last moment the jirga came in, the movement was cancelled, and the force moved back to Manzal a short way above Haidari Kach. During this march the battalion furnished the advanced guard and piquets. Rain in the afternoon caused a welcome reduction of the very high temperature.

On the 19th July the battalion piqueted the road to within two miles of Sarwakai for the Political Agent proceeding thither. The few Mahsuds who were seen were peaceably tilling their fields or repairing damages.

During the stay at Manzal the battalion took its turn with other units in piqueting the road to Chagnalai Camp for supply columns which were at times seriously impeded and suffered losses by the sudden spates in the Shahur River.

In the sports which were held by the force the battalion won the khud race, bombing competition, and the Officers' V.C. Race.

Though trouble with the Mahsuds had ceased for the time, the force suffered severely from jaundice and fever. Owing to salts in the water of the river, stomach troubles were very prevalent, scarcely a man in the force escaping.

Peace with the Mahsuds having been settled, the force returned to Jandola on the 12th August and began to break up.

The 2/1st Gurkhas were to be the last unit to leave Jandola and were therefore lent to the Officer Commanding Lines of Communication which meant for them work on road repairing, and piqueting for every other unit from the 13th August to the 1st September. Heavy spates in the river had delayed movements at first and done much damage to the camel track. The strenuous work in great heat had disastrous effects on the health of the battalion, as is shown by the fact that on the average it had, during the period 25th-30th August, one hundred and twenty-two sick or only fit for light duty.

When at last they marched out of Jandola on the 1st September 1917 they had only five British Officers, the rest having gone sick or been ordered to other units. Tank was reached on the 4th September in very bad weather. There the battalion entrained and reached Dharmasala on the 10th with four British Officers who were all laid up with jaundice soon after. The men were suffering generally from fever, jaundice, and frontier sores. Several died within a month.

Shortly after arrival at Dharmasala the battalion was medically inspected and pronounced unfit for service.

On the 13th December 1917 the battalion again marched, without its recruits, to join the 44th Brigade at Ferozepur, where it arrived on the 18th and encamped near the arsenal.

On the 31st December the battalion had a strength of 19 British Officers, 25 Gurkha Officers, 1,332 rank and file, and 159 recruits. Of these, two British and three Gurkha Officers with 338 rank and file were attached to the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia. Altogether, from the 1st July to the end of the year, the following had been seconded to the 1st Battalion: 5 British Officers, 15 Gurkha Officers, 1,119 rank and file. Besides these, in August the following had been detached as a nucleus for the raising of the 3rd Battalion, one British Officer, 6 Gurkha Officers, 398 rank and file.

In December orders were received for the battalion to proceed to Nowshera, but were later suspended and it remained at Ferozepur. It took no part in the training of the 44th Brigade, for which it was not fit, on account of its sufferings in health in the trials of Waziristan.

On the 1st January 1918 Major M. E. Dopping-Hepenstal, D.S.O., from the 1st Battalion, joined the 2nd at Ferozepur as second-in-command.

On the 9th the Commander-in-Chief inspected the officers, both British and Gurkha, and that night the battalion entrained for Nowshera, where it was attached to the 2nd Infantry Brigade commanded by Brig.-General Climo, C.B., D.S.O. The depot and recruits also joined the battalion, which went into barracks at Nowshera.

On the 23rd January General Climo inspected the battalion.

On the 2nd March Major Dopping-Hepenstal succeeded Lieut.-Colonel E. D. Money, C.I.E., D.S.O., as commandant of the battalion.

At the annual inspection by General Climo, on the 1st April, the battalion had the satisfaction of being reported on by him as follows: "The best Indian Infantry Battalion in the Brigade this year. Fit for service in every respect. Is up to former standard in steadiness and training, also in physique, with the exception of about twenty per cent. of the younger soldiers. The band of the regiment is an extremely fine one. Buglers very efficient and smart. The discipline, tone, and appearance of all ranks is excellent."

Major-General Sir F. Campbell, K.C.B., D.S.O., commanding the 1st Peshawar Division, had also remarked, on his annual inspection on the 7th March: "It is a great pleasure to see this unit, or any part of it, on parade or at drills. The Gurkha Officers are intelligent, and the rank and file present a very soldierly appearance. The standard of all-round efficiency, and the smartness and steadiness are much above the average. In particular, I had occasion to remark on the smart appearance and snap shown by the band. This very satisfactory condition reflects great credit on Colonel Money whose system has produced such excellent results. Fit for service."

At this time one company was at Risalpur, guarding the aerodrome and Air Force stores there.

At Dharmasala the 2/12th Pioneers were in occupation of the lines of the 2nd Battalion, an arrangement which raised some difficulties in respect of buildings owned by the battalion.

On the 19th May Major A. E. Johnson left the battalion for Mesopotamia to command the 1/11th Gurkhas.

The hot weather of 1918 was very trying, and resulted in the deaths of Major Turner and sixteen men, mostly from sunstroke.

In October the strength of the battalion was 22 British and 20 Gurkha Officers, with 1,375 other ranks, and on the 12th December demobilization commenced to reduce it to a strength of 21 Gurkha Officers, 96 N.C.O.s, 19 buglers, and 767 other ranks—a total of 903, which was later further reduced to 850. The battalion continued at Nowshera till, on the 6th May 1919, war was declared against Afghanistan.* The strength of the battalion present was then only 10 British and 9 Gurkha Officers with 383 other ranks. On the 9th May it left Nowshera by train to join the 3rd Infantry Brigade under Major-General Skeen. On arrival at Kacha Garhi, between Peshawar and Jamrud, it found the 4/3rd and 3/11th Gurkha Rifles already there, and the place in a state of great confusion. During the night of the 9th–10th orders were received to march to Ali Masjid, which was reached at 10 a.m. after a long and very hot march which, following on a night of very little sleep, had greatly fatigued all ranks. Two officers (Lieutenant Knowles, M.C., and Lieutenant Lewis) had to be sent to Landi Kotal with fever, and as the empty lorries which conveyed them were returning from Landi Kotal to Peshawar, about a dozen shots were fired at them by snipers from the hills west of the camp. These snipers were dispersed by the fire of a Lewis gun sent out by the battalion. Some more shots in the night did no harm, and at 3 a.m. on the 11th, "C" and "D" Companies of the battalion continued their march to Landi Kotal, the other two being left to hold the camp piquets at Ali Masjid.

There were no piquets on the road to Sultan Khel where "C" and "D" arrived at dawn, and, after filling up water bottles and ammunition in pouches to one hundred and fifty rounds per rifle, marched to the general camp where they were to act as reserve in an attack carried out by the 1st and 2nd Brigades on the Afghan positions west of the Bagh springs. The attack was successful, and the reserve was not called up, so "C" and "D" Companies returned at 5 p.m. to Landi Kotal, where they were rejoined half an hour later by "A" and "B" from Ali Masjid.

Owing to operations towards Dakka, there was heavy piquet and fatigue work for the battalion at Landi Kotal. They were relieved in the piquets, on the 14th, by the 1st Yorkshire Regiment, and on the 16th they took over a new perimeter, on the departure of the 1st Infantry Brigade for Dakka. Heavy firing was heard that day in the direction of Loe Dakka, and on the 17th the battalion with the 1st Yorkshire marched for Loe Dakka at short notice. When they arrived at the point where the Khyber Pass ends and the Dakka plain begins, the Afghans were shelling the road with but poor results, as their shells burst either too high or on percussion. Arriving at Dakka, one company was detailed as escort to two mountain howitzers, whilst the others went into general reserve to await orders. Here the enemy succeeded in dropping a shell in the midst of the first-line transport, fortunately without injury to any of them.

In the afternoon "B" and "D" Companies went with the commandant to occupy Sikh Hill, which had just been captured by the 1/15th Sikhs. These two companies had a rough time. They had had no food, water was scarce, and they were heavily laden with ammunition and entrenching tools. All this on a stiff climb on a very hot day.

One of their piquets took a hand in stopping the attack of an Afghan infantry battalion which was trying to recover three guns which had been lost on the hill. A Lewis-gun team of the battalion claimed a bag of about forty Afghans killed or wounded. Besides these Krupp guns some ammunition and ponies were found.

* See Map of N.W. Frontier, Sheet I, in pocket at end of Volume.

Next day, on relief by a company of the 1/15th Sikhs, the two Companies returned to camp, which was moved from just south of Loe Dakka to south of Robat Fort near Sherabad Cantonment, about one mile off.

On the 19th a small force consisting of the 2/1st Gurkha Rifles, a Squadron of King's Dragoon Guards and a section each of a mountain battery and a cavalry machine-gun squadron, went out to see if a mountain battery, which the enemy had placed south of the position captured on the 17th, had been abandoned or not. It was not to be found. The battalion was now reinforced by four Gurkha Officers and one hundred and ninety-six other ranks from the combined depot of the 2/3rd and 3/3rd Gurkhas.

There now ensued a quiet time as regards hostilities, but everybody had plenty to do. There were numerous piquets to be supplied, including a large one on the west of the Khyber Pass near Haft Chah which the companies supplied in turn. Then there were foraging expeditions attended with more or less success. "Malaun Day" (24th May) was celebrated by one of these to the Afghan village of Girdi, three miles on the road to Kabul. Here the Battalion reaped and despatched to camp about two thousand maunds of wheat. There was no opposition. Road making and working at fortifications or water channels were other activities. All this, be it remembered, was done in terribly hot weather, varied by the discomforts of a dust storm lasting two days. The camp was situated on the south bank of the Kabul River, opposite the Afghan village and old fort of Lalpura, and towards the end of May sniping at night began from the north bank. It was generally dealt with by Lewis guns, and on one occasion a single round from the artillery dislodged the snipers from the old fort.

The heat was very trying to all ranks, especially in the early days when the tents were not up from Kachi Garhi, and even the British Officers had only one 160-lb. tent amongst them for all purposes.

On the 13th June the battalion moved to a new camp near the Sherabad cantonment, in the north-west angle of the camp.

Next day Lieut.-Colonel Dopping-Hepenstal took out a mixed force to Girdi to investigate a report of a Mohmand and Shinwari Lashkar which was said to be erecting "sangars" about Hazar Nao, with a view to molesting foraging parties. The advanced guard and piquets were provided by Captain Rogers. No opposition was encountered till the retirement began, when a few shots were fired. Two Afghan envoys presented themselves under a white flag. As they carried sealed letters from the Amir they were sent in to Head-quarters in camp. Ambushes set by the battalion as it returned to camp took nothing, as the retirement was not followed by the enemy.

On the 16th June the battalion took over the outer line of piquets from the Yorkshire Regiment. About 9.30 p.m. an attack was made by about eighty of the enemy on No. 5 Piquet commanded by Captain Rogers, and No. 4 under Subadar Damarsing Gurung, M.C., was also attacked. Both attacks were driven off by Lewis-gun fire. None of the other piquets were threatened and, save for the usual sniping, all was quiet by 11 p.m.

Next day about 1 p.m. two subsidiary piquets, to the west of the Khurd * Khyber piquet north of the Kabul Road, were heavily fired on by about one hundred Afghans advancing from the direction of Girdi. These also were driven off by a Lewis gun at the main piquet.

* Khurd = small, little.

As a cavalry reconnaissance by the King's Dragoon Guards reported about one hundred of the enemy and some tribesmen between Girdi and Dakka, the two subsidiary piquets above mentioned were pushed forward, whilst one section of No. 8 Mountain Battery and a company of the 2/1st Gurkhas were sent to the Khurd Khyber Pass on the left of the piquet. One of the Lewis guns of this company opened fire on a few of the enemy who were observed creeping along a ridge just north of the road and two of them were reported to have fallen.

On relief at 6 p.m. by the 2nd Somerset Light Infantry, the Battalion returned to camp.

Next day (19th) the cavalry reported four hundred of the enemy towards Girdi. The western piquets were heavily sniped at night but not attacked. The 2/1st Gurkhas, however, were in the camp at this time.

About this time the piquets and posts were distinguished by names instead of numbers, and the 3rd Brigade were given all those from the Kabul River as far as Black Hill, whilst the 1st Brigade took the rest, including that of Haft Chah. The 3rd Brigade assumed responsibility for piquets for the daily cavalry reconnaissances. On the 26th the 2/1st Gurkhas took over all the inner and outer piquets of the 3rd Brigade.

On the 27th Captain Rogers, with "D" Company, established two new piquets on Conical Hill and West Ridge, between which the Kabul Road passes a mile beyond the Khurd Khyber Pass. Little opposition was incurred. These piquets were very necessary to protect the cavalry reconnaissances passing between them.

On the 30th the signature of the Treaty of Versailles was greeted by a salute of one hundred and one guns and an issue of 2 ozs. of rum to each man.

In the third week of June the depot, which had hitherto been left to grill in the heat of Nowshera, was sent back to Dharmasala—a great relief both to the depot itself and to the sick who were returned to it.

On the 30th June there were at the depot 7 British and 4 Gurkha Officers, 69 recruits and 144 other ranks. At Dakka there were 13 British and 12 Gurkha Officers with 530 other ranks.

On the 2nd July there were attached to the battalion one Gurkha Officer and twenty-two other ranks of the recently formed Gurkha Scouts.

On the 5th July a special reconnaissance was carried out towards Girdi by Lieut.-Colonel Stack, C.M.G., with two squadrons 33rd Cavalry, two sections No. 77 Howitzer Battery, one section "M" Battery Royal Horse Artillery, and "A" and "C" Companies of the 2/1st Gurkhas. It had been reported that two hundred tribesmen had taken up a position astride the Kabul Road near Girdi. There was no opposition till the cavalry were nearly opposite Girdi when a heavy fire was opened on them, which however was kept down by the artillery. The retirement was not molested and the force was back in camp by 10.30 a.m. The battalion again took over the piquets on this day. Of course sniping was a regular incident of these days. On the 13th, "D" Company under Captain Rogers went out to the Khurd Khyber Pass to furnish the piquets for the cavalry reconnaissance, and was so strongly opposed by about two thousand tribesmen that another company, under Lieutenant Falkenstein, had to be called up before the piquets could establish themselves. Fortunately piquets were sent up to two hills about a thousand yards south-west of the pass which had never before been occupied.

The tribesmen were relying on these hills being again unoccupied and on several

occasions during the day they occupied one side of them whilst the Battalion held the other. Hand-to-hand fighting took place in several instances, and in one a lance naick shot six of the enemy at a range of ten yards. The withdrawal of the piquets was closely followed and the troops were back in camp by noon.

The casualties of the battalion in this affair were:—

Killed. One non-commissioned officer and three other ranks.

Wounded. One Gurkha Officer, two non-commissioned officers, and four other ranks.

The enemy casualties were estimated at two hundred.

Captain Rogers acted very wisely in occupying the two hills which were afterwards known as "the Breasts." From these the enemy clearly intended, if they could have held them, to harass the reconnaissance from a flank, and later to enfilade the retiring piquets. It was unfortunate that the battalion had no bombs with it. That the enemy's losses were so heavy was due to the good target they offered to the machine guns and the howitzers covering the retirement.

In the night of the 17th–18th Black Hill and Emergency piquets, held by the battalion, were heavily sniped by the enemy, who got up to the wire in both places but were driven off by bombs. In Black Hill piquet, held by Lieutenant Knowles, M.C., there were two casualties.

On the 23rd there was an unusually severe fight. The battalion was then in support of the 1st Yorkshires who were supplying the piquets for the cavalry reconnoitring towards Girdi and met with such strong resistance, that by 9.30 all four companies of the 2/1st Gurkhas had had to be called up in succession. The Yorkshiremen had failed to occupy Twin Peaks, projecting westwards from West Ridge. About seven hundred to a thousand tribesmen held these peaks which were being shelled by the 4.5 inch howitzers. A fresh attack was now made to reach them with one Yorkshire platoon and one platoon of "C" Company of the 2/1st Gurkhas. This company had been the first called up, and the platoon was commanded by Subadar Tula Gurung.

This attack likewise failed. The British Officer of the Yorkshire platoon and Subadar Tula Gurung arrived simultaneously at the top, and both were instantly killed by the tribesmen just below the crest on the farther side. The same fate met a sergeant of the Yorkshires who, with two Gurkhas, followed them closely. The two Gurkhas endeavoured to carry off Subadar Tula Gurung, but when they had got him under cover they found he was dead. They were compelled by the advancing tribesmen to abandon the body and to retire under a heavy fire and much exhausted to West Ridge. The rest of the Yorkshires and Gurkhas never reached the summit of the peak. Three attacks had now failed.

The fourth was made by two platoons of "C" Company under Lieutenant Simons and two of "B" under Lieutenant Harvey.

Lieutenant Simons and Jemadar Kharakbahadur Pun, with the two platoons of "C," advanced under very heavy fire, starting from a point four or five hundred yards from Twin Peaks, and established themselves in a flank position, whence they could effectively cover the advance up the peaks of Lieutenant Harvey and Jemadar Mandhoj Rana with the two "B" Platoons. The attack was supported by heavy fire on the peaks from the howitzers in the plain in front, and a mountain battery on Green Hill shelling the reverse slopes. This attack successfully carried Twin Peaks, and the tribesmen retiring over the plain towards Girdi, both from the peaks and from in front of the piquets of West Ridge and Conical Hill, were followed up by a very heavy fire.

The casualties in the 2/1st Gurkhas were :—

Killed. One Gurkha Officer and three Other Ranks.

Wounded. Four Other Ranks.

The Yorkshire Regiment lost one Officer and four men killed and thirteen men wounded.

For this fight the rewards given in the battalion were as follows :—

For the third attack—Subadar Tula Gurung, I.D.S.M. (posthumous).

Rifleman Kintar Gurung, I.D.S.M.

„ Kishensing Lama, I.D.S.M.

For the fourth attack—Lieut. C. W. Harvey, M.C.

Jemadar Mandhoj Rana, I.D.S.M.

„ Kharakbahadur Pun, I.D.S.M.

Next day the Afghan Peace Delegates passed through Dakka on their way to Rawal Pindi. The rest of July was uneventful, except for the construction of a flying bridge over the river and the occupation by the 15th Sikhs of the old fort at Lalpura, which had a beneficial effect in keeping down the sniping from the North bank.

Nothing notable occurred up to the 8th August when news was received of the signing of peace with Afghanistan.

On the 2nd August there had been notified the awards for gallantry in the action of the 13th July. They were :—

Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class.

Naick Tegbahadur Sahi, 3/3rd Gurkhas, attached 2/1st.

Lance Naick Lachman Lama, 3/3rd Gurkhas, attached 2/1st.

Rifleman Jubdir Ale, 2/1st Gurkhas.

Indian Distinguished Service Medal.

Rifleman Dhanbahadur Gurung, 2/1st Gurkhas.

Rifleman Indarbahadur Thapa, 2/1st Gurkhas.

The signing of peace by no means meant the end of sniping by the tribesmen, whose tie to the Afghan Government was of the slightest, but daily cavalry reconnaissances ceased after the 11th August.

There was now time for sports and other diversions and the Battalion Lewis-gun team were easy victors in the contest for the best turn out in the 1st Division.

The withdrawal from Dakka began on the 9th September and the last night spent there by the battalion was disturbed by an extra allowance of sniping, which continued during the retirement in the early hours of the 13th without any more serious results than the wounding of one mule. That day Landi Khana was reached and Landi Kotal on the 15th.

On the 17th the battalion entrained at Jamrud after parting with the two Gurkha Officers and 154 other ranks of the 2/3rd and 3/3rd Gurkha Rifles, the remains of the draft which had been attached to it.* They are described in the battalion diary as “an excellent lot in the field who, under Subadar Damarsing Gurung, had done excellent work.”

Dharmasala was reached by march from Pathankot on the 23rd September 1919.

During 1919 there had been awarded to the battalion 124 “Jangi Inams” which meant Rs. 5 per mensem to the recipient for life, or in the case of a non-commissioned officer, Rs. 10. These grants were in place of grants of land and were for services rendered in the Great War.

* Cf. p. 190.

CHAPTER XIX

THE THIRD BATTALION—THE DEFENCE OF FORT SANDEMAN

1917-1921

THE Third Battalion dates from the 13th June 1917, on which date Major J. Simpson of the 10th Gurkha Rifles arrived at Dharmsala as Wing Commander of the new battalion, officiating as commandant pending the appointment of a permanent commandant.

Three days later Lieutenant W. S. Mackenzie, 4th Gurkha Rifles, took over the office of officiating Quartermaster, and on the 18th Lieutenant A. W. Woodhead, I.A.R.O., became officiating Adjutant; Lieutenant E. A. Courthope arrived on the 3rd July. The nucleus of Gurkha Officers and other ranks was supplied as follows:—

From the Depot 1st Battalion, 100 trained Gurkhas and 75 recruits.

From the 2nd Battalion, Subadar Kishensing Karki,* Jemadar Bahadursing Gurung, 3 colour havildars, 15 havildars, 15 naicks, 195 trained riflemen, and 105 recruits.

These were taken on the strength from the 1st July, and a few days later four havildars were promoted to Jemadar. Further reinforcements were received from the 1st Battalion—Subadar Kamarsing Thapa, 2 havildars, 8 naicks, 10 lance naicks, and there were two British N.C.O.s attached to help in training, in bayonet fighting and physical training. These returned to their battalions on the 1st September, and a regular Gurkha drill staff was appointed a fortnight later. Rifles (1914 pattern) were issued to the battalion at the end of July.

British Officers continued to join, and on the 30th September, command of the battalion was assumed by Lieut.-Colonel W. I. Ryder who had retired from command of the 2nd Battalion as long ago as August 1915, but had now rejoined the regiment from England. He says that, when he joined, he found that the preliminary hard work of raising a new unit had been done on thoroughly sound lines, and that even at this early stage he found the battalion well forward in drill.

Parades were held on the 2nd Battalion parade ground and training was continued vigorously. Amongst the difficulties, Colonel Ryder says, was the want of Hindustani-speaking British Officers. He bears strong testimony to the energy and experience of the Adjutant, Lieutenant Courthope.

On the 20th October three Gurkha Officers and one hundred and ninety-seven other ranks joined from the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles. It had been proposed by Major Simpson to continue the training in the hills near Dharmsala, but this was disallowed, and on the 12th November 1917 orders were received for the battalion to move to Jubbulpore.†

Starting from Dharmsala on the 30th November, and entraining at Pathankot on the 5th December, the main body of the battalion reached Jubbulpore on the 7th, having been preceded by an advance party a week earlier.

* Afterwards subadar-major of the battalion throughout its existence.

† The approaching return of the 2nd Battalion would have necessitated a move of the 3rd from Dharmsala itself.

The Officers with the battalion at this time were:—

Lieut.-Colonel W. I. Ryder, Commandant.
Major J. Simpson, Right Wing Commander.
Captain C. F. M. Birch, Left Wing Commander.

Lieutenants.

A. W. Woodhead.
E. A. Courthope (Adjutant).
R. W. Copland.
R. C. Grey (Quartermaster).
W. S. Mackenzie.
J. Baumber.
H. S. J. Lloyd.
R. Kissane.
A. Delap.

2nd Lieutenants.

W. J. Woodward.
J. R. Harder.
W. C. Whiting.
C. A. Strong, M.C.
J. W. Campbell.
H. B. Robertson.
A. W. Duncan.
J. C. L. O'Neil Shaw.
G. Allison.

Lieut. G. C. Roy, I.M.S. Medical Officer.

After continuing its training at Jubbulpore the battalion entrained on the 2nd February 1918 for the Baluchistan frontier. Leaving the train at Harnai on the 12th February, it reached Fort Sandeman on the 1st March, and relieved the 2/19th Punjabis.* There was an outbreak of measles in the battalion during this march. This place, though called a fort, was at this time hardly correctly so named, as it had scarcely any fortifications. The first thing to be done was to make it defensible. Colonel Ryder realized this at once, and it was only owing to his exertions and those of the battalion, assisted by Captain Darling, R.E., that Fort Sandeman could be held as it was when besieged in 1919.

The water supply was the great difficulty, as in March 1918 the place was dependent on an irrigation channel liable to be cut at any moment by an enemy. Wells had to be dug †; besides this there was construction of fortifications, including a barbed-wire fence round a perimeter camp. All this entailed heavy work for the men who suffered much from fever, especially in the heat of summer following great cold in winter. Heavy out-post and convoy duty also stood in the way of maintaining smartness, though it was done somehow, as is testified to by inspection reports.

A movable column also had to be maintained of a strength of two subadars, two jemadars, eight havildars, eight naicks, fourteen lance naicks, one bugler and one hundred and seventy riflemen.

There were outposts at Kapip, Babar, Gowal, Lakaband and Adazai and the battalion had to take a share of the occupation of these from the day of their arrival at Fort Sandeman. They were at distances of one or more marches from the Fort.

There is little to be said of the battalion between the date of its arrival at Fort Sandeman and that of the outbreak of the Third Afghan War. Its special activities, under the command of Colonel Ryder, have been noted above. Otherwise life at Fort Sandeman and its outposts seems not to have differed from that of any regiment occupy-

* See Map of the N.W. Frontier, Sheet IV, in pocket at end of Volume.

† One large one dug in Colonel Ryder's time almost sufficed to supply the whole garrison when the channel was cut in 1919.

ing a frontier post during peace-time, if such an expression can ever be applied strictly to the turbulent North-West frontier of India.

Up to September 1918 the battalion had been organized on the basis of two wings, each with its wing commander. On the 17th September 1918 it was reorganized on the four-company basis, the companies being then commanded by Major Simpson, Captain Birch, Lieutenant Woodhead, and Lieutenant MacGillivray.

In the later months of 1918 the strength of the battalion was fairly constant and high. The maximum strength was reached on the 30th January 1919, when the strength of all ranks was as follows:—

With the battalion at Fort Sandeman	991
At outposts	214
Absent for other reasons, leave, etc.	299
	<hr/>
Total	<u>1,404</u>

Demobilization began next day and the strength fell at once to 913.*

On the 29th January 1919 Colonel W. I. Ryder was sent to England on six months' leave pending retirement: he was succeeded in command by Major J. Simpson who became an acting Lieutenant-Colonel.

On the 6th May, late in the evening, in the middle of the only dance given by the battalion, the first news of the outbreak of the Third Afghan War reached Fort Sandeman. The exposed positions of the outposts furnished by the North and South Waziristan Militias caused grave anxiety to the political and military officers concerned and in a disastrous moment it was decided to evacuate Wana, the head-quarters of the South Waziristan Militia, and the smaller, subsidiary, outposts. To this deplorable decision was due the subsequent fighting round Fort Sandeman and the later and much more serious and expensive campaign against the Mahsuds.

* Readers, ignorant of the Indian Frontier, should remember that between the North-west Frontier of British India and Afghanistan there lies a strip of dry and arid hilly country, inhabited by wild and savage tribes, who prey on their less virile neighbours and on the rich caravans that pass along the historic trade routes which traverse this tribal territory and connect India with the Middle East. Along many of these routes, at intervals of about a day's march, the Indian Government have in the past established small permanent outposts which serve as a reminder of British Power, afford safe harbourage for the merchant traveller at night, and provide small garrisons which can deal with minor raiding gangs. As this tribal territory produces no food for man or beast, these posts, which are often more than one hundred miles from railhead, must be supplied by convoys of pack animals, since the roads are not fit for wheeled traffic, and, since the convoys are liable to attack, they must be provided with escorts. These escorts are never large as they are only meant to protect a convoy from small raiding gangs. When large hostile gatherings are known to be about it is usual to temporarily suspend the movement of convoys, make the escort large enough to ensure the convoy getting through or send a force to disperse the hostile gathering.

The Third Afghan War took India at a great disadvantage as demobilization was in full swing. Every available man was hurried to the Khyber area and the forces left in other parts of the frontier were barely sufficient even if all should go well.

In the particular events of the 15th and 16th July 1919 an escort of three hundred rifles and two mountain guns were detailed to escort a convoy though it was known that a hostile force of two thousand rifles, many of them trained by British Officers in one or other of the Frontier Militias from which they had deserted, was in the hills through which the convoy must pass. From that escort of three hundred rifles must be found advanced and rear guards, troops to clear the hills of the enemy and hold the hills when cleared till the convoy was through and troops to protect the convoy from infighting and from looting.

The officer commanding in Fort Sandeman asked that the oncoming convoy should be stopped. Whether it was right or wrong to disregard that request is beyond the province of this history, it is however bare justice to the memory of three gallant officers, two of them hardly more than boys, and of the men under them, who, throughout a long and cruel day did their duty, tried again and again to do the impossible and, at the last died; to make it clear that there was no chance of success unless help could be sent from Fort Sandeman or elsewhere.

The position in Fort Sandeman was as follows: the 3/1st Gurkhas, who comprised the bulk of the garrison, had nine hundred and seventy men on their rolls, but of that total over two hundred were still away on leave or furlough, while just over two hundred more were permanently employed on the outposts already described. There were therefore left in Fort Sandeman just five hundred and fifty men to garrison the place and provide the movable column: Colonel Simpson therefore applied to Quetta for reinforcements.

The area was organized as follows:—

(1) *Militia Hill* overlooking the bazar; some of the buildings near this had been demolished and the parapets of others were loopholed and armed with machine guns. Garrison, one company 3/1st. In this area was the house of the officer commanding the Zhob Militia, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul, who was the senior officer and commanded the whole Sandeman area; here Colonel Paul made his head-quarters.

(2) *Castle Hill and Political Agent's Hill*. Garrison, one company 3/1st. There was a machine-gun emplacement at the east end of the hill and reserve ammunition dug-outs were made on the south face of the hill.

(3) *Assistant Political Agent's Hill*. Garrison, one company 3/1st. The Hospital was established here in the Assistant Political Agent's house. Machine-gun emplacements commanded the hill nine hundred yards to the south.

(4) *Reserve*. One company 3/1st.

The Zhob Militia lines were north of Castle Hill and in the lines was a well that had been dug by Colonel Ryder's orders. "Sangars" were constructed on all roads. There were three gates to the perimeter, one on the east was between Castle Hill and Assistant Political Agent's Hill: a second gate was on the north side, while a third or west gate was south of Militia Hill facing the bazar and protected by a redoubt armed with machine guns.

On the 27th May Colonel Simpson went sick and handed over the battalion to Major S. S. Whitaker, M.C., 7th Gurkha Rifles.


On the 30th May, on the recommendation of the Political Agent, the battalion left its lines and moved inside the perimeter, two platoons under a Gurkha Officer being left in the lines for patrol work. The perimeter gates were closed. On the same day all the outposts on the Fort Sandeman-Loralai Road were ordered to evacuate their posts, destroy the rations and stores they could not carry and fall back on Fort Sandeman. On this day also Lieutenant-Colonel Paul sent Lieutenant A. F. Reilly of the Zhob Militia with a small force of mounted militiamen to meet and help in the South Waziristan Militia who were retiring from Wana on Fort Sandeman in compliance with the orders that have been already alluded to. Lieutenant Reilly was killed, his little force was dispersed and all the Zhob Militia posts to the north and north-west of Fort Sandeman surrendered.

On the 31st May the heroic Major Russell, himself shot through both thighs, with three other British Officers, one of whom was also wounded, and about one hundred and twenty loyal men, the remnants of the South Waziristan Militia, reached Fort Sandeman. Four of the eight British Officers who had started from Wana had been killed and Major Russell brought confirmation of the death of Lieutenant Reilly and of the dispersion of his force.

After Major Russell's arrival Colonel Paul cancelled his order to the outposts to

evacuate their posts and, the garrison of Adazai having already complied with the original order, that post was reoccupied. The next day or two were spent by the garrison in bringing rations, equipment, etc., inside the perimeter and in improving the defences.

On the 2nd June information was received that an attack on Kapip Post was probable that night: the Gurkha Officer in command was warned but was also told not to waste ammunition on snipers. Next day the telegraph and telephone wires connecting Kapip to Fort Sandeman were cut.



Kapip Post is at Kapip Waterworks, here was also the junction of the roads from Fort Sandeman to Loralai through Babar, Lakaband and Murgha and to Dera Ismail Khan through Draband. Mile 107 was three miles west of Kapip Post and seven miles east of Fort Sandeman, between Kapip Post and Mile 107 the road ran through a narrow "Tangi" or gorge. The junction mentioned in the narrative is the meeting place where the empty convoy from Fort Sandeman would meet the next full incoming convoy from Dewal. It would be mutually agreed on by the commanders of the two escorts, and would be a mile or more north of Babar.

About this time Colonel Paul sent off a party, including the four surviving British Officers of the Wana garrison, down the road to Harnai. He sent, as escort to the party, as far as Lakaband, a force of Zhob Militia Cavalry under Captain Yule, himself an officer of the Zhob Militia. Instead of moving by the road Captain Yule took his party by a shorter, cross-country track to Lakaband.

Shortly afterwards news was received that a draft of one hundred and twenty men of the 1/10th Gurkha Rifles under 2nd Lieutenant Thatcher, I.A.R.O., was on the way

from Quetta to Fort Sandeman as a reinforcement, whilst information was also received that 2nd Lieutenant G. Allison, who had been away on a musketry course, was on his way back to Fort Sandeman and that he had with him details of the 3/1st who were returning from courses, leave, etc. When this information was received, Allison was instructed to join up with the 1/10th draft from Quetta.

On the 4th June a telephone message was received at Fort Sandeman that Allison, with his own details and the draft of the 1/10th, had reached Murgha. This message proved to be correct, but many conflicting and false reports were received about this time. Instructions were now sent to Allison to go on to Lakaband and to halt there till the 8th after which, if he had in the meantime received no further orders, he was to push on to Fort Sandeman. It will be remembered that Captain Yule in command of a force of his own sowars was escorting a party of officers, some of whom were wounded, to Lakaband: that officer was now instructed to take over command of the parties of the 3/1st and 1/10th Gurkhas under Allison and Thatcher and bring them all to Fort Sandeman.

On the 8th June Captain Yule left Lakaband. Hearing that the hills to the south and south-east of Fort Sandeman were occupied by the enemy, he decided to return by a circuitous route from the south-west. This involved a forced march of thirty-seven miles over arid and broken country at the very hottest time of the year. 2nd Lieutenant Allison was put in charge of the rear-guard.

The little force covered the greater part of this long march without incident and late in the afternoon a message was received at Fort Sandeman from Captain Yule that he was then eleven miles from Fort Sandeman on the Hindu Bagh Road and had with him 2nd Lieutenants Allison and Thatcher and the men of the 3/1st and 1/10th Gurkhas, all much exhausted. On receipt of this message Colonel Paul sent out some men of the 3/1st under Lieutenant Campbell, I.A.R.O., with A.T. carts and water to help Yule's force in.

While Yule's message was coming in and Campbell's party was going out, Yule's force was heavily attacked eight miles from Fort Sandeman. At 6.30 p.m. heavy firing was heard in Fort Sandeman and Yule himself rode in with the news that his force was being attacked. At 7.30 p.m. Colonel Paul sent out Lieutenant Hawkes of the Zhob Militia with some militia sowars to help in the exhausted and harassed force. Heavy firing continued till 8.30 p.m. when Hawkes arrived back with the news that the first party of the 1/10th Gurkhas were just arriving on camels. By this time the enemy were holding the hills south of the Fort Sandeman perimeter in force. From this time onward for about an hour the men of the 1/10th under Thatcher continued to arrive in small parties, some in carts and some on camels. It was reported that 2nd Lieutenant Allison who was with the rearguard was wounded in three places. A summer day in India is much shorter than an English summer day and it will be readily understood that daylight had long since begun to fail.

At 9.30 p.m. Lieutenant Campbell returned. He did not come in till he had been assured that all the wounded and stragglers had been accounted for, but on his arrival it was discovered that 2nd Lieutenant Allison and the whole of the rear-guard were missing. No further relief party was sent out that night.

Next morning—the 9th of June—a relief force was sent out consisting of fifty Zhob Militia Cavalry under Lieutenant Hawkes and fifty of the 3/1st under Lieutenant Sinker.

Hampered by casualties and stragglers, Allison had been compelled to halt and make his last stand on a low hill six miles west-south-west of Fort Sandeman. There Hawkes and Sinker found his mutilated body with the bodies of his men. Round them was the clear evidence that they had gone down fighting hard. Cut off and alone, the gallant fight put up by this young lad and his little rear-guard was the one bright spot in a tragic day.

The total losses on the 8th June were :—

3/1st, 2nd Lieutenant Allison killed and eleven men wounded.

1/10th, Twenty-six Other Ranks killed and six wounded.

On the 10th June there were some small fights about Fort Sandeman, the only share in which taken by the 3/1st was the co-operation of their machine guns on Militia, Assistant Political Agent's, and Castle Hills in an attack on the southern hills by the Zhob Militia.

At 11 p.m. on the 11th Captain Copland and Lieutenants R. C. Sinker and F. M. W. Crooke went out with two hundred of the 3/1st to relieve Kapip Post which was successfully done and a new garrison under Jemadar Balasing was left there. Jemadar Thamansing, who had commanded the relieved garrison, reported that his men had killed about eighty of the enemy and had themselves lost one man killed and five wounded. The relieving column was attacked on its way back by about two hundred of the enemy, of whom nine were killed, without any casualties among the 3/1st.

On the 14th Captain Woodhead, Lieutenant J. Baumber, and 2nd Lieutenant Dobbin took out one hundred rifles to recover some loot taken by the enemy from Fort Sandeman. Only slight resistance was encountered. Two of the enemy were killed, and one was taken. The battalion had no casualties, and returned with two cartloads of the loot.

On the 20th communication was established by heliograph with Kapip Post. A force of two hundred of the 3/1st and sixty Zhob Militia, commanded by Captain Spain of the Militia, piqueted the road to Kapip as far as Milestone 109 for General O'Grady who reached Fort Sandeman by car.

The same operation was repeated on the 21st for his return and that of a convoy of provisions for his force. It was again done on the 22nd for a convoy of sick.

On the 23rd June Major A. B. Rombulow-Pearse, 6th Gurkha Rifles, arrived at Fort Sandeman and took over command of the battalion from Major Whitaker. Major Rombulow-Pearse remained in charge of the battalion until it was disbanded.

Nothing particular happened till the 29th when Major S. S. Whitaker, M.C., Captain R. W. Copland, and Lieutenant Crooke started with one hundred and fifty rifles of the 3/1st, a squadron of Patiala Lancers, and one hundred of the Zhob Militia, for Badanzai. The object of the expedition, which was commanded by Major Jennings of the Patiala Lancers, was to burn some villages about Badanzai.

About 11 a.m. the following message was received by helio from Major Jennings :—

“ Engaged with two hundred or three hundred tribesmen at Mile 12 approximately. Few casualties. Am coming in to-night. Suggest ‘bhoosa’ being brought in by fresh guard to-morrow. Reported about five hundred additional tribesmen in hills.”

The casualties turned out to be Jemadar Thamansing Gurung, seriously wounded, one follower killed, and two wounded.

The column, having started at 4.30 a.m., was back at 5 p.m. What had happened appeared from Major Jennings' report. The Lancers and Militia proceeded, on arrival, to burn the villages and crops, whilst the 3/1st escorted the transport on the way back to Fort Sandeman. They were also to piquet the road. The burning of the villages being completed, the Lancers and Militia rejoined the 3/1st, whom they found held up about Milestone 12. The enemy were posted on a ridge which was turned by the Militia and the march was resumed when the transport had been reorganized. The enemy were believed to have suffered severely.

A column of somewhat lower strength, in which were one hundred 3/1st under Captain Woodhead and Lieutenant Sinker, went out again, under the command of Major Jennings, to forage at Malwar eight miles off on the 1st July, and returned with 750 maunds of wheat and "bhoosa." They had no fighting.

On the 3rd July General O'Grady's force arrived from Kapip, bringing with them the 3/1st Gurkha garrisons of Kapip, Lakaband, Babar, Gowal and Adazai, and next day the force marched for Wani, accompanied by two hundred rifles of the 3/1st Gurkhas, commanded by Captain Woodhead and Lieutenant Sinker. For an account of Captain Woodhead's doings we will quote, practically in full, his report as follows :—

"Strength
3/1st G.R.
200 Rifles
2 Lewis Guns.
Zhob Militia
100 Rifles.

"4th July. Left Fort Sandeman with Gradiforce at 05.00 hrs. and proceeded to Wani via Todozai Kalai. No opposition, no sign of any enemy. Wani was reached about 13.00 hrs. Two villages were burnt *en route*, including Todozai. In the evening three more villages near to Wani were also destroyed.

"5th July. Left Gradiforce 05.30 hrs. and proceeded to Babar via the short cut from Fort Sandeman to Lakaband, and then direct across country to Babar. No opposition or sight of enemy. The tracks of about two hundred men moving in the hills towards Babar were seen, and information was also gathered from local Pathans corroborating this, to the effect that a party of Siranis had been that way the day before, and gone into the hills round Babar and Kapip. Babar was reached about 12.30 hrs., and the column accommodated itself in the Post Serai and Dak Bungalow. The Post had been damaged, but still gave plenty of protection.

"6th July. The column took over the escort of one section 38th Mountain Battery and a wireless section from a party of 3/124th Baluchis at 08.00 hrs. and proceeded towards Kapip. One gun was placed with the advanced guard and one with the rear-guard. No opposition or sign of enemy until Kapip was reached about 11.30 hrs. Here enemy were found in considerable force and an action, a detailed account of which follows, lasting nearly six hours took place, before the convoy was able to push through the 'tangi.' The whole force was clear of the hills by 18.00 hrs. No casualties took place among the transport. On reaching Mile 103 the advanced guard was sent over the low hills S. of Kapip Post. Information was sent back that a few armed men were in the gardens near the Dak Bungalow. The force immediately moved ahead and, while descending the hills on the East side of the Pareza nala saw about twenty 'badmashes' in the nala below the Post. One gun was immediately rushed forward, and a Lewis Gun. The advanced guard was reinforced by fifty Zhob Militia Infantry, under Subadar Gulab Shah, and the Gurkhas and Militia attacked. This attack was carried out rapidly and with success, the enemy being driven right back into the hills North of the Post. They were followed up and the summit of this commanding hill was taken by the Militia. The gun got into action early and gave plenty of assistance. Piquets were now pushed

on about six hundred yards from the Post, in the direction of Fort Sandeman, on either side of the nala. The transport was moved up into the Pareza nala and halted there. It was now found that the heights commanding the 'tangi' about Mile 105 were strongly held, particularly on the left flank. The guns were brought forward and men collected for assault. This original assault was not pushed forward, and the line halted for a considerable time. About 14.15 hrs. the key position on the left flank was secured. The enemy fired heavily on the attacking party, but did not wait for them to get to close quarters. A small party of Militia had also been sent away on the left flank, on the initiative of the Zhob Militia Subadar Major, and their arrival in that position was most opportune. The guns had been forced to evacuate one of their positions just before this, and were now in action on the road supporting an attack led by Lieutenant R. C. Sinker, 3/1st Gurkha Rifles, against a very strong enemy position.

"This officer had already been wounded, but, finding it was very slight and seeing the party sent off to take this position was held up, he gallantly went forward and led them right up to within a few yards of the crest, when heavy fire was opened from the 'sangar' above them. The gunners spotted this precarious position and immediately gave him excellent support, which cleared the crest and enabled the party to gain their objective.

"Orders were now given for the convoy to push on and it advanced along the road, but could not yet clear the 'tangi.' One more piquet had to be established on the right-hand side of the nala, and a party was collected and sent, under Subadar Nare Thapa, 3/1st Gurkha Rifles, to occupy this position, which they did without a great deal of opposition. The enemy continued to snipe along the road, the guns in particular always drawing their fire, but they were firing badly and inflicted no loss.

"The convoy now pushed forward and was able to get through the 'tangi' without loss. As it was expected that the rearguard would be followed up, the transport was taken to a point about Mile 107, and a position for a possible camp selected. It was not intended to camp there, unless the rearguard was so late in getting clear that further advance was impossible before dusk.

"The rearguard was fairly heavily attacked, but withdrew safely and joined the main body about 18.00 hrs. It was now decided to advance absolutely clear of the hills and encamp in the nala bed another two miles farther on. When this proposed position was reached, however, it was found that the irrigation channel had been cut and there was no water; consequently a return to Fort Sandeman was the only course left. The Zhob Militia put out flank and rear guards, and the column reached Fort Sandeman about 20.30 hrs. without any further molestation.

"The number of the enemy is estimated at between two and three hundred, mainly Sheranis, under one Maschoo.

"Our casualties were:—

38th Mountain Battery. Wounded. Jemadar Mohamad Khan and 3 other ranks.

3/1st Gurkha Rifles. Killed. 2 other ranks.

" " *Wounded.* Captain Woodhead and 11 other ranks.

" " " *Lieut. Sinker.*

Zhob Militia. Killed. 1 other ranks.

" " *Wounded.* 3 other ranks.

"The enemy killed were twenty-five bodies counted by Militia, and twelve counted by

Gurkhas. The body of Maschoo was found. These numbers may possibly overlap, as it is possible for some bodies to have been seen by both Militia and Gurkhas.

"In conclusion, I should like to bring to your notice the great assistance rendered throughout by the following officers:—

Lieut. G. E. Hawkes, M.C., Zhob Militia.

Lieut. R. C. Sinker, 6th Gurkha Rifles, attd. 3/1st G.R.

Subadar-Major Gulab Khan, Zhob Militia.

"Detailed recommendations regarding the two latter officers have already been submitted by me.

"The gunners rendered invaluable assistance throughout the engagement. The Militia were untiring, and are apparently incapable of fatigue."

On the 9th July 225 rifles went out to Kapip under Captain Copland to repair the pipe line and irrigation channel, which Captain Woodhead had reported damaged. Few of the enemy were seen and those only at a distance.

On the 12th and 13th the Political Officers began to receive disquieting reports of at least two bodies of Wazirs, each one thousand strong, seen not very far off and believed to be on their way to attack Fort Sandeman. On the 14th an aeroplane arrived to reconnoitre the neighbourhood. Meanwhile, on the 13th, the officer commanding at Fort Sandeman had countermanded a convoy proceeding outwards, and suggested stopping the incoming convoy from Babar. However, under orders received from Head-quarters of the Zhob Force, to which he now belonged, he despatched the escort at 9 a.m. to meet and bring in the convoy from Babar on the 15th, with orders to march on the

15th. Fort Sandeman to Babar.

16th. Babar to Mile 107.

17th. Mile 107 to Fort Sandeman and back to Mile 107.

18th. Mile 107 to Junction and back to Mile 107.

19th. Mile 107 to Fort Sandeman.

Two hours later the aeroplane left Fort Sandeman to reconnoitre the route of the escort towards Lakaband. The escort consisted of the following:—

Officer commanding, Captain R. W. Copland (3/1st Gurkhas).

Right Section 38th Mountain Battery (Lieut. Gilbert).

225 rifles 3/1st Gurkhas (2nd Lieuts. Dobbin and French).

75 rifles Zhob Militia.

At 1 p.m. the aviator returned, reporting that six or seven hundred of the enemy were attacking the convoy at Babar. The escort had occupied the serai, and the loads were on the road outside. The enemy scattered under fire from the aeroplane's Lewis gun. The aviator, as he returned, informed the officer commanding the escort. From Fort Sandeman also a helio message was sent to him to press on to the relief of the convoy at Babar. After that there was no more news on the 15th. On the 16th a Zhob Militia naick, who had been sent with a message to Captain Copland, returned to report that he could not get through the enemy surrounding the escort. At 3.45 p.m. gunfire was heard from the hills North of Kapip, and presently shell bursts were seen there.

A party of fifty Zhob Militia was then sent out to piquet the last four miles into Fort Sandeman, and a party of fifty rifles 3/1st Gurkhas, with hospital transport, was

held ready, as it appeared clear there had been serious fighting. About 9 p.m. the Zhob Militia returned, reporting that, as they could see or hear nothing of the enemy or the escort, it seemed evident the latter had bivouacked for the night.

Two hours later more definite news was brought by Havildar Gamarsing of "C" Company 3/1st Gurkhas. He stated that Captain Copland and another British Officer had been killed, and 2nd Lieutenant Dobbin wounded. The convoy had been cut up by two thousand of the enemy. Two guns had been lost and all the animals killed. He added that he had been told that a British Officer had given orders, after the capture of the convoy, that all troops should make their way back to Fort Sandeman as best they could. A few stragglers came in in the night of the 16th-17th, all reporting the convoy and escort cut up, two guns lost, and Captain Copland and 2nd Lieutenants Dobbin and French killed.

On the 17th more stragglers from the escort came in, and 2nd Lieutenant J. V. Gilbert of the mountain battery was found and brought in by the Zhob Militia. Outlying strong points were now destroyed, and the garrison brought into the inner perimeter. A spy reported that he had been fired on by a machine gun at Mile 105 where the enemy were in strength and were, no doubt, using a captured machine gun. They had burnt everything from the convoy which they did not want. For the history of what happened to the unfortunate convoy and its escort we must depend on the following report of Lieutenant J. V. Gilbert, the only surviving British Officer.

"The escort left Fort Sandeman to meet the incoming convoy at 09:00 hrs. on the 15th, intending to march to Babar, take over the convoy, and halt the night. The journey was uneventful until the escort was one and a half miles from Babar when bursts of fire came from hills on left of road—time 18:30 hrs. Under the orders of O.C. Column the enemy were engaged by the infantry and guns. Enemy fire quietened after thirty minutes, and the column moved forward under some sniping fire from flanks.

"On approaching Babar Post it was seen that the convoy was parked to the East of the Post, which was being subjected to heavy fire from the high ground to the East and South and from cover near the village. Troops in the Post were gallantly replying. Guns were run up, Lewis gun brought into action, and after twenty to thirty minutes' firing the enemy fire ceased. The troops in the Post were found to be a party of 3/124th Baluchistan Infantry (Subadar Sulleh Mahomed, I.D.S.M.), who stated that the enemy had attacked the convoy about Mile 97 at 10:00 hrs. that morning. Convoy had retired, part staying at Babar, and part moving on towards Dewal. From all evidence the troops in the Post had had an extremely hard fight to keep the enemy out. Many enemy dead were lying round the Post, about twenty-five to thirty being reported seen. The 3/124th had about fifteen killed and many wounded in the Post.

"O.C. Escort took over the convoy, and ordered a camp for the night round the Post. On the night 15/16th a few rounds were fired into the camp. Nothing important.

"Reports were received from people sent out from Babar about 09:00 hrs. 16th that Dewal was now deserted, one British Officer lying dead in the camp where there were a few empty tents. Further reports indicated that road as far as Kapip was clear. Everything pointed to the enemy having moved towards Lakaband, and the O.C. Convoy ordered it to move to Mile 107 for the night 16/17th.

"A start was made at 11:00 hrs., piquets were pushed out, spies sent ahead, and all was well until the 104.6 milestone when three men were sighted ahead dressed as Gurkhas. Lieutenant Dobbin and three men went forward to investigate. On nearing them

the men fired on the party and severely wounded Lieutenant Dobbin, time 16.00 hrs. The column was halted and closed up, as it was soon seen that the hills were held in force by the enemy. O.C. Column now sent forward two parties, one under Lieutenant Dobbin (who though severely wounded refused to go behind) and one under Lieutenant French, to attack and clear the hills on either side of the river and establish piquets. The guns were brought into action to assist in the task in hand and brought gunfire to bear on the enemy on both flanks.

"The attempts were partially successful, a few men established themselves in the 'tangi,' but all round met with desperate resistance. Owing to enemy pressure on the rear and flank piquets, the column was advanced a few hundred yards. The advanced guard could make no further progress, in spite of a gun being run up level with them. The enemy, in ever-increasing numbers, poured down fire on the column, inflicting many casualties among men and animals. The O.C. Column now himself went forward (18.00 hrs.) with all the men he could collect (eighteen to twenty) to try and improve the increasingly grave position that was developing. He, however, found it impossible to push on, and returning after sustaining many casualties, he again endeavoured to scrape together enough men to make a second attempt. With the few men he could get he again set out, and a little later (19.00 hours) a report was received that he had been killed whilst leading this attack. During this time Lieutenants Dobbin and French were making gallant attempts to hold the piquets already established. On hearing that Captain Copland had been killed, I handed over the gun I had been shooting to the Senior N.C.O. and assumed Command of the Column. Immediately information was received that Lieutenants Dobbin and French had been killed. I went back along the convoy to investigate the state, and found that all the cartmen had deserted. On nearing the rear of the column, I sent for Subadar Gulab Shah of the Zhob Militia (Rearguard Commander) and held a hurried consultation. This Indian Officer and myself made a tour of the piquets on the left flank and found them in imminent danger of being driven in. On getting level with the advanced guard, the great strength of the enemy was realized; many of them holding strongly prepared positions from which they were pouring a heavy fire, effectively prevented any advance of the column. I thought it was my duty to inform O.C. Fort Sandeman of the gravity of the situation, and sent him word by four Zhob Militia Orakzais, hoping they would be able to get through the enemy position. On arrival at Fort Sandeman, I found they had succeeded in eluding the enemy, arriving at Fort Sandeman 04.00 hrs. 17th instant.

"Returning along the inside of the piquet positions, I found that the enemy were very heavily pressing the rearguard, who were putting up a brave resistance. Crossing over the river to inspect the piquets on the right flank, I found them in an equally serious position (20.00 hrs.).

"Now the volume of fire increased to its greatest intensity, and shortly after this as it grew dark, whistles were blown by the enemy, who on this signal rushed the convoy in overwhelming numbers. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued, and the escort was hopelessly outnumbered and swept away. The enemy then raided the carts and proceeded to take away loot up the nala about Mile 105.4 on the right bank. The rearguard, who had joined me on the hill overlooking the 'tangi,' poured volleys of fire into the enemy taking away the loot. A Lewis gun on the other bank of the river of 3/124th assisted greatly in harassing the enemy carrying away loot.

"After this, all was chaos, and our forces, cut off in small numbers, commenced to make their way in twos and threes in the direction of Fort Sandeman.

"I recrossed the river at 00.15 hrs., and remained on the scene until 01.15 hrs. when the rearguard and myself moved off, hoping to meet any force that may have been coming to the assistance of the column. After making a detour, we struck the Kapip-Fort Sandeman Road about Mile 109, and arrived at Fort Sandeman about 09.00 hrs. on the 17th inst.

Casualties.

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Missing.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Rifles lost.</i>
3/1st K.G.O. Gurkha Rifles.	B.O.s 3	—	—	—
		Other Ranks		
		33	34	91 and 1 Lewis gun.

British Officers. Killed. Captain R. W. Copland.
2nd Lieutenant F. le F. Dobbin.
2nd Lieutenant E. D. French.

Losses in Guns. Two 2.75 inch; B.L. guns 38th Mountain Battery were lost with all equipment and mules. 27 rounds of ammunition were lost. Both guns were put out of action by the Nos. 1.

2nd Lieutenant F. le F. Dobbin, 6th Gurkha Rifles, displayed the most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty. Wounded by the first shots fired, he continued with the utmost bravery to throw himself into the very heart of the engagement until killed. A most inspiring example to all who witnessed his gallantry."

The following story is furnished by Colonel Simpson:—

"A young signaller was captured by the Mahsuds in this action and left bound hand and foot with ropes for a week. He was kept alive because the Mahsuds imagined the signaller's badge on his arm denoted that he was a Lewis gunner, and that at the point of the knife he could be forced to use the Lewis gun captured against the garrison. He was starved and daily threatened with the knife being drawn across his throat. His bonds were finally cut by a man who had been in Government service, and he reached Fort Sandeman in safety."

After this disaster there does not remain much to relate regarding the history of the 3rd Battalion.

On the 27th July the approach of a body of six hundred or seven hundred of the enemy caused a heavy outbreak of fire from parts of the perimeter. This stampeded the horses and mules, and one Lewis-gun mule of the 3/1st Gurkhas was lost. Two of the enemy who had invaded and fired the bazar, were killed by the men. There was much sniping, and on the last day of July spies reported the enemy numbers in the neighbourhood of Fort Sandeman to be about four thousand five hundred.

On the 3rd August they began to descend boldly from the hills and occupied the irrigation channel, endeavouring to advance along it to the landing-ground of the aeroplane.

Two platoons of "A" Company were sent into the cemetery, the other two being in reserve in the East garden. The Zhob Militia Cavalry, acting as a screen on the left flank, were driven in, and one platoon of the 3/1st Gurkhas was sent to support them, which prevented the enemy from working up the nalas on the left and getting within range of the landing-ground.

Five hundred of the enemy, attacking along the irrigation channel, were beaten off, but, as they were constantly reinforced, it was decided that the aeroplane had better leave. Before doing so, it flew several times up and down the channel, firing with its Lewis gun on any of the enemy seen. When it was gone, after dropping a bomb on Techai Kalai, the troops retired to the perimeter. The enemy appears then to have cleared off from the immediate neighbourhood of Fort Sandeman.

As we know, peace with Afghanistan was signed on the 8th August. On the 19th orders were received that the battalion was to be relieved at once and return to Quetta, and that afternoon the 97th Infantry arrived and took over charge.

The 3/1st Gurkhas marched next morning, but, owing to two periods of segregation on account of cholera, it was only on the 25th September 1919 that it entrained at Kolpur for Quetta, where it occupied the Kandahar lines.

The battalion was disbanded at Quetta on the 31st March 1921.

"BHURTPORE."
"ALI WAL."
"SOBRAON."

"GIVENCHY, 1914."
"NEUVE CHAPELLE."
"YPRES, 1915."
"ST. JULIEN."
"FESTUBERT, 1915."
"LOOS."
"FRANCE AND
FLANDERS, 1914-15."

"AFGHANISTAN, 1878-80."
"PUNJAB FRONTIER."
"TIRAH."

"MEGIDDO."
"SHARON."
"PALESTINE, 1918."
"TIGRIS, 1916."
"KUT AL AMARA, 1917."
"BAGHDAD."
"MESOPOTAMIA, 1916-18."
"N.W. FRONTIER, INDIA, 1915, 17."

APPENDICES
I-VII



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- I. CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF OFFICERS, 1815-1921.
 - II. THE TITLE OF THE REGIMENT.
Commandants of the Regiment.
 - III. ESTABLISHMENTS.
 - IV. THE COLOURS.
 - V. UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT.
 - VI. THE PENSION LINES—DHARMSALA.
 - VII. CORRESPONDENCE (1864). FIXING THE HOMES
OF THE 1ST, 2ND, 3RD AND 4TH GURKHAS.

APPENDIX I

LIST OF OFFICERS WHO HAVE SERVED WITH THE 1ST KING GEORGE'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES (THE MALAUN REGIMENT) FROM 1815 TO 1921 IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER BY THE DATES WHEN THEY FIRST JOINED THE REGIMENT

(1) ROSS, LIEUTENANT ROBERT. Raised the Irregular Force during the Nepalese War of 1814-16, part of which in April 1815 became the 1st Nasiri Battalion. Appointed from the 6th Native Infantry to be the first Commandant of the Battalion with the rank of Lieutenant and pay of Captain. On the 1st January 1819 was promoted Captain with pay of Major. Was ex-officio Superintendent of the Simla Hill States. In that capacity he built the first habitation in Simla, a mere shanty. In the beginning of 1822 he left the Battalion and became Commandant of the Resident's Escort in Rajputana and Malwa, to which appointment was added, in 1825, that of 1st Asst. Resident. In 1826 went to 18th Native Infantry. In 1831 commanded the Agra Provincial Battalion; in 1832 was Asst. Resident Hyderabad (Deccan). From 1835 to 1840 was Political Agent at Kotah and became Lieut.-Colonel in September 1839. In 1844 became Lieut.-Colonel in the 25th Native Infantry. In 1847 held the same rank in the 71st Native Infantry, in 1848 in the 7th Native Infantry. On the 14th November 1849 is shown in the Army List as Colonel of the 1st Native Infantry, and remained so till his death at the Cape of Good Hope on the 7th November 1854, apparently on his way to England.

So far, all attempts to trace his family or any portrait of him have failed. The considerable part which he played in the Siege of Malaun and in raising the Irregular Force there appears in the text.

(2) NICHOLSON, LIEUTENANT JAMES. Appointed, from the 1st Native Infantry, to be the first Adjutant of the 1st Nasiri Battalion in 1815. Continued in that position till his promotion, on the 21st June 1826, when he was transferred to the 4th Bengal Native Infantry. From that regiment he returned to the 1st Nasiris as second-in-command at the end of 1828. Would doubtless have become Commandant had he not been invalided in 1832.

(3) WALKER, LIEUTENANT WILLIAM. Attached to the 1st Nasiris from February 1817 to August 1819, when he returned to the 26th Native Infantry from which he had come.

(4) GERARD, LIEUTENANT PATRICK. Was doing duty as Lieutenant 1st Nasiri Battalion in 1818. Belonged to the 8th Native Infantry. Served with Regiment till 1831. In 1832 he is still noted against the Regiment, but on special duty. After this his name is no longer recorded.

(5) GERARD, JAMES GILBERT. Was Assistant-Surgeon with the Regiment from 1818; Surgeon from 1827 to 1834. These two Gerards were brothers, who with a third brother did much exploring and surveying, and it is probable that either Patrick or James was the first to discover the advantages of Simla as a hill station.

(6) HEMMING, S. B., Local Ensign. Doing duty with Battalion from 1820 to 1822.

(7) KENNEDY, CAPTAIN CHARLES PRATT. From Captain in the Bengal Artillery was appointed the second Commandant of the 1st Nasiris in 1822, in succession to Robert Ross. As Superintendent of the Simla Hill States, ex officio, built the first real house in Simla, which still survives as "Kennedy House."

From the accounts of him given in the letters of the French scientist and traveller M. Jacquemont he appears to have enjoyed great power and influence in the small states he looked after. Commanded the 1st Nasiris till his retirement in 1836, and was therefore in command when the detachment was sent to the Siege of Bhurtpore. Died at Cheltenham in August 1875.

(8) McCausland, Lieutenant John Kennedy. Joined the 1st Nasiris in April 1823 from the 16th Bengal Native Infantry and remained with them till May 1825, when he was transferred to the 2nd Extra Infantry Regiment. From that he returned to the Nasiris in December 1826, when he succeeded James Nicholson in the Adjutancy. Was second-in-command from October 1832 till July 1841, when he was transferred to the 70th Bengal Native Infantry. He once more joined the battalion (then the 66th Gurkhas) from the 45th Bengal Native Infantry in November 1855, appointed to the command. Commanded during the Mutiny, though for most of the time was in command of the Kumaon Defence Force, the officiating command of the 66th being held by Captain C. C. G. Ross. In September 1859 went to command at Sialkot and elsewhere. Was made a C.B. in 1859 and retired as Lieut.-General on the 31st December 1861.

(9) Osborn, Lieutenant Henry Roche. Came to the Battalion in June 1823 from the 27th Bengal Native Infantry and was transferred to the 54th Bengal Native Infantry in the same year.

(10) Meade, Ensign Edward. Joined from 55th Bengal Native Infantry in June 1825. Returned to 55th Bengal Native Infantry in March 1828.

(11) Kirke, Lieutenant Henry. Of the 12th Native Infantry. Was only with the 1st Nasiris for a few weeks in January-February 1826. During that short period commanded the Nasiri detachment at the Siege of Bhurtpore and was wounded in the assault. In February 1826 went to the Sirmur Battalion (now 2nd Gurkha Rifles).

(12) Newton, Lieutenant Henry Augustus. Joined the 1st Nasiri Battalion from the Kumaon Battalion (now 3rd Gurkhas) as second-in-command in July 1826 till October 1828, when he went to the 2nd Nasiris. Appears to have been the first second-in-command.

(13) Stacy, Captain L. R. Was doing duty with the Battalion in January 1827.

(14) Speck, Captain Samuel. Appears in the Bengal Army List of 1st April 1828 as second-in-command. Possibly was only officiating pending the return of James Nicholson later in the year.

(15) O'Brien, Lieutenant C. Came from 3rd Native Infantry in October 1832 and succeeded McCausland as Adjutant when the latter succeeded Nicholson as second-in-command. Promoted Captain in October 1840, and succeeded McCausland as second-in-command in July 1841. Acted in command at the Battle of Sobraon when Nicholas Penny the commandant was in command of a Brigade. In June 1846 promoted Major and succeeded Penny as Commandant. In 1850, when the Native ranks of the Nasiri Battalion became the 66th Gurkhas, O'Brien raised the New Nasiri Battalion, the history of which is given in the text. He was Lieut.-Colonel commanding the 2nd Sikh Infantry when he died or was killed at Fatehipur on the 21st October 1857.

(16) Mitchelson, W. Was Assistant-Surgeon in charge during absence of Surgeon J. G. Gerard on special duty in 1832 and 1833.

(17) Maclean, Assistant-Surgeon. Succeeded Mitchelson in 1834 in medical charge.

(18) Lloyd, Lieutenant E. S. 49th Native Infantry. Acted as Adjutant for O'Brien on leave March 1835.

(19) Laughton, Assistant-Surgeon R. In medical charge 1834-39.

(20) TAPP, BT.-COLONEL HORATIO THOMAS. From 15th Native Infantry succeeded Kennedy as Commandant in March 1836 till June 1841.

(21) SIMPSON, LIEUTENANT R. S. Acted as Adjutant for O'Brien on leave in 1836 till 15th May.

(22) STEEL, J. Asst.-Surgeon, M.D. In medical charge 1840-44.

(23) PENNY, MAJOR NICHOLAS. Belonged to the 69th Bengal Native Infantry, but was in charge of the Adjutant-General's Office when, on the 9th June 1841, he succeeded Horatio Tapp as Commandant of the Nasiris. Commanded the Battalion at Aliwal, but at Sobraon was in command of a Brigade. Wounded there and received a C.B. for his services. Left the Battalion in October 1848 to become Lieut.-Colonel commanding the 69th Native Infantry. Afterwards served with distinction in the Second Sikh War and in the Mutiny. For his services in the former was made an A.D.C. to H.M. Queen Victoria. On the 7th June 1849 was promoted Colonel of the 2nd European Regiment and Major-General on the 28th November 1854. Killed in action near Bareilly on the 30th April 1858.

(24) HAY, LIEUTENANT ROBERT. Joined from 50th Bengal Native Infantry October 1841, as Adjutant in succession to Charles O'Brien, killed at Sobraon when acting as Brigade-Major to Nicholas Penny.

(25) REID, ASSISTANT-SURGEON A. In medical charge April 1843 vice Steel on detached duty.

(26) BROWN, ASSISTANT-SURGEON J. C. In medical charge 1847 until February 1851, when he went on furlough and did not return.

(27) REPTON, LIEUTENANT W. W. From 56th Native Infantry. Acting Adjutant in succession to R. Hay, killed at Sobraon 1846.*

(28) HARDINGE, ENSIGN G. N. From 45th Native Infantry, Adjutant 1847-50.

(29) LYON, CAPTAIN S. A. 34th Native Infantry. Acting second-in-command December 1848 to September 1849.

(30) McMALLIN, LIEUTENANT A. L. 23rd Native Infantry. Acting Adjutant 1847, whilst Hardinge was acting A.D.C. to the Commander-in-Chief.

(31) CAPEL, CAPTAIN E. S. Officiating second-in-command 1849-50 in succession to Lyon.

(32) BAGOT, LIEUTENANT A. 15th Native Infantry. Second-in-command from 27th March 1849 in succession to O'Brien, but did not rejoin from furlough till 15th April 1849. Was with O'Brien in February 1850 when the New Nasiri Battalion was raised. Succeeded to the command of it September 1855 and was with it during the trouble at Jutogh in 1857 and until disbandment.

In 1850 the disaffected 66th Native Infantry were disbanded, their place in the Line being taken as described in the text by the Nusseree Battalion. The British officers of the old "66th Native Infantry" became the British officers of the New "66th or Goorkha Regiment." As was always the case at this period of Indian history, several of the British officers then on the books of the "66th N.I." were seconded in civil or other employment, and some of these officers, though they appear for a few years on the lists of the new "66th or Goorkha Regiment," certainly never joined it. At the time of the change Major Troup was in command of the disaffected "66th N.I.," Lieut.-Colonel

* According to the East India Register, Captain R. R. Troup, 63rd Native Infantry, succeeded Hay as Adjutant and was transferred to the 2nd Oudh Infantry in December 1847. The Regiment however is unable to find any record of his name.

Parsons (the real commandant) being on leave. The latter officer never joined the new "66th," and Major Troup was promoted Lieut.-Colonel and confirmed in command with effect from 13th August 1850.

(33) TROUP, LIEUT.-COLONEL HUGH. Was officiating in command at the time of the transfer. Became substantive commandant 13th August 1850. Promoted November 1855, Colonel of 47th Bengal Native Infantry and retired.

(34) BROWNE, MAJOR SAMUEL. Succeeded Hugh Troup as second-in-command 13th August 1850. Died in camp at Abazai 10th May 1852.

(35) STRACHEY, CAPTAIN HENRY. Major from December 1861 to June 1862, when he retired. Was with the Regiment at Almora in the Mutiny.

(36) GARSTIN, CAPTAIN JOHN FRANCIS. With Regiment at Almora 1857-58. Died at Barrackpore 7th November 1858.

(37) PHILLPOTTS, LIEUTENANT JOHN SCOTT. Succeeded Henry Strachey as Major 1862. Promoted Captain 28th October 1850; Major 1st January 1862; Lieut.-Colonel 20th November 1862. Retired as Lieut.-Colonel May 1869. Was at Almora in Mutiny, but never commanded the Regiment.

(38) ROSS, LIEUTENANT CAMPBELL CLAY GRANT. Promoted Captain 10th May 1852. Officiated in command of 66th Gurkhas when Lieut.-Colonel McCausland was in command of the Kumaon Defence Force in 1857-58 and again in Oudh when McCausland left in September 1859. Awarded a Brevet Majority for the Action at Charpura 1858. In 1861 was transferred to command the 14th Bengal Native Infantry, for which appointment he was specially selected. He was the greatest loss to the regiment.

(39) HOCKLEY, LIEUTENANT JULIUS JOSEPH. Adjutant from February 1850 till October 1853. Was with the Regiment at Almora. In 1864 transferred to H.M. 104th Foot.

(40) LAW, LIEUTENANT JAMES ADEANE. Captain 6th November 1858. Was on furlough when Regiment was at Almora. Resigned in April 1860. Was Quartermaster and Interpreter.

(41) BARKER, LIEUTENANT ALFRED. Died 23rd February 1856 at Ferozepur.

(42) TYTLER, LIEUTENANT JOHN ADAM. Succeeded Julius Hockley as Adjutant in October 1853. Gained the Victoria Cross for gallantry at Charpura 10th February 1858. Transferred to 3rd Gurkhas August 1862. Died on active service when commanding a Brigade in the Kurram 14th February 1880.

(43) CLAY, LIEUTENANT EDWARD BERTIE. Captain 22nd April 1860; Major 2nd March 1865; second-in-command August 1868 till September 1876. Was in officiating command during the Perak Expedition. Transferred to command of 19th Bengal Native Infantry September 1876.

(44) SYKES, LIEUTENANT JAMES. With the Oudh Irregular Force when the Regiment was at Almora in the Mutiny. Transferred to Commissariat Department October 1859. Was with the 66th only in 1850-51, after which he went to 2nd Punjab Infantry.

(45) MILES, ENSIGN FREDERICK NICHOLAS. Lieutenant 30th April 1858, and transferred to 53rd Bengal Native Infantry.

(46) SWETENHAM, ENSIGN JAMES ROBERTS. Resigned 1854.

(47) GRAVES, ENSIGN ROBERT STANNUS. Lieutenant 15th September 1854; Captain 1st January 1862. Went to Commissariat Department in August 1863. With Regiment in Mutiny.

(48) RUXTON, ENSIGN ARTHUR UPTON FOX. Lieutenant 15th September 1854. With Punjab Infantry when Regiment was at Almora in Mutiny. Transferred to 3rd Punjab Infantry February 1864.

(49) FORBES, CHARLES. Assistant-Surgeon 1850-54.

Here ends the list of officers of the 66th Bengal Native Infantry who became officers of the 66th Gurkhas in 1850.

(50) MACINTYRE, ENSIGN DONALD. With the Regiment as Lieutenant at Almora in 1857, when he was deputed to Pithoragarh to raise a Gurkha Regiment which afterwards became the 4th Gurkha Rifles. In January 1858 is still shown on the list of the 66th "on special duty Kumaon," and in 1859 as "in charge of the Gurkha recruit depot at Pithoragarh." In July 1860 was officiating second-in-command Sirmoor Regiment. Gained the Victoria Cross in the Lushai Expedition when still second-in-command of the 2nd Gurkhas (Sirmoor Battalion).

(51) HAVELOCK, ENSIGN CHARLES WEMYSS. Lieutenant 1856. Was Adjutant 12th Irregular Cavalry when killed in action in Oudh on the 11th May 1858. Left the 66th before the Mutiny.

(52) SWENEY, ENSIGN WILLIAM FREDERICK. Joined 1853. Died at Lahughat of cholera 25th March 1857.

(53) GEPP, ENSIGN THOMAS SIDNEY. Joined December 1854. Lieutenant 31st May 1857. Killed in action at Charpura 10th February 1858. Colonel McCausland would have recommended him for Victoria Cross had he survived. (See correspondence quoted at end of Chapter V.)

(54) IRWIN, HENRY, F.R.C.S.I. Surgeon 1854-59.

(55) TUCKER, SAMUEL REEVE. Assistant-Surgeon 1855 with left wing at Kohat.

(56) CLIFFORD, FREDERIC MORRISON. Assistant-Surgeon 1856.

(57) FITZGERALD, ENSIGN EDWARD TROWER. Joined 7th March 1856. Lieutenant 10th February 1858 and went in same year to Commissariat Department. With the Regiment in Almora in the Mutiny and received his step on Gepp's death at Charpura.

(58) SALE-HILL, ENSIGN ROWLEY. Joined January 1857. Succeeded J. A. Tytler as Adjutant November 1859. Served with Regiment in Mutiny at Charpura, Pusgaon, Rasulpur, Biswah and Mithauli. In Bhutan 1865-66, Hazara 1868. Became second-in-command September 1876. Afghan War 1878-79. Commandant 1st January 1879 till 25th January 1882, when he became Brig.-General, Pindi Brigade. In 1883-84 employed at Assam reorganizing the 42nd, 43rd and 44th Gurkha Regiments. In May 1904 appointed Colonel of the 1st Gurkha Rifles (see p. 116). Died in England 23rd March 1916.

(59) YOUNGHUSBAND, LIEUTENANT GEORGE DUKINFELD ASTLEY. Joined from 58th Native Infantry in May 1857. Died at Dharmasala 26th July 1861.

(60) PEARSON, LIEUTENANT THOMAS. Joined 18th May 1858. Captain 19th December 1867. Removed from Service 21st January 1869. Does not appear with the Regiment in the Army List after July 1867.

(61) BISHOP, LIEUTENANT ST. GEORGE MEADOWS. Joined November 1858. Went to 6th Bengal Cavalry 1861, and was killed on the Peshawar Frontier. Was with Regiment at Almora in Mutiny.

(62) STORY, ENSIGN PHILIP. Joined from D.C.L.I. in 1858 at Almora. Adjutant September 1862

till May 1868. Second-in-command 1st January 1879 till 26th January 1882, when he became Commandant till he was appointed Brig.-General on 31st December 1885.

(63) YOUNG, ENSIGN GEORGE. Joined from 2nd Bengal Fusiliers July 1859. Succeeded Philip Story as Adjutant May 1868. Second-in-command 1882-86, when he succeeded Philip Story as Commandant till his retirement at the end of 1892. Was still alive 1924, the senior surviving officer of the Regiment.

(64) GRAHAM, LIEUT.-COLONEL JOSEPH. Joined from 29th Bengal Native Infantry as Commandant, in succession to J. K. McCausland, in September 1859, and continued in command till November 1861, when he retired. Had been for many years seconded in the Thuggi Department.*

(65) CRADDOCK, WILLIAM. M.D., F.R.C.S.Eng. Surgeon 1860-70.

(66) PRIOR, MAJOR CHARLES. From 64th Bengal Native Infantry. Succeeded Joseph Graham as Commandant from 21st November 1861 till he retired 24th August 1868.

(67) BROWN, LIEUTENANT R. H.M. 107th Foot. Doing Duty Officer 1862.

(68) FITZGERALD, LIEUTENANT W. H. B. H.M. 107th Foot. Doing Duty Officer 1860-62.

(69) PARKER, LIEUTENANT A. W. H.M. 107th Foot. Doing Duty Officer 1860-62.

(70) BRUCE, LIEUTENANT T. F. General List Infantry. Doing Duty Officer 1860-62.

(71) OLIPHANT, LIEUTENANT T. T. Late 5th E.R. Doing Duty Officer 1861-63.

(72) SIMPSON, LIEUTENANT F. W. General List Infantry. Doing Duty Officer 1861-64.

(73) MERCER, LIEUTENANT C. General List Infantry. Doing duty 1862 till 1867, when he became second-wing subaltern. Captain and first-wing subaltern 1868. Quartermaster 1874-77. Died Dharmasala 22nd May 1877.

(74) BRUCE, LIEUTENANT A. MCC. General List Infantry. Doing duty 1863 to 1866, when he went to 4th Punjab Infantry.

(75) LAING, CAPTAIN F. E. Late 17th Native Infantry. Doing duty February 1863. Major 10th December 1864. Was with Depot 1866.

(76) CAVENAGH, CAPTAIN GORDON. Late 39th Native Infantry. Doing duty 8th August 1863 to April 1868. Major 18th January 1865. Last appears in List April 1868.

(77) RAWLINS, MAJOR JAMES SEBASTIAN, transferred from the 44th Bengal Native Infantry 19th July 1864 as second-in-command. Substantive Commandant August 1868, retired December 1878.

(78) CUMINE, CAPTAIN ARCHIBALD, transferred from the 4th Bengal Native Infantry January 1864. Died at Buxa Bhutan the following year.

(79) TAYLOR, A. Asst.-Surgeon. Officiating Medical Charge 1866.

* This was the reconstruction period in the Indian Army taken over by the Crown. Commanding officers were for a few years appointed from among those senior officers of the Company's army who had for years been divorced from all real military life, while several junior officers of the old European regiments of the Company's army served for short periods with the regiment.

- (80) FORBES, CAPTAIN F. W. H. Staff Corps. Only appears in List of July 1867.
- (81) COCK, LIEUTENANT C. R. Staff Corps. Joined 22nd February 1867. Captain 4th September 1868. In 1870 went to 20th Native Infantry.
- (82) CHURCHILL, LIEUTENANT G. F. Staff Corps (106th Foot). Joined on probation 5th October 1868. Succeeded G. Young as Adjutant 12th September 1870, and as second-in-command in January 1886. Retired 27th December 1892.
- (83) BARNETT, LIEUTENANT C. ST. J. B. Joined 27th June 1868 as Quartermaster. Captain 4th November 1869. Major 4th November 1877. Retired 4th November 1882.
- (84) CARTER, SURGEON F. In medical charge 31st October 1870 to 2nd January 1877.
- (85) JENKINS, ENSIGN R. E. A. 1st Battalion 11th Foot. Joined on probation 7th October 1871. Transferred to 20th Native Infantry May 1873.
- (86) MELVILLE, CAPTAIN J. S. (unattached). Commanding at Kangra 27th June 1871. Does not appear after List of January 1872.
- (87) RANKIN, CAPTAIN H. H. General List Infantry. Transferred to 34th Native Infantry 1878.
- (88) MASSY, ASSISTANT-SURGEON G. Only appears in List of January 1872, when he was noted as "Civil Dharmasala."
- (89) GARDEN, CAPTAIN H. C. Late 57th Native Infantry. Joined 4th April 1872. Does not appear after List of January 1873.
- (90) HOWEY, CAPTAIN J. E. W. General List Infantry. Joined 17 May 1872. Last appears in List of April 1876.
- (91) CHANNER, CAPTAIN GEORGE NICHOLAS. Staff Corps. Joined 6th March 1873 from 2nd Native Infantry. Bt.-Major 12th April 1876. Served in Malay Peninsula 1875-76, where he gained the Victoria Cross for gallantry at Bukit Putoos and was made Brevet-Major. Transferred January 1878 to 29th Native Infantry.
- (92) OLDHAM, SURGEON-MAJOR C. F. Joined in officiating medical charge 16th March 1874. Succeeded Surgeon-Major F. Carter in 1877.
- (93) BOMFORD, SURGEON G. Doing duty 22nd November 1875. Does not appear after List of April 1876.
- (94) ROBINSON, LIEUTENANT GEORGE HENRY. Joined from 2nd Battalion 12th Foot as Staff Corps probationer 9th October 1876. Adjutant 1882. Second-in-command 1st Battalion September 1894. Commandant 2nd Battalion February 1900. Severely injured and broken down in the Dharmasala earthquake of April 1905. Retired 9th August 1905, and died in the following year.
War Services: Afghanistan, 1878-80; Sikkim, 1888 (despatches); Waziristan (Wana), 1894-95 (despatches, Bt.-Lieut.-Colonel).
- (95) SPANKIE, LIEUTENANT J. P. W. Joined from 2/22nd Foot 4th June 1877. Transferred to 3rd Gurkhas February 1881.
- (96) TEMPLE, LIEUTENANT R. C. Joined from 1/21st Foot 8th February 1878. Became a Cantonment Magistrate August 1879.

(97) OZZARD, LIEUTENANT H. H. Joined from 1/3rd Foot 24th October 1878 as probationer. Was apparently only a few months with the Regiment.

(98) MARTIN, LIEUTENANT EDWARD WILLIAM FANE. Joined from 34th Foot September 1879. Adjutant 1st Battalion 6th February 1885. Second-in-command 1st Battalion July 1894. Transferred to 5th Gurkhas May 1899. Died at Abbottabad of a malignant fever in 1906 when temporarily commanding the Brigade there as well as the Battalion of the 5th Gurkhas.

War Services: Afghanistan, 1879-80; Mohmand and Tirah, 1897-98 (despatches, Bt.-Lieut.-Colonel).

(99) KEMPSTER, LIEUTENANT FRANCIS J. Joined from 100th Foot September 1879. Appears to have returned to his British Regiment in the first half of 1881, whilst still a Staff Corps probationer.

(100) POWELL, LIEUTENANT CHARLES HERBERT. Joined from 40th Native Infantry 26th February 1881. Adjutant 1st Battalion September 1886. Captain 15th February 1887. Second-in-command 2nd Battalion February 1900. Commandant 1st Battalion September 1903. Colonel on Staff May 1907. Colonel of the Regiment in succession to Sir Rowley Sale-Hill 1917. C.B. 26th June 1908. K.C.B. 1st January, 1917.

War Services: Waziristan (Wana), 1894-95 (despatches); N.W. Frontier 1897-98 (Tirah) (despatches, Bt.-Lieut.-Colonel); China, 1900 (British Representative on Count von Waldersee's Staff).

During the Great War Sir C. H. Powell was appointed to raise the 16th Irish Division from which he was transferred to raise the 18th Division, and finally was ordered in September 1914 to raise the Ulster Division. That Division remained in Ulster till June 1915, when it moved to Seaford, where it was inspected by Lord Kitchener, who ordered immediate mobilization for France. The Division went to Borden, where Sir C. H. Powell found himself barred by age under Lord Kitchener's orders from going with it to France.

(101) COUPER, LIEUTENANT EDWARD EDMONSTONE. Joined from 17th Native Infantry October 1882. Transferred to 4th Gurkhas June 1884.

(102) REID, LIEUTENANT H. A. S. From 6th Native Infantry February 1883. Transferred to K.O. Yorkshire Light Infantry April 1885.

(103) KERR, LIEUTENANT MARK ANCRUM. From 4th Gurkhas February 1883. Adjutant (1st Bn.) 15th February 1887. Transferred to 44th Gurkhas March 1894.

(104) HATCH, LIEUTENANT ARTHUR VINCENT. From 24th Punjab Infantry February 1883. Adjutant (2nd Bn.) February 1886. Commandant (2nd Bn.) 9th August 1905. Retired August 1910.

War Services: Sikkim, 1888; Mohmand and Tirah, 1897-98.

(105) CROMMELIN, LIEUTENANT CLARENCE YULE. From 3rd Bengal Native Infantry April 1885. Adjutant (1st Bn.) August 1890. Captain October 1892. Major July 1901. Transferred to 9th Gurkhas March 1903.

War Services: Waziristan, 1894-95.

(106) LANG, LIEUTENANT ARTHUR GEORGE BOILEAU. From 30th Bengal Native Infantry 20th January 1886. Captain 10th May 1893. Major 10th July 1901. Second-in-command (1st Bn.) September 1903. Commandant (1st Bn.) and Lieut.-Colonel 30th September 1907. Retired September 1912.

War Services: Waziristan, 1894-95 (severely wounded at Wana).

(107) ROGERS, MAJOR GEORGE WALTER. From 4th Bengal Native Infantry in February 1886 to raise and command 2nd Battalion. Commandant till 5th March 1894, when exchanged with Lieut.-Colonel Sage to command 1st Battalion till August 1894. Bt.-Colonel 29th September 1893.

War Services: Sikkim, 1888 (despatches, D.S.O.).

(108) CORSE-SCOTT, MAJOR JOHN. From 4th Bengal Native Infantry February 1886 to be second-in-command 2nd Battalion. Died at Dharmsala August 1888, whilst the Battalion was in Sikkim.

(109) HAWKES, CAPTAIN GEORGE. From 17th Madras Infantry February 1886. Transferred to 5th Gurkhas March 1888.

(110) FULTON, CAPTAIN ROBERT. From 33rd Bengal Native Infantry February 1886. Second-in-command (1st Bn.) February 1893. Commandant (1st Bn.) September 1894. Retired 31st August 1903. War Services: Sikkim, 1888.

(111) OMMANEY, LIEUTENANT GEORGE STEWART. From 10th Bengal Native Infantry February 1886. Second-in-command (2nd Bn.) November 1900. Transferred to 3rd Gurkhas May 1903. War Services: Afghanistan, 1879-80; Sikkim, 1888; Waziristan, 1894-95.

(112) JOHNSON, LIEUTENANT ARTHUR CYRIL BEAUMONT. From 96th Foot February 1886. Captain 10th March 1894. Major 10th July 1901. Died at Dharmsala 11th September 1904. War Services: Sikkim, 1888.

(113) SHAKESPEAR, LIEUTENANT LESLIE WATERFIELD. From 38th Bengal Native Infantry, February 1886. Transferred to 2nd Gurkhas April 1888.

(114) MASTER, LIEUTENANT ROBERT STRENSHAM. From 15th Madras Infantry April 1886. Died of wounds Burma 6th February 1888, when with Burma Military Police.

(115) RYDER, LIEUTENANT WILFRED IRONSIDE. From 29th Punjab Infantry April 1887. Second-in-command (2nd Bn.) 9th August 1905. Commandant (2nd Bn.) 9th August 1910 till 21st August 1915. Captain 23rd August 1895; Major 20th May 1898; Lieut.-Colonel 9th August 1910.

War Services: Sikkim, 1888; Malakand, Mohmand and Tirah 1897-98 (wounded, despatches, Bt.-Major).

In August 1917 Colonel Ryder was employed as a Draft Conducting Officer. On arrival in India he proceeded to Dharmsala to take over the then forming 3rd Battalion of his old regiment. Arrived at Dharmsala and took over command on 30th September 1917. Served with 3/1st till 29th January 1919, when he handed over command to Major Simpson and proceeded on sick leave ex India, pending retirement. Finally retired with effect from 23rd August 1919.

(116) WATSON, LIEUTENANT HARRY DAVIS. From Dorsetshire Regiment June 1886. Transferred to 2nd Gurkhas August 1890.

War Services: Sikkim, 1888.

(117) ANGELO, LIEUTENANT RAYMOND DAVIS. From 5th Bengal Native Infantry May 1887. Adjutant (1st Bn.) 31st July 1893. Died of wounds received at Wana 30th November 1894.

(118) SAVAGE, LIEUTENANT WILLIAM HENRY. From 25th Bengal Native Infantry June 1886. Transferred to 2nd Gurkhas June 1887.

(119) WOODYATT, LIEUTENANT NIGEL GRESLEY. From 30th Bengal Native Infantry May 1887. Transferred to 3rd Gurkhas June 1887.

(120) SAGE, MAJOR CHARLES ARTHUR ROSS. From 35th Sikhs in July 1888 to be second-in-command (2nd Bn.). Commandant (2nd Bn.) 6th March 1894 till 6th February 1900. Lieut.-Colonel 8th July 1894.

War Services: Sikkim, 1888; Mohmand and Tirah, 1897-98 (severely wounded, despatches).

(121) DRUMMOND, LIEUTENANT EDMOND JOHNSTON. From West Yorkshire Regiment 1888. Transferred to 2nd Gurkhas August 1890.

(122) STRACHEY, LIEUTENANT B. Staff Corps 18th September 1889. Disappears from List in 1892.

(123) HOME, LIEUT.-COLONEL JAMES MURRAY. Rejoined the 1st Battalion as Lieut.-Colonel from the 8th Gurkha Rifles on 31st July 1912, but had served before as a subaltern for a few months in 1890 before being posted to the 2nd Gurkhas. Commanded till January 1915, when he handed over command to Colonel W. C. Anderson.

(124) ROSE, LIEUTENANT JOHN LATHAM. From Highland Light Infantry May 1890. Adjutant (2nd Bn.) 17th April 1894. Second-in-command (2nd Bn.) 9th August 1910, but was deputed to the Kashmir State. Captain 16th November 1898. Major 16th November 1905.

War Services: Mohmand and Tirah, 1897-98. Also served away from Regiment in China 1900 (despatches) and East Africa 1902-04.

(125) MONEY, LIEUTENANT ERNEST DOUGLAS. From Lincolnshire Regiment March 1891. Adjutant (1st Bn.) 1st December 1894. Second-in-command (2nd Bn.) 9th August 1910 p.t. Commandant (2nd Bn.) 21st August 1915 till 11th March 1918. Captain 9th May 1899. Major 9th May 1906. Lieut.-Colonel 9th May 1914. C.I.E. 1911. D.S.O. 1917.

War Services: N.W. Frontier, 1892; Waziristan, 1894-95; Tirah, 1897-98; 1914-18 N.W.F. Swat Valley and Mohmand Frontier: Waziristan, 1917.

(126) ANDERSON, LIEUTENANT WILLIAM CHRISTIAN. From Highland Light Infantry September 1891. Adjutant (2nd Bn.) 25th November 1898. Captain 14th January 1899. Major 8th December 1906. Lieut.-Colonel 8th December 1914. Went to 2/6th Gurkhas as second-in-command 20th May 1909. Rejoined the 1st Battalion from the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles in France, as Major on 5th January 1915, and succeeded Colonel Home in command on 21st May 1915. Served continuously with the Battalion in France and Mesopotamia till dangerously wounded at Jabal Hamrin on 25th March 1917. On 5th March 1918 took over command of the Quetta Brigade. Promoted temporary Brigadier-General while commanding a Brigade on 11th March, and retired 13th September 1919 as Brigadier-General. C.M.G. 1916; Order of St. Anne (with Swords) (Russia); Brevet of Colonel 3rd June 1916.

Other War Services: N.W. Frontier (Tirah), 1897-98.

(127) BATEMAN-CHAMPAIN, LIEUTENANT HUGH FREDERICK. From 3rd Bengal Infantry July 1891. Adjutant (2nd Bn.) 6th February 1900. Transferred to 9th Gurkhas January 1905.

War Services: Waziristan, 1894-95; Tirah, 1897-98.

(128) LANG, LIEUTENANT EWEN MONTGOMERY. From Royal Artillery March 1892. Adjutant (1st Bn.) 9th May 1899. Captain 3rd October 1903. Resigned 4th November 1907.

(129) HERBERT, CAPTAIN CLAUD. From 44th Gurkhas April 1893. Served in Waziristan 1894 (despatches). D.S.O. Dangerously wounded at Wana and being unfit for further active service, transferred to the Cantonment Magistrates' Department, in which he served till 1918.

(130) THOMPSON, LIEUTENANT HARRY ARTHUR HALE. From 2nd Gurkhas August 1893. Second-in-command (1st Bn.) 29th March 1909. Retired 6th February 1913. Captain 5th February 1900. Major 5th February 1905.

War Services: Tirah, 1897-98.

(131) MCLEOD, LIEUTENANT TORQUIL JOHN. From 3rd Gurkhas May 1894. Captain 10th July 1901. Transferred to 7th Gurkhas November 1907.

(132) MUSCROFT, LIEUTENANT JAMES. From K.O. Yorkshire Light Infantry February 1896. Captain 1st April 1900. Killed in earthquake at Dharmasala 4th April 1905.

(133) YOUNG, 2ND LIEUTENANT ARTHUR. Joined the 1st Battalion on 22nd July 1899, elder son

of Colonel G. Young, who commanded the 1st Battalion from 1886 to 1892. Present at the memorable storming of the Dargai Heights, was recommended for the Victoria Cross and received a mention in despatches. At the outbreak of the Great War was Brigade-Major, Garhwal Brigade and went to France in August 1914 in that capacity, and was killed on the 14th December 1914.

(134) HUGHES, 2ND LIEUTENANT ARTHUR PITCAIRN. Joined the 1st Battalion on 13th April 1900. Transferred to the 7th Gurkhas in Quetta in 1907.

(135) JOHNSON, 2ND LIEUTENANT ALLEN EDWIN. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 27th April 1900. At the outbreak of the War in 1914 he was in command of the 2nd Battalion Depot in Dharmasala, the battalion being in Chitral. Left the Depot of the 2nd Battalion with reinforcements for France on 9th December 1914, and joined the 1st Battalion, with which unit he was wounded severely in the Second Battle of Ypres on 2nd May 1915. Returned to India and rejoined the 2nd Battalion on 16th November 1915. Served with the Southern Waziristan Field Force in 1917. Sailed for Mesopotamia in May 1918, and on the 3rd June took over command of the 1/11th Gurkha Rifles which had just been raised at Kut. Commanded this unit till 20th August 1921, when it was disbanded. During its short life the Battalion served in Mesopotamia till July 1918 and then sailed for India. It served in the 3rd Afghan War where Major, Acting Lieut.-Colonel Johnson, was awarded the D.S.O. dated 1st January, 1920, G. of I. 1747 dated 27th August 1920. The Battalion was again despatched overseas to Mesopotamia and served in the Arab revolt from October 1920 to April 1921, for his services in which campaign was promoted Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel and mentioned in despatches, G. of I. 2051 dated 21st October 1921. On the expiry of the command of the 2nd Battalion of Colonel Dopping-Hepenstal in March 1922 Colonel Johnson was appointed to succeed him and is commanding at date of writing.

(136) EVANS, 2ND LIEUTENANT WALTER JAMES. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 12th May 1900. Transferred to the 1st Battalion as a Company commander in 1910. At the outbreak of war went with the 1st Battalion to France and served with it till wounded. On release from hospital was sent to India and joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala. For his services after the earthquake at Dharmasala was awarded the medal of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. Sailed for Mesopotamia and took over command of the 1st Battalion 18th April 1917. Commanded the Battalion continuously till the end of the War, serving in Mesopotamia and Palestine. Mentioned in despatches by Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. French, G. of I. 684 dated 23rd July 1915, and for his services in Palestine in 1918 in the final offensive was mentioned in despatches and awarded the D.S.O. G. of I. 2461 dated 18th July 1919 and 187 dated 24th January 1920. Retired after the War.

(137) GRAHAM, 2ND LIEUTENANT BAZETT COLVIN. Joined the 1st Battalion on 22nd June 1900, and had previously served in the Tirah Campaign of 1897-98. After joining the Battalion served temporarily with the 42nd, now 1/6th, Gurkha Rifles and 30th Punjab Infantry, now 1/16th Punjab Regiment. Transferred to the 125th Napier's Rifles (now 5/6th Rajputana Rifles) 26th March 1912. Retired 4th August 1920.

(138) SANDEMAN, 2ND LIEUTENANT ALFRED PATRICK. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 6th October 1920. Seconded for service with the Burma Military Police in 1904 and subsequently transferred permanently to the Burma Commission.

(139) SHAW, 2ND LIEUTENANT HAROLD MIDDLETON DRURY. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 30th October 1900. He served with the 2/3rd and 3/3rd Gurkha Rifles in Egypt and Palestine. Severely wounded at Enab on 21st November 1917, but rejoined on 29th December and assumed command of the 3/3rd Gurkhas on 30th December. Promoted to Acting Lieut.-Colonel on 5th January 1918 and held command of the unit till it was disbanded on the 11th September 1920. For his services with the 3/3rd Gurkha Rifles Colonel Shaw was mentioned in despatches and awarded the D.S.O. G. of I. 415 dated 22nd February 1919, and 536 dated 8th March 1919. After the Armistice the 3/3rd Gurkhas formed part of the *post-bellum* garrison in Egypt, and they served in the

Egyptian Rebellion of 1919. For services in this operation was awarded the 3rd Class of the Order of the Nile, G. of I. 400 dated 28th February 1920. For his services with the Nepalese Contingent in the early days of the War Colonel Shaw was awarded the 2nd Class of the Star of Nepal by the Maharajah and Prime Minister of Nepal, G. of I. 2454 dated 11th December 1920. On the disbandment of the 3/3rd Gurkha Rifles, rejoined the 2nd Battalion as second-in-command, and was appointed to permanent command of the 1st Battalion with effect from 1st November 1921 on the promotion of Colonel Holdich to command of a Brigade. On 21st April 1923 proceeded as instructor to the Senior Officers' School, Belgum. On the 1st December 1923 confirmed in his appointment and ceased to command the Battalion.

(140) BIRDWOOD, 2ND LIEUTENANT RICHARD LOCKINGTON. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 22nd June 1901. Joined the Political Department in 1904. At the outbreak of war was serving in Persia, where he was killed on 17th November 1914.

(141) CROOKSHANK, 2ND LIEUTENANT WILFRED PLASSY. Joined the 1st Battalion on 1st September 1901. On the outbreak of war was left in command of the 1st Battalion Depot which he commanded till the end of 1915. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on 8th January 1916 and was killed in the unsuccessful attempt to take the Dujaila position on 8th March 1916.

(142) ELIAS, 2ND LIEUTENANT ALFRED HEARST WYNN. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 4th November 1901. During the War he served as Staff Officer on Lines of Communication to the force operating in German East Africa. Retired from the Indian Army 1st August 1919, and transferred to the Royal Air Force.

(143) LATHAM, 2ND LIEUTENANT ALAN. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 7th July 1902. Had seen service in the Waziristan Blockade 1901-02, medal and clasp. Present in the operations in the Swat Valley in August and September 1915. In October 1917 transferred to the 4/39th Garhwal Rifles, now the Kumaon Rifles, and served with that unit till end of the War. Despatches, D.S.O., and on the retirement of Major Evans in 1919 rejoined the 1st Battalion and took over command in Egypt. Brought the Battalion back to India and commanded till Colonel Holdich took over on appointment as substantive Commandant on 10th August 1920. In 1921 transferred as Substantive second-in-command to the Kumaon Rifles.

(144) HOLDERNESS, LIEUTENANT HARDWICKE. Joined the 1st Battalion on 17th August 1902, having previously served in the Waziristan Blockade of 1901-02, medal and clasp. Served with 2nd Battalion in Swat Valley and on Mohmand Frontier in 1915. Operations against the Mahsuds in 1917. Transferred to the 4/39th Garhwal Rifles—now the Kumaon Rifles—on 17th November 1917. Was present with that unit in the final advance in Palestine, Battles of Megiddo, D.S.O. and despatches. Commanded the 1/50th Kumaon Rifles from 19th May 1919 to 16th February 1921. Appointed substantive second-in-command 1st Battalion 1st November 1921. Officiating Commandant 1st Battalion 20th April 1923; substantive Commandant and Lieut.-Colonel 1st December 1923.

(145) DUFF, 2ND LIEUTENANT BEAUCHAMP OSWALD. Joined the 1st Battalion on 14th October 1902 and had seen service in the Waziristan Blockade 1901-02, medal and clasp. Seconded for service in Somaliland on 23rd August 1903, medal and two clasps. For his services in the cause of humanity in the earthquake of 1905 was awarded the Silver Medal of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. Served with the Miri Mission in 1911. In October 1914 he was temporarily attached to the 2nd K.E.O. Gurkha Rifles and was killed on 7th November, being the first Officer of the Regiment to fall in the War.

(146) BRETT, 2ND LIEUTENANT FRANCIS LIONEL SEYMOUR. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 4th January 1904, and was transferred to the 7th Gurkhas in December 1907.

(147) INGLIS, LIEUTENANT ALEXANDER FRANCIS. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 20th February 1904.

Seconded, about the time of the outbreak of the Great War, for service with the Gilgit Scouts under the Kashmir Agency. Towards the close of the War saw service as a supervising officer with the 1st Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry. O.B.E. and despatches. Retired on 15th November 1922.

(148) GIFFARD, LIEUTENANT COLIN HAY. Joined the 1st Battalion on 6th March 1904. Served in France with the 1st Battalion: wounded at Festubert. Killed at Dujaila, Mesopotamia, 8th March, 1916.

(149) MONEY, 2ND LIEUTENANT HENRY IRONSIDE. Joined the 1st Battalion on 2nd April 1904. Served with the 1st Battalion in France and was killed in action on 20th December 1914 at Festubert. Despatches.

(150) BROUGHTON, 2ND LIEUTENANT GERALD FILOSE. Joined the 1st Battalion from 2nd Gurkha Rifles in April 1904, and was re-transferred to them again in November.

(151) SCOTT, LIEUTENANT HENRY LAWRENCE. Joined the 1st Battalion on 12th July 1904. Served with the 1st Battalion. Served with the Battalion continuously in France till 1st August 1915, when he was appointed Staff Captain 8th Jullundur Brigade. Had wide experience on staff in France and Mesopotamia and in command of 1/10th Gurkha Rifles: D.S.O. and Bar; M.C., Brevet of Lieut.-Colonel and eight times mentioned in despatches. Rejoined 1st Battalion as second-in-command December 1923.

(152) BATTYE, MAJOR ARTHUR HENRY. Joined the 2nd Battalion from the 4th Gurkha Rifles on 23rd October 1904. Transferred to the 10th Gurkha Rifles in November 1907.

(153) ORCHARD, LIEUTENANT DONALD STUART. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 22nd December 1904. Joined Depot immediately after the earthquake on the 4th April 1905. For his services after the earthquake was awarded the Silver Medal of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. Transferred to the Remount Department on 8th July 1907.

(154) GIBSON, LIEUTENANT PENDARVES CHRISTOPHER FOLL. Joined on 29th December 1904 from 54th Sikhs. Left the army in March 1909. In the Great War he joined the Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment), and was killed in action on the 10th April 1917.

(155) HARCOURT, 2ND LIEUTENANT EDRIC SHERWOOD. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 7th May 1905, and was transferred to the 7th Gurkhas in January 1908.

(156) BIRCH, 2ND LIEUTENANT COLVIN FREDERIC MONTAGU. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 2nd July 1905. Served with the Battalion in the Swat Valley in 1915. Transferred to the 3rd Battalion in 1917. Rejoined the 2nd Battalion as a Company commander in 1923.

(157) BALDWIN, 2ND LIEUTENANT MONTAGU CHENEVIX. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 9th July 1905. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on 22nd March 1916 and was severely wounded at Bait Aissa on 17th April 1916. Military Cross, despatches. Rejoined the 2nd Battalion in India on 5th February 1917. Transferred to 3/6th Gurkha Rifles on 26th February 1917. Joined the 1st Battalion as a Company commander on 19th October 1922. In addition to service in Mesopotamia in 1916 served in the Third Afghan War 1919, and the Moplah Rebellion of 1921-22.

(158) NORTHEY, LIEUTENANT WILLIAM BROOK. Joined the 1st Battalion 29th July 1906. Employed with the Nepalese Contingent from 3rd March 1915 to 20th April 1916. Rejoined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on 4th October, and was severely wounded at the Battle of Jabal Hamrin on 25th March 1917. Military Cross, despatches. Invalided April 1924.

(159) KENNEDY, LIEUTENANT GILBERT STUART. Joined the 1st Battalion on 8th July 1907.

Served with the Battalion in France till 12th March 1915, when he was killed in the attack on the Bois de Biez.

(160) WALKER, BREVET-LIEUT.-COLONEL WILLIAM GEORGE, V.C. Joined the 1st Battalion from the 4th Gurkha Rifles, as second-in-command and officiating Commandant on 27th July 1907. In March 1909 was reposted to 1/4th Gurkha Rifles.

(161) OGILVY, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN DONALD. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 8th March 1908. Served with the 2nd Battalion in the operations against the Swatis and Mohmands on the Indian Frontier in 1915, and later served in the Mirri expedition and in the Campaign in Waziristan in 1919-20.

(162) MINCHINTON, 2ND LIEUTENANT HENRY DARRELL. Joined the 1st Battalion on the 22nd March 1908, and rejoined the 1st Battalion in France on the 22nd July 1915, and served with it in France and Mesopotamia till 8th March 1916, when he was severely wounded. Rejoined the Battalion in September 1917 and served with it in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria and Egypt till its return to India. In February 1920 was sent to join the 2/9th Gurkha Rifles in Waziristan, and served with that unit till July. Military Cross. Rejoined the 1st Battalion in July 1920.

(163) GRÆME, LIEUTENANT NINIAN FRANCIS. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 8th April 1908. Served in the operations in the Swat Valley and on the Mohmand Frontier in 1915, in the operations in Waziristan against the Mahsuds March 1917 and June to September 1917. Afghanistan 1919, Battle of Twin Peaks—Brevet of Major—Waziristan 1920-21.

(164) ST. GEORGE, 2ND LIEUTENANT GUY STANFORTH WEMYSS. Joined the 1st Battalion on the 22nd June 1908. Served with the 1st Battalion in France till the 27th April 1915, when he died of wounds received at Neuve Chapelle.

(165) COBBOLD, 2ND LIEUTENANT MONTAGU FRANCIS DAVY. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 19th March 1909. Served with the 2nd Battalion till the end of 1915, including the operations in the Swat Valley and on the Mohmand Border in 1915. Transferred to the 2/4th Gurkha Rifles in November 1923.

(166) DOPPING-HEPENSTAL, CAPTAIN MAXWELL EDWARD. Joined the 1st Battalion on 27th July 1909 from the 1/3rd Gurkha Rifles. Served with the Battalion in France and was wounded on the 18th March 1915, just after the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. Rejoined very shortly afterwards, and on the 19th of April, after the inspection of the Battalion by Sir John French, was terribly burned in a gallant attempt to save life from a burning French farmhouse. Rejoined the Battalion in France on the 27th September. Wounded at Dujaila on the 8th March 1916, but rejoined at once. Served with the Battalion till 25th March 1917, when he was very dangerously wounded at the Jabal Hamrin. Later in the year joined the 2nd Battalion, of which he got command on the 11th March 1918. With them he served in the Third Afghan War and Waziristan: D.S.O., Croix de Guerre, twice Despatches Mesopotamia, C.B.E.

(167) MOCKLER, 2ND LIEUTENANT EDWARD CLAUDE. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 14th November 1909. Served with the 2nd Battalion till 8th October 1916, including the operations in the Swat Valley and on the Mohmand Border in 1915, and was then transferred temporarily to the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles. Joined the 2/11th Gurkha Rifles (since disbanded) on the 10th May 1919, and served with them in the Third Afghan War, being mentioned in despatches. Rejoined the 2/1st 16th June 1921 and served in the operations in Waziristan from the 20th June to 9th December 1921. Still serving with 2/1st.

(168) WILSON, LIEUTENANT NIGEL MAITLAND. Joined the 2nd Battalion from the Royal Welch Fusiliers on the 27th November 1909, but was transferred to the 2/7th Gurkha Rifles on the 6th February next year.

(169) RUNDALL, 2ND LIEUTENANT LIONEL BICKERSTETH. Joined the 1st Battalion on the 2nd January 1911. Served with 1st Battalion in France till the 19th December 1914, when he was killed in action.

(170) ROGERS, 2ND LIEUTENANT GEORGE GORDON (eldest son of Colonel G. W. Rogers, who raised the 2nd Battalion). Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 9th March 1913. Served with the 2nd Battalion till September 1915, including the operations in the Swat Valley in August 1915. Transferred to the Nepalese Contingent at Kakul near Abbottabad in December 1915, and served with these troops till early in 1919, when he rejoined the 2/1st, and with them served in the Third Afghan War, being awarded the Military Cross. At the end of 1920 was sent to the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, and with them served in the operations in Waziristan till early in 1921. Rejoined the 2/1st at the end of 1921.

(171) CARPENDALE, 2ND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM ST. JOHN. Joined the 1st Battalion from the Unattached List on the 12th March 1913. Went with the 1st Battalion overseas at the outbreak of the Great War and served with it in France till 3rd August 1916. Served later with the Nepalese Contingent in India and rejoined 1st Battalion after the War.

(172) BURKE, CAPTAIN THOMAS CAMBELL. Joined the 1st Battalion on the 21st May 1913 from the 125th Napier's Rifles. Served with the 1st Battalion in France and was killed in action on 19th December 1914.

(173) BLISS, MAJOR CHARLES, C.I.E. Joined the 1st Battalion on 7th August 1914, just before it left for the Great War. Came from the 8th Gurkhas and had been posted to the 2nd Battalion several years previously but had never joined, being seconded for service with the Assam Military Police. Went with the 1st Battalion to France and died on 20th December 1914 of wounds received in action the same day.

(174) BELLERS, 2ND LIEUTENANT ERIC VERNON ROBERT. Joined the Depot of the 2nd Battalion on the 16th October 1914. Served with the 2nd Battalion, including the operations in the Swat Valley in August and on the Mohmand Border in October 1915, till the 27th January 1917, when he joined the first Battalion in Mesopotamia. Served with the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria and Egypt, till the Battalion returned to India, when he was temporarily transferred to the 1/8th Gurkhas. He rejoined the 1/1st 1921.

(175) ASHMORE, LIEUTENANT EDWIN JAMES CALDWELL. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 23rd January 1915 from the 1/10th Gurkha Rifles. Served with the Battalion till the 27th April that year, when he was wounded and went to hospital. Later he rejoined his own Regiment.

(176) MOORE, LIEUTENANT CHARLES FRANCIS FITZGERALD. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 23rd January 1915 from the 123rd Outram's Rifles. Went to hospital on the 21st March that year.

(177) WATTS, LIEUTENANT EDWARD PONSONBY. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 3rd February 1915 from the 53rd Sikhs F.F. Went to hospital sick on the 5th March that year.

(178) GOÛT, CAPTAIN PERCIVAL JAMES. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 9th February 1915 from the Burma Military Police, but belonged to the 94th Russell's Infantry. Served with the 1st Battalion till the 27th April that year, when he was wounded and went to hospital.

(179) BATEMAN-CHAMPAIN, MAJOR CLAUDE EDWARD. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 21st February 1915 from the 2/5th Gurkha Rifles. Served with the 1st Battalion till the 12th March, when he was wounded and went to hospital.

(180) FITZPATRICK, 2ND LIEUTENANT GERALD VICTOR, I.A.R.O. Joined the Depot of the 1st

Battalion in Dharmsala on the 27th February 1915. Served with the Depot to the end of the year and went overseas with reinforcements, but never joined either of the Battalions of the Regiment.

(181) DARLEY, CAPTAIN WILLIAM HASTINGS LA TOUCHE. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 18th March 1915 from the 12th Pioneers. Wounded and went to hospital on the 27th April that year.

(182) FLAGG, CAPTAIN A. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 28th March 1915 from the 25th Punjabis, but was not a regular Indian Army Officer. Served with the Battalion till the 31st July that year, when he went to hospital.

(183) BAMPFIELD, LIEUTENANT GEORGE CHARLES. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 28th March 1915 from the 90th Punjabis. Went to hospital sick on the 25th August that year.

(184) FRY, 2ND LIEUTENANT STEPHEN GABRIEL, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 20th April 1915 and was killed in action with the Battalion on the following 22nd May.

(185) SUTCLIFFE, LIEUTENANT H. P. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 28th April 1915, and went to hospital wounded on the following 22nd May.

(186) ANTRAM, CAPTAIN E. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 28th April 1915 from the 9th Battalion of the Lincolnshire Regiment. He was a tea planter who had gone home at the outbreak of war to join up at an age approaching fifty years. Served with the Battalion in France and Flanders and afterwards in Mesopotamia till 5th October 1916, during which time he was wounded. On the 25th June 1917 transferred as Commandant 1st Battalion Nayar Brigade, Travancore.

(187) KEATINGE, 2ND LIEUTENANT FREDERICK WILLIAM GEORGE, I.A.R.O. Joined the Depot of the 2nd Battalion in Dharmsala in April 1915. Went overseas with a draft and joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 4th October that year. Served with the 1st Battalion in France and later in Mesopotamia, during which time he won the Military Cross in Mesopotamia, till the 4th December 1916, when he was transferred to the Supply and Transport Corps.

(188) HEYLAND, LIEUTENANT ARTHUR ALEXANDER. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 4th May 1915 from the 2/5th Gurkha Rifles. Killed in action with the Battalion on the 22nd May.

(189) HERBERT, 2ND LIEUTENANT HARRY BENTLEY, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 4th May and was killed in action with the Battalion on the 22nd May 1915.

(190) GAMBLE, 2ND LIEUTENANT RICHARD SUMMER, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 16th and was missing on the 22nd May 1915. Was officially recognized as killed in action in 1920.

(191) KEELING, 2ND LIEUTENANT EDWARD PHILIP, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 16th May, and was wounded and went to hospital on the 10th October 1915.

(192) MELLIS, CAPTAIN ATHERLEY RENFREW, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 17th May and was wounded on the 22nd and went to hospital. For his services was awarded the Military Cross.

(193) GREATWOOD, CAPTAIN WALTER. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 23rd May 1915 from the 123rd Outram's Rifles. Served with the Battalion in France and later in Mesopotamia till the 8th March 1916, when he was killed in action.

(194) MACGILLIVRAY, 2ND LIEUTENANT DUNCAN GRANT, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in

France on the 23rd May 1915, and served with it in France and later in Mesopotamia till the 16th January 1918, when he was transferred to the newly raised 4/11th Gurkha Rifles. Joined the 3/1st on the 11th February 1918 and served with them till February 1919, when he was released and demobilized.

(195) WEBB, CAPTAIN ALLAN BONVILLE HAY. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 25th May 1915 from the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles. Rejoined his own unit on the 16th July 1915.

(196) GREENFIELD, 2ND LIEUTENANT EDWARD GEORGE, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 12th June 1915 and went to hospital sick on the 9th September following.

(197) BROAD, 2ND LIEUTENANT ROBERT NORMAN DYMOKE, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 23rd June 1915 and served with the Battalion till the 6th May 1916, when he went to hospital sick.

(198) BOUSFIELD, MAJOR EDMUND EMERSON. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 16th July 1915 from the 123rd Outram's Rifles. Served with the Battalion in France till the 25th September that year, when he died of wounds received in action a few days after he had become Lieut.-Colonel.

(199) O'REILLY, 2ND LIEUTENANT DONALD OWEN, I.A.R.O. Joined the Battalion in France on the 22nd July 1915 and served with it continuously in France, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria till the 5th April 1919, when he was demobilized. Despatches.

(200) BELL, CAPTAIN HAROLD WILBERFORCE. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 2nd August 1915 from the Political Department. Went to hospital sick on the 9th September that year. Early in 1916 he joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala. Commanded the Depot for more than a year, and in June 1917 went to Northern Army Head-quarters in Rawal Pindi. Reverted to the Political Department after the War.

(201) SCOTT, 2ND LIEUTENANT GEORGE DUNCAN, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion in the Swat Valley on the 24th August 1915 and served with it till March 1916, when he was transferred for service with the Nepalese Contingent.

(202) DANIELS, 2ND LIEUTENANT CHARLES JAMES FRANK WALTER, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 30th August 1915. Eventually left with reinforcements in 1917.

(203) SORBY, 2ND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM JOHN, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in France on the 28th September 1915. Served with the Battalion in France and later in Mesopotamia till the 17th April 1916, when he was very severely wounded at the Battle of Bait Aissa.

(204) WEBB, 2ND LIEUTENANT LOUIS VICTOR, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 1st October 1915 and had previously served in the ranks of a Territorial Battalion. Served with the 2/1st till August 1916, when he went overseas with reinforcements. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 4th September that year, and died of wounds on the 10th January 1917 which he had received in action the day before.

(205) FULTON, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN OSWALD (only son of Colonel Robert Fulton who commanded the 1st Battalion from 1894 to 1903). Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 28th October 1915. Served with the 2nd Battalion, including the operations in Waziristan in 1917 till the 29th August 1917, when he went overseas and joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 9th November that year. Served with the 1st Battalion continuously since.

(206) POWERS, 2ND LIEUTENANT HERBERT GRENDON, I.A.R.O. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 8th November 1915. In April 1916 joined the 1st Battalion in Meso-

potamia. Served with the Battalion continuously afterwards in Mesopotamia, where he was awarded the Military Cross and mentioned in despatches, and in Palestine till the 19th September 1918, when he was killed in action in the Battle of Megiddo.

(207) HAMBER, 2ND LIEUTENANT LANCELOT GEORGE WERGE. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 9th November 1915. Had already served in France from the 17th March to the 7th September 1915. In December 1916 was transferred to the 3/5th Gurkha Rifles, since disbanded. Reposted to the 1st Battalion on the 1st November 1921 and has served with it since.

(208) UPTON, 2ND LIEUTENANT ROBERT BABINGTON EVERARD. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 9th of November 1915, and had already been on service with a British Regiment in France where he had been dangerously wounded. Served with the 2nd Battalion till the 25th January 1917, when he was transferred to the 2/39th, now the 2/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles. Despatches, *London Gazette*, 27th August 1918. Joined the 1st Battalion in India in 1921 and served with it till the middle of 1923, when he was transferred to the 2/7th Gurkha Rifles.

(209) GRACEY, 2ND LIEUTENANT DOUGLAS DAVID. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 16th November 1915, and had already served in France (having been wounded at Givenchy) from the 11th January to the 3rd May 1915. Served with the 2nd Battalion till October 1916, when he went to Mesopotamia and joined the 1st Battalion on the 6th November. Has served with the 1st Battalion ever since. Military Cross and Bar.

(210) RUTHVEN, 2ND LIEUTENANT HUGH PETER LANSDALE, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 24th November 1915 and served with it till June 1916, when he was sent on sick leave to the U.K.

(211) BLAKESTON, 2ND LIEUTENANT BERNARD MOORE, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 24th November 1915. Went with reinforcements to Mesopotamia and joined the 1st Battalion there on the 4th October 1916. Served with the Battalion till the 25th March 1917, when he was killed in action at the Battle of Jabal Hamrin.

(212) SWAN, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN CYRIL KINGSLEY, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 24th November 1915 and served with it till the 8th August 1916, when he was transferred to the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles.

(213) PRIOR, 2ND LIEUTENANT HENRY CARLOS, I.A.R.O. (Indian Civil Service). Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 29th December 1915. Served with the 2nd Battalion, including the operations in Waziristan in March and in June to September 1917, till the 12th January 1918, when he was transferred to the Head-quarters 16th Indian Division.

(214) SIMEON, 2ND LIEUTENANT GEOFFREY NELTHORPE, I.A.R.O. (Imperial Forest Service). Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 29th December 1915. Served with the Battalion till the 19th January 1917, when he went to Egypt and joined the 3rd Gurkha Rifles.

(215) PATTERSON, 2ND LIEUTENANT CHRISTIAN BINGLEY, I.A.R.O. (Imperial Forest Service). Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 19th February 1916 from the 39th Garhwalis. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 25th July that year and was killed in action with the Battalion on the 30th December.

(216) MANGIN, 2ND LIEUTENANT PAUL HENRY, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion from the 39th Garhwalis on the 19th February 1916. In July 1916 went to Mesopotamia, and while in Basra was in charge of the waterworks.

(217) HARROP, 2ND LIEUTENANT HENRY ROBERT, I.A.R.O. (Indian Educational Service). Joined

the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 22nd February 1916 and served with the Battalion till the 8th March 1916, when he was severely wounded at Dujaila. Later, joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala and served with it till November or December 1917, when he was transferred to the 4/39th Garhwal, now the Kumaon, Rifles.

(218) GRIFFIN, 2ND LIEUTENANT SEYMOUR FORTESCUE HASSEL, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 2nd May 1916 and served with it till the 12th January 1917, when he went to hospital sick.

(219) D'OYLY-HUGHES, 2ND LIEUTENANT RICHARD. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 4th July 1916. In December 1916 was transferred to the newly raised 3/5th Gurkha Rifles.

(220) McKEAG, 2ND LIEUTENANT HUGH THEODORE ALEXANDER, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion in India on the 13th July 1916. On the 8th of August following was transferred to the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles.

(221) TANBURN, 2ND LIEUTENANT WALTER LOUIS, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 21st July 1916. In December 1916 went overseas and joined the 1/2nd K.E.O. Gurkha Rifles in Mesopotamia, with which unit he was killed in action very soon afterwards.

(222) LOWE, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN SANDERSON, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 18th August 1916 and served with it, including the operations in Waziristan in 1917, till December that year, when he went to Mesopotamia and joined the 1st Battalion there on the 23rd February 1918. Served with the 1st Battalion there and later in Palestine till the 24th May, when he was transferred to the Indian Infantry Base Depot at Kantara.

(223) WARD, 2ND LIEUTENANT LEONARD HARRIS, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 27th August 1916 and served with it, including the operations in Waziristan in 1917, till the 7th November that year, when he was transferred to the Burma Military Police.

(224) WEST, 2ND LIEUTENANT EDWARD MAXWELL. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia from the 1/3rd Gurkha Rifles on the 18th September 1916, and served with it till the 17th July 1917, when he went to hospital.

(225) WILLIAMSON, 2ND LIEUTENANT FREDERICK, I.A.R.O. (Indian Civil Service). Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 4th October 1916. Served with the Battalion there and in Palestine till the 1st June 1918, when he went with the whole of "D" Company to the newly raised 4/11th Gurkha Rifles, since disbanded. When Colonel Anderson and Major Dopping-Hepenstal and Captain Northey were all wounded at the Battle of Jabal Hamrin on the 25th March 1917, he was the senior officer left with the Battalion and commanded it till the 18th April, when Major Evans arrived from India and took over command. After the War he reverted to his own Service.

(226) CHISHOLM, 2ND LIEUTENANT DONALD MALCOLM FRANCIS, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 17th October 1916. Transferred to the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles on the 26th March 1918.

(227) SNODGRASS, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 6th November 1916 and served with it in Mesopotamia and Palestine till the 1st June 1918, when he went with "D" Company to the newly raised 4/11th Gurkha Rifles.

(228) BARRY, 2ND LIEUTENANT JACK LESLIE. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 10th November 1916. Transferred to the 2nd Q.V.O. Guides Infantry in India on the 31st January 1917. Joined the 1st Battalion in Egypt on the 19th August that year and served with the Battalion till the 21st January 1924, when he died at Moffat in Scotland while on leave. For his services in the Egyptian

outbreak in 1919 he was awarded the M.B.E. The Plates of uniforms worn in the Regiment at different periods during its history are the work of his hands.

(229) BURCH, 2ND LIEUTENANT PHILLIP DOUGLAS. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 23rd November 1916. On the 1st December 1916 was transferred to the 3/5th Gurkha Rifles. Rejoined the 1st Battalion in Egypt on the 23rd September 1919 and was reposted on the 8th December that year to the 1/50th Kumaon Rifles.

(230) WOOLLEY, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN HAROLD CROWN. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 23rd November 1916. Transferred to the 3/5th Gurkha Rifles on the 1st December 1916.

(231) SHERIDAN, 2ND LIEUTENANT FRANCIS SIDNEY, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 20th January 1917. Wounded at the Jabal Hamrin on the 25th March 1917 and made prisoner by the Turks. He twice escaped but was recaptured.

(232) COCHRANE, 2ND LIEUTENANT GEORGE KING HICKS, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 26th January 1917, and was killed in action with the Battalion at the Jabal Hamrin on the 25th March that year.

(233) FOSTER, 2ND LIEUTENANT LIONEL ALFRED. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 7th February 1917. Served with the Battalion in Waziristan in 1917 and was dangerously wounded at Zam on the 5th June. Later in the year he went to Mesopotamia and joined the 3rd Gurkha Rifles, with which unit he won the Military Cross and with which he is still serving.

(234) MONIER-WILLIAMS, 2ND LIEUTENANT LAWRENCE. Joined the 2nd Battalion in Waziristan from the 1/3rd Gurkha Rifles on the 13th March 1917, and was reposted to the 1/3rd in May that year.

(235) ARMITAGE, 2ND LIEUTENANT AUBREY SEYMOUR. Joined the 2nd Battalion in Waziristan from the 1/3rd Gurkha Rifles on the 13th March 1917, and was reposted to the 1/3rd in May that year.

(236) GRAY, 2ND LIEUTENANT CHARLES EDWARD. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia from the 1/3rd Gurkha Rifles on the 18th April 1917. Served with the Battalion there, in Palestine, Syria and Egypt till the 24th December 1919, when he was posted to the 1/50th Kumaon Rifles.

(237) STRAHAN, CAPTAIN GEOFFREY CARTARET. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia from the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles on the 19th April 1917. Served with the Battalion till the 16th January 1918, when he was reposted to the 6th Gurkhas.

(238) LAWRENCE, 2ND LIEUTENANT NEVIL SHERBROOKE, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 3rd May 1917 from the 9th Gurkha Rifles, and was transferred to 3rd Corps Head-quarters on the 13th June that year.

(239) BOLSTER, 2ND LIEUTENANT ROBERT CROFTS, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 3rd May 1917 from the 10th Gurkha Rifles. Was transferred as R.T.O. Baghdad on the 18th of the same month.

(240) LINDQUIST, 2ND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM HERBERT HORATIO. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia from the 1/10th Gurkha Rifles on the 6th May 1917. Served with the Battalion continuously since in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, Egypt and India. For his services in the final advance in Palestine was awarded the Military Cross.

(241) PATTON, 2ND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM FRANCIS. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 11th May 1917. Went to Egypt on the 14th November that year and joined the 3/3rd Gurkha Rifles.

(242) MURISON, LIEUTENANT GILBERT DE HUSSEY. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 14th May 1917. Has served with the 2nd Battalion continuously since.

War Services: Operations in France and Belgium 1st October 1915 to 3rd March 1916. Operations in Waziristan June to September 1917. Afghanistan N.W.F. 1919. Despatches. Waziristan 1921.

(243) JOSEPH, CAPTAIN ARTHUR FREDERICK, I.A.R.O. (Indian Educational Service). Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 26th May 1917 from the 53rd Sikhs F.F. Served with the 2nd Battalion till the 27th November 1917, when he was transferred to the Staff School, Saugor.

(244) ROBSON, CAPTAIN HENRY WILLIAM CUMINE (1/7th Gurkha Rifles). Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 1st June 1917, and was re-transferred to his own Regiment on the 22nd of the same month.

(245) SIMPSON, MAJOR JAMES (10th Gurkha Rifles). Joined the 3rd Battalion 13th June 1917. Officiated in command till 29th September, when he handed over to Colonel Ryder. Again commanded the Battalion from 29th January 1919, on which date Colonel Ryder went on leave pending retirement. On 26th May 1919 went sick to hospital and was struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(246) MACKENZIE, LIEUTENANT WILLIAM STUART. Joined the 3rd Battalion from the 4th Gurkhas on 16th June 1917 and served with it till the 11th October 1918, when he was transferred to the 1/144th Infantry at Bharatpore and was struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(247) WOODHEAD, LIEUTENANT ALEXANDER WILLIAM, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion from the 4th Gurkhas on 18th June 1917. Served with the Battalion till July 1919, when he was wounded in the fighting round Fort Sandeman. Despatches.

(248) CAYLEY, 2ND LIEUTENANT PHILIP ESTCOURT, I.A.R.O. Joined the Depot of the 2nd Battalion at Dharmasala on 23rd June 1917, and left on 9th September that year.

(249) COURTHOPE, LIEUTENANT EDWARD ARTHUR, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on 2nd July 1917 and served with it till 25th May 1918, when he was transferred to Army Head-quarters.

(250) GREY, LIEUTENANT ROLAND CECIL. Joined the 3rd Battalion on 5th August 1917. Transferred to the 2/98th Infantry on 11th February and struck off the strength.

(251) BLACK, 2ND LIEUTENANT HENRY, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 19th August 1917. On 13th March 1918 was sent overseas to Egypt and joined the 3/3rd Gurkhas.

(252) WHITING, 2ND LIEUTENANT WALTER CECIL. Joined the 3rd Battalion on 26th August 1917. Transferred on 22nd August 1918 to the 2/15th Sikhs, and was struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(253) THOMAS, 2ND LIEUTENANT KEMPSON FREDERICK WELMAN. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 15th September 1917. On 12th September 1918 left with a complete Company of the Battalion under Captain J. D. Ogilvy, Lieutenants J. H. J. Hampson, R. C. Jackson, I.A.R.O. and himself, for Egypt. On arrival in Egypt the Company was sent to join the 2/127th Baluchis, but all four British Officers were sent to join the 1st Battalion. Has served with the 1st Battalion continuously since.

War Services: Mesopotamia, March to September 1917; E.E.F. September to 31st October 1918.

(254) SHEPPARD, 2ND LIEUTENANT BERTRAM KINGSTON. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on 21st September 1917. Served with the Depot till the return of the 1st Battalion in February 1920, and then served with the Battalion till the 17th January 1921, when he proceeded to Dacca to take up the appointment of Assistant Commandant Bengal Military Police.

(255) CAMPBELL 2ND LIEUTENANT JAMES WHITTAKER, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on 21st September 1917 and served with it till the end of the Third Afghan War, and was then released.

(256) COPLAND, LIEUTENANT REGINALD WALLACE. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 24th September 1917. Served with the Battalion till 16th July 1919, when he was killed in the fighting near Fort Sandeman.

(257) LLOYD, LIEUTENANT HAMILTON SAMUEL JOHN. Joined the 3rd Battalion on 24th September 1917. Served with the Battalion till it was disbanded.

(258) BAUMBER, LIEUTENANT JOSEPH, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on 25th September 1917. Served with the Battalion till he was released from the I.A.R.O.

(259) KISSANE, LIEUTENANT RICHARD, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on 25th September 1917. Served with the Battalion till 15th April 1918, when he was sent to Egypt with reinforcements.

(260) DUNCAN, 2ND LIEUTENANT ALISTAIR WILLIAM, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on 6th October 1917 and served with it till 2nd June 1918, when he was sent to Egypt with reinforcements.

(261) HAMPSON, LIEUTENANT JOHN HENRY JAPHETH. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 7th October 1917. On 12th September 1918 he left with a complete Company of the 2nd Battalion (*vide* record of K. F. W. Thomas, ante) and joined the 1st Battalion in Syria in October that year. Served with the Battalion in Syria and Egypt till the end of 1919, when he was reposted to the 1/50th Kumaon Rifles then in Egypt.

(262) HARDER, LIEUTENANT JOHN REEDIE, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 8th October 1917 and served with it till 22nd August 1918, when he was transferred to the 1/11th Gurkha Rifles at Manmad and was struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(263) STRONG, 2ND LIEUTENANT CECIL ALFRED, M.C. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 8th October 1917. Served with the Battalion till it was disbanded.

(264) GAUL, 2ND LIEUTENANT ALEXANDER DUTHIE, I.A.R.O. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 9th October 1917. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on 23rd February 1918 and served with it there, and later in Palestine, till he was released on 17th May 1919.

(265) WOODWARD, LIEUTENANT WILLIAM JAMES. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 11th October 1917. Served with the 3/1st till 26th September 1918, when he was transferred to the 2/131st at Bareilly and struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(266) ROBERTSON, 2ND LIEUTENANT HAROLD BARON, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on 12th October 1917 and served with it till it was disbanded. On the 29th June 1921 was transferred to the 1st Battalion, with which he served until he retired, being struck off on 6th August 1922.

(267) DELAP, LIEUTENANT ALEXANDER. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 28th October 1917. Only served a few months with the Battalion and reverted to the British Service.

(268) MACDONALD, LIEUTENANT SUTHERLAND ROBERT, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia on the 2nd November 1917, and had previously served in the ranks of the London Scottish from March 1912 to June 1915, and as a 2nd Lieutenant in the Yorkshire Regiment from 25th June 1915. Served with the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria and Egypt, and returned with the Battalion to India. In February 1920 was sent to Waziristan and joined the 4/3rd Gurkha Rifles. Served with that unit throughout the operations in Waziristan till 28th February 1922, when he was reposted to the 1st Battalion with which he has served since. Despatches.

(269) LEWIS, 2ND LIEUTENANT CHARLES BENJAMIN. Joined the 2nd Battalion from the Un-attached List on the 4th November 1917. Has served with the Battalion continuously since.

(270) COWELL, 2ND LIEUTENANT FRANCIS JOHN, I.A.R.O. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 9th November 1917. Served with the Depot till the outbreak of the Afghan War, when he went to the 4/3rd Gurkhas.

(271) BROWNE, 2ND LIEUTENANT GEORGE DE LA RUE, I.A.R.O. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 11th November 1917. Served with the Depot till May 1919, when he was transferred to the 2/6th Gurkhas.

(272) HERRING, LIEUTENANT RALPH LENNOX. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 28th November 1917. Served with the Depot and with the 1st Battalion till April 1922, when he retired.

(273) OWEN, LIEUTENANT VAUGHAN EDWARD O'NEILL, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 28th November 1917 and served with it till he was demobilized on 17th September 1919.

(274) KNOWLES, 2ND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM SCOTT, M.C. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 29th November 1917. Served with the 2nd Battalion till the 11th March 1920, when he was transferred to the South Persian Rifles. Killed in action in Persia on the 26th November 1920.

(275) DOUGLAS, 2ND LIEUTENANT LESLIE NORMAN. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 1st December 1917. Transferred as R.T.O. Lahore on 28th February 1919.

(276) MILLING, 2ND LIEUTENANT ROBERT CRANSTON. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 1st December 1917. Served with the 2nd Battalion till about May 1923, when he was transferred to the Corps of Signals.

(277) MITCHLEY, LIEUTENANT EDWARD CHARLES THOMAS. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 4th December 1917. Served with the Depot till the early part of 1919, when he was transferred.

(278) KIDD, 2ND LIEUTENANT ROBERT JOHN. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion on 9th December 1917. Transferred soon afterwards to the 1/11th Gurkhas and on 1st April 1921 was attached to the 2nd Battalion in Waziristan. Died of wounds received in action with the 2nd Battalion in Waziristan on 24th of the same month.

(279) BROOKMAN, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 10th December 1917. Served for about a year with the Depot and was then transferred to the 4/3rd Gurkha Rifles.

(280) RUNDALL, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN WINGATE. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 10th December 1917. Joined the 1st Battalion in Syria on the 20th October 1918. Served with the Battalion till it returned to India, and in January 1920 was transferred to the 4/3rd Gurkhas in Waziristan. Served through the operations in Waziristan in 1920 and 1921. In March 1923 was reposted to the 1st Battalion with which he is still serving.

(281) NEWLAND, LIEUTENANT CECIL DUNBAR. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 10th December 1917. Served with the 2nd Battalion till 18th January 1919, when he was transferred as Staff Captain, additional, Rawal Pindi Brigade.

(282) LOMAS, 2ND LIEUTENANT LEOPOLD, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 11th December 1917 and served with it till the 6th June 1918, when he went overseas to Egypt.

(283) MACLEOD, 2ND LIEUTENANT NORMAN MURRAY. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 14th December 1917. On the 13th March 1918 went overseas to Egypt and joined the 3/3rd Gurkha

Rifles in Palestine. In September 1920 was reposted to the 1st Battalion and has served with it since.

(284) STEVENSON, 2ND LIEUTENANT HERBERT ALLAN. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 15th December 1917. Went to Egypt on 15th April 1918.

(285) PLUNKETT, 2ND LIEUTENANT REGINALD FREDERICK DESMOND. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 17th December 1917. Went to Mesopotamia on the 3rd February 1918 with reinforcements, and was accidentally drowned while swimming in the Tigris.

(286) O'NEILL-SHAW, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN CHARLES LIDDELL, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 19th January 1918 and served with it till the 2nd June that year, when he went overseas.

(287) FALKENSTEIN, 2ND LIEUTENANT ALBERT JAMES. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 26th January 1918. Served with the 2nd Battalion, including the Third Afghan War and operations in Waziristan 1920-21. Retired 18th July 1922.

(288) ALLISON, 2ND LIEUTENANT GORDON. Joined the 3rd Battalion on 5th February 1918. Served with the Battalion till 8th June 1919, when he was killed in action in the fighting near Fort Sandeman.

(289) BATES, 2ND LIEUTENANT ALFRED THOMAS TREVOR. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 6th February 1918. Joined the 1st Battalion in Syria 2nd October 1918, and served with it till 17th August 1919, when he went as an Assistant Instructor to the Central School, Zeitoun, Cairo.

(290) HARRISON, 2ND LIEUTENANT JIM WILLOUGHBY HYDE. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 6th February 1918. From the 2nd Battalion he was attached to the 2/9th Gurkha Rifles in Waziristan; on the 1st April 1920 very severely wounded during the retirement down the Baddar Toi. For his services on that day was awarded the Military Cross. His wound rendered him unfit for any further active service, and on 8th April 1922 was transferred to the Temporary Non-effective List. On 22nd October 1922 was appointed to the Indian Army Ordnance Corps, with which he is still serving.

(291) HARVEY, LIEUTENANT CECIL WALTER LEWERY. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 16th February 1918. Served with the 2nd Battalion continuously till March 1924, when he was transferred to the Political Department.

(292) TURNER, MAJOR HAROLD LAKE COMPTON, 9th Gurkha Rifles. Attached to the 2nd Battalion as second-in-command on 21st February 1918, and died at Nowshera on the 14th June that year.

(293) PETTY, 2ND LIEUTENANT HARRY GORDON, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 25th February 1918. On the 16th May that year transferred to Mechanical Transport, Quetta.

(294) KING, 2ND LIEUTENANT THOMAS ALFRED, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 25th February 1918. On the 29th July that year transferred to the 3rd Indian Machine Gun Company and was struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(295) RADCLIFFE, 2ND LIEUTENANT HEBER, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 4th March 1918. Transferred to the S. & T. Corps on the 7th May that year.

(296) SHAKESPEAR, CAPTAIN WYNDHAM BIDDULPH (2nd K.E.O. Gurkha Rifles). Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 12th March 1918, and took over command. Served in command of the Depot till 1st June 1919, when was reposted to the 2nd K.E.O. Gurkha Rifles.

(297) PARTRIDGE, 2ND LIEUTENANT HARRY VICTOR. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 22nd March 1918. Transferred on the 26th of November that year to the 1/131st Regiment.

(298) EDWARDS, 2ND LIEUTENANT EDWIN, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 28th March 1918. On the 22nd August that year was transferred to the 2/15th Sikhs and struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(299) NOEL, 2ND LIEUTENANT OWEN CYRIL. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 1st April 1918. Transferred to the Depot of the 1st Battalion in 1919. From there was transferred to the 2/9th Gurkha Rifles before the return of the 1st Battalion from Egypt. With the 2/9th Gurkhas he served in the Waziristan operations. Dangerously wounded at Marobi in February 1920. Rejoined the 1st Battalion on 1st January 1921 on return from sick leave. Transferred to the Corps of Signals on 30th October 1921, and eventually retired.

(300) WILSON, LIEUTENANT ERIC CHILVER. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 14th April 1918. Served with the Battalion till May 1920, when he was retransferred to the British Service. Was eventually killed in Dublin.

(301) CROOKE, 2ND LIEUTENANT FREDERICK MONTAGUE WARREN, M.M. Joined the 3rd Battalion from the Australian Imperial Forces on the 27th April 1918. Served with the 3/1st till it was disbanded, and was then posted to the 2nd Battalion with which he is now serving as Adjutant.

(302) ADAMS, LIEUTENANT THOMAS, M.C. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 23rd May 1918. Served with the Battalion till the 11th October that year and was then transferred to the 1/98th Infantry, and was struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(303) WAKEHAM, LIEUTENANT ARNOLD RUPERT, I.A.R.O. Joined the 1st Battalion in Palestine on the 23rd May 1918, and transferred as Claims Officer to the 3rd Lahore Division on the 24th June. Served later with the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala from June to October 1919.

(304) HOSGOOD, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN WINSBORROW, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 15th June 1918 and served with it till it was disbanded.

(305) OTTER, 2ND LIEUTENANT REGINALD BRUCE. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 29th June 1918. On the 22nd August that year was transferred to the 2/15th Sikhs and struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(306) SIMONS, LIEUTENANT JOHN GUY, M.C. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 3rd July 1918. Served with the 2nd Battalion in the Third Afghan War and the operations in Waziristan in 1920-21, and won a Bar to his M.C. Retired on 23rd August 1922.

(307) DAVIES, LIEUTENANT CUTHBERT COLIN. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 3rd July 1918. Served with the 2nd Battalion in the Third Afghan War and the operations in Waziristan in 1920-21, and he was then transferred to the 1/4th Gurkhas.

(308) HARTWELL, CAPTAIN JOHN REDMOND, D.S.O. (4th Gurkha Rifles). Attached to the 2nd Battalion on 3rd July 1918. Transferred to Staff Employ Army Head-quarters on the 8th May 1919.

(309) SAUNDERS, 2ND LIEUTENANT HOWARD FAUNTLEROY, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion the 8th July 1918 and served with the Battalion until he was demobilized.

(310) JACKSON, 2ND LIEUTENANT RALPH CECIL, I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 15th July 1918. On the 12th September that year, left with a complete Company of the 2nd Battalion for Egypt (*vide* record of K. F. W. Thomas, ante) and joined the 1st Battalion in Syria in October. On the 14th November was sent to a course at El Arish and was struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(311) FORREST, 2ND LIEUTENANT GEORGE. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 17th August 1918. Has served with the Battalion continuously since.

(312) PILCHER, LIEUTENANT VERNON DOYLE. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala in August 1918. On the 11th November 1919 was transferred to the 1/124th D.C.O. Baluchistan Infantry.

(313) RUNDLE, 2ND LIEUTENANT ARTHUR LESLIE DE VILLIERS. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 4th September 1918. On the 29th July 1919 was transferred to the 3/5th Gurkha Rifles.

(314) WATTS, 2ND LIEUTENANT LANCELOT GUTICHEN. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 4th September 1918. Was transferred to the 3/5th Gurkha Rifles on the 29th July 1919.

(315) O'FERRALL, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN LAWRENCE FRANCIS. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 16th October 1918. Has served with the Battalion continuously since.

(316) BANESS, 2ND LIEUTENANT HORACE EDWARD. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 2nd November 1918. Served at the Depot and afterwards with the 1st Battalion till the 4th August 1922, when he retired.

(317) MEADMORE, 2ND LIEUTENANT CECIL RUFFORD ANALABY. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 23rd November 1918. Served with the 2nd Battalion till about the middle of 1923, when on the general reposting of officers was permanently transferred to the 3/7th Rajput Regiment.

(318) MORRIS, 2ND LIEUTENANT FREDERICK ARTHUR. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 10th January 1919. Served with the Battalion till October 1919, and was then sent to the 2/19th Punjabis—since disbanded—in Waziristan. Severely wounded at Madanna Hill on the 20th December 1919. Rejoined the 2nd Battalion on 9th September 1920 and served with it till 2nd November, when he was transferred to the 2/41st Dogras. Served with that unit till 29th March 1921, when he rejoined the 2/1st. Served with the S. & T. Corps, now the I.A.S.C., from 26th June 1922 to the 5th May 1923, when he rejoined the 2/1st and has served with them since.

(319) WHITBY, 2ND LIEUTENANT HENRY FRANCIS. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 18th January 1919. Sent as R.T.O. to Waziristan on 19th September 1921.

(320) WHITAKER, 2ND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM BENJAMIN. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on 22nd January 1919. Transferred to the 3/5th Gurkha Rifles on the 26th July 1919.

(321) HURRELL, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN GOOCH. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 30th April 1919. Attached to the 4/3rd Gurkha Rifles in 1920, but was later reposted to the 2nd Battalion about the middle of 1923. Was permanently transferred to the 10th Gurkha Rifles.

(322) EGAN, 2ND LIEUTENANT JOHN FRANCIS. Joined the 1st Battalion in Egypt from the 1/4th Gurkha Rifles on the 6th May 1919. Transferred to Gamrah Rest Camp, Cairo, on the 15th November 1919.

(323) SINKER, LIEUTENANT ROBERT CAREY. Joined the 3rd Battalion from the 6th Gurkha Rifles, Abbottabad, on 17th May 1919. Served with the 3/1st till the second half of 1920, but eventually returned to the 6th Gurkhas, with which unit he is still serving. Wounded in the fighting at Fort Sandeman, and was mentioned in despatches.

(324) DOBBIN, 2ND LIEUTENANT FERGUS LE FANU. Joined the 3rd Battalion from the 6th Gurkha Rifles, Abbottabad, on the 17th of May 1919 with R. C. Sinker. Killed in action in the fighting near Fort Sandeman on the 16th July 1919.

(325) BRYANT, 2ND LIEUTENANT GEORGE DANGERFIELD. Joined the 3rd Battalion from the Depot of the 1st Q.V.O. Guides Infantry on 19th May 1919. Served with the 3/1st till June 1920, when he went on eight months' combined leave ex India. Was later transferred to the 2/7th Rajput Regiment.

(326) COLEMAN, 2ND LIEUTENANT GEORGE VINCENT LEIGH. Joined the 3rd Battalion from the Depot of the 1st Q.V.O. Guides Infantry on the 19th May 1919. Served with the 3/1st till 16th April 1920, when was reposted to the 1st Guides at Mardan and struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(327) FFRENCH, 2ND LIEUTENANT ERNEST DUDLEY. Joined the 3rd Battalion from the Depot of the 1st Q.V.O. Guides Infantry on the 19th May 1919. Killed in action near Fort Sandeman on the 16th July 1919.

(328) WHITAKER, MAJOR SIDNEY STATTON, M.C. (7th Gurkha Rifles). Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 26th May 1919 and took over the command the following morning from Major Simpson, who went to hospital. Commanded the Battalion till 25th June 1919, when he handed over command to Major Rombulow-Pearse, 6th Gurkhas. Major Whitaker continued to serve with the 3/1st as second-in-command till the Battalion was disbanded.

(329) ROMBULOW-PEARSE, MAJOR AUBREY BEWICKE (6th Gurkha Rifles). Joined the 3rd Battalion on the evening of the 25th June 1919, and took over command from Major Whitaker next morning. Commanded the Battalion till it was disbanded.

(330) ROSSELLOTY, LIEUTENANT GERALD ARTHUR CRAMPERN. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 26th June 1919. Served with the 2nd Battalion till 25th September 1922, when he retired.

(331) BOWEN, LIEUTENANT WILLIAM OSWALD. Joined the 3rd Battalion from the 6th Gurkha Rifles on the 29th November 1919. Served with the 3/1st till it was disbanded.

(332) APPLEWHAITE, 2ND LIEUTENANT REGINALD HANSON. Joined the Depot of the 1st Battalion in Dharmasala on the 3rd December 1919. Served with the Depot, and after its return with the 1st Battalion till the 10th November 1920, when he was transferred to the 1/4th Gurkha Rifles.

(333) GAHAN, 2ND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM GERALD. Joined the 2nd Battalion on 3rd December 1919. Has served with the Battalion continuously since.

(334) BURSCOUGH, LIEUTENANT GEORGE EDWARD. Joined the 3rd Battalion on the 27th December 1919. On the 11th May 1920 was transferred to the Concentration Camp, Deolali, pending repatriation to the U.K. Retired on 1st September 1921.

(335) BERTHON, 2ND LIEUTENANT CHARLES HECTOR DARELL. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 6th February 1920. Has served with the 2/1st continuously since.

(336) DEAN, LIEUTENANT R. W. (late R.F.A.). Joined the 1st Battalion with a temporary commission in the Indian Army on the 29th March 1920. Proceeded to Mesopotamia on appointment as a field-cashier on the 6th October 1920.

(337) FISHER, CAPTAIN PERCY, M.C., I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion, re-employed on return from leave in the U.K. on 29th March 1920, and served with it till it was disbanded. Eventually transferred to a regular commission in the British Army.

(338) DUNCKLEY, CAPTAIN PERCY JOHN, I.A.R.O. Joined the 3rd Battalion, re-employed on return from leave in U.K. on 29th March 1920. Served with the 3/1st till it was disbanded.

(339) DEDMAN, LIEUTENANT JAMES BAILLIE. Joined the 3rd Battalion from the 105th Mahratta

Light Infantry on the 7th April 1920. Served with the 3/1st till it was disbanded, and then went back to the 105th Mahratta Light Infantry.

(340) HOWITT, LIEUTENANT C. H., I.A.R.O. Joined the 2nd Battalion from the R.A.F. on the 14th May 1920, and was transferred to the 2/41st Dogras, now the 10/17th Dogra Regiment, in the following October.

(341) BRUCE, CAPTAIN-BREVET-MAJOR ROBERT MASON, M.C. (5th Gurkha Rifles). Joined the 3rd Battalion on 18th May 1920 on arrival from leave in the U.K. Served with the Battalion till it was disbanded, when he returned to his own regiment, with which he is still serving.

(342) HINWOOD-SMITH, CAPTAIN F. P. Joined the 1st Battalion with a temporary commission in the Indian Army on arrival from the U.K. on the 18th May 1920. Left the Battalion for Embarkation Camp, Deolali, pending repatriation to U.K. on the 8th April 1921, and was struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(343) COSTER, LIEUTENANT GEORGE WORTHY. Joined the 3rd Battalion with a temporary commission in the Indian Army on the 1st June 1920, and served with the Battalion till it was disbanded. Left the Army on the 1st September 1921.

(344) HOLDICH, COLONEL HAROLD ADRIAN, D.S.O. Joined the 1st Battalion from the 5th Gurkha Rifles and Quartermaster-General's Branch, Army Head-quarters, on the 9th August 1920 as temporary Commandant. Was appointed Commandant on the 1st December that year vice Lieut.-Colonel Donald Munro Watt, who, though appointed Commandant, had never joined the Battalion. Assumed temporary command of the 1st Indian Infantry Brigade on the 12th January 1921 and was confirmed on the 15th, and was struck off the strength of the Battalion.

(345) HODDER, LIEUTENANT ERIC MESNEY. Joined the 2nd Battalion on the 14th May 1921 from the 3/7th Gurkha Rifles when that Battalion was disbanded. Has served with the 2nd Battalion continuously since.

APPENDIX II

THE TITLE OF THE REGIMENT

AT VARIOUS DATES SINCE IT WAS FIRST RAISED

1815.	24th April	The 1st Nusseree Battalion.
1823.	6th May	The 6th Local, 1st Nusseree (Gorka) Battalion.
1826.	1st December	The 4th Local, 1st Nusseree Battalion.
1829.	1st February	The 4th Local, Nusseree Battalion.
1850.	27th February	The 66th or Goorkha Regiment.
1858.	11th November	The 66th Goorkha Light Infantry.
1861.	3rd May	The 11th Goorkha Light Infantry.
1861.	29th October	The 1st Goorkha Light Infantry.
1891.	20th February	The 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
1901.	The 1st Gurkha Rifles.
1903.	2nd October	The 1st Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment).
1906.	1st January	The 1st Prince of Wales' Own Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment).
1910.	2nd December	The 1st King George's Own Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment).

APPENDIX II

COMMANDANTS OF THE REGIMENT

(SUBSTANTIVE APPOINTMENTS ONLY)

1ST BATTALION

Robert Ross	from	1815 till 3rd April	1822.
Charles Pratt Kennedy	„ October	1822 „ 17th January	1836.
Horatio Thomas Tapp	„ 14th March	1836 „ 1st June	1841.
Nicholas Penny	„ 2nd June	1841 „ 6th June	1848.
Charles O'Brien	„ 7th October	1848 „ 26th February	1850.
Hugh Troup	„ 13th August	1850 „ 1st December	1855.
John Kennedy McCausland	„ 2nd December	1855 „ 26th September	1859.
Joseph Graham	„ 27th September	1859 „ 20th November	1861.
Charles Prior	„ 21st November	1861 „ 24th August	1868.
James Sebastian Rawlins	from 25th August	1868 till 31st December	1878.
Rowley Sale-Hill	„ 1st January	1879 „ 25th January	1882.
Philip Story	„ 26th January	1882 „ 31st December	1886.
George Young	„ 1st January	1886 „ 31st December	1892.
C. A. R. Sage	„ 1st January	1893 „ 5th March	1894.
G. W. Rogers	„ 6th March	1894 „ 31st August	1894.
Robert Fulton	„ 1st September	1894 „ 31st August	1903.
Charles Herbert Powell	„ 1st October	1903 „ 21st April	1907.
A. G. B. Lang	„ 29th September	1907 „ 28th September	1912.
J. M. Home	„ 29th September	1912 „ 20th May	1915.
W. C. Anderson	„ 21st May	1915 „ 19th February	1919.
Harold Adrian Holdich	„ 10th August	1920 „ 31st October	1921.
H. M. D. Shaw	„ 1st November	1921	

2ND BATTALION

G. W. Rogers	from 19th February	1886 till 5th March	1894.
C. A. R. Sage	„ 6th March	1894 „ 5th March	1900.
G. H. Robinson	„ 6th March	1900 „ 8th August	1905.
A. V. Hatch	„ 9th August	1905 „ 8th August	1910.
W. I. Ryder	„ 9th August	1910 „ 29th September	1915.
E. D. Money	„ 30th September	1915 „ 10th March	1918.
M. E. Dopping-Hepenstal	„ 11th March	1918 „ 6th February	1921.
A. E. Johnson	„ 7th February	1921	

3RD BATTALION

W. I. Ryder	from 30th September 1917 till 23rd June	1919.
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APPENDIX III

ESTABLISHMENTS

The original establishment of the 1st Nasiri Battalion in 1815 has already been given in the text (p. 6 *et seqq*). That of 1823 is shown at p. 14 in tabular form.

We have examined at the India Office the annual statements of establishment from 1823-24 to 1857-58, and they are shown in the tabular statement attached to this appendix for all years in that period in which there was a variation. It will be seen that in 1825-26 (the year of the Siege of Bhurtpore) the number of companies was raised from eight to ten, and was again reduced to eight in 1826-27. In 1841-42 the number was raised to nine, and in 1842-43 to ten. It was again reduced to nine in 1847-48 and remained at that number till the battalion became the 66th Gurkhas in 1850. In that year the regimental records state that the companies were fixed at eight in July, but this appears not to have been acted on; for the annual statements show ten companies of a hundred sepoy each from 1850-51 to 1857-58.

By a Government Order of the 5th July 1859, the establishment was fixed at ten companies of seventy sepoy each with the same proportion as before of Native commissioned officers and N.C.O.s, viz. one subadar, one jemadar, five havildars and five naicks for each company.

On the reorganization of the Bengal Army in 1861 the strength of all infantry battalions was fixed at six hundred sepoy in eight companies, each of one subadar, one jemadar, five havildars, five naicks, two drummers or buglers, and seventy-five sepoy.

After that the number of companies in the battalion appears to have remained constant, except that in 1900 the double-company system was introduced, and in 1914 the 1st Battalion, going on service in Europe, was reorganized in four companies to conform to the British system.

In 1873 an increased establishment of twenty-five sepoy was sanctioned for Gurkha Regiments, thus raising the total of sepoy to six hundred and twenty-five.

In 1878 the strength of Native infantry regiments was raised from 600 to 800 sepoy which, with the extra 25 sanctioned for Gurkha Regiments in 1873, raised their number to 825, with 16 Gurkha Officers, 80 N.C.O.s, and 16 buglers.

In 1882, when the total of all ranks for ordinary Native Infantry Regiments was fixed at 832, the five Gurkha Regiments were kept at 912. In 1887 each Gurkha battalion was allowed to enlist 20 supernumeraries.

In 1889, for the first time, fifteen recruit boys were enlisted in each battalion, the number of supernumeraries being reduced from twenty to fourteen. This has since become a regular custom. The recruit boys must be sons of old soldiers, bred in barracks, and enlisted only in the band (one-third), buglers and drummers (one-third), signallers (one-third). In 1905 the establishment of one tindal and three lascars was abolished, the men being transferred to the combatant ranks.

In this year also, the number of naicks in each battalion was raised from forty to forty-six, though the total of the regiment was kept unaltered by a corresponding reduction in the number of riflemen.

In 1912 the establishment of each battalion was revised to the following:—

British Officers (14).—Commandant, four double-company commanders (of whom one was second-in-command), one adjutant, one quartermaster, seven double-company officers.

Gurkha Officers and N.C.O.s (102).—One subadar-major, 7 subadars, 8 jemadars (including jemadar-

adjutant), 40 havildars (including havildar-major), 46 naicks (including drill naick), 810 riflemen (including lance-naicks), 14 supernumeraries, 15 recruit boys.

In the early days of the Nasiri Battalion the British Officers shown in the annual statements occasionally exceeded the sanctioned number, but this appears to be due to officers being on leave or acting in other appointments, with another officer officiating for them meanwhile. We have been unable to trace any Government Order creating the appointment of second-in-command, but the first year in which an officer with that title appears in the annual statements is 1826-27, when Lieutenant Newton is so styled. The regimental records give Samuel Speck about that time, but he is not shown in the annual statements. Possibly he officiated for a short time for Newton. In 1828-29 James Nicholson, the first Adjutant of the regiment, returned to it as second-in-command. The appointment seems to have been regularly recognized from 1826-27 onwards.

**STATEMENT SHOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 1ST GURKHAS IN VARIOUS YEARS
FROM 1823-24 TO 1861**

This Statement does not include British Officers or N.C.O.s, or miscellaneous establishment, such as Bhistis, etc. The Battalion had either drummers or buglers according as it was an ordinary or a rifle or light infantry regiment.

Year.	Companies.	Subadar-Major.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Drummers or Buglers and Bugle-Major.	Sepoys or Riflemen.
1823-24 . .	8	—	8	8	40	40	16	640
1824-25 . .	10	—	10	10	50	50	20	860
1826-27 . .	8	—	8	8	40	40	16	640
1828-29 . .	8	1*	7	8	41†	41†	17‡	640
1841-42 . .	9	1*	8	9	55†	55	19‡	900
1842-43 . .	10	1*	9	10	58†	58†	21‡	950
1847-48 . .	9	1*	8	9	55†	55†	19‡	900
1850-51 . .	10	1*	9	10	61†	61†	21‡	1,000
1861 . . .	8	1	7	8	41†	41†	17‡	600

* Kamlapati specially appointed for Bhurtpore.

† Includes drill havildar and drill naick.

‡ Includes Bugle-Major.

When there was a subadar-major he also acted as subadar of one company, so one subadar less than the number of companies was allowed.

In the early days there were a varying number of supernumeraries who probably represented the garrison companies.

APPENDIX IV

THE COLOURS

Whether the Regiment carried Colours in the days when it was still an irregular or local battalion as Nasiris is a question which it seems impossible to answer with certainty at this date.

The only positive evidence in favour of an affirmative answer is contained in the Orders of 1850, directing Captain O'Brien, when he marched from Jutogh, to leave his Colours there and to take over the Colours of the disbanded 66th Native Infantry. But, as will be seen presently, it is by no means impossible that when the Orders were drafted they were in this respect inaccurate. The drafter may have followed a common form in writing of "arms, colours, accoutrements and stores," without considering or inquiring whether this particular regiment carried Colours. Yet it was by no means a matter of course that even regular regiments carried Colours; for we find that in 1876 Colours were granted, for the first time, to nineteen regular infantry regiments, though it is true these were mostly regiments raised in the Mutiny.*

At page 66 of Colonel Shakespear's *History of the 2nd Gurkhas* it is stated that, in 1858, that regiment was allowed to carry a third Colour in commemoration of its services at Delhi. The Order for this is quoted. It states that "the Governor-General is pleased to confer on the Sirmoor Rifles the privilege of carrying Colours similar to those of line regiments." The inference is that the previous carrying of Colours was not officially authorized at all. Looking to the similarity of the history of the 1st Nasiris and the Sirmur Battalions from 1815 to 1850, it seems a reasonable inference that, if the Nasiris carried Colours before 1850, their doing so was not officially authorized. It must also be remembered that by para. 5 of the Orders of 6th May 1823 the post of Colour-havildar was abolished for Local Corps.†

Supposing for the moment that the New Nasiri Battalion raised by Captain O'Brien in 1850 had any old Colours of the 1st Nasiris for the term of its existence (1850 to 1861), we should naturally have assumed that those Colours would, on the dissolution of the New Nasiri Battalion, have been handed over to the 66th Gurkhas as representing the original regiment. But of this there is no evidence in the regimental records.

The only surviving officer who was in the 66th Gurkhas in its early days is Colonel George Young, who joined it in 1859. He has kindly furnished us with his recollections on the subject. He says that when the New Nasiri Battalion was disbanded in 1861 a small party of one Gurkha Officer and about thirty N.C.O.s and men was sent over to the 66th Gurkhas at Dharmsala, but no Colours accompanied them. He also says that his impression was that the Nasiri and other Irregular Regiments had no Colours.

No trace has yet been discovered of the old Colours, if they ever existed.

The first Colours which were probably carried by the regiment were those to which they succeeded in 1850 on their becoming the 66th Gurkhas. Their whereabouts was unknown till a few years ago, when Major Latham on visiting the arsenal at Rawal Pindi saw part of the Regimental Colour. The Colour had been split in half and the central portion, about two feet square, containing the wreath number and title of the regiment, had been framed.

By the courtesy of the Officer-in-Charge of the arsenal, the two fragments were made over to the regiment, and they now hang in the Officers' Mess at Dharmsala on either side of the Orders of the 27th February 1850 converting the Nasiris into the 66th Gurkhas.

* The Services of the Bengal Native Army, p. 334. It is a curious fact that in 1906 again similar Orders authorized the Prince of Wales' Plume being borne on the Colours.

† *Supra*, p. 11.

The central portion bears a wreath within which is a circular inscription "Regiment Native Infantry," and in the centre thereof the figures LXVI. There are no battle-honours.

These Colours, as already related, were replaced on the 29th August 1852 by a new set, which is still in the possession of the regiment.

All that remains of the King's Colour is a tassel and a few fragments of blue silk which are kept in a glass case in the Mess. The Regimental Colour is a very large one, about seven feet square, of heavy hand-woven white silk in a very good state of preservation. Till a few years ago it hung from its pole in the Mess dining-room. To ensure its preservation, it was then sent to the Royal Kensington School of Needlework, where it was mounted on net, and is now kept in a case with plate-glass front in the dining-room.

In the centre is the usual wreath surrounding the inscription "Goorkah or LXVI Regiment." Above the wreath is the word "Aliwal" and below it "Subraon," both honours being embroidered on the silk, not added later. The poles of these Colours are surmounted by brass spear-points bearing a crescent and a star.

The third set of Colours are those which were presented by General Cunyngham at Dharmasala in 1863. The Colours of 1852 were retained by the regiment when these new ones were presented.

These 1863 Colours are also in the possession of the regiment. They are much smaller than the Colours of 1852, and the Regimental Colour is of less durable silk. Up to a few years ago it had been the practice of the 1st Battalion to swear in its recruits on the Colours, which were actually touched in the ceremony by the recruit. When recruits were to be sworn in, a Guard with two Gurkha Officers proceeded to the Mess and carried the Colours up to the parade ground for the ceremony, which was very imposing.

However, it was obvious that the Colours must eventually be worn out by this use, and, at the request of the 2nd Battalion, the 1st consented to abandon the custom in order to preserve them.

The central design is the usual wreath with the figure 1 in the centre surrounded by the words "Goorka Light Infantry." Above and below the wreath respectively the honours "Aliwal" and "Subraon" are embroidered on the silk. Above "Aliwal" is "Bhurtpore" (granted only in 1874) embroidered on a separate piece of silk sewn on later. Similarly, below "Subraon" there has been added "Afghanistan 1878-80." The poles of these Colours are surmounted by a crowned lion on a crown.

In the Regimental Colour, instead of the centre being embroidered on a background of plain silk with a small union in the upper corner next to the pole, it is placed in the centre of a large cross of St. George, like the Naval White Ensign.* The Colours of 1863 were the last carried by the 1st Battalion. In 1889 they were ordered to be discontinued, but kept in regimental custody and not carried in the field or on parade. The 2nd Battalion never had any Colours, as they never had any but green uniform.

* This form of Regimental Colour is quite common in British Regiments.

APPENDIX V

UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT

Though changes in uniform and equipment have generally been mentioned as they occurred in the narrative, it seems desirable to collect the various alterations here in a consecutive note.

The original uniform, with its red cuffs, collars and trimmings, was laid down in the Commander-in-Chief's Orders of the 27th July 1815 already referred to.*

The G.O.C.C. of the 23rd May 1823 shows the accoutrements as being black instead of buff as in the Line regiments. The next change was made in September 1828.† That this change was actually carried out at the time is proved by the following extract from a bill sent to Captain C. P. Kennedy (the second Commandant of the Regiment) by a London tailor (Stultz, Housley & Stultz, 10, Clifford Street), dated 15th August 1829.

	£	s.	d.
" A superfine dark green S.B. Regimental jacket. Black velvet collar and cuffs richly trimmed with black Mohair Braid	20	10	0
Lined throughout with black silk	2	2	0
A superfine green uniform waistcoat, richly trimmed with black Mohair braid, silk back and lined thro' with silk	8	5	6
A pair green Regl. trousers, 2 stripes of black mohair braid down the sides	5	3	6
A dark green cloth forage cap with black lace band and braid	2	2	0
A Regimental sword	4	18	0
A patent leather sword belt, gilt furniture with tache and straps	3	10	0
A black leather sword knot	0	10	6
An extra steel scabbard	1	11	6
A black patent pouch with silver lion's head, whistle, chain and bugle on pouch	6	13	6
A regimental sash	3	10	0
An oilskin bag for sword	0	7	6
2 pair white buckskin gloves	0	14	0
2 black silk stocks	2	2	0
12 fine flannel waistcoats with long sleeves	14	8	0"

In 1842 one company received two-grooved rifles, in place of the old smooth-bore musket, and in 1844 the whole regiment received the new arm.

1849. It was ordered that the band woven into the dark blue Kilmarnock cap worn by the men was to be dark green instead of the white one worn by regiments with red uniform.

1850. The uniform was completely changed on the Nasiris succeeding the old 66th Native Infantry.

It was now the ordinary red uniform worn by Native Regiments of the Line, the facings being white.

1851. The bayonet was ordered to be carried on the waistbelt, instead of on a shoulder belt.

1852. Knee-caps issued to the men. Perhaps this was only a temporary equipment whilst the regiment was on a hill campaign.


1869. Zouave tunics with slashed cuffs, and serge pyjamas (in place of cloth trousers) were ordered.

* See p. 8.

† See p. 23. The Regimental records speak of this change being made only in 1844. Hence the importance of Captain Kennedy's bill as showing that for officers at any rate the change was made in 1828 or 1829.

1870. The summer clothing of the regiment was changed from "khaki" to white. Also, for European Officers, patent cork helmets covered with white cloth were introduced. Enfield rifles were received in November 1870.
1871. Entrenching tools (50 picks and 50 shovels) issued to the regiment in November.
1872. New pattern of spurs for European Officers. Also steel mounted short Enfield rifles with sword bayonets supplied in November, in place of brass mounted rifles issued in 1870.
1873. The summer uniform was again changed from white to "khaki."
1875. Regiment armed at Calcutta, with short Snider rifles with bayonets in exchange for Enfield rifles. The old pattern ball bags and cap pouches were also returned to store. In place of them were issued pouches for twenty rounds in the case of havildars and fifty rounds in the case of men.
1876. White leather sword knots introduced for Native officers.
1878. The new yoke accoutrements were supplied to the regiment at Montgomery on the 29th October as it moved for Southern Afghanistan.
1879. Native shoes were introduced in lieu of ammunition boots by Orders of 10th September from Simla. Commanding officers were directed "to shoe the troops in the manner best suited for efficiency." *
- Khaki blouses were ordered to be worn by the men during the campaign in Afghanistan, and on the return of the regiment the summer clothing was made up so as to admit of its being worn, if necessary, over the winter clothing.
1880. New badges for officers' helmets and men's forage caps were sanctioned. Above the bugle on the badge were crossed "Kukris" with the number of the regiment above them.
1883. Summer clothing once more made "Khaki."
1886. Change from red uniform to green (see p. 82).
1888. Regiment rearmed with Martini-Henry rifles.
1896. MacKenzie equipment substituted for old V.E. pattern.
1897. Aluminium water-bottles were introduced.
1901. Regt. rearmed with Lee-Enfield rifles.
1905. New badge with Prince of Wales' plume ordered, but pattern not actually sanctioned till July 1909.
1906. Re-armament with short Lee-Enfield rifle and new bandolier equipment.
1910. Badge changed to present form, but not actually approved as to design till February 1913.

* If we remember rightly this injunction was not always successfully carried out and there were stories, after the Delhi camp of exercise in 1885, of regiments marching past barefooted owing to their shoes having been lost in the mud.



To face p. 245.]

UNIFORMS.



UNIFORMS

1ST NUSSEREE BATTALION
1815

With minor changes as regards belts, this uniform continued to be worn until 1829, when the facings were changed from Red to Black.

1ST NUSSEREE BATTALION
Circa 1829

With certain minor changes, this uniform continued to be worn until 1850, when the Regiment ceased to be an Irregular Corps, and was brought into the Line as the 66th or Goorkha Regiment.

1ST NUSSEREE BATTALION
Circa 1829

A BRITISH OFFICER

With very minor changes this uniform continued to be worn until 1850, when the Regiment was transferred to the Line, as the 66th or Goorkha Regiment, and changed from Green to Red.

THE 66TH OR GOORKHA REGIMENT
Circa 1855

A BRITISH OFFICER.

The details of this plate are taken from a portrait of Lieutenant Thomas Sydney Gepp, of the 66th or Goorkha Regiment, who died of wounds, received in action, on the 10th February, 1858, at Charpura, near Haldwani, against the Rebels of the Rohilcund.

UNIFORMS

**1ST GOORKHA REGIMENT
(LIGHT INFANTRY)
*Circa 1868***

The cap-badge only dates from 1861, when the Regiment ceased to be the 66th or Goorkha Regiment.

The jacket or tunic probably dates from 1850, when the old Nusseree Battalion was brought into the Line in place of the disaffected 66th Native Infantry, as the 66th or Goorkha Regiment.

This Tunic was replaced in 1869 by a Zouave tunic, as shown in the next plate.

**1ST GOORKHA REGIMENT
(LIGHT INFANTRY)
*Circa 1880***

The tunic and pyjamas were introduced in 1869, and the cap-badge in 1880.

The dress continued to be worn until 1886, when the uniform was changed from Red to Green.

Martini-Henry Rifles were not introduced until 1888 and it is evident that the picture painted by Lieutenant Martin, from which this plate was taken, was painted **AFTER** the uniform had ceased to be worn.

**1ST GOORKHA RIFLES
A GOORKHA OFFICER
*Circa 1900***

This uniform was introduced with the change from Red to Green when the Regiment again became a Rifle Regiment and continued to be worn without material change until the outbreak of the Great War.

Goorkha Officers did not wear gloves, but owing to Captain Barry's tragic death, before the sketch could be altered, it has been decided to leave the plate as it was left by him and add this note of explanation.

**1ST GOORKHA RIFLES
A RIFLEMAN
*Circa 1913***

In 1886 the uniform was changed from Red to Green and in 1891 the title of the Regiment was altered from Light Infantry to Rifles.

The scarlet facings were granted to commemorate the discarded scarlet uniform.

With but little change this uniform continued to be worn down to the outbreak of the Great War. After that date, in common with other full-dress uniform, it ceased to be manufactured and so in a few years ceased to exist.

UNIFORMS.

[To face p. 24b.]



APPENDIX VI

THE PENSION LINES—DHARMSALA

The precise date on which these lines were started is a matter of some uncertainty. It was stated in a petition of the residents in the Dharmsala lines that they were demarcated in 1878; but no documentary evidence of this can be traced. What seems certain is that they were finally brought into being during the command of Colonel Rowley Sale-Hill, between 1879 and 1882, and mainly owing to the personal interest taken by him in them. He appears to have had the lines demarcated and to have framed rules for their administration. They had probably already begun to grow in a haphazard way, as is common in Indian Cantonments, without leaving any written traces. The earliest document in existence is a set of rules marked "corrected up to 1900."

The object aimed at was to provide land on which poor pensioners could erect small houses in which to end their days with the regiment in which they had served. Such houses were to be passed on by sale, will, or deed of gift to other pensioners, and it was never contemplated that a house erected by a pensioner should pass from father to son, or to an outsider, irrespective of whether the subsequent owner was a pensioner or not. The rules laid down that the land was absolutely reserved for pensioners of the 1st Gurkhas, but later copies of the rules merely prescribed that preference was to be given to such pensioners. As time passed, irregularities crept in, the original boundaries of the lines were over-stepped, and individual retired Gurkha officers acquired more than one house, which they let out to poorer pensioners. In other cases, the houses passed, on the death of the original owner, to sons or other relatives still serving in the regiment, who let them to pensioners. In one case it was discovered that a man who was neither a Gurkha nor a soldier had owned a large house within the lines before they were demarcated. At the time of the original demarcation the 1st Battalion was quartered near them in Lower Dharmsala. It was after the battalion moved to Upper Dharmsala, at a distance of five miles from them, where the old close supervision could not be exercised, that most of the irregularities began to creep in.

In the early part of 1911 the Officer Commanding at Dharmsala, who had hitherto controlled the Pension Lines, yielded his position, in accordance with Government sanction, to the Civil authorities, who have since then administered the lines.

Rules were passed entirely on the old military model but adapted to modern needs. Very generous terms were granted to owners who were not pensioners, or who owned houses which they did not want to occupy.

The Gurkha who desires to settle in the vicinity of Dharmsala—the most popular of the Gurkha hill stations as regards the Gurkha ranks—finds it very difficult to purchase land to build on elsewhere than in the Pension Lines. Prices have risen abnormally. Therefore, the Pension Lines, administered sympathetically as has been done by the Civil Authorities, meets a real need.

About 1911 the idea of extending the lines was mooted, but was finally vetoed by the Forest Department which was compelled to intervene on the ground of the difficulties, common to all hill stations, of the supply of fuel if the forest were further encroached on. Any addition to the lines would have involved cutting of the pine forest which adjoins them on the only side on which extension is possible.

APPENDIX VII

Correspondence regarding fixing the Homes of the
1ST, 2ND, 3RD and 4TH Gurkhas in 1864

Letter from the Secretary to Government of India to Q.M.G., No. 692, dated 18th March 1864

In continuation of my telegram, I am directed to acquaint you that the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General in Council sanctions the retention of the lines at Dehra by the families of the 2nd Goorkha Regiment during the absence of the corps, as His Excellency in Council considers it very desirable—looking to the different circumstances in which recruits from Nepal entering our service find themselves, as compared with other races—that each of the four Goorkha Regiments should have a station peculiarly its own, at which it should usually be stationed, though liable, of course, to removal anywhere, and at any time, for active service, or for a tour of regular duty either at Peshawar or at any other station where it may be considered desirable to have a regiment composed of that class.

2nd. On these occasions of absence the families will be able to remain in quiet occupation of the lines, as heretofore, until the Regiment returns.

Copy of a Letter No. 1657—General, dated Simla the 13th May 1864, from the Quartermaster-General in India to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department

I am directed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief with reference to your dispatch No. 692 dated 18th March last, preparatory to informing the different Goorkha Regiments of the Government boon therein granted, to urge that it be distinctly understood, to prevent future misunderstanding, that the localities of the existing Cantonment Lines in which they are now located, be given over to the respective corps in perpetuity as their Homes.

2. That regular sub-division Sepoy Barracks be constructed entirely separate from such Goorkha villages for the obvious reason, that although as far as practicable it is the desire of Government to locate these troops generally in their own Homes, yet it may be found convenient, from at present unforeseen causes, to locate temporarily in such positions troops of a different race, in which case, it would be found inconvenient to allow of a Corps claiming as a right the non-intervention of Government with the Homes granted to them: before affording to the Commanding Officer greater facility for maintaining discipline.

3. In this sense the Commander-in-Chief would solicit sanction for informing the 1st Goorkha Regiment that the Government have given them their present locality at Dharmsala as their Home, and that the Civil Authorities be directed to take necessary steps to secure the lands, etc., attached to the same for them; as also for the construction of sub-division barracks on a fresh site, either at Dharmsala or, as already recommended by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, at Dalhousie for the regiment.

4. That the same steps be taken with regard to the 2nd Goorkha Regiment at Dehra, only that no barracks need be constructed until the return of the regiment from its tour of duty in the Peshawar Division.

5. That the 3rd Goorkhas in the next relief return to Almora as they have many of their lands there, and have inter-married with the Kumaonies, and that entirely separate barracks be established as their cantonment.

6. That the 4th Goorkhas be informed that their Homes will be on suitable ground pointed out and given over by the Civil Authorities in the neighbourhood of Pochree, but entirely distinct from the cantonment where the Corps itself will be located in barracks.

*Copy of Letter from the Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, to the Q.M.G.
No. 424 dated 29th June 1864.*

1. I am directed to acknowledge your letter No. 1657, dated 13th May 1864, conveying the wish of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that before communicating to the several Goorkha Regiments the decision of the Government announced in this Dept. Letter No. 692, of 18th March 1864, it may be distinctly understood that the localities of the existing cantonment lines in which the Corps are now located be given over to them in perpetuity as their homes.

2. His Excellency also expresses his wish that regular sub-divisional sepoy barracks be constructed entirely separate from such Goorkha villages.

3. I am to acquaint you for the information of the Commander-in-Chief that the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General in Council sanctions the present lines being considered as belonging to the Regiments in perpetuity, and his Excellency in Council sanctions the erection of lines as proposed by Sir Hugh Rose for a Native Regiment in the immediate neighbourhood of the existing Goorkha lines.

4. I am to request that it may be explained to each Corps in the clearest possible manner, so as to leave no chance of a misunderstanding hereafter that the Goorkha Regiments are liable to be taken away from the stations allotted to them whenever Govt. may see fit to do so, and that they are liable to be kept away as long as it may be convenient to Govt. to keep them away, and that this may be necessary in time of peace as well as in time of war, but that they will always eventually return to their own stations, and that during their absence their families will remain in their homes.

5. I am, however, to dwell on the fact that in assigning these lines as homes, it is not contemplated by Govt. to grant more than this. It is not intended to give free grants of land for cultivation or to form a rent-free settlement in the more extended sense of the term.

6. On these points being clearly explained to the men of these Regiments the Rt. Hon. the Gov. Genl. in Council is pleased to approve of the Communications which His Excey. proposes to the Regiments to the following extent: "That the 1st Regiment will have its home at Dharmsala, with its lines in that neighbourhood. That the 2nd Regiment will be similarly situated at Dehra, and the 3rd Regiment at Almora.

The location of the 4th Regiment will be hereinafter decided upon."

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
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